Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.@mdashThe appellants are the plaintiffs and have filed the present original side appeal against the judgement and decree dated 27.9.2013 passed by the learned Single Judge of this court in Civil Suit No. 65 of 2000.
2. Plaintiffs- appellants filed the suit seeking a decree for the following reliefs:--
"(i) That the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have 1/8th share each in the following properties:--
(a) Shop situated on Khasra No. 496/1 Khata Khatauni No. 44 min/144, measuring 0-00-52 hectares on which single storey shop is standing, according to the jamabandi for 1984-85 of mauza Sarkaghat Distt. Mandi. The shop is on area measuring 0-00-25 hectares;
(b) Double storeyed shops on Khasra No. 564 and 502 in khata khatauni No. 205/460 min in Abadi measuring 0-00-65 and 0-00-63 hectares, in all measuring 0-01-28 hectares according to jamabandi for 1984-85 of mauza Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi;
(c) House standing on Khasra No. 497/1 which is three storeyed on area measuring 0-00-22 hectares in Khata Khatauni No. 474-426 according to the Jamabandi for the year 1984-85 of mauza Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi.
(d) Shop-cum-house on Khasra No. 501/1 measuring 0-00-12 hectares, Khata Khatauni No. 174/426 according to Jamabandi for 1984-85 of mauza Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi.
(e) Three storyed house on Khasra No. 503/1 measuring 0-00-16 hectares in Khata Khatauni No. 174/426 according to Jamabandi for 1984-85 of mauza Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi.
(f) Shop standing on Khasra No. 506/1, measuring 0-00-10 hectares in Khata Khatauni No. 175/427 according to Jamabandi for the year 1984-85 of Muaza Sarkaghat Distt. Mandi.
(g) Three storeyed shop-cum-house on khasra No. 570, khata khatauni No. 100/262 min measuring 0-00-90 hectares according to Misal Hakiat Bandobasat Jadid of Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi.
(h) Double storeyed shop-cum-residence on Khasra No. 563 Khata Khatauni No. 174/426 measuring 0-00-36 hectares according to Jamabandi for 1984-85 mauza Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi.
(i) Two plots of land, compromised in Khasra No. 465 measuring 47-05 Sq. yards and 1191 measuring 22-08 Sq. yards in Mauja Una, Tehsil and District Una according to the jamabandi for the year 1976-77 and the joint Hindu Family M/s. Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal and Sons, Sarkaghat and a decree for partition and separate possession of their 5/8th share in the said properties by metes and bounds, be passed in their favour.
(ii) That the plaintiffs be also granted a decree for rendition of accounts of the Joint Hindu Family business M/s. Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal and sons and entitled to their 5/8th share in the said business.
(iii) That for partition and separate possession and for rendition of accounts local commissioner may be appointed to go into the rendition of accounts and divide their property by metes and bounds.
3. According to the appellants, the pedigree table of the parties is as follows:--
4. Though the aforesaid pedigree table has been admitted in part, but according to the defendants-respondents, this pedigree table is incomplete and the same is as follows:--
5. The plaintiffs pleaded that the common ancestor of the parties was one Shri Goru Mall, who had two sons Telu Ram and Ram Rakha Mall. This fact has been disputed by the defendants and submitted that there is third son also namely Dhani Ram and that the parties to the suit constitute a Joint Hindu Family and carried on the business of Kariana, cloth, iron and hardware etc. under the name and style of M/s. Telu Ram Ram Rakha Mall at Sarkaghat, District Mandi. In 1970, two brothers Telu Ram and Ram Rakha Mall separated. Telu Ram started his business in the name and style of M/s. Telu Ram Amritsaria Mall at Sarkaghat while Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal started his business in the name and style of M/s. Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal and sons at Sarkaghat. Shri Ram Rakha Mall constituted a Joint Hindu Family of the plaintiffs namely Hushan Kaushal, Tara Kaushal, Dinesh Kaushal, Bachni Devi and Usha Rani and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 namely Bal Raj, Ramesh and Subhash, who continued the business of Karyana, cloth and later on added sale of cement etc. The Joint Hindu Family business was run as a partnership business between Ram Rakha Mall, Bal Raj, Husan and Tara Chand under deed of partnership Ext. DW1/A, which was executed on 2.9.1970. It is further pleaded that plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and Shri Ram Rakha Mal had a joint mess and common residence at that relevant point of time and Shri Ram Rakha Mall was the head of the family. Ram Rakha Mall died on 12.8.1983. Since he was not keeping good health, he retired from the Hindu Undivided Family firm namely Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal and Sons and Shri Satish Kumar son of Bal Raj was inducted as partner in the ancestral business, but the Joint Hindu Family continued as such. There is no dispute about the death of Ram Rakha Mall. On the death of Ram Rakha Mall, his estate devolved upon the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 in equal shares and the Joint Hindu Family business M/s. Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal and sons continued as such. Defendant No. 1 Bal Raj was eldest brother and head of the family, he became Karta of HUF in place of Shri Ram Rakha Mall. It has been further pleaded that Shri Telu Ram had separated himself from his brother Shri Ram Rakha Mal and had also started his separate business. He died in the year 1975 and his estate devolved upon Shri Suriya Mall @ Amritsaria Mall, defendant No. 6 who is in possession of the estate. The plaintiffs or defendant Nos. 1 to 5 have no common concern in the estate of Shri Telu Ram which has been inherited by Shri Amritsaria Mall. The plaintiffs pleaded that partition took place between Telu Ram and Ram Rakha Mall. The share of Ram Rakha Mall is jointly held by the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 to 5 in the following manner:
"1. Shop situated in Khasra No. 496/1, Khata Khatauni No. 44 min. 144, measuring 0-00-52 hectares on which single storey shop is standing, according to the jamabandi for 1984-85 of mauza Sarkaghat, District Mandi. The shop is on area measuring 0-00-25 hectares;
2. Double storeyed shops on Khasra No. 564 and 502 in Khata Khatauni No. 205/460 min in Abadi measuring 0-00-65 and 0-00-63 hectares in all measuring 0-01-28 hectares according to Jamabandi for 1984-85 of mauza Sarkaghat, District Mandi;
3. House standing on Khasra No. 497/1 which is three storeyed on area measuring 0-00-22 hectares in Khata Khatauni No. 474-426 according to the Jamabandi for the year 1984-85 of mauza Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi.
4. Shop-cum-house on Khasra No. 501/1 measuring 0-00-12 hectares, Khata Khatauni No. 174/426 according to Jamabandi for 1984-85 of mauza Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi.
5. Three storyed house on Khasra No. 503/1 measuring 0-00-16 hectares in Khata Khatauni No. 174/426 according to Jamabandi for 1984-85 of mauza Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi.
6. Shop standing on Khasra No. 506/1, measuring 0-00-10 hectares in Khata Khatauni No. 175/427 according to Jamabandi for the year 1984-85 of Muaza Sarkaghat Distt. Mandi.
7. Three storeyed shop-cum-house on khasra No. 570, khata khatauni No. 100/262 min measuring 0-00-90 hectares according to Misal Hakiat Bandobasat Jadid of Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi.
8. Double storeyed shop-cum-residence on Khasra No. 563 Khata Khatauni No. 174/426 measuring 0-00-36 hectares according to Jamabandi for 1984-85 mauza Sarkaghat, Distt. Mandi.
9. Land comprised in Khasra No. 1165, 34, 36, and 2339 measuring 47.05 sq. yards in mauza Kotla Khurd, Tehsil and District Una according to Jamabandi for the year 1976-77."
6. The aforesaid properties were inherited by Shri Ram Rakha Mall and after his death, the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have 1/8th share each in the same. The plaintiffs are in possession of shops and residential houses situated over khasra No. 570. All other properties except two plots in Una, which are lying vacant, are in possession of defendant No. 1 and his sons, defendant Nos. 4 and 5. The properties are liable to be partitioned by metes and bounds and the plaintiff and defendants No. 1 to 3 are entitled to separate possession of the properties, as mentioned above.
7. On partition of the properties between Telu Ram and Ram Rakha Mall, Shri Ram Rakha Mall continued the business in the name and style of M/s. Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal and Sons. The business was of kariana, cloth etc. and cement was later on added to it. The business was carried on in partnership, the terms of which were reduced into writing vide partnership deed Ext. D1 dated 2.9.1970, vide which Ram Rakha Mall had 40% share, Bal Raj 40%, Husan Chand and Tara Chand 10% each share. Defendant No. 1 Bal Raj was the Karta and managing the whole affairs. Shri Ram Rakha Mall because of his ill health, had retired from the partnership on 1.4.1983 and the business continued in the name and style of M/s. Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal and Sons with Bal Raj having 40% share, Satish Kumar with 25% share, Husan Chand 25% and Tara Chand 10% share. This partnership business was Joint Hindu Family Business and continued till 15.3.1990 when Bal Raj defendant converted the business into another partnership business with three partners namely Bal Raj defendant No. 1 and his two sons Satish Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar. In this business, Bal Raj has 40% and Satish Kumar and Sanjeev Kumar 30% shares each. The business was being run in the name and style of the original firm i.e. M/s. Ram Rakha Mal Kaushal and Sons at Sarkaghat with all stock, assets, trade and goodwill etc. The plaintiffs and defendants No. 1 to 3 have 1/8th share each in the said business. Therefore, the appellants prayed for decree of rendition of accounts and share in the properties and assets of the firm.
8. The defendants-respondents contested the suit. It has been pleaded that defendant No. 1 and his two sons, defendant Nos. 4 and 5, have started separate business by forming a separate partnership. It was pleaded that the pedigree table is incorrect. Before 1950 there was a firm in the name and style of Telu Ram Dhani Ram but after 1950 Shri Dhani Ram separated himself from the family and started his own business. Thereafter the business was run in the name and style of Ram Rakha Mall. After 1970, there was partnership between Telu Ram and Ram Rakha Mall and Telu Ram started business in the name of M/s. Telu Ram Amritsarai Mall and Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal and Sons. Prior to 1962, the earlier firm also used to deal in medicines under the name of Shakti Medical Store and after partition in 1970, the said Shakti Medical Store also fell to the share of Ram Rakha Mall. Further, it was pleaded that after 1970 Shri Ram Rakha Mall was doing separate business and Telu Ram and Sons were doing separate business and there was no Joint Hindu Family business as pleaded. After 1970, the sons of Ram Rakha Mall were carrying on business separately under different partnerships. Partnership deed was entered into between Ram Rakha Mall, Bal Raj, Husan Chand Tara Chand on 2nd September, 1970 and a firm under the name and style of M/s. Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal and Sons was constituted which was a partnership at will. The business of the firm was to deal in retail and wholesale business of karyana, cloth and such other items. By another deed of partnership dated 17.3.1970 Ext. D-5 Shri Husan Chand and Tara Chand constituted another firm in the name and style of Shakti Medical Store in which they had equal shares. Defendant No. 2 Ramesh Kumar had renounced the world and has not been seen/heard of after 1965 and was not associated in any of the businesses run by different firms. Defendant No. 3 Subhash Kaushal after completion his MA.LLB also did not take interest in any of the partnership businesses and therefore, he is also not partner of any of the firms. In the year 1980, there was again partition of the properties between Ram Rakha Mall and his sons in a family settlement. This settlement was not reduced into writing but the parties acted upon the partition by taking possession of the respective properties which fell to their shares. The respondents- defendants then proceed that there was no Joint Hindu Family as pleaded by the appellants- plaintiffs because:
"(a) Husan Lal (plaintiff No. 1) purchased Jeep in the year 1972 and registration certificate was also in his own name and then sold the same in the year 1985 and the sale price was pocketed by him alone;
(b) In the year 1981 Dinesh Kumar (plaintiff No. 3) purchased Truck No. HPM-5335 and after plying the same for 3-4 years sold the same and pocketed the earnings and sale amount himself;
(c) Tara Chand (plaintiff No. 2) purchased van in the year 1989 bearing registration No. DNB-1283 and sold the same after about one year. The said purchase and sale was from his own account and had nothing to do with the alleged Joint Hindu Family;
(d) The income tax returns of Shakti Medical Store are submitted on behalf of two partners only namely Husan Chand and Tara Chand;
(e) The income tax return of M/s. Ram Rakha Mall and Sons are submitted on behalf of four parties prior to financial year 1988-89 and thereafter on behalf of three partners due to change in the constitution of partnership;
(f) A partnership under the name and style of Tara Cloth House is doing separate business and the partners in the said concern are Dinesh Kumar (plaintiff No. 3), Smt. Neelam (wife of Tara Chand, plaintiff No. 2) and Sh. Prem Krishan Thapar (father-in-law of Tara Chand plaintiff No. 2). The alleged Joint Hindu Family has nothing to do with this business of M/s. Tara Cloth House;
(g) After family settlement in 1980 Bal Raj (defendant No. 1) constructed three-storey pucca house over Khasra No. 497/1 and 503/1, which had fallen to his share and no person had any objection on the said construction;
(h) Tara Chand and Dinesh Kaushal have raised third storey in 1984 over a two storey house constructed over khasra No. 570 which fell in their share in family settle in the year 1980;
(i) Out of a share in the partnership firm M/s. Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal and Sons a shop was constructed over khasra No. 496/1 which fell in the share of Husan Chand;
(j) Over Khasra No. 570 there were two shops and prior to 1985 in one shop was Shakti Medical Store and the other shop was used as store by M/s. Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal and Sons, but in the year 1985 Sh. Dinesh Kumar (plaintiff No. 3) got vacated the said store from M/s. Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal and Sons as the said shop had fallen in his share. Thereafter, M/s. Tara Cloth House was opened in the said shop wherein Dinesh is also one of the partners.
(k) Orchard situated at Galyog (Karsog) measuring about 26 bigha (owner of 1/2 share out of this 26 bighas is Amritsaria Mall) was given to Sh. Hussan Chand in the family settlement in the year 1980 but the amount for the development of the said orchard and construction of house in the said orchard was spent by M/s. Ram Rakha Mall and Sons as Husan Chand had some share in the said partnership. But in the year 1990 out of total sale proceeds of about Rs. 45,000/- it was the first income from the said orchard. Sh. Husan Chand had pocketed Rs. 35,000/- out of which Amritsaria Mall is entitled to 1/2 of the amount. From 1990 onward Sh. Husan Chand is looking after the said orchard himself, which goes to suggest that he is acting on the family settlement of the year 1980.
(l) Out of capital share of Tara Chand in the firm M/s. Ram Rakha Mall Kaushal and Sons existing prior to 15th March, 1990, Sh. Tara Chand had asked to pay his share capital to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- to Sh. Dinesh Kumar along with whom his wife and his father-in-law were doing business under the name and style of M/s. Tara Cloth House.
(m) Shri Tara Chand and Dinesh Kumar (plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 respectively) are negotiating at their own levels for grant of Bata Agency with which the alleged Joint Hindu Family had nothing to do.
(n) Sh. Husan Chand had also been carrying business of money lender and it was his own business which had nothing to do with the alleged Joint Family business.
(o) That Sh. Husan Chand used to spend most of his time in the development and maintenance of RIUR DEVI Temple as he is chairman of the management committee of the said temple and due to this he did not take any interest even in the partnership business."
9. The defendants admitted the death of Ram Rakha and denied that the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 to 5 are in joint possession of the aforesaid properties on which the plaintiffs claimed their right by virtue of being members of a Joint Hindu Family. They submitted that in the partnership business of M/s. Ram Rakha Mall and Sons, Bal Raj defendant No. 1 and his sons defendant Nos. 4 and 5 were conducting the business after 1980, therefore, there was necessity of change in the partnership deed executed on 1.4.1983 and on 15.3.1990 fresh partnership deed between defendant No. 1 and his sons was executed. There are two more partnership concerns which are carrying on their own business. M/s. Shakti Medical Store is a partnership concern of Husan Chand and Tara Chand and Tara Cloth House is a partnership concern of Dinesh Kumar and his wife and father-in-law of Tara Chand. Both these businesses had been started by their own independent assets and goodwill.
10. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned single Judge:--
"1. Whether the sons of Goru Mall constituted a Joint Hindu Family and carried on joint family business, as alleged?..... OPP
2. Whether during partition in 1970 of the Joint Hindu Family constituting of sons of Goru Mall, Ram Rakha Mal got the properties mentioned at serial No. 1 to 9 in para 3 of the plaint?...... OPP
3. Whether the properties described at serial No. 1 to 9 are the properties of plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 to 3?..... OPP
4. Whether after partition, in the year 1970, business of Ram Rakha Mal Kaushal and Sons was a Joint Hindu Family business, as alleged in para 1 of the plaint?..... OPP
5. Whether on retirement of Ram Rakha Mal from the aforementioned JHF business and on induction of Satish Kumar, business of M/s. Ram Rakha Mal Kaushal and Sons continued to be joint, as alleged in para 4 of the plaint?..... OPP
6. Whether the properties mentioned in para 3 of the plaint are required to be partitioned. If so, what are the shares of the parties?..... OPP
7. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for rendition of accounts. If so, with regard to what business/property and who is the accounting part?..... OPP
8. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction. If so, what is the correct valuation?..... OPD 1, 4 & 5.
9. Whether the suit is not within the its effect?..... OPD 1, 4 & 5.
10. Whether the business carried on in the name and style of M/s. Ram Rakha Mal Kaushal was a partnership business, as alleged and the said partnership stood dissolved on 1.4.1983, if so, its effect?..... OPD 1,4 & 5.
11. Relief."
11. Thereafter following two additional issues were framed on 14.5.2007:--
"10-A Whether there had been a family settlement in March, 1980 and in that settlement, the properties mentioned at Sr. No. 1 to 9 in para 3 of the plaint, had been divided amongst the joint owners?...... OPD 1, 4 & 5.
10-B. If issue No. 10-A is proved, whether the alleged family settlement had been acted upon and the parties have developed the properties that were allotted to them as per that settlement, if so, its effect?...... OPD 1, 4 & 5."
12. The learned single Judge gave findings only on issue No. 1, while the remaining issues were dealt with in the following manner:--
"Issue Nos. 2 to 5.
30. In view of what I hold on issue No. 1, these issues are also decided against the plaintiff.
Issue Nos. 6, 7 & 10
31. I find that evidence is tenuous as I have considered the evidence of all witnesses supra. Therefore, all these issues are also held against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant.
Issue Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 10-B
32. In view of the findings on above issues, these issues have become redundant.
Relief
33. I find no merit in this suit, which is accordingly dismissed. Decree sheet be drawn accordingly."
13. The appellants have assailed the decree on a number of grounds as taken in the memorandum of appeal, which we need not advert to, since the moot question required to be determined in this appeal is as to whether it was incumbent upon the learned single Judge to have recorded findings on all issues or could the suit have been dismissed by simply recording findings on one issue.
Order 14 Rule 2 CPC reads as follows:--
"14. 2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.---(1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues.
(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to-
(a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
(b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue."
Order 20 Rule 4(2) and Order 20 Rule 5 reads as under:--
"4. (2) Judgment of other Courts.----Judgments of other Courts shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision.
5. Court to state its decision on each issue.---In suits in which issues have been framed, the Court shall state its finding or decision, with the reasons therefor, upon each separate issue, unless the findings upon any one or more of the issue is sufficient for the decision of the suit."
14. A combined reading of aforesaid provisions would reveal that the mandate of the Code is that the judgement shall contain a concise statement of the case, points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision. Further Order 20 Rule 5 CPC re-strengths the requirement contained in Order 20 Rule 4(2) CPC requiring that in suits, in which issues have been framed, the court shall state its finding or decision with the reasons therefor, upon each separate issue, unless the finding upon any one or more of the issue is sufficient for the decision of the suit. Therefore, despite mandate of deciding the issue separately, if the court comes to the conclusion that certain issues need to be decided together, there is no bar to do the same.
15. Undisputedly, in the present case, the issues were primarily both of law as well as facts and there was scope of an appeal from the decision of the learned single Judge. This being the position, it was desirable that the matter ought to have been disposed of on all points and should not have merely rested on consideration of a single point. In taking this view we are supported by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in
"27. In a matter of this nature where several contentions factual and legal are urged and when there is scope of an, appeal from the decision of the Court, it is desirable as was observed by the Privy Council long time ago to avoid delay and protraction of litigation that the court should, when dealing with any matter dispose of all the points and not merely rest its decision on one single point."
16. A Division Bench of this court while dealing with the provisions of Rule 5 of Order 20 in
"12. In the present case, trial Court has framed all the issues and was supposed to give separate findings on each issue, as admittedly the findings upon any one or more of them are not sufficient for the decision of the suit. By simply enumerating the evidence and law and thereafter giving conclusion whereby the case of one party is accepted and the other party is rejected, is no judgment in the eyes of law. In other words, the judgment which does not contain the reasons or grounds on the basis of which the Judge has come to his conclusion/decision for passing a Judgment and decree on the points in issue or controversy, is vitiated. It is all the more necessary, when the judgment is by the Court of fact and is appealable, to avoid unnecessary delay and protracted litigation..."
17. The provisions of Order 20 CPC came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in
"10. Certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be noticed. Order VII Rule 1 of the CPC requires the plaintiff to give sufficient particulars of the relief, which the plaintiff claims. Order XX requires a judgment to contain all the issues and findings or decision thereon with the reasons therefor. The judgment has to state the relief allowed to a party. The preparation of decree follows the judgment. The decree shall agree with the judgment. The decree shall contain, inter alia, particulars of the claim and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. The decree shall also state the amount of costs incurred in the suit and by whom or out of what property and in what proportions such costs are to be paid. Rules 9 to 19 of Order XX are illustrative of contents of decrees in certain specified categories of suits. The very obligation cast by the Code that the decree shall agree with the judgment spells out an obligation on the part of the author of the judgment to clearly indicate the relief or reliefs to which a party, in his opinion, has been found entitled to enable decree being framed in such a manner that it agrees with the judgment and specifies clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. The operative part of the judgment should be so clear and precise that in the event of an objection being laid, it should not be difficult to find out by a bare reading of the judgment and decree whether the latter agrees with the former and is in conformity therewith. A self-contained decree drawn up in conformity with the judgment would exclude objections and complexities arising at the stage of execution."
18. A clear distinction has to be drawn between the findings and the reasons, which is apparent from the language of Order 20 Rule 5 CPC, which clearly provides that the court is required to state its findings and record reasons. Therefore, unquestionably the findings and reasons are totally two different aspects. Whereas, the findings would be the conclusions drawn, the reasons are as to why such a conclusion has been arrived at and in absence of reasons recorded by the court and jumping on to findings would be contrary to the express requirement of Order 20 Rule 5 CPC and would clearly vitiate the judgement.
19. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in
"9. .....Under this Order, a "finding " is therefore, a decision on an issue framed in a suit. The second part of the rule shows that such a finding shall be one which by its own force or in combination with findings on other issues should lead to the decision of the suit itself. That is to say, the finding shall be one which is necessary for the disposal of the suit. The scope of the meaning of the expression "finding" is considered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
"The word "finding" interpreted in the sense indicated by us above, will only cover material questions which arise in a particular case for decision by the authority hearing the case or the appeal which, being necessary for passing the final order or giving the final decision in the appeal, had been the subject of controversy between the interested parties or on which the parties concerned have been given a hearing."
20. It has to be remembered that while deciding issues, the courts should not adopt a shortcut method of adjudicating upon a claim by resting its decision on one single point. The adjudication is essentially required to be made by way of reasoned judgement of the dispute upon a finding on the facts in controversy and application of law to the facts found which are essential attributes of a judicial trial. In a judicial trial the Judge not only must reach a conclusion which he regards as just, but, unless otherwise permitted, by the practice of the court or by law, he must record the ultimate mental process leading from the dispute to its solution. Here it would be apt to reproduce the following passage from the judgement passed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in
"6. Trial of a civil dispute in Court is intended to achieve, according to law and the procedure of the Court, a judicial determination between the contesting parties of the matter in controversy. Opportunity to the parties interested in the dispute to present their respective cases on questions of law as well as fact, ascertainment of facts by means of evidence tendered by the parties, and adjudication by a reasoned judgment of the dispute upon a finding on the facts in controversy and application of the law to the facts found, are essential attributes of a judicial trial. In a judicial trial the Judge not only must reach a conclusion which he regards as just, but, unless otherwise permitted, by the practice of the Court or by law, he must record the ultimate mental process leading from the dispute to its solution. A judicial determination of a disputed claim where substantial questions of law or fact arise is satisfactorily reached, only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that suggest themselves to the Judge; a mere order deciding the matter in dispute not supported by reasons is no judgment at all. Recording of reasons in support of a decision of a disputed claim serves more purposes than one. It is intended to ensure that the decision is not the result of whim or fancy, but of a judicial approach to the matter in contest : it is also intended to ensure adjudication of the matter according to law and the procedure established by law. A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the grounds on which the Court has decided against him, and more so, when the judgment is subject to appeal. The Appellate Court will then have adequate material on which it may determine whether the facts are properly ascertained, the law has been correctly applied and the resultant decision is just. It is unfortunate that the learned Trial Judge has recorded no reasons in support of his conclusion, and the High Court in appeal merely recorded that they thought that the plaintiff had sufficiently proved the case in the plaint."
21. The mode and manner in which issues have to be answered in terms of Rule 2 of Order 14 has been dealt with in detail by a Full Bench of this court in
"2. Rule 2 of Order 14 C.P.C. as it presently stands reads as under:
2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.--(1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues.
(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to--
(a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
(b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.
3. The present structure of Rule 2 was brought about by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. Before its amendment by the aforesaid amending Act of 1976, Rule 2 read as under:
Order XIV, Rule 2 - Issues of law and of fact. - Where the issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined.
4. When one draws a comparison between the earlier Rule 2 and the amended Rule 2, the comparison immediately leads to a conclusion that whereas under the old Rule 2 it was mandatory for a Court to try the issues of law in the first instance and to postpone the settlement of issues of fact until after findings had been arrived at with respect to the issues of law, under the new, amended Rule 2, as has been spelt out and clearly stipulated in Sub-rule (1) thereof, the legislature has mandated that a Court shall pronounce judgment on all issues, both of law as well as facts, notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of only on a preliminary issue. Under the new Rule 2 the only exception is contained in Sub-rule (2) thereof which, in a manner of speaking relaxes the aforesaid legislative mandate to a limited extent by conferring a discretion upon the Court that if it is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on a issue of law only, it may try that issue first, in the process postponing the settlement of other issues until the issue of law has been determined. This discretion even though conferred by the aforesaid legislative amendment has however been circumscribed and limited, specifically and explicitly only to two situations and these are that the issue or issues of law only upon which the case or any part of the case may be disposed of must relate to either the jurisdiction of the Court or a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. By a combined reading of Sub-rule (1) and Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 what therefore emerges is that, except in situations covered by Sub-rule (2) a Court must dispose of a suit as a whole, try all issues of law and fact together and accordingly pronounce judgment on all such issues even though the case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue. More importantly, and for the purposes of our case, in the light of the specific reference on the formulated question of law, Rule 2 as it presently stands caters to and creates two sets of situations in a suit. One situation is where, at the stage of framing of issues the Court exercises its discretion conferred upon it under Sub-rule (2) and frames, in the first instance issues of law only and passes an order specifically and explicitly proposing to try issues of law only, in the process postponing the settlement of other issues until after it has decided the issue of law only. In this situation, at the stage of determining or deciding the issues of law only the Court may either dispose of the suit based on such determination of the issues of law only, of course these issues of law relating to the jurisdiction of the Court or a bar to the maintenance of the suit created by law for the time being in force, or upon determination of issues of law only the Court may hold that the suit is maintainable and/or that it has jurisdiction also to try the suit and thus, consequently to proceed to settle other issues for trial and determination. Such a situation is contemplated by Sub-rule (2) and there is no manner of doubt that in taking recourse to such a situation the Court has the mandate as well as the sanction from the legislature.
5. The second, other situation which may arise is that the Court does not exercise its discretion, for any reason whatsoever, valid or otherwise, and at the stage of framing of the issues frames all the issues, of law as well as fact and proceeds to decide all such issues together. This course of action is contemplated by an explicit mandate of the legislature in Sub-rule (1). The question which has fallen for our consideration in this reference is that if a suit falls under the second situation where the Court has not exercised its discretion under Sub-rule (2) and it has not only framed all the issues, of law as well as fact and has also tried all such issues together, is it open to the Court, after the conclusion of the trial on all the issues to take up issues of law only and by adopting this principle of severability to proceed to dispose of the suit on the issues of law only, without at the same time according its consideration to other issues.
6. While examining the repercussions of the unamended Rule 2 and the ramifications arising therefrom, the Law Commission of India had opined as under:
"This rule has led to one difficulty. Where a case can be disposed of on a preliminary point (issue) of law, often the Courts do not inquire into the merits, with the result that when, on an appeal against the finding on the preliminary issue the decision of the Court on that issue is reversed, the case has to be remanded to the Court of first instance for trial on the other issues. This causes delay. It is considered that this delay should be eliminated, by providing that a Court must give judgment on all issues, excepting, of course, where the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction or where the suit is barred by any law for the time being in force".
7. The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the amending Act of 1976 whereby Rule 2 was amended read thus:
"Clause 67 - Sub-clause (ii). - Rule 2 is being substituted to provide that although a suit can be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall ordinarily pronounce judgment on all issues; but where any issue relating to the jurisdiction of the Court or a bar created by any law for the time being in force, the Court may postpone settlement of the other issues until the preliminary issue with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court or such bar has been determined and the Court may deal with the suit in accordance with the determination of such preliminary issue".
8. The legislative mandate is very clear and unambiguous. In the light of the past experience that the old Rule 2 whereby, in the fact situation of the trial Court deciding only preliminary issues and neither trying nor deciding other issues, whenever an appeal against the judgment was filed before the Appeal Court and the Appeal Court on finding that the decision of the trial Court on preliminary issues deserved to be reversed, the case per force had to be remanded to the trial Court for trial on other issues. This resulted in delay in the disposal of the cases. To eliminate this delay and to ensure the expeditious disposal of the suits, both at the stage of the trial as well as at the appeal stage, the legislature decided to provide for a mechanism whereby, subject to the exception created under Sub-rule (2), all issues, both of law and fact were required to be decided together and the suit had to be disposed of as a whole, of course based upon the findings of the trial Court on all the issues, both of law and fact.
9. Based upon the aforesaid reasons therefore, and in the light of legislative background of Rule 2 and the legislative intent as well as mandate based upon such background, as well as on its plain reading, we have no doubt in our minds that except in situations perceived or warranted under Sub-rule (2) where a Court in fact frames only issues of law in the first instance and postpones settlement of other issues, under Sub-rule (1), clearly and explicitly in situations where the Court has framed all issues together, both of law as well as facts and has also tried all these issues together, it is not open to the Court in such a situation to adopt the principle of severability and proceed to decide issues of law first, without taking up simultaneously other issues for decision. This course of action is not available to a Court because Sub-rule (1) does not permit the Court to adopt any such principle of severability and to dispose of a suit only on preliminary issues, or what can be termed as issues of law. Sub-rule (1) clearly mandates that in a situation contemplated under it, where all the issues have been framed together and have also been taken up for adjudication during the course of the trial, these must be decided together and the judgment in the suit as a whole must be pronounced by the Court covering all the issues framed in the suit."
22. While answering issue No. 1, the learned single Judge concluded that plaintiff had failed to prove that sons of Goru Mall constituted a Joint Hindu Family and carried on joint business and on basis of such findings dismissed the suit without answering the other issues. Now in case the other issues more particularly issue No. 3 is seen, it would be apparent that the same was in no manner connected with issue No. 1 and was therefore, required to be answered separately irrespective of the findings recorded while answering issue No. 1. Even otherwise issues not only of fact but even of law, like valuation (issue No. 8) and limitation (issue No. 9) had been framed and therefore, also it was incumbent that separate findings qua each of the issue should have been recorded.
23. The main object of a judgement after all is to support by the most cogent reasons that suggest themselves, the final conclusion at which the Judge has conscientiously arrived. It is the mandate of Orders 14 and 20 of the Code that the court shall state its finding or decision and reasons thereof upon each separate issue and all the distinct issues have to be answered by findings supported by reasons, unless of course the finding upon one or more of the issue is sufficient for the decision of the suit. Despite this mandate of deciding the issues separately, if the court comes to the conclusion that certain issues need to be decided together, there is no bar to do the same. The impugned judgement does not in any manner confirm or comply with the provisions of either Order 14 or Order 20 CPC.
24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered view that the judgement passed by the learned single Judge does not comply with the mandate of law and the learned single Judge could not have dismissed the suit by deciding only issue No. 1 and was required to decide all the issues.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the judgement and decree passed by the learned single Judge are set-aside and the matter is remanded to the learned single Judge to decide the case afresh in accordance with law.
