Sudhir Agarwal, J@mdashThis appeal under section 100 C.P.C. has been brought against the judgment and decree dated 26.10.1988 passed by Sri Kashi Nath Pandey, VIIIth Additional District Judge, Azamgarh in Civil Appeal No. 204 of 1983, whereby having allowed the appeal, it has set aside the judgment and decree dated 28.4.1983 passed by the Munsif City, Azamgarh. As a result of allowing appeal the Lower Appellate Court has dismissed the suit also. It is thus a plaintiffs'' second appeal. The plaint case set up by plaintiffs, Raj Kishore, Kedar and Kamla, sons of Sri Ramnath is that the disputed holding, i.e., Araji No. 48, area 175 Kadi, shown in the plaint map as A, B, C, D was earlier Sirdari of Sri Ram Dev and now has become Bhumidhari. Ramdev had two sons Markandey and Ramnath. Ramnath died earlier and the plaintiffs are sons of Ramnath. After the death of Ramdev, Markandey, son of Ramdev, and the appellants, who are grandsons of Ramdev, succeeded property in dispute. Since Markandey was Karta of family and appellants were minor, the property was recorded in revenue records in the name of Markandey. After death of Markandey, the defendants, who are sons and successors of Markandey, are co-owners along with plaintiffs of property in dispute. Besides disputed holding, Markandey constructed a house at Araji No. 11, area 245 Kadi, situated at Mauja Usufabad, from the funds of joint family. At the time of separation, plaintiffs claimed their share in that house but Markandey told that it is his individual property. Consequently, plaintiffs instituted Original Suit No. 35 of 1974 for partition. The suit was decreed holding that plaintiffs of Suit No. 35 of 1974 had half of the share in the said house. The judgment and decree of Trial Court was confirmed after dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 323 of 1975.
2. Sri Kashi, father of defendants No. 1 to 5, started construction in the disputed land which comprises of a boundary wall, three rooms on eastern side and a verandah on northern side. When plaintiffs objected to the said construction, they came to know that Markandey has transferred by sale, the said land to Kashi. On inquiry the plaintiffs came to know that a sale deed was executed by Markandey in favour of Kashi on 18.3.1963. The disputed construction commenced by defendants'' father in 1976 but when obstructed by plaintiffs, was stopped. The plaintiffs also took possession of entire land which is continuing. Since plaintiffs now apprehend a further construction and/or attempt to dispossess them from disputed land, therefore, a relief for mandatory injunction was prayed that defendants No. 1 to 5 be directed to remove entire construction already raised on disputed land and restore original condition of land. A decree for possession was also prayed and a decree of declaration in respect of sale deed dated 18.3.1963 was prayed that it should be cancelled. The suit was instituted by filing a plaint dated 2.8.1979, which was registered in the Court of Munsif Haveli, Azamgarh on 7.8.1979.
3. Defendants No. 1 to 3 contested suit pleading that Markandey was tenure holder and transferred by sale, the disputed land vide sale deed dated 18.3.1963. He also handed over possession thereof to transferee, i.e., Kashi, father of defendants No. 1 to 3. The construction over property in dispute started in 1963 itself. The PWD officials objected construction on the ground that without permission it should not have been raised and that is why it was stopped. Thereafter, Sri Kashi died and construction activities could not be restored. The claim of plaintiffs that they are in possession of disputed property is incorrect.
4. The Trial Court formulated seven issues as under:
"1. Whether the plaintiff is the owner in possession of disputed land being araji No. 48 measuring 175 kari?
2. Whether the disputed construction merits being demolished?
3. Whether the said sale-deed dated 18.3.1963 is liable to be cancelled on the grounds enumerated in plaint?
4. Whether the suit is time-barred?
5. Whether the plaintiff has no right to file a suit?
6. Whether the suit is undervalued and Court fee is underpaid?
7. Any other relief which the plaintiff is entitled to get?"
(English translation by the Court)
5. Issue No. 6 was tried as a preliminary issue and answered vide order dated 20.5.1982, whereupon additional stamp duty was also paid by plaintiffs, after amendment of plaint.
6. Proceeding further, issues No. 1, 2 and 3 were taken together and answered in favour of plaintiffs and against defendants. Issues No. 4 and 5 were taken together and same were also answered in favour of plaintiffs. Consequently, the suit was decreed and a preliminary decree was directed to be prepared declaring that plaintiffs have half of the share in disputed land, i.e., Araji No. 48 area 175 Kadi and till a final decree is made, defendants No. 1 to 5 were restrained from raising further construction till partition of disputed premises is finalized.
7. Aggrieved thereto the defendants No. 1 to 3, 4 and 5 preferred Civil Appeal No. 204 of 1983. The Lower Appellate Court considered appeal on the issues formulated by Trial Court and reversing the findings, allowed appeal, vide judgment and decree date 26.10.1988, set aside Trial Court''s judgment and decree dated 28.4.1983 and dismissed original suit.
8. This Court while admitting appeal after hearing under Order XLI, Rule 11, C.P.C., formulated following three substantial questions of law:
"1. Whether Ram Deo, grand-father of appellants having been recorded in Clause 20 as occupier of the land without consent of the persons, if any, entered in column 5 of the Khasra, for 4 years in the Khatauni of 1356-F, and had not been ejected under section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act would become hereditary tenant without being recorded as a sub-tenant and upon his death on 25.6.1951 the inheritance would devolve under section 25 of U.P. Tenancy Act upon his grand sons (the appellants) to the extent of half share along with his other sons Markandey and the defendants and Markandey would become bhumidhar under section 18 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act?
2. Whether Markandey could alone acquired Adhiwasi right on the basis of entry of his name in Khatauni of 1359-F, who was Karta of Joint Hindu Family, in view of the fact that Ramdev had two sons, Markandey and Ramnath, Ramnath predeceased and plaintiffs are his sons, should be deemed to be in possession being co-sharer?
3. Whether Karta of Joint Hindu Family had a power to transfer coparcenary and as such transfer by Markandey by sale deed dated 18.3.1963 in favour of defendants-respondents can be justified?"
9. Before learned Counsel for the parties commenced hearing under Order LXI, Rule 13, C.P.C., it was also agreed between them that there is one more substantial question of law which has arisen in the matter regarding limitation and the same should also be allowed to be addressed by them. This Court, therefore, formulated one more substantial question of law as under:
4. Whether the Lower Appellate Court has rightly held that suit in question was barred by limitation?
10. Before examining the aforesaid questions, it would be appropriate to notice here at the evidence adduced by parties before Courts below which has been examined by both the Courts below in recording findings in one or the other way.
11. The family pedigree of plaintiffs and defendants as is evident from record is as under:
12. Ramnath died on 1.9.1944 and his father Ramdev died on 25.6.1951. Copy of Khatauni of 1356 Fasli (i.e., period from 1.7.1948 to 30.6.1949) (Exhibit 3) shows name of Ramdev at Serial No. 48 as occupier of disputed land, the original tenure holder whereof was Sri Gaya. The nature of his (Ramdev) possession shown was "unauthorized", i.e., possession without consent of actual tenure holder. The period of unauthorized possession shown in 1356 Fasli was 4 years. In the copy of Khatauni of 1359 Fasli (Exhibit Ka-3, paper No. 41-C), name of Markandey was shown as the person in possession for last 7 years. These two documents are the basis whereupon Trial Court declared that plaintiffs were owner having share to the extent of 50% of the disputed land, and for this reason alone, Trial Court also held, that Markandey was not entitled to transfer, by sale deed dated 18.03.1963, entire disputed land.
13. On the question of limitation, Trial Court has acknowledged knowledge of sale deed to plaintiffs during pendency of Suit No. 35 of 1974 and construction commenced in January, 1976. The Trial Court also considered oral deposition of DW-1, Heera and PW-2, Hari Shankar and held that suit was not barred by time.
14. The judgment of Lower Appellate Court shows that there existed some more relevant evidences on record, i.e., sale deed of 1966 (Paper No. 51-C, Exhibit 9), whereby Markandey, Kedar, Raj Kishore and Kamla transferred joint family property, i.e., Araji No. 47, area 99 Kadi in favour of Ram Asrey, Sri Ram, Paras and Vijay Bahadur and copy of Khatauni 1370-1373 Fasli (Exhibit-2) showing name of Markandey as the sole Sirdar of Araji No. 48.
15. Now I proceed to examine the aforesaid substantial questions of law.
16. It is not in dispute that in Khatauni 1356 Fasli (1.7.1948-30.6.1949), name of Sri Ramdev was recorded, who died on 25.6.1951, i.e., 1358 Fasli. In the entire plaint it is not stated, whether the disputed land was Sirdari of Ramdev since beginning or it became Sirdari at a subsequent period. In para 1 of plaint, the case set up by plaintiffs was that Araji No. 48 was earlier Sirdari of Ramdev and has become now Bhumidhari. The Trial Court, on the contrary, though noticed that Ramdev was recorded in Khatauni of 1356 Fasli but in what manner or capacity, this aspect has not been given any due attention at all. The Lower Appellate Court has given details in this regard and pointed out that in Khatauni of 1356 Fasli (Exhibit-3), Ramdev was mentioned at Serial No. 48 being in possession for the last four years but his possession was not shown as a sub-tenant. On the contrary it was under column 20, i.e., such occupier who has taken possession of land without consent of actual tenure holder. Learned Counsel for the appellants could not show that aforesaid finding recorded by Lower Appellate Court is either on account of any misreading of document or otherwise is incorrect.
17. Now the question is, Whether Ramdev matured his rights over disputed land at any point of time.
18. Admittedly, Ramdev died on 25.6.1951 (1358 Fasli) as has also been noticed by Trial Court relying on Ex-hibit-7. How and when Ramdev matured right of hereditary tenant could not be shown by learned Counsel for plaintiffs-appellants. The plaint case set up by plaintiffs, suggested that Ramdev was alive on the date of vesting but the facts and record are otherwise. Ramdev died in 1358 Fasli, i.e., on 25.6.1951. The date of vesting under section 4 of U.P. Zamidari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1950") admittedly is 1.7.1952. On this aspect there is no dispute. The death of Ramdev is much before the date of vesting, hence there could not have been any question of acquiring rights by him, with reference to section 20(b)(i) of Act, 1950, which reads as under:
"20. A tenant of sir, sub-tenant or an occupant to be an adhivasi--Every person, who:--
(a)......
(b) was recorded as occupant:--
(i) of any land (other than groveland or land to which section 16 applies) or land referred to in the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 27 of the U.P. Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947 in the khasra or khatauni of 1356 F. prepared under sections 28 and 33 respectively of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, or who was on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting entitled to regain possession thereof under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 27 of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947 (U.P. Act X of 1947), or."
19. On the date of vesting, i.e., 1.7.1952, Ramdev was not alive to claim any right over land in dispute and on the basis of entry of 1356 Fasli, no rights could have been claimed under section 20 of Act, 1951 by his heirs as held in Kapeldeo Kunwar v. Anant Nonia, 1. 1967 RD 334, wherein this Court held that right of Adhiwasi came into effect only from 1.7.1952 hence question of vesting, where death of an Adhiwasi is prior to that, does not arise. If the name of a person was not recorded in cultivatory possession in 1359 Fasli, he cannot claim any right under section 20 of Act, 1951. It further said:
"Adhivasi rights are acquired by certain persons under section 20 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or under section 3 of the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, 1952, if they satisfy certain conditions. The conditions relevant for the purposes of this appeal are that the claimant should have been a recorded occupant in 1356 Fasli in the former case and in cultivatory possession in 1359 Fasli in the latter. If these conditions are satisfied, the person so recorded or so in cultivatory possession would become an adhivasi. The person recorded as an occupant in 1356 Fasli was Balkhira and even the person who was in cultivatory possession in 1359 Fasli was Balkhira. Balkhira could, therefore, acquire adhivasi rights under either of the two provisions. But according to the finding of the Assistant Collector which was not challenged before the Civil Judge, he died before July 1, 1952, with effect from which date adhivasi rights came into existence. Balkhira, therefore, never became an adhivasi of these plots and the plaintiffs who claim to be his heirs, were neither the recorded occupants in 1356 Fasli, nor were they in cultivatory possession of the plots in 1359 Fasli. There is no provision either under section 20 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or under section 3 of the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act, 1952, that even the heirs of an occupant or a person in cultivatory possession would acquire adhivasi rights. The plaintiffs cannot, therefore, claim adhivasi rights in these plots. They themselves do not satisfy the conditions prescribed under either of the two provisions and there is no provision under which they could inherit the rights of an occupant or the person in cultivatory possession before July 1, 1952."
(Emphasis added)
20. So far as maturity of rights under United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1939") are concerned, the discussion made above makes it clear that in 1356 Fasli possession of Ramdev was shown "unauthorized" and without consent of tenure holder Gaya. The said possession was continuing for the last 4 years. 1356 Fasli means 1.7.1948 to 30.6.1949 and if we go four years back thereto, it takes us to a period between 1.7.1944 to 30.6.1945, i.e., 1352 Fasli. In section 180 of Act, 1939, the period of limitation for ejectment of a trespasser by tenant-in-chief was six years where the land over which trespass has been committed, was contiguous to any land lawfully occupied by trespasser. The limitation commences from the first July following the date of such occupation or following the date of commencement of said, whichever is later. The relevant provision pertaining to limitation as provided in IVth Schedule, Group-B, Item 18, is reproduced as under:
21. Taking the entry of 1356 Fasli in respect of Ramdev, the period of four years would begin in 1352 Fasli. Hence period of limitation of six years would commence on first July of 1945 i.e. 1353 Fasli. Ramdev died in 1358 Fasli, therefore, the period of six years had not expired on that date at all. The question of acquiring hereditary tenant, having not been ejected under section 180 of Act, 1939, would not have arisen since the period of limitation had not expired till then. In the result, the question of devolution of hereditary rights upon heirs of Ramdev would not arise. Even otherwise, there is no such pleading. In fact, it cannot be said that aforesaid question has actually arisen from the judgment of Court below when there was no such pleading at all. The parties obviously could not have led evidence also in respect of a fact which is not part of pleading. The question No. 1, therefore, in my view, would have to be answered against plaintiffs.
22. The next question then arises, whether there was any evidence to show that Markandey was Karta of Joint Hindu Family and, therefore, in 1359 Fasli only his name was entered in revenue record.
23. So far as questions No. 2 and 3 are concerned, I find that the Lower Appellate Court also has proceeded with a view that Markandey continued to be Karta of Joint Hindu Family till 1974 and if that be so, the property in dispute being part of Joint Hindu Family, merely for the reason that it was shown in the name of Markandey only, would not cease its nature of Joint Hindu Family property. Markandey individually was not entitled to transfer a Joint Hindu Family property by executing a sale deed dated 18.3.1963. This is a finding of fact recorded by Courts below and in absence of anything to show that aforesaid findings are perverse or otherwise legally incorrect, I find no reason to take a difference view and answer the questions No. 2 and 3 in favour of appellants, i.e., questions No. 2 and 3 are answered in negative.
24. Now comes question No. 4, regarding limitation.
25. Three reliefs were sought by plaintiffs. First, mandatory injunction for removal of construction already raised; second, restoration of possession to plaintiffs; and, third, cancellation of sale deed dated 18.3.1963.
26. Different provisions of limitation in respect of all the three reliefs are attracted. There is no otherwise specific entry in the schedule of Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1963") which governs period of limitation in respect of a suit for mandatory injunction for removal of alleged unauthorized or illegal construction. It is thus Article 113 of Schedule of Act, 1963 which can be taken recourse to for the purpose of looking into limitation, which reads as under:
27. The period of limitation of three years commences when right to sue accrues. For the purpose of seeking an injunction for removal of alleged unauthorized or illegal construction, the right to sue would accrue when construction commences and comes to the knowledge of plaintiffs. Though the defendants have pleaded that property in dispute came to their possession in 1963 and disputed construction commenced at that time itself but the plaintiffs have pleaded that construction commenced only in 1974 or 1975 inasmuch as in para 8 of the plaint it is said that during pendency of Suit No. 35 of 1974, father of defendant (first set), i.e., defendant No. 5 started raising construction, i.e., a permanent boundary over disputed plot and three rooms on the northern side and one Varandah, whereupon plaintiffs raised objection and thereafter they got further construction stopped. Then again in para 10 it is said that during pendency of this case in January, 1976, Kashi and other defendants (first set) commenced construction of a boundary wall on the disputed plot and completed three rooms and one Varandah. In para 16 it says that cause of action arose when construction was started in September, 1976.
28. If the averments contained in para 8 of the plaint are taken that construction of boundary wall, rooms and Varandah commenced during pendency of Suit No. 35 of 1974, which was decided by 1975 even if no particular date is given, still the period of three years by any means would expire in 1978. The present suit, seeking mandatory injunction for removal of construction, has been filed in August, 1979 and, therefore, so far as aforesaid relief is concerned, it was apparently barred by limitation.
29. The another date which has been given in para 10 of the plaint is January, 1976. If this Court takes the aforesaid date when cause of action accrued, even then the suit filed in August, 1979 would obviously be barred by time for the reason that period of three years would expire in January, 1979. As per the own case of plaintiffs when construction in question commenced in January, 1976, as has been pleaded in para 10 of the plaint, from own showing of plaintiffs suit is apparently barred by limitation. Three years period expired in January, 1979 while the plaint is dated 2.8.1979 and was registered by Trial Court on 7.8.1979. Regarding commencement of construction in oral statement PW-1, Kamla Prasad Upadhyay has said in examination-in-chief as under:
"In January 1976, the defendant Kashi started erecting a boundary over the suit area. He constructed three rooms and a courtyard in three portions of the disputed plot."
(English translation by the Court)
30. Same thing he has repeated in cross-examination also. Once the construction as per own admission of plaintiffs commenced in January, 1976 and the items for which he has prayed for removal, i.e., boundary wall, rooms and Varandah were constructed, the cause of action or the right to sue not only accrued but completed. If suit was not filed within three years thereof it was clearly barred by limitation. The commencement of cause of action has been specifically stated by plaintiffs in the suit, i.e., January, 1976. It is also stated that construction completed but when it was actually completed, has not been stated specifically. No evidence has been led despite the fact that plea of limitation has been taken. Even in the oral examination no evidence has been led by plaintiffs to show that construction had not completed in January, 1976 but on a date which would bring the suit within the period of limitation, if this Court treats the right to sue as continuing right starting from the date when construction commenced till it was completed. Once the right to sue accrued in January, 1976, in order to bring suit for injunction seeking removal of construction, the onus was upon the plaintiffs to show that this relief was within the period of limitation of three years when the suit was instituted. In absence of anything to show, I have no hesitation in holding that suit in respect of aforesaid relief was barred by limitation.
31. Then comes the second relief, i.e., cancellation of a document, i.e., sale deed dated 18.3.1963. For the purpose of seeking declaration of a document as illegal or for cancelling a document, the limitation prescribed under Article 58 or 59 of the Schedule of Act, 1963 will be attracted. Both read as under:
32. There is no pleading with respect to knowledge gathered by plaintiffs regarding sale deed dated 183.1963 so as to find out, whether suit in respect of aforesaid relief was within the limitation or not. In absence of any otherwise pleading, registration of the document will presume knowledge to all, particularly when it is the own case of plaintiffs that they were residing upto 1974 as a Joint Hindu Family property with Markandey. The plaintiffs have not pleaded anywhere that he got knowledge subsequently. In absence of any pleading there could not have any occasion to lead evidence on this aspect.
33. At this stage, my attention was drawn to para 16 of the plaint in which it is pleased as to when cause of action arose and there it is said that plaintiff acquired knowledge of sale deed dated 18.03.1963 in September, 1976. Whatever pleaded in para 16 of the plaint, is very vague and reads as under:
"16. That the boundary having been begun to be erected in January 1976 and the facts as to the constructions of rooms 1 and 2/3 and of the sale-deed dated 18.3.1963 having come to notice in September 1976 and the aforesaid constructions not having been removed upto July 1979, attracted the cause of action with respect to the property situated at Durga Tappa Haweli, Pargana Chiraiyakot, District Azamgarh under the jurisdiction of the Court."
(English translation by the Court)
34. In the oral statement, PW-1 has said that knowledge of sale deed dated 18.3.1963 was acquired by him in 1979 when the suit in question was filed and thereafter he obtained copy of said sale deed. They filed suit in question with a prayer for cancellation of sale deed as relief No. ''C'', therefore, before filing the suit, factum of execution of sale deed dated 183.1963 was in the knowledge of plaintiffs. Further when I carefully perused the plaint, I found that with reference to Suit No. 35 of 1974, where against appeal was filed in 1975, it has been stated in para 8 of the plaint that during earlier suit, i.e., 35 of 1974 the defendants raised construction over disputed property and when plaintiffs made inquiry came to know about the sale deed and then they got construction stopped. Para 7, 8 and 9 of the plaint, read as under:
"7. That at the time of separation, when the plaintiffs demanded share in the aforesaid house then Markandey stated the same to be under his sole ownership; hence, the plaintiffs being compelled filed a suit for partition being 35 of 1974 titled as Kamla v. Markanday before the Court of Civil Judge; and secured a declaration from the Court for half share even in the aforesaid house along with other property in their favour and the said judgment was also upheld by the Appellate Court in Case No. 323 of 1975 titled as Markandey v. Kamla.
8. That during pendency of the case, Kashi, father of defendant No. 1 started erecting a concrete boundary over the disputed area being No. 48 and in continuation thereof started constructing, in the east of the disputed area, three rooms facing north and a courtyard. The plaintiffs were surprised and when they restrained aforesaid Kashi from raising construction, he pretended that said Markandey has executed a sale-deed of the disputed area in his favour."
9. That when the plaintiffs inquired about the sale-deed and saw the same, they came to know about it completely in September then they restrained the aforesaid Kashi from raising further construction; and the said construction having been started in the year 1976 is lying incomplete on account of interference by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have taken possession over the said entire area and their possession still continues. The defendants have so far neither interfered nor raised any objection."
(English translation by the Court)
35. It clearly shows that plaintiffs got information regarding sale deed in 1974-75 when aforesaid original suit was filed and decided as also the appeal was decided. The period of limitation if commenced in 1974-75, admittedly in August, 1979 the three years period had already expired long back and suit for cancellation of aforesaid document is also clearly barred by limitation. If this Court proceed on the basis of pleadings in para 9 of the plaint, it is evident there from that construction was started by Sri Kashi as per the own showing of plaintiffs in January, 1976 and at that time itself the plaintiffs obstructed the same. From reading of paras 8 and 9 it is evident that first information of sale deed in question came to plaintiffs sometime between 1974 to January, 1976. It is not the completion of knowledge but for the purpose of commencement of limitation under Article 59, it is the first date when the document comes to the knowledge of plaintiffs. In the present case the plaintiffs have tried to explain that though the first information came to him sometime between 1974 to January, 1976 but it was completed in September, 1976. This completion part is wholly irrelevant and the first knowledge of document having come on or before January, 1976 in respect of relief for cancellation of sale deed apparently the suit was barred by limitation.
36. Then comes the question of limitation with respect to relief for delivery of possession.
37. The suit for possession would govern by Article 64 or 65 as the case may be, which read as under:
38. Under Article 64 the period of limitation of 12 years commences from the date of dispossession. The defendants have specifically pleaded that they got possession of property in dispute at the tune of execution of sale deed dated 18-3.1963, i.e., in 1963 itself. In the entire plaint there is no averment whatsoever as to when plaintiffs were dispossessed. In absence of any statement of fact regarding dispossession, there is no subsequent period from which limitation would commence. There is no reason to doubt the veracity of statement of defendants that they got possession of disputed property in 1963 on execution of sale deed in absence of any pleading and evidence otherwise. Any subsequent date of dispossession, also has neither been pleaded by plaintiffs nor any evidence has been given. Further the fact is admitted that in 1974-75 and onwards, the period of which the facts have been pleaded, plaintiffs were not in possession since defendants were raising construction to which plaintiffs allegedly raised objection. The plaintiffs, therefore, were already dispossessed. In absence of any otherwise evidence pleaded, the evidence of defendants that they were in possession of disputed property on the date of execution of sale deed dated 18.3.1963, remained uncontroverted. The Trial Court in ignoring this aspect has clearly not only misread and misconstrued the evidence on record but has recorded an otherwise perverse finding. The Lower Appellate Court, therefore, has rightly reversed the finding of Trial Court I have no hesitation in holding that even the relief of possession was apparently barred by limitation.
39. The question No. 4, therefore, is answered in favour of defendants and against the plaintiffs-appellants.
40. In view of above, the ultimate decision of Lower Appellate Court that suit has to be dismissed by reversing the judgment of Trial Court, has to be sustained. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs throughout.
