Khandokar Afia Sultana and Others Vs P.O., MACT and Others

RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT (JAIPUR BENCH) 6 May 2014 SB Civil Writ Petition Nos. 8812, 18561, 18604 and 18613/2013 (2014) 05 RAJ CK 0077
Bench: Single Bench
Result Published
Acts Referenced

Judgement Snapshot

Case Number

SB Civil Writ Petition Nos. 8812, 18561, 18604 and 18613/2013

Hon'ble Bench

R.S. Chauhan, J.

Advocates

Vinay Mathur, for the Appellant; Rizwan Ahmed, for the Respondent

Final Decision

Allowed

Acts Referred
  • Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) - Section 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 140, 158, 165, 166, 166(1)(d) - Powers of Attorney Act, 1882 - Section 2

Judgement Text

Translate:

R.S. Chauhan, J.�Since these petitions arise out of the same impugned judgment and involve similar issue to be decided by this court, these petitions have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment.

2. The petitioners-claimants are aggrieved by the judgment dated 9.2.2012 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ajmer whereby the learned Tribunal has directed that the claim petitions be returned back to the petitioners ostensibly on the ground that the Tribunal does not have territorial jurisdiction to hear the claim petitions.

3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioners-claimants are residents of Dhaka, Bangladesh. On 17.2.1997, the claimants, alongwith their other relatives, had come to Ajmer for visiting the holy shrine of Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Hasan Chishti. Having done so, on 18.2.1997 they were returning back from Ajmer to Jaipur. When they reached near Village Mokhampura, Tehsil Dudu, District Jaipur, suddenly a bus, bearing registration No. RJ14-P-2218, being driven rashly and negligently, came from opposite side, and collided with the Matador in which the claimants and their relatives were traveling. Consequently, three persons expired on the spot, and others were seriously injured. Since the claimants lost their family members, and since others suffered injuries, they decided to file claim petitions. However, as they were residents of Bangladesh, they did not know anyone except Jaan Mohammad Chishti, a Khadim at the holy shrine and through him, Mr. Ramesh Dhabhai, a practicing Advocate at Ajmer. Therefore in order to pursue their legal remedies, the petitioners gave their power of attorney to both, Jaan Mohammad Chishti and Ramesh Dhabhai. Consequently, Jaan Mohammad Chishti filed different claim petitions on behalf of the petitioners and others. All the claim petitions were decided by judgment dated 26.2.2011 by the Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No. 4, Ajmer. The learned Judge returned the claim petitions on the ground that the court did not have the territorial jurisdiction to hear the claim petitions. Since the petitioners and others were aggrieved by the said judgment, they challenged the same before this court. By judgment dated 10.5.2011, this court remanded the case back to the learned Tribunal. After hearing both the parties, by judgment dated 9.2.2012 the learned Tribunal maintained its earlier judgment and again returned the claim petitions to the petitioners. Hence, this petition before this court.

4. Mr. Vinay Mathur, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has vehemently contended that while passing the impugned order, the learned Tribunal has ignored Section 166(1)(d) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (''the Act'', for short). According to the said provision, an application for compensation can be filed "by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be". Moreover, according to Sub-clause (2) of Section 166 of the Act, the claimant has an option to submit his claim petition either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides. Since Jaan Mohd. Chishti was a resident of Ajmer, he as the ''claimant'' could file the claim petitions before the learned Tribunal at Ajmer. Therefore, the conclusion drawn by the learned Tribunal is erroneous. Hence, return of the claim petitions is legally unsustainable.

5. On the other hand, Mr. Rizwan Ahmed, the learned counsel for the respondent-insurance company, has pleaded that Section 166 of the Act is divided into two parts, namely Sub-clause (1) and Sub-clause (2). While Sub-clause (1) does mention "any agent duly authorised", Sub-clause (2) does not use such words and merely uses the word "claimant". Therefore, the option given in Sub-clause (2) is available to the "claimant", but not to "the agent duly authorised by the claimant". Hence, according to Sub-clause (2), the power of attorney holder is duty bound to institute a claim petition with the Claims Tribunal under whose jurisdiction accident has taken place, or under whose jurisdiction the claimant resides, or carries on his business, or in whose jurisdiction the defendant resides. But the power of attorney holder cannot file claim petition at the place where he himself/herself resides. Therefore, the learned Tribunal was justified in returning the claim petition. Hence, the learned counsel has supported the impugned judgment.

6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment.

7. Section 166 of the Act is as under:--

"166. Application for compensation.--(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section 91) of section 165 may be made-

(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or

(b) by the owner of the property; or

(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or

(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be:

Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application.

(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendants resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed:

Provided that where no claim for compensation under section 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant.

(3) ******

(4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act."

8. While interpreting the provision, the Section has to be read as a whole and not in a piecemeal. Therefore, the word "claimant" used in Sub-clause (2) would have to be interpreted keeping in mind those persons who have been enumerated in Sub-clause (1) and have been given the right to file an application for compensation. According to Sub-clause (1), the application can be filed either by the person who has sustained the injury, or by the owner of the property, or by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, or most importantly for our purpose, "by any agent duly authorized by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased", as the case may be. Thus, a power of attorney holder can submit a claim petition. According to Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882, the power of attorney holder steps into the shoes of the claimant. Hence, he does not submit the claim petition in his own private capacity, but merely as the claimant himself. Therefore, the word "claimant" used in Sub-clause (2) of Section 166 of the Act of 1988 would have to be interpreted as the four categories of persons enumerated in Sub-clause (1). Needless to say, one of the categories is of an agent duly authorised. Hence, the word "claimant" would, ipso facto, include a power of attorney holder. Therefore, the power of attorney holder can also file a claim petition before the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction either he resides or carries on his business.

9. In the case of Kusum Devi and Others Vs. Dungaram and Others, , this court had noticed the fact that Section 166 makes a clear departure from the Civil Procedure Code which deals with Sections 16 to 20 of the Code which deal with the place of suing. Section 166 of the Act of 1988 is a beneficial piece of legislation whose intention was to make it easier for a claimant to file his claim petition before the Claims Tribunal under whose jurisdiction either he resides or carries on his business, or in whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, or in whose jurisdiction the accident had occurred. If the interpretation given by the learned Tribunal is to be accepted then it would rob Section 166 of its beneficial nature as the original claimant who gives a power of attorney to other person would not be able to file his claim petition conveniently. For, his power of attorney holder would not be permitted to file a claim petition before the Claims Tribunal under whose jurisdiction he resides, or carries on his business. An interpretation that defeats the very purpose of Section 166 is clearly unacceptable. Therefore, while reading Section 166 in a holistic manner the only interpretation that can be placed is that a power of attorney holder would have the same discretion as the claimant mentioned in Sub-clause (2) of Section 166 and would be in a position to institute a claim petition before a Claims Tribunal within whose local jurisdiction he/she resides, or carries on business. Hence, the interpretation given by the learned Tribunal is misplaced.

10. For the reasons mentioned above, these petitions are hereby, allowed. The order dated 9.2.2012 is hereby, set aside and the case is remanded back to the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ajmer to decide the matter afresh keeping in mind the view expressed by this court while interpreting Section 166 of the Act of 1988, within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment.

From The Blog
Madras High Court to Hear School’s Plea Against State Objection to RSS Camp on Campus
Feb
07
2026

Court News

Madras High Court to Hear School’s Plea Against State Objection to RSS Camp on Campus
Read More
Delhi High Court Quashes Ban on Medical Students’ Inter-College Migration, Calls Rule Arbitrary
Feb
07
2026

Court News

Delhi High Court Quashes Ban on Medical Students’ Inter-College Migration, Calls Rule Arbitrary
Read More