B. Rama Krishna Reddy Vs S.B.S.Y.M. Degree College and Others <BR> Sri Bala Siva Yogendra Maharaj, Secretary and Correspondent, S.B.S.Y.M. Degree College Vs Commissioner of Collegiate Education and Others <BR> B. Ramakrishna Reddy Vs Sri Balasivayogendra Maharaj, Correspondent/Secretary/President, S.B.S.Y.M. Degree College

@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER

S.R. Nayak, J.@mdashIn Writ Petition No. 20222 /1994 the petitioner is one B. Ramakrishna Reddy, Lecturer in Economics in the first respondent S.B.S.Y.M. Degree College, Mydukur in Cuddapah district. In this writ petition, he seeks for a declaration that the inaction of the Management of the first respondent College in not implementing the orders of the Regional Joint Director of Higher Education (2nd respondent) and that of the Commissioner of Collegiate Education (3rd respondent) datedll-2-1994 and 8-4-1994 respectively as illegal improper, arbitrary and opposed to principles of natural justice and a consequential direction to the first respondent-Management of the College to reinstate him into service with effect from24-7-1991 the date on which he was earlier removed by the Management with all consequential benefits attached to the post of Lecturer in Economics. Writ Petition No. 847 of 1995 filed by Sri Bala Siva Yogendra Maharaj is directed against the proceedings dated 8-4-1994 issued by the Commissioner of Collegiate Education, Hyderabad (third respondent) directing the Management of the College to implement the orders of the Regional Joint Director of Higher Education Cuddapah dated 11-2-1994. Contempt Case No. 48 of 1995 is filed by B. Ramakrishna Reddy complaining about deliberate disobedience of the interim order passed by this court on 27-12-1994 in W.P.M.P.No. 24959 of 1994 in W.P.No. 20222 of 1994. These two writ petitions and the contempt case are interconnected and arise from the same set of facts and circumstances. Therefore all these cases were clubbed and heard together and they have been disposed of by this common judgment.

2. The petition averments disclose that B. Ramakrishna Reddy was appointed as a Lecturer in Economics in the S. B. S. Y. M. Degree College on 18-9-1981 and he worked as such till 30-6-1983 and subsequently he was placed incharge of Principal of the College with effect from 1-7-1983 as the then Principal was tranferred to Kurnool. He worked as incharge Principal of the College till 1988. According to Ramakrishna Reddy there were certain disputes and misunderstanding between him and the Correspondent of the college namely Sri Bala Siva Yogendra Maharaj relating to collection of donations from the teaching and non-teaching staff of the College and from the citizens of the locality for purchase of land for the purpose of constructing a permanent building for the college in Mydukur. He made detailed reference to this aspect of the matter in para 3 of the Writ Petition No. 20222/1994. It is not necessary to consider the same in detail for the purpose of deciding these cases. According to Ramakrishna Reddy this misunderstanding and grouse entertained by the Correspondent of the College led to place him under suspension on 1-11-1987 on frivalous and untenable grounds. Ramakrishna Reddy filed an appeal against this action of the Correspondent u/s 80 of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982, herein after shortly referred to as ''the Act''. The Appellate Authority suspended the said order and directed the Correspondent to reinstate him into service. But the correspondent did not reinstate him into service despite repeated written requests in that regard. That brought Mr. Ramakrishna Reddy to this court by way of Writ Petition No. 14326/1989. This Court at the stage of admission itself directed the Correspondent to implement the order made by the Appellate Authority and reinstate Sri Ramakrishna Reddy into service. That also did not yield any result. Sri Ramakrishna Reddy filed Contempt Case No. 82/1990 in this court and in the said case this Court by its order dt.4-4-1991 directed Sri Ramakrishna Reddy to report for duty at the college office with the Mandal Revenue Officer and the Mandal Revenue Officer was directed to get the endorsement from the Correspondent or from the Principal of the College. The Mandal Revenue Officer, Mydukur was directed to submit a report to this Court. In pursuance of the order made by this Court on 4-4-1991 in C.C.No. 82/1990. Sri Ramakrishna Reddy reported for duty as Lecturer in Economics on 18-4-1991. This Court was constrained to make such an order because the Correspondent took the contention in the Contempt Case that after the Appellate Authority set aside the suspension and directed the Correspondent to reinstate Sri Ramakrishna Reddy into service. Sri Ramakrishna Reddy never turned up for reporting to duty whereas it was the case of Sri Ramakrishna Reddy that despite several requests both in writing and in person the Correspondent deliberately refused to permit him to report for duty as Lecturer in Economics.

3. The Correspondent again placed Sri Ramakrishna Reddy under suspension pending an enquiry by his proceedings dated 24-7-1991. Sri Ramakrishna Reddy filed Writ Petition No. 7214/1992 in this court. In the said writ petition the Correspondent filed counter contending that subsequently the services of the petitioner were terminated by proceedings dated 30-3-1992 after conducting a domestic enquiry. Therefore this Court disposed of that writ pentition on 13-7-1993 reserving liberty to Sri Ramakrishna Reddy to appeal against the order of termination dated 30-3-1992 issued by the Correspondent of the College and directing the Appellate Authority to entertain the appeal and dispose of the same in accordance with law expeditiously. In pursuance of the order of this court dated 13-7-1993 Sri Ramakrishna Reddy preferred an appeal against the orders dated 24-7-1991 and 30-3-1992 of the Correspondent of the College to the Regional Joint Director of Higher Education, Cuddapah mainly on the groud among other grounds that the Correspondent did not follow the procedure prescribed in Section 79(1) of the Act in passing the orders. The Regional Joint Director of Higher Education, Cuddapah set aside the said orders passed by the Correspondent and directed the Correspondent to reinstate Sri Ramakrishna Reddy into service as Lecturer in Economics with effect from the date of his removal from service by his order dated 11-2-1994.

4. Despite the order made by the Regional Joint Director of Higher Education, Cuddapah the Correspondent of the College did not implement the order. Therefore Sri Ramakrishna Reddy made a representation to the Commissioner of Collegiate Education, complaining about the disobedience of the order made by the Appellate Authority. The Commissioner of Collegiate Education considering the representation of Sri Ramakrishna Reddy by his proceedings dated 8-4-1994 directed the Secretary and the Correspondent of the College to implement the order of the Regional Joint Director of Higher Education, Cuddapah immediately. The Secretary and the Correspondent of the College was also informed that if he failed to comply with the order of the Appellate Authority necessary action would be intitiated against the Management as per the provisions of the Act. Inspite of these orders passed by the Regional Joint Director of Higher Education, Cuddapah and the Commissioner of Collegiate Education, the Secretary and the Correspondent of the College did not implement the orders. Under those circumstances Sri Ramakrishna Reddy filed Writ Petition No. 20222 of 1994 seeking the reliefs referred to above. This Writ Petition was filed on 14-11-1994 and this Court issued rule nisi on 16-11-1994 and ordered notice On W.P.M.P.No. 24959/1994 returnable in four weeks. In W.P.M.P. No. 24959 /1994. Sri Ramakrishna Reddy sought for an interim direction to implement the orders made by the Regional Joint Director for Higher Education dated 11-2-1994 and the order made by the Commissioner of Collegiate Education dated 8-4-1994. This Court after service of notice, on 27-12-1994 passed the following interim order in W.P.M.P. No. 24959/1994:

"The Petitioner is seeking a direction to the first respondent which is a Private Aided Educational Institution to implement the order made by the Joint Director of Higher Education Cuddapah Region, Cuddapah on 11-2-1994 setting aside the suspension order passed by the 1st respondent Management as well as the termination and directing the 1st respondent to reinstate the petitioner into service as lecturer in Economics from the date of his removal from service. The petitioner complains that despite the lapse of more than ten months the 1st respondent did not reinstate the petitioner for the reasons best known to him. It is also submitted that the order made by the Regional Joint Director has become final. It is also submitted that even the Government and the Commissioner for Education have also directed the 1st respondent to reinstate the petitioner into service as Lecturer in Economics. There is absolutely no justification for the 1st respondent to sleep over the matter without complying with the direction. A prima facie case is made out. Accordingly, W.P.M.P.No. 24959 of 1994 is ordered and the 1st respondent is directed to reinstate the petitioner within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order."

5. After the this Court passed the interim order on 27-12-1994 in W.P.M.P.NO.24959 of 1994 in W.P.No. 20222 of 1994 the Correspondent presented Writ Petition No. 847 of 1995 in this court on 18-1-1995. The Correspondent did not implement/obey the interim order made by this court on 27-12-1994 in W.P.M.P.N0.24959 of 1994. Therefore Sri Ramakrishna Reddy filed Contempt Case No. 48 of 1995 in this court on 2-2-1995 complaining about the disobedience of the interim order by the Correspondent of the College and praying the Court to initiate contempt proceedings against the contemnor the Secretary and Correspondent of the College.

6. Smt. S. Rekha Prasad, the learned Counsel appearing for Sri S. Ramakrishna Reddy, the petitioner in W.P.No. 20222 of 1994 firstly submitted that the order dated 11-2-1994 passed by the Regioal Joint Director for Higher Education, Cuddapah who is the prescribed Appellate Authority u/s 80 of the Act has become final in the absence of any challenge to it and therefore the Correspondent/Secretary is under an obligation to implement the order of the Appellate Authority. The learned counsel also submitted mat added to the direction issued by the Appellate Authority even the Commissioner of Collegiate Education by his proceedings dated 8-4-1994 has directed the Correspondent to implement the order of the Appellate Authority failing which he would initiate necessary proceedings under the provisions of the Act The learned Counsel also submitted that because the order made by the Appellate Authority on 11-2-1994 remained unchallenged this court also by its order dated 27-12-1994 passed in W.P.M.P.No. 24959 of 1994 in W.P.No. 20222 of 1994 directed the Correspondent to reinstate Sri Ramakrishna Reddy within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. Under these circumstances the learned Counsel would maintain that a prima facie case is made out of the reliefs sought in W.P.No. 20222 of 1994.

7. Smt. S. Rekha Prasad, the learned counsel while making her submission in C.C.No. 48/1995 would submit that despite a clear direction issued by this court on 27-12-1994 in W.P.M.P.No. 24959 of 1995 to reinstate Sri Ramakrishna Reddy into service within a week from the date of receipt of a copy of the order, the Correspondent deliberately and intentionally did not implement the direction and has the audacity to tell the Court in his counter that he has not committed any contempt and the contempt action initiated by Sri Ramakrihna Reddy is unfounded and baseless. The only reason given in the counter filed on behalf of the Correspondent in the contempt case is that he filed an application seeking vacation of the interim order granted by this court on 27-12-1994 and the said application is not yet decided. The learned counsel would maintair that mere filing of an appeal or filing an application seeking vacation of the interim order is not a justifiable ground to disobey the lawful order made by this court and in that view of the matter a clear case is made out to punish the Correspondent of the College under the provisions of the Contempt of the Courts Act, 1971 read with Articles 215 and 227 of the Constitution of India and the Rules framed there under.

8. Sri B. V. Subbaiah, the learned senior counsel appearing for the Correspondent-pentitioner in W.P.No. 847 of 1995 contended that the order dated 11-2-1994 passed by the Regional Joint Director of Higher Education, Cuddapah is totally violative of principles of natural justice and the provisions of Section 80(2) of the Act and therefore a nullity in the eye of law. The order made by the Commissioner of Collegiate Education dated 8-4-1994 is only a consequential order in pursuance of the order made by the Appellate Authority dated 11-2-1994 and therefore that order is also bad in law. When the Court pointed out that the Correspondent of the College has not questioned the legality and validity of the order dated 11-2-1994 made by the Regional Joint Director of Higher Education, Cuddapah who is the prescribed Appellate Authority u/s 80 of the Act Sri B. V. Subbaiah, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that though in the prayer in W.P.No. 847/95 the petitioner sought for quashing the proceedings of the Commissioner of Collegiate Education dated 8-4-1994, the actual attack, as could be seen from the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ petition, is against the order made by the Appellate Authority dated 11-2-1994 and therefore simply because there is no prayer to quash the order made by the Appellate Authority dated 11-2-1994 and on such a technical ground the Writ Petition should not be dismissed. At this stage Smt. S. Rekha Prasad intervened and maintained that the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Correspondent noted above is untenable and factually incorrect. Smt. S. Rekha Prasad, the learned counsel would alternetively submit that even assuming that the writ petition filed by the Correcpondent is virtually directed against the order made by the Appellate Authority dated 11-2-1994 even then the Writ petition as presented cannot be entertained and the order of the Appellate Authority dated 11-2-1994 cannot be permitted to be reviewed in the absence of any application for amendment of the pleadings or amendment of the prayer. In support of this submission the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Prabodh Verma and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, . The learned Counsel further contended that the Correspondent cannot be permitted to bypass statutory remedy available to him under Sce. 81 of the Act. u/s 81 of the Act a further appeal lies to the Government against an order made by the Appellate Authority u/s 80 of the Act and the Correspondent for the reasons best known to him has not exhausted that remedy and has approached this Court directy challenging only the consequential order made by the Commissioner of Collegiate Education dated 8-4-1994. Therefore W.P.No. 847of 1995 filed by the Correspondent, according to the learned Counsel, is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine for not exhausting the alternative statutory remedy u/s 81 of the Act. In support of this submission the learned Counsel placed reliacne on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. and Others, .; Champalal Binani Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal and Others, . Lastly Smt. Rekha Prasad contended that assuming that the Correspondent has made out an exception not to exhaust the alternative statuory remedy and to approach this Court directly, even then there is inordinate delay in approaching this Court. The learned Counsel would point out that the Appellate Authority made the order on 11-2-1994 and at any rate the Correspondent was aware of this order of the Appellate Authority well before 16-2-1994 itself whereas Writ Petition No. 847 of 1995 was filed in this Court only on 18-1-1995 and there is absolutely no explanation for this inordinate delay in approaching this Court. The learned Counsel would submit that the Correspondent thought of filing the writ petition on 18-1-1995 only after this Court granted interim order on 27-12-1994 in W.P.M.P.No. 24959/1994 in W.P.NO. 20222/1994.

9. In view of the contentions placed before the Court by the learned Counsel for the parties it becomes necessary in the first instance, to consider the question whether W.P.No. 847 of 1995 filed by the Correspondent of the College should be entertained or the same should be dismissed without going into the merits of the case for non-exhaustion of alternative remedy available to the Correspondent u/s 81 of the Act. Ordinarily, avilability of an adequate and efficacious alternative legal remedy is a ground for the Court to decline to exerceise its writ jurisdiction, but this principle does not apply to the enforcement of Fundemental Rights either under Article 32 or under Article 226 of the Constitution. In W.P.No. 847 of 1995 the petitioners-Correspondent has not alleged any violation Fundamenal Right nor sought enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights. Therefore this case does not come under the said exception. Where no Fundamental Right is involved, normally speaking, the High Courts would not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 when an alternative, adequate and efficacious legal remedy is available and the petitioner has not availed of the same before coming to the High Courts. Article 226 is silent on this point; it does not say so in so many words anything about this matter, but the Courts have themselves evolved this rule as a kind of selfimposed restriction on their writ jurisdiction under Article 226. This rule of nonexhaustion of alternative remedy as a ground for not entertaining writ petitions, has been justified on the ground that persons should not be encouraged to circumvent the provisions made by a statute providing for a mechanism and procedure to challenge administrative or statutory action taken thereunder. The Courts have also stressed the point that the remedy under Article 226 being discretionary, the High Courts should refuse to grant a writ if it is satisfied that the petitioner could have an adequate alternative or suitable remedy or relief elsewhere. However, to this rule there are certain exceptions. The first exception, as pointed out supra, is enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Added to this exception which is unexceptionable, in certain circumstances, the High Courts may entertain writ petitions filed by the parties by passing statutory or other alternative remedies if the High Court is of the opinion that the remedy provided elsewhere is not adequate but illusory and it involves inordinate delay. The Court may also entertain the writ petitions directly without exhaustion of alternative remedy where the order complained of is one without jurisdiction or one made in violation of principles of natural justice.

10. In the present case the prescribed Appellate Authority u/s 80 of the Act made the order on 11-2-1994. Against this order an appeal lies to the Government u/s 81 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 81 of the Act provides that any employee or the management aggrieved by an order of the competent authority under sub-section (2) of Section 80, may appeal to the Government within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. It is not the Case of the Correspondent that there is no appeal against the order made by the first Appellate Authority. Sri B. V. Subbaiah, the learned senior counsel would contend that the order made by the first Appellate Authority on 11-12-1994 is in violation of principles of natural justice as well as the provisions. of the proviso to Section 80(2) (d) of the Act. Sections 80 and 81 of the Act read as under:

"80.Appeal against orders of punishment imposed on employees of private institutions:

(1) Any employee who is dismissed/removed or reduced in rank may prefer an appeal against the order to the competent authority within thirty days of the receipt of order by him.

(2) The competent authority shall not interface with the order appealed against unless the order is vitiated on any one or more of the following grounds namely:-

(a) that there is no material to substanciate the charge or charges framed against the employee; or

(b) that the authority who passed the order acted with bias or mala fides; or

(c) that the of order is perverse or arbitrary; or

(d) that no reasonable opportunity has been afforded to the employee to prove his innocence;

Provided that the competent authority shall not pass any order prejudicial to the management unless an opprotunity of making a representation is given.

(3) The competent authority may, after giving notice to the management of the private institution, pass such interim orders as it deems fit, pending disposal of the appeal under sub-section (2), if it is satisfied that the employee has made out a prima facie case for interference.

(4) In respect of an order imposing any penalty as laid down in Sub-section (5) of Section 79 an appeal shall lie to the District Educational Officer having jurisdiction and in respect of such appeals the order appealed against shall not be set aside except on the grounds specified in sub- section (2)

81. Appeal to Government:

(1) Any employee or the management aggrieved by an order of the competent authority under sub-section (2) of Section 80, may appeal to the Government within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order.

(2) Where an appeal preferred under sub-section (1) of Section 80 has not been disposed of by the competent authority within nine days from the date the appeal was preferred, it shall be competent for the Government either suo motu or on application, to withdraw the appeal from the competent authority and dispose of the same.

(3) The powers exercisable and procedure to be followed by the Government acting under this section shall be the same as that of the competent authority u/s 80."

11. The argument of Sri B. V. Subbaiah, the learned Senior Counsel is that the Management and the Principal of the College did receive notice sent by the Appellate Authority u/s 80 (3) of the Act, and service of notice under sub- section (3) of Section 80 of the Act, according to the learned Counsel, is not sufficient. Sri Subbaiah, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that in addition to the notice sent by the Appellate Authority under sub-section (sic) at Section 80 of the Act relating to the interim orders made by it, in the event of the Appellate Authority finally deciding to make any order prejudicial to the Management, it should have sent one more notice to the Management as required under the proviso to Section 80(2) (d); This argument of the learned Senior Counsel is not acceptable to the Court. Sub-section (1) of Section 80 of the Act provides that an aggrieved employee can make an appeal. Sub-section (2) of Section 80 mentions the grounds on the basis of which the Appellate Authority will interfere with the order made by the Management. Proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 80 provides that the Appellate Authority shall not pass any order prejudicial to the management unless an opportunity of making a representation is given. Therefore it is necessary that before the Appellate Authority passes any order prejudicial to the management, the management should be notified and given an opprotunity to have its say in the matter. Added to this requirement, sub-section (3) of Section 80 provides that after giving notice to the management, the Appellate Authority may pass such interim orders as it deems fit pending disposal of the appeal. Admission of appeal u/s 80 of the Act is automatic, and it is not left to the discretion of the Appellate Authority. Once the aggrieved employee presents an appeal under sub-section (1) of Section 80 of the Act that appeal has to be heard on merits by the Appellate Authority. Therefore, there is no question of the Appellate Authority dismissing the main appeal filed by an aggrieved employee, at the stage of admission itself or after passing some interlocutory orders. In this case since the Management was served with notice in respect of an interim order made by the Appellate Authority by virtue of the power granted to him under Sub-section (3) of Section 80 of the Act, the Management ought to have known that the aggrieved employee had filed the appeal and the same was pending. If the management wanted to contest the appeal it had notice as well as it had opportunity to go before the Appellate Authority and contest the same. For the reasons best known to the Correspondent he did not appear before the Appellate Authotrity and the appeal of Sri Ramakrishna Reddy was decided ex parte. The submission of Sri B. V. Subbaiah, the learned Senior Counsel that the Correspondent-Secretary was expecting one more notice from the Appellate Authority under the proviso to Section 80 (2) (d) is not at all convicing nor was it a requirement of law. Therefore it should be held that the Appellate Authority made the order dated 11-2-1994 not in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Correspondent, therefore, cannot contend that there is an exception to the "rule of non-exhaustion of alternative remedies" to approach this court directly under Article 226 of the Constitution bypassing the statutory remedy available to him u/s 81 of the Act. At this stage it may also be noted that even in a case where an order is made or an action is taken in violation of principles of natural justice or without notice, it is not the invariable rule that the High Courts should entertain writ petitions filed by the aggrieved parties without exhausting the alternative efficacious statutory remedies. In a given case the question whether a writ petition filed in the High Court without exhausting the alternative remedy should be entertained or not is left to the discretion of the High Court and there is no vested right in any party to approach this Court under Article 226 without exhausting the alternative remedies in the event of an order is made or action is taken in violation of principles of natural justice.

12. Sri B. V. Subbayya placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay Vs. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani and Another, in support of his submission. That decision is not at all helpful to the Correspondent. In that case the Apex Court held that the rule that the party who applies for the issue of a high prerogative writ should, before he approaches the Court, have exhausted the other remedies open to him under the law is not one which bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petition or to deal with it, but is rather a self-imposed rule which Courts have laid down in the exercise of their discretion. The Apex Court further proceeded to observe that the wide proposition that the existence of an alternative remedy is a bar to the entertainment of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution unless (1) there was a complete lack of jurisdiction in the officer or authority to take the action impugned or (2) where the order prejudicial to the writ petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and could, therefore, be treatd as void or non est and that in all other cases. Courts should not entertain petitions under Article 226, or in any event not grant any relief to such petitioners cannot be accepted. The Apex Court pointed out that the said two exceptions to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy are by no means exhaustive, and even beyond them a discretion vests in the High Court to entertain the petition and grant the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. Therefore, according to this decision of the Apex Court the question whether in a given case a writ petition should be entertained or not notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy is left to the discretion of the court.

13. In this case admittedly Section 81 (1) provides for an appeal to the Government and the appeal has to be filed by the management within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. I have pointed out that atleast on 16-2-1994 itself the Correspondent had the knowledge of the order made by the first Appellate Authority. The Correspondent cannot plead ignorance of period of limitation prescribed under sub-section (1) of Section 81 of the Act for filing the appeal. It is not that within the said period of limitation without filing appeal to the Government, he filed the writ petiiton in this Court. In other words the Correspondent completely ignored the order made by the first Appellate Authority nearly for a year despite the fact that the Commissioner of Collegiate Edcuation directed him to implement the order made by the Appellate Authority. The writ petition was filed in this Court on 18-1-1995 only after this court passed the interim order on 27-12-1994 in W.P.M.P. No. 24959/94 in W.P.No. 20222 of 1994. Added to this in this writ petition also the order made by the Appelate Authority is not challenged. These writ petitions and the Contempt case were heard on several occasions and this fact was pointed out by the Court to the learned Senior Counsel. No steps were taken to amend the writ petition so as to challenge the order made by the Appellate Authority dated 11-2-1994. The Supreme Court in Probodh Verma and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (1 supra) in the context of a challenge to an ordinance as unconstitutional by issuance of a writ of certiorari observed as follows:

"A writ of certiorari or a writ in the nature of certiorari cannot be issued for declaring an Act or an Ordinance as unconstitutional or void. A writ of certbrari or a writ in the nature of certiorari can only be issued by the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution and a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to direct inferior Courts, Tribunals or authorities to transmit to the Court the record of proceedings pending therein for scrutiny and, if necessary, for quashing the same."

In that case it was the petitioner''s contention that the Ordinance in question was unconstitutional and the petitioner sought for writ of certiorar: while challenging the constitutional validity of the Ordinance. The Apex Court found fault with the High Court and held that the High Court ought not to have proceeded to hear and disposed of the writ petition without insisting upon the petitioners amending the writ petition to seek writ of mandamus and prayer for proper reliefs, namely, seeking a declaration to the effect that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and any consequential reliefs if any. Therefore in this case on the basis of oral submission made by the learned Counsel for the Correspondent that W.P.No.847/95 is virtually directed against the order of the Appellate Authority dt. 11-2-1994 this Court cannot proceed to review the said order in the absence of the amendment of the writ petition and the prayer. Even otherwise the writ petition cannot be entertained for want of exhaustion of a statutory alternative remedy provided u/s 81 (1) of the Act.

14. The Supreme Court in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and Another Vs. State of Orissa and Others, held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority, a second appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statutory machinery. Subsequently, echoing the same the Supreme Court in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Limited and Ors. (2 supra) observed as under in para 3 of the Judgment:

"Art. 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of the public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Art, 2.26 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged."

15. At this juncture we may also usefully refer to what the Apex Court has to say in para 5 of the judgment in Champalal Binani v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal and Ors. (3 supra) in the context of the petitioner therein not availing of an alternative statutory remedy under the provisions of Income Tax Act, 1922. The Court observed as under in para 5 of the judgment:

"Before parting with the case we deem it necessary once more to emphasize that the Income Tax Act provides a complete and ''selfcontained machinery for obtaining relief against improper action taken by the departmental authorities, and normally the party feeling himself aggrieved by such action cannot be permitted to refuse to have recourse to that machinery and to approach the High Court directly against the action. The assessee had an adequate remedy under the Income Tax Act which he could have availed of."

In the instant case also the Act provides a complete and self-contained machinery for obtaining relief against improper action taken by the Management of the educational institutions or the orders made by the first Appellate Authorities under Sec,80 of the Act. No good ground is shown by the Correspondent of the college to bypass the statutory remedy u/s 81(1) of the Act. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel Sri B.V.Subbaiah that since the dispute between the parties was seized by this Court in W.P. No. 20222 of 1994 the Correspondent filed the writ petition directly in this Court bypassing statutory remedy is not at all acceptable to the Court nor tenable. W.P.No. 20222 of 1994 was filed in this Court on 14-11-1994 and in mat writ petition Sri Ramakrishna Reddy was seeking enforcement of the order madeby the first Appellate Authority dated 11-2-1994. As per the limitation prescribed under sub-section (1) of Section 81 of the Act the Correspondent ought to have filed the appeal within 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. Even otherwise, there is inordinate and unexplained delay in approaching this Court. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case the Court is inclined to think that even this writ petition might not have been filed by the Correspondent but for the interim order granted by this Court on 27-12-1994 in W-P.M-P.No. 24959/94/ in W.P.No. 20222/1994. Added to all these lapses, an undisputed circumstance should be noted. Sri Ramakrishna Reddy was suspended and subsequenly removed by the Management of the college in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 79 of the Act, Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 79 of the Act provides that no order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank shall be passed under the sub-section against an employee without prior approval of such authority or officer as may be prescribed. It is the specific contention of Sri Ramakirshna Reddy that the suspension order as well as the termination order were passed by the Management of the college without obtaining prior approval of the prescribed educational authorities and his contention is not dispued seriously or at any rate materials are (not) placed before the Court to show that such prior approval was obtained before the impugned orders were passed. Looking from any angle I do not find any justification to entertain the writ petition No. 847/95. The order made by the Appellate Authority as far back as on 11 -2-1994 as well as the order made by the Commissioner of Collegiate Education dated 8-4-1994 remain nonimplemented and disobeyed. Added to this even the interim directions issued by this Court on 27-12-1994 in W.P.M.P.No. 24959/1994 in W.P.No. 20222/94 also remains disobeyed. The petitioner Sri Ramakrishna Reddy is seeking a declaration that the inaction of the Management in implementing the lawful orders made by the statutory authority is illegal and arbitrary and consequently a direction to reinstate him into service. Therefore, a prima facie case is made out to allow the writ petition and to grant the relief sought by him.

16. This takes us to the contempt case C.C.No.48/95. As already pointed out the complaint in this contempt case is that the order made by this Court on 27-12-94 in W.P.M.P.N6.24959/94 in W.P.20222/94 is deliberately and intentionally disobeyed by the respondent-Correspondent of the College and therefore he is guilty of contempt of Court and therefore the complainant has sought for taking action against him under the provisions of Article 215 read with the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the Rules framed there under. The respondent Correspondent has filed a counter in the contempt case. The only defence put forth in the counter for not complying with the order made by this Court is that he has filed an application seeking vacation of the order made by this Court on 27-12-1994 and the said application is not yet decided. That is the only ground /defence. I have carefully read the averments in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the contemnor. It totally lacks in interospection and bon fide. The language employed in the counter-affidavit is assertive as if he has not done any wrong against the order made by this Court. Further, there are certain statements in the counter-affidavit which are in my considered opinion are misleading. The order made by this Court on 27-12-1994 directs the Correspondent to reinstate Sri Ramakrishna Reddy into service within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The offence of contempt was complete immediately when the breach had occurred. In the contempt application it is stated that Sri Ramakrishna Reddy sent a representation to the Correspondent along with copy of the order made by this Court on 27-12-1994 by registered post with acknowledgment due on 12-1-1995 requesting the latter to comply with the order. Sri Ramakrishna Reddy again on 23-1-1995 represented in person to the Principal to reinstate him and also gave written representation enclosing an order copy. But the Principal refused to receive the same on the plea that he had no instructions from the respondent- Correspondent. Another representation along with the copy of the order was again sent by registered post on 24-1-1995 to the Correspondent and the same was returned unserved with a postal endorsement "Refused to take. Hence returned to the sender". This clearly goes to show that the respondent- Correspondent has no respect for the orders made by this Court and that he has been deliberately and intentionally disobeying the order made by this Court.

17. The only favourite explanation offered in the counter-affidavit is that he had filed an application seeking vacation of the interim direction issued by this Court and the said application is not yet heard and decided. It is now well settled law that in a case where a party against whom an order is passed is genuinely aggrieved and desires to adopt further proceedings that appropriate time for this purpose must be sought from the Court which has passed the order or from the Appeal Court. This presupposes the fact that such an application for stay of the order or for time to file an Appeal or to consider its position must be made and orders obtained thereon from the Court that has passed the order. In other words in the absence of the order being stayed or extension of time being obtained either for considering one''s position or implementing the order, it shall be no defence to state mat the application filed by him was pending. Therefore pendency of the application filed by the respondent-Correspondent seeking vacation of the interim order is not a legally permissible defence to disobey the order made by this Court. Therefore a prima facie case is made out to hold that the respondent is guilty of contempt of the Court. However taking into account the totality of circumstances I think that ends of justice will be met by awarding exemplary costs to the petitioner.

18. In the result and for the foregoing reasons I make the following

Common Order

(i) Writ Petition No. 20222/94 is allowed with costs. Advocate''s fee Rs. 1500/-. A writ of mandamus shall issue to the first respondent to reinstate the petitioner into service as Lecturer in Economics within a week from today. It is also held and declared that the petitioner is entitled to all pecuniary and other benefits flowing from the order made by the second respondent dated 11-2-1994 u/s 80(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act, 1982 with effect from 24-7-1991. It is further directed that the first respondent shall pay all arrears of salary and allowances attached to the post of Lecturer in Economics and payable to the petitioner with effect from 24-7-1991 within a period of one month from today.

(ii) W.P.No. 847/95 is dismissed with costs. Advocate''s fee Rs. 1500/-. Costs shall be paid to the third respondent within a period of one month from today.

(iii) Contempt Case No. 48/95 is disposed of discharging Form I Notice but directing the respondent-Contemnor to pay exemplory costs quantified at Rs. 5000 / - to the petitioner within two weeks from today.