Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.@mdashThe petitioner has sought regular bail in case FIR No. 25/2015, registered at Police Station, Nirmand, District Kullu, on 24.03.2015, under Sections 20, 60 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (for short the ''Act'') and under Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
2. The records of the investigation have been produced and status report filed by the prosecution. As per prosecution story, the petitioner was driver in Car No. HP-12E-5851. This car was intercepted by the police at Block Kainchi, Nirmand. At the relevant time, the owner of the vehicle was accompanying the vehicle. On inquiry, the petitioner and the owner of the vehicle could not give satisfactory reply as to why they were at Nirmand. Upon this, the police got suspicious and after associating witnesses conducted search and recovered 960 grams of Charas from the co-accused.
3. The case of the petitioner is that he is innocent and is employed as a driver with Avtar Singh the other co-accused, who admittedly was carrying the bag, which was searched. It was Avtar Singh, who had been given an option by the Investigating Officer of being searched under Section 50 of the Act and the petitioner has only been roped in because he was driving the car at the relevant time that too in his capacity as a driver with the owner Avtar Singh.
4. The learned Additional Advocate General has opposed the bail application by alleging that the petitioner is an accused in a serious offence and bail ought not to be granted in such cases.
5. What probably has been over-looked by Mr. Verma is the fact that the object of bail is only to secure the appearance of the accused person at the time of trial by granting reasonable amount of bail. Therefore, the object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. At this stage deprivation of liberty will have to be considered a punishment, unless of course, the presence of the accused person cannot be secured. The Courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. Even otherwise, the law with regard to bail is now well settled. As early as in the year 1978, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in
"22. In other non-bailable cases the Court will exercise its judicial discretion in favour of granting bail subject to sub- section (3) of Section 437 Cr.P.C. if it deems necessary to act under it. Unless exceptional circumstances are brought to the notice of the Court which may defeat proper investigation and a fair trial, the Court will not decline to grant bail to a person who is not accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is also clear that when an accused is brought before the Court of a Magistrate with the allegation against him of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, he has ordinarily no option in the matter but to refuse bail subject, however, to the first proviso to Section 437(1) Cr.P.C. and in a case where the Magistrate entertains a reasonable belief on the materials that the accused has not been guilty of such an offence. This will, however, be an extraordinary occasion since there will be some materials at the stage of initial arrest, for the accusation or for strong suspicion of commission by the person of such an offence.******
24. Section 439(1) Cr.P.C. of the new Code, on the other hand, confers special powers on the High Court or the Court of Session in respect of bail. Unlike under Section 437(1) there is no ban imposed under Section 439(1), Cr.P.C. against granting of bail by the High Court or the Court of Session to persons accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is, however, legitimate to suppose that the High Court or the Court of Session will be approached by an accused only after he has failed before the Magistrate and after the investigation has progressed throwing light on the evidence and circumstances implicating the accused. Even so, the High Court or the Court of Session will have to exercise its judicial discretion in considering the question of granting of bail under Section 439(1) Cr.P.C. of the new Code. The overriding considerations in granting bail to which we adverted to earlier and which are common both in the case of Section 437(1) and Section 439(1) Cr.P.C. of the new Code are the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood, of the accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offence; of jeopardising his own life being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case; of tampering with witnesses; the history of the case as well as of its investigation and other relevant grounds which, in view of so many valuable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out."
6. The Hon''ble Apex Court in
"(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced;
and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail."
7. Thereafter, in a detailed judgment, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in
"111. No inflexible guidelines or straitjacket formula can be provided for grant or refusal of anticipatory bail. We are clearly of the view that no attempt should be made to provide rigid and inflexible guidelines in this respect because all circumstances and situations of future cannot be clearly visualized for the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail. In consonance with the legislative intention the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail should necessarily depend on facts and circumstances of each case. As aptly observed in the Constitution Bench decision in Sibbia''s case (supra) that the High Court or the Court of Sessions to exercise their jurisdiction under section 438 Cr.P.C. by a wise and careful use of their discretion which by their long training and experience they are ideally suited to do. In any event, this is the legislative mandate which we are bound to respect and honour.
112. The following factors and parameters can be taken into consideration while dealing with the anticipatory bail:
(i) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made;
(ii) The antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether the accused has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence;
(iii) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice;
(iv) The possibility of the accused''s likelihood to repeat similar or the other offences.
(v) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her.
(vi) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail particularly in cases of large magnitude affecting a very large number of people.
(vii) The courts must evaluate the entire available material against the accused very carefully. The court must also clearly comprehend the exact role of the accused in the case. The cases in which accused is implicated with the help of sections 34 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, the court should consider with even greater care and caution because over implication in the cases is a matter of common knowledge and concern;
(viii) While considering the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors namely, no prejudice should be caused to the free, fair and full investigation and there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the accused;
(ix) The court to consider reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant;
(x) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail."
113. Arrest should be the last option and it should be restricted to those exceptional cases where arresting the accused is imperative in the facts and circumstances of that case. The court must carefully examine the entire available record and particularly the allegations which have been directly attributed to the accused and these allegations are corroborated by other material and circumstances on record.
114. These are some of the factors which should be taken into consideration while deciding the anticipatory bail applications. These factors are by no means exhaustive but they are only illustrative in nature because it is difficult to clearly visualize all situations and circumstances in which a person may pray for anticipatory bail. If a wise discretion is exercised by the Judge concerned, after consideration of entire material on record then most of the grievances in favour of grant of or refusal of bail will be taken care of. The legislature in its wisdom has entrusted the power to exercise this jurisdiction only to the judges of the superior courts. In consonance with the legislative intention we should accept the fact that the discretion would be properly exercised. In any event, the option of approaching the superior court against the court of Sessions or the High Court is always available."
(Emphasis supplied)
8. In
"21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.
22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some un-convicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, ''necessity'' is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.
23. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of a refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any Court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an un-convicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.
40. The grant or refusal to grant bail lies within the discretion of the Court. The grant or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. But at the same time, right to bail is not to be denied merely because of the sentiments of the community against the accused. The primary purposes of bail in a criminal case are to relieve the accused of imprisonment, to relieve the State of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to keep the accused constructively in the custody of the Court, whether before or after conviction, to assure that he will submit to the jurisdiction of the Court and be in attendance thereon whenever his presence is required."
9. Taking into consideration the aforesaid parameters and principles, it would be relevant to note here that the prosecution story in itself acknowledges the fact that it was the other co-accused, who was carrying the bag, who had been given option under Section 50 of the Act and it was from his custody that the contraband is alleged to have been recovered and the only role attributed to the petitioner was that he was driving the car. But, then it is not even disputed that the petitioner infact was employed as a driver with the other co-accused. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was aware of the fact that the co-accused was carrying Charas. Once it is, prima-facie, established that the petitioner was unaware about this fact, then in such circumstances, the principle of conscious possession, at this stage, cannot be applied. Whether the petitioner was infact having knowledge that the co-accused was carrying the contraband can only be established in a full-fledged trial and at present after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that it would be travesty of justice to deny bail to the petitioner.
10. No doubt, the accusations against the petitioner are grave and serious in nature, but then a balance has to be struck between the rights of the petitioner and the rights of the police to carry out free and fair investigation. On the basis of the records, it cannot be said that the petitioner would in any manner impede the course and cause of justice or that the petitioner in any manner hamper the free, fair and full investigation. Since one of the main objects of refusal of bail is to secure the presence of the accused, I find that the petitioner is a permanent resident of tehsil and district, Hamirpur and I have no reason to doubt that the petitioner would either jump the bail or flee from justice. Even otherwise, stringent conditions for securing the presence of the petitioner for the purpose of trial etc. can always be imposed.
11. Accordingly, the bail application is allowed and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail in FIR No. No. 25/2015, registered at Police Station, Nirmand, District Kullu, on 24.03.2015, under Sections 20, 60 of the Act and under Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act, on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Kullu, subject to the following conditions:--
"(i) he shall make himself available for the purpose of interrogation, if so required and regularly attend the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason to do so, seek exemption from appearance by filing appropriate application;
(ii) he shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence nor hamper the investigation of the case in any manner whatsoever;
(iii) he shall not make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him/her from disclosing such facts to the Court or the Police Officer; and
(iv) he shall not leave the territory of India without prior permission of the Court."
Learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Kullu, is directed to comply with the directions issued by the High Court, vide communication No. HHC.VIG./Misc. Instructions/93-IV.7139 dated 18.03.2013.
12. Any observation made hereinabove shall not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case and the trial Court shall decide the matter uninfluenced by any observation made hereinabove.
Petition stands disposed of.
