@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
L. Narasimha Reddy, J.@mdashThis batch of revisions arises out of a batch of Rent Control Appeals, being R.C.A. Nos. 14 to 21 of 2012, pending in the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam. The appeals, in turn, were filed against the orders, dated 29.08.2012, passed by the Court of Rent Controller-cum-IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, in R.C.C. Nos. 41 of 2007 and 49 of 2008 and certain applications filed u/s 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short ''the Act''), in those two eviction petitions. In fact, the proceedings of such large number are between one landlord and his tenant, in respect of only one item of property. The history of the litigation, up to this stage, is as under:
2. The petitioner is the owner of premises, bearing No. 51-1-2, Sithammadhara, Visakhapatnam, situated in an area of Acs. 2.78 cents with 30,000 square feet built up area thereon. He leased the premises to the respondents for a period of 33 years under a lease deed, dated 30.03.1973 for establishment of the office and press of a News Paper. Initially, the rent was Rs. 2,500/-, per month, and after some time, it was enhanced to Rs. 3,000/-, per month, in terms of the lease deed.
3. Stating that the lease between them came to an end by afflux of time on 31.03.2007, and the respondents committed default in payment of rent for the months of April, May and June, 2007, the petitioner filed R.C.C. No. 41 of 2007, u/s 10 of the Act. He has also filed I.A. No. 106 of 2007 u/s 11 of the Act, with a prayer to direct the respondents to deposit the rents, and in default, to strike off the defence. On receipt of notice in the I.A., the respondents deposited a sum of Rs. 18,000/-.
4. Alleging that the respondents committed default in payment of rent for December, 2007, the petitioner filed I.A. No. 31 of 2008 u/s 11(1) of the Act. The application was opposed by the respondents stating that there is no default in payment of rent. It was pleaded that the amount representing the rent was handed over to the clerk of their advocate, and in that view of the matter, there is no wilful default. Two more interlocutory applications were filed alleging default in payment of rents.
5. The petitioner has also filed R.C.C. No. 49 of 2008 against the respondents, for eviction by pleading the ground that alternative premises have been secured by the respondents and that they deserve to be evicted from the premises. In that RCC also, an application u/s 11(4) of the Act was filed alleging non-payment of rent and praying for striking off the defence.
6. After hearing the parties, at length, the learned Rent Controller, disposed of all the interlocutory applications filed u/s 11(4) of the Act, through separate orders, dated 29.08.2012. A finding was recorded to the effect that the respondents failed to comply with the orders for deposit of rents, and thereby, they incurred the liability to put the petitioner in peaceful possession of the premises. Since the orders u/s 11(4) of the Act were passed in six applications, two R.C.Cs. were disposed of in terms of the said orders on the same day.
7. The respondents filed Rent Control Appeals, being R.C.A. Nos. 14 to 21 of 2012, before the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, u/s 20 of the Act. They have also filed I.A. Nos. 852, 854, 856, 858, 860, 862, 864 & 866 of 2012 under sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act with a prayer to stay the operation of the orders, dated 29.08.2012, passed in the respective R.C.Cs., or I.As., as the case may be, pending disposal of the R.C.As. It was pleaded that if they are evicted from the schedule premises even while the appeals are pending, serious hardship would be caused not only to them, but also to quite large number of employees working in their establishment, existing over the schedule premises. The applications were opposed by the petitioner herein. Through a common order, dated 22.12.2012, the Appellate Authority allowed those applications, granting stay of operation of the orders passed by the Rent Controller by imposing certain conditions as to deposit of the rent and arrears. Eight revisions, being C.R.P. Nos. 2619 to 2626 of 2013, are filed, against the orders in the respective I.As.
8. The petitioner filed I.A. Nos. 909 to 916 of 2013, in the respective appeals, with a prayer to reject the appeals, on the ground that the respondents did not comply with Section 11(1) of the Act. Their plea was that Section 11(1) of the Act mandates that an appeal filed u/s 20 of the Act can be entertained, only on deposit of the rents, as provided for u/s 11(1) of the Act and since such deposit was not made, the appeals are liable to be rejected. The Appellate Authority dismissed those applications, through a common order, dated 22.12.2012. Eight more revisions, being C.R.P. Nos. 2627 to 2634 of 2013, are filed, against those orders.
9. The arguments in C.R.P. Nos. 2627 to 2634 of 2013 are advanced by Sri Mohan Reddy and Sri S.R. Ashok, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and arguments in the first batch of revisions are advanced by Sri Sunil Ganu, learned counsel for the petitioner.
10. Learned Senior Counsel submit that the remedy of appeal provided for u/s 20 of the Act, is subject to compliance with Section 11(1) of the Act, and since the respondents did not comply with the same, the appeals ought not to have been numbered at all. They submit that the view taken by the Appellate Authority that there is no necessity to comply with Section 11 of the Act, when the appeals themselves are filed against the orders passed under different sub-sections of Section 11 of the Act, is untenable. It is also pleaded that the respondents did not even make an effort to comply with the condition. They submit that once the defence is forfeited through an order passed u/s 11(4) of the Act, and the tenant is directed to put the landlord in possession of the premises, such order stands fitted or dovetailed into the eviction petition itself, and thereby, what becomes appealable is an order of eviction. They submit that the Rules framed under the Act also give clear indication to the effect that an appeal can be numbered, only had deposit of the arrears of rent been made, and the trial Court did not follow the procedure prescribed. Reliance is placed upon various judgments rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court and this Court.
11. On the batch of revisions, which relate to the orders of stay granted by the Appellate Authority by imposing certain conditions, Sri Sunil Ganu, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the Appellate Authority ought to have followed the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in
12. Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, appeared for the respondents, in all the revisions. He submits that the very procedure adopted by the learned Rent Controller in passing an order u/s 11(4) of the Act and then straight away closing eviction petitions, i.e. R.C.C. Nos. 41 of 2007 and 49 of 2008, is contrary to the scheme under the Act and the Rules made thereunder. He contends that the necessity for making deposit of arrears of rent u/s 11(1) of the Act would arise, if only an order of eviction is passed on merits and an appeal is filed against such order of eviction and not when an appeal is preferred against an order passed u/s 11(4) of the Act. He submits that this Court maintained a clear distinction between the appeals that arise out of orders of eviction passed u/s 10 of the Act, on the one hand, and those that arise out of orders passed under relevant sub-sections of Section 11 of the Act, on the other hand. He contends that the Appellate Authority has taken correct view of the matter on this aspect. According to him, the objection, if any, in this regard, can be considered at the hearing of the appeals, but it cannot constitute the basis for rejection of the appeals.
13. On the question relating to the conditions imposed by the Appellate Authority for granting stay of eviction, learned Senior Counsel submits that the ratio in State of Maharashtra v. Super Max International (P) Ltd. (supra) does not apply to the facts of this case. He contends that there is a substantial distinction between the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short "the Bombay Act"), under which the case before the Supreme Court arose, and the A.P. Act, which governs the case on hand. Placing reliance upon the definition of the word ''tenant'' u/s 2(ix) of the Act, he submits that the application u/s 11, during the pendency of an appeal against the order of eviction can be only for deposit of the undisputed rent, but not the one, that is worked out according to the parameters stipulated by the Supreme Court. Learned Senior Counsel submits that a tenant is entitled to remain in possession of the premises as of right till the order of eviction, is confirmed in appeal. He submits that the Appellate Authority has undertaken extensive discussion on this aspect and that the orders passed by it do not warrant any interference.
14. The relationship between the parties is not in dispute. After expiry of the period of tenancy mentioned in the lease deed, dated 30.03.1974, the petitioner filed an eviction petition, being R.C.C. No. 41 of 2007 pleading the ground of wilful default in payment of rents. The principal ground urged by the respondents in opposing the R.C.C. was that he filed a suit for specific performance for execution of a lease in relation to the same premises. Even while the first R.C.C. was pending, a second R.C.C., being R.C.C. No. 49 of 2008, was filed by raising the ground of acquisition of separate premises by the respondents.
15. Successive applications were filed by the petitioner u/s 11 of the Act with a prayer to direct the respondents to deposit the rents for the period specified therein, and in default, to strike off the defence and require the respondents to put him in possession of the premises. All the applications were heard together and orders were passed on 29.07.2012. We are not concerned with the merits of the said orders at this stage. Against six orders passed in the respective applications filed under Sections 11(1) and 11(4) of the Act and the consequential orders passed in the two R.C.Cs.; the respondents filed eight appeals.
16. Two batches of applications were filed in those appeals. One batch is to reject the appeals on the ground that the appeals were filed without complying with the requirement u/s 11(1) of the Act. That batch of applications was dismissed through a common order, dated 22.12.2012. Second batch of applications is for grant of stay of eviction, the Appellate Authority allowed them through an order, dated 29.07.2012 by imposing the condition that the respondents shall pay the rent @ Rs. 3,000/- per month, together with arrears into an account mentioned in the memo filed by the respondents. In relation to the first batch of applications, the question that arises for consideration is as to whether Section 11(1) of the Act applies to an appeal filed against an order u/s 11(4) of the Act.
17. For better appreciation of the matter, it is essential to extract Sections 11 and 20 of the Act:
Section 11. Payment or deposit of rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction:--
(1) No tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord u/s 10, shall be entitled to contest the application before the Controller under that Section or to prefer any appeal u/s 20 against any order made by the Controller on the application, unless he has paid to the landlord or deposits with the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit and continues to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be.
(2) The deposit of rent under sub-section (1) shall be made within the time and in the manner prescribed.
(3) Whether there is any dispute as to the amount of rent to be paid or deposited under sub-section (1) the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, shall on application made to him either by the tenant or by the land-lord, and after making such inquiry as he deems necessary, determine summarily the rent to be so paid or deposited.
(4) If any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building.
(5) The amount deposited under sub-section (1) may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him in that behalf to the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be.
Section 20. Appeal:--
(1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may, within thirty days, from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court in the cities of Hyderabad and Sec''bad and elsewhere to the Subordinate Judge or if there are more than one Subordinate Judge, to the Principal Subordinate Judge having original jurisdiction over the area aforesaid. In computing the said period of thirty days the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded.
(2) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on the appeal.
(3) The appellate authority shall send for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as he thinks fit either personally or through the Controller, shall decide the appeal.
(4) The decision of the appellate authority and subject to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in Section 22.
18. By and large, in an application filed u/s 10 of the Act, an order of eviction is passed after contest by the parties, and on recording findings about the grounds pleaded for eviction. An appeal against such an order can be filed only on compliance with the requirements u/s 11(1) of the Act. A perusal of that provision discloses that a condition, akin to pre-deposit of the undisputed amount, is incorporated therein. Such arrangements are mostly found in the statutes of Taxation, Custom and Central Excise etc. An order of assessment can be appealed against only on deposit of the stipulated amount. Unless the condition as to pre-deposit is complied with, the appeal cannot be entertained at all. While in some statutes a facility of total waiver or partial waiver is created, in others there is no such facility.
19. It is not in dispute that the respondents did not make the pre-deposit of the amount, as required u/s 11 of the Act. Since the premises is common in all the appeals, the deposit of arrears of rent in one appeal would have ensured to the benefit of other appeals. The respondents were of the view that no order of eviction as such was passed against them and even two R.C.Cs., that were filed for eviction were just disposed of by taking note of the fact that interlocutory applications filed u/s 11(4) of the Act were allowed and mentioning that the further proceedings of the petitions are stopped and the defence of the respondents is struck off.
20. The question as to whether an order passed u/s 11(4) of the Act by itself, is executable resulting in eviction or whether it must entail in a separate order of eviction in the main R.C.C. was dealt with by this Court in T. Venkatesam v. Akula Krishnaiah 1966 (2) A.W.R. 245. In that case, as in the present one, an eviction petition was filed u/s 10 of the Act and during the pendency of that, an order u/s 11(4) of the Act was passed. The appeal preferred against the order u/s 11(4) of the Act was dismissed. Thereafter, an execution petition was filed on the strength of the order passed u/s 11(4) of the Act. An objection was raised by the tenant, as to the maintainability of the execution petition. It was pleaded that Section 15 of the Act, which confers power of execution, covers only the orders that are passed under Sections 10, 12 or 13 and omission of Section 11 is deliberate and that the Executing Court cannot assume to itself, the power to enforce an order, which is not mentioned in Section 15 of the Act. Even while taking the view that an order passed u/s 11(4) of the Act, cannot be equated to the one u/s 10 of the Act, Gopal Rao Ekbote, J. in a lucid manner held as under:
I find it little difficult to equate the order passed u/s 11(4) with the order passed u/s 10 of the Act. It would practically amount to legislate if the Court declares that any order passed u/s 11(4) would be deemed to be an order passed u/s 10. There is no justification for any such interpretation. While orders u/s 10 are the final orders passed after proper enquiry, the order u/s 11(4) is an order passed at an intermediate stage. To say that an order passed u/s 11(4) would be deemed to be an order u/s 10 for the purposes of section 15 of the Act would not in my opinion be correct. Apart from the obvious distinction between the characters of the two orders the deeming provisions cannot be supplied by the Court. It is the function of the Legislature and if the Legislature has not characterized the order passed u/s 11(4) to be deemed as an order passed u/s 10, it would not be correct for the Court to say that an order passed u/s 11(4) would be deemed to be an order u/s 10. The lower Court therefore in my view have committed an error in considering the order passed u/s 11(4) as an order passed u/s 10 and capable of being executed u/s 15.
21. The matter, however, did not rest at that. The learned Judge upheld the order of the trial Court on a different ground, and observed,
...The conclusion of the Courts below however can be supported on a well-recognized principle of interpretation of statutes. One of the first principles of law with regard to the effect of an enabling Act is that, if the Legislature enables something to be done, it gives power at the same time, by necessary implication, to do every thing which is indispensable for the purpose of carrying out the purpose of the Act. In other words, when the intention of an Act in conferring an express power is likely to be frustrated by not construing it as necessarily implying another incidental power of however substantial in nature, the same must be implied in order not to bring about frustration of the express intention of the Legislature. That being the principle as I comprehend it, if the power to direct eviction of the tenant is expressly given u/s 11(4) to the Rent Controller or the appellate authority and if there is no express provision to enforce that order, it must necessarily be held to imply the power to enforce such a direction..." "...I am therefore satisfied that the power which section 11 confers upon the Rent Controller or the appellate authority of giving direction in regard to eviction of a tenant necessarily carries with it a power to see that the order is enforced in the same way in which orders passed u/s 10, 12 or 13 of the Act are executed.
22. Support was derived from the following passages from the treatises on interpretation of statutes:
Where a statute confers powers or duties in general terms, all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make such legislation effective are included by implication ...... That which is clearly implied is as much a part of a law as that which is expressed.
(Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Third Edition, Vol. 3, section 5402, page 19)
The reason for allowing the Court to give effect to necessary implications is quite apparent. Many matters of minor detail are often omitted from legislation. If these details could not be inserted by implication, the drafting of legislation would be an interminable process and the legislative intent would likely be defeated by a most insignificant omission. Consequently, these minor details are considered as if included in the general terms of the enactment as well as in the purpose sought to be achieved by the Legislature, and therefore, are regarded as actually intended by the Legislature.
One may find numerous situations where statutes have been extended by implication. Thus, a statutory grant of a power, privilege or property carries with it, by implication everything necessary to its enjoyment or exercise.
(Crawford on Statutory Construction, page 267)
If a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, but omits to mention in terms some detail which is of great importance (if not actually essential) to the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation, the Courts are at liberty to infer that the statute by implication empowers that detail to be carried out.
(Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edition, page 111)
Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution.
(Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, page 350)
23. The judgment of the Madras High Court in
24. Once it emerges that the order u/s 11(4) of the Act, is executable, the appeal referred to u/s 20 of the Act, filed against it, can be treated on par with an appeal filed against an order of eviction. Any other interpretation is likely to bring out an element of uncertainty and in a given case, a tenant may run the risk of rendering the appeal, untenable, if he declines to comply with the condition as to pre-deposit. Further, if one takes into account, the objective underlying Section 11(1) of the Act, it becomes clear that the Legislature intended to protect the interests of the landlord, even while conferring a right of appeal on a tenant.
25. Reliance is placed by the respondents on the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in
26. In view of conflicting opinions that were prevailing in different cases, at that time, the matter was referred to a Division Bench. Their Lordships held that, when an appeal itself is filed u/s 20 of the Act, against an order passed u/s 11 of the Act, a landlord is not entitled to file a fresh application u/s 11 of the Act before the Appellate Authority.
27. In the instant case, the petitioner did not file any application for deposit of the arrears of rent, during the pendency of the appeal, as was done during the pendency of the R.C.Cs. Their effort was only to see whether the requirement u/s 11 of the Act, as a condition precedent for filing of the appeal, was complied with. Therefore, it is difficult to treat the said judgment, as a precedent for the proposition that if an appeal is filed u/s 20 of the Act against an order passed u/s 11(4) of the Act, it is not necessary to comply with the requirement u/s 11(1) of the Act viz., pre-deposit of the arrears of rent that have accrued up to the date of the order appealed against.
28. In a way, the controversy, in this regard, pales into insignificance in the instant case. The respondents filed applications for stay of eviction during the pendency of the appeals. As a matter of fact, they have offered to deposit arrears of rent as a condition for that relief. The Appellate Authority passed common order in batch of applications, granting stay of eviction, subject to deposit of arrears of rent and future rents. The premises being common to all the proceedings, deposit of the arrears of rent, can safely be treated as compliance u/s 11(1) of the Act. Though the deposit was required to be made while filing the appeal itself, the consequences that ensue on account of non-compliance with such conditions, for the remedies under the statutes of taxation, cannot be applied.
29. If one takes into account the objective underlying the Act, which is predominantly to protect the interests of the tenants, slight delay in payment of arrears of rents as provided for u/s 11(1) of the Act should not lead to rejection of an appeal. At the most, it may be a case of return thereof. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the applications filed by the petitioner for rejection of the appeals cannot be entertained, particularly in view of the fact that arrears of rents were directed to be deposited as a condition for grant of stay. It is difficult to adopt the analogy of the provisions under the Income Tax Act or the Customs Act, in this behalf.
30. The petitioner contends that once an order of eviction has been passed, the respondents can remain in possession only by paying the rent, as per the formula prescribed in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd.''s case (supra), in a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Super Max International Private Limited (supra). The respondents, however, opposed the plea stating that there is a difference in the purport of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, on the one hand, and the A.P. Act, on the other hand.
31. The judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Super Max International Private Limited (supra), arose out of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Super Max International Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra 2009 (2) MLJ 134. The tenant in that case, suffered an order of eviction. In the appeal preferred against the order of eviction, the appellate forum granted stay, without imposing any conditions. The landlord approached the High Court, feeling aggrieved by the order of stay. The Bombay High Court took note of the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd.''s case (supra) and held that a landlord, who was successful in obtaining the order of eviction is entitled to be paid the rent, worked out on the market value. The formula adopted was that the value of the entire property be arrived at and 6% thereof is adopted as its annual rent. That, in turn, is distributed over 12 months. Adopting that principle, the Bombay High Court held that for the premises of 9,000 square feet, the market value is Rs. 10,80.00 lakhs, 6% thereof is Rs. 64,80,000. On that basis, the monthly rent was fixed at Rs. 5,40,000/-. The tenant carried the matter in appeal before the Supreme Court.
32. In Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd.''s case (supra), two questions were framed, viz., (a) When does the tenancy terminate in respect of premises, enjoying the protection of the Rent Control Legislation and (b) up to what point of time is the tenant liable to pay the rent contractual rate and when does the tenant become liable to pay for use and occupation of the premises, at the contractual rate of rent. After referring to various judgments rendered by itself, the Supreme Court, at para 14 observed:
Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in
33. Para 16 is also of immediate relevance in this regard.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the tenant having suffered a decree or order for eviction may continue his fight before the superior forum but, on the termination of the proceedings and the decree or order of eviction first passed having been maintained, the tenancy would stand terminated with effect from the date of the decree passed by the lower forum. In the case of premises governed by rent control legislation, the decree of eviction on being affirmed, would be determinative of the date of termination of tenancy and the decree of affirmation passed by the superior forum at any subsequent stage or date, would not, by reference to the doctrine of merger have the effect of postponing the date of termination of tenancy.
34. So far as the second question is concerned, the Supreme Court held that the liability to pay the rent otherwise than under contractual terms would arise on the order of eviction being passed. The answers were provided in para 19 as under:
To sum up, our conclusions are:
(1) While passing an order of stay under Rule 5 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the appellate court does have jurisdiction to put the applicant on such reasonable terms as would in its opinion reasonably compensate the decree-holder for loss occasioned by delay in execution of decree by the grant of stay order, in the event of the appeal being dismissed and in so far as those proceedings are concerned. Such terms, needless to day, shall be reasonable.
(2) In case of premises governed by the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, in view of the definition of tenant contained in clause (1) of Section 2 of the Act, the tenancy does not stand terminated merely by its termination under the general law; it terminates with the passing of the decree for eviction. With effect from that date, the tenant is liable to pay mesne profits or compensation for use and occupation of the premises at the same rate at which the landlord would have been able to let out the premises and earn rent if the tenant would have vacated the premises. The landlord is not bound by the contractual rate of rent effective for the period preceding the date of the decree.
(3) The doctrine of merger does not have the effect of postponing the date of termination of tenancy merely because the decree of eviction stands merged in the decree passed by the superior forum at a latter date.
35. In State of Maharashtra v. Super Max International Private Limited (supra), the said principles were taken note of. In the context of determination of the market rent, the formula adopted by the Bombay High Court was affirmed. Their Lordships held at paras 77 and 78 as under:
77. In the light of the discussions made above we hold that in an appeal or revision preferred by a tenant against an order or decree of an eviction passed under the Rent Act it is open to the appellate or the Revisional Court to stay the execution of the order or the decree on terms, including a direction to pay monthly rent at a rate higher than the contractual rent. Needless to say that in fixing the amount subject to payment of which the execution of the order/decree is stayed, the Court would exercise restraint and would not fix any excessive, fanciful or punitive amount.
78. In the case in hand, the High Court has fixed the amount of Rs. 5,40,000/- per month with reference to Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner and hence, its reasonableness cannot be doubted. In fairness to Mr. Lalit he did not challenge the fixation of the amount on that ground.
36. Sri D. Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, submits that if one takes into account, the definition of Section 2(ix) of the Act, it takes in its fold not only the one, who is a tenant, but also the one who suffered an order of eviction, till the termination of the appeal. Section 2(ix) of the Act reads as under:
''Tenant'' means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son or daughter, of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of tenant''s family up to the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building, by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughterhouse or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased by a local authority.
37. He has also made reference to sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act (extracted supra) to contend that an order of eviction assumes finality only after the remedy of appeal is exhausted.
38. This Court is of the view that the purpose of definition u/s 2(ix) of the Act, is some what different and it has no relevance to the determination of the rent, that a tenant, who suffered an order of eviction must pay as a condition for continued enjoyment of the premises. The purport of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act is comparable to the provisions of many statutes which add finality to the order, unless the further remedies are availed. From the language employed in sub-section (4) thereof, it is difficult to construe that an order of eviction shall become final only after the remedy of appeal is exhausted. If that meaning is ascribed to the said provisions, the easiest course for a tenant, who suffers an order of eviction, would be to refrain from filing an appeal, so that, an order of eviction does not become executable. That is not at all the scheme or purport of the Act.
39. The Appellate Authority, in the instant case, refused to follow the judgments of the Supreme Court simply by observing that the appeals in the present case have not arisen under an order passed u/s 11(1) of the Act. It has already been observed earlier that an order passed u/s 11(1) directing eviction, in default of payment of rent, is as good as the order of eviction passed u/s 10 of the Act and is equally, executable.
40. This Court held in
41. The relevant particulars of market value are placed before this Court. Visakhapatnam is one of the most developed cities in the State of A.P. and in certain aspects, it remains ahead of Hyderabad. The basic value of the schedule property as per the particulars furnished by the Department of Stamps and Registration is Rs. 30,000/- per yard. Total extent of the scheduled premises is 13,455 square yards. There is a building of about 30,000 square feet and the basic value thereof is shown at Rs. 300/- per square feet. In a daily published by the respondents themselves, it was mentioned that 10% of the market value of the property can be treated as Annual Rental Value for the premises.
42. Learned counsel for the respondents submit that it was published in a different context and the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Super Max International Private Limited (supra), cannot be applied to the facts of the case. Those figures are not disputed. The total value of the property comes to Rs. 40,36,50,000 (land) + Rs. 90,00,000 (structure) = Rs. 41,26,50,000/-. 6% of the total value was taken as the Annual Rental Value for premises in Bombay. For Visakhapatnam, it can be taken as 5%. The resultant figure would be Rs. 2,06,32,500/-. The monthly rent on this basis would be Rs. 17,19,375/-. It can be rounded off to Rs. 17.00 lakhs. The respondents can be required to pay the rent at that rate from the date of order, whereas the arrears of rent up to the date of order of eviction shall be as per the contractual rate.
43. Hence, C.R.P. Nos. 2619 to 2626 of 2013 filed against the orders of the Appellate Authority granting stay, are allowed in part, directing that the stay granted by the Appellate Authority shall be on condition that the respondents shall deposit the arrears of rent calculated @ Rs. 17.00 lakhs, per month, from the date of eviction. C.R.P. Nos. 2627 to 2634 of 2013, filed against the dismissal of applications for rejection of the appeals are dismissed.
44. Three months time from today is granted to the respondents for depositing the arrears, so calculated. They shall be under obligation to pay the future rent @ Rs. 17.00 lakhs, per month, on or before 10th of every month.
45. There shall be no order as to costs. The miscellaneous petitions filed in these revision petitions shall stand disposed of.
