Manjit Singh Bali Vs Union Of India

Vipin Sanghi, J

1. The petitioner has preferred the present writ petition to assail the order dated 22.09.2017 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal

Bench, New Delhi (CAT/ Tribunal) in O.A. No.616/2017, whereby the Tribunal has dismissed the said Original Application preferred by the

petitioner. In the said Original Application, the petitioner had sought to assail the memo dated 20.06.2011 issued to him initiating disciplinary

proceedings against him under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. He also assailed the subsequent proceedings undertaken in pursuance of the

said memo dated 20.06.2011, including the disagreement note issued to him vide memo dated 19.10.2016 by the Disciplinary Authority, disagreeing

with the findings returned by the Inquiry Officer exonerating him of the charge in question. In substance, the charge against the petitioner was that he

had misused his official position in issuing a “No Objection Certificate†(NOC) in respect of a plot situated in Meera Bhyandar Municipal

Corporation with the ulterior motive of obtaining illegal gratification. He was trapped by the CBI and caught red handed while accepting bribe of Rs.2

crores from the complainant. When the Original Application was filed, the matter was still pending consideration before the Disciplinary Authority on

the aspect of imposition of penalty. The petitioner also sought release of consequential benefits in the form of promotion, arrears of pay as well as

pensionary benefits with interest @ 9% per annum.

2. The petitioner joined the Indian Postal Service Group ‘A’ on 13.11.1978. On 30.10.2010, the CBI filed a charge-sheet in Special Case

No.116/2010 before the Special Court CBI, Greater Mumbai against the petitioner and two other private persons under Section 120C IPC read with

Sections 7, 8 and 13(2) read with Section 13(i)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 with the allegation that the petitioner had demanded and

accepted illegal gratification of Rs.2 crores on 24.02.2010 for issuing a NOC in respect of Plot No. 177 in Meera Bhyandar Municipal Corporation

reserved for Posts & Telegraph under the Meera Bhyandar Development Control Regulations. The petitioner challenged the action of the CBI by

claiming that the same was in violation of Section 6(A) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and the matter is pending consideration

before the Supreme Court. Consequently, the trial in the said case has not progressed. The petitioner was, however, placed under deemed suspension

with effect from 25.02.2010 on account of his being in police custody for more than 48 hours. His suspension was revoked on 03.11.2011. In the

meantime, on 20.06.2011, the impugned memo was issued to the petitioner under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules initiating departmental proceedings

against him for alleged irregularities committed in issuance of NOC in respect of the aforesaid plot with ulterior motive of accepting illegal

gratification. The petitioner was, thereafter, again placed under suspension on 08.11.2011 and he continued to remain suspended till the date he

attained the age of superannuation.

3. The inquiry proceedings were undertaken by the Inquiry Officer and the Inquiry Officer found the charge against the petitioner not proved. The

Disciplinary Authority, however, tentatively disagreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer vide disagreement note dated 19.10.2016. The petitioner

demanded the documents referred to in the disagreement note. The submission of the petitioner is that he had been making a request for supply of the

relevant file bearing No.16-5/2011/DIG in which the departmental inquiry was ordered to be undertaken against the petitioner. However, the same

was denied to him. He even raised a query demanding the said file under the Right to Information Act. The proceedings under the Right to

Information Act travelled before the Central Information Commission (CIC). Before the CIC, the respondent gave an undertaking that they would

supply a copy of the said file to the petitioner. Consequently, on 20.01.2015, the CIC passed an order directing the respondent to provide him with the

required information. The respondent then preferred a writ petition before this Court to assail the order of the CIC. Even though there is no stay

granted in respect of the order passed by the CIC, the information has still not been supplied to the petitioner.

4. The ground taken by the petitioner in his Original Application was that the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against him without the

approval of the Competent Authority and, therefore, the same was non-est. It was also the petitioner’s submission that the respondents had

carried out amendments in the Article of Charge, which too were not approved by the Competent Authority.

5. The petitioner sought to place reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in CMD, Coal India Limited & Others Vs. Ananta Saha & Others,

(2011) 5 SCC 142, in support of the proposition that the Disciplinary Authority must give some reasons for initiating the disciplinary proceedings

against the delinquent and, if no reasons are recorded, the charge memo and further proceedings are non-est and without any consequence. He also

placed reliance on Union of India & Another Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2013) 16 SCC 147, to submit that if the initial action is not in accordance

with law, all subsequent acts/ actions and decisions would fall to the ground automatically.

6. The respondents contested the Original Application. The submission of the respondent was that although Article I in the proposed charge memo

was approved by the Competent Authority, when the actual charge memo was issued, the said Article I was slightly changed after vetting was done

by the CVC. The respondent claimed that the modifications were minor and clarificatory in nature, and thus, it was not considered necessary to seek

fresh approval of the Competent Authority. The respondent claimed that the amendments made in Article I did not change the nature of the charge as

the wordings of the amendment were a part of para 26 of the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior. Consequently, it did not require

a fresh approval of the Competent Authority once again. The respondent also claimed that challenge to the memo dated 20.06.2011 was barred by

limitation, since the Original Application was preferred about six years after issuance of the same. On the other hand, challenge to the disagreement

note vide memo dated 19.10.2016 was premature, for the reason that the Disciplinary Authority had not yet taken a final decision in the matter with

regard to imposition of penalty upon the petitioner.

7. The Tribunal, while dismissing the Original Application, formulated the submissions of the petitioner as follows:

“… … … His first ground was that some amendments were made in the charge memorandum after approval of the same by the

competent authority i.e. the Minister. However, these amendments were not approved by the Minister and, therefore, the charge

memorandum ab initio has become vitiated. His other ground was that even the initial charge memorandum was not approved by the

Competent Authority i.e. the then Minister of Communication & IT. He drew our attention to copy of the notesheet (page 107 of the paper

book) where the DDG (Vg.) & CVO has proposed that disciplinary proceedings against him be approved. He argued that the essential and

basic legal requirement for any disciplinary proceedings i.e. the competent authority’s approval on the charge memorandum is lacking

in the instant case and, therefore, the charge memorandum itself cannot be the basis for any enquiry. Citing some judgments, he tried to

establish that non-approval of the charge memorandum by Competent Authority has been held to be perverse to the process of departmental

proceedings and such proceedings have been quashed by the Apex Court.â€​

8. The Tribunal examined the original file and found that the Competent Authority, namely, the concerned Minister’s approval had indeed been

recorded in the file to the draft charge-sheet on 16.03.2011. In this regard, the Tribunal placed reliance upon paragraph 6 of the note of the Assistant

Director General (Vig.-I) dated 04.03.2011. Placated by the factual position emerging from the record, the petitioner then sought to place reliance on a

Division Bench judgment of this Court in Dr. Sahadeva Singh Vs. Union of India & Another, (2016) SCCONLINE DEL 4233, to submit that the

approval of the charge memorandum, and approval to initiate departmental proceedings, are two distinct stages and approval in respect of both the

stages should be taken separately. The petitioner contended that a composite approval obtained for initiation of departmental inquiry, and in respect of

the charge memorandum would not be valid and in accordance with law. The petitioner contended that first an approval to initiate departmental

proceedings should be granted by the Competent Authority on the record, and thereafter the approval to the charge memorandum should be granted

by him on the record.

9. The Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s reliance placed on Dr. Sahadeva Singh (supra) by observing that from the record it transpires that

composite approval for initiation of departmental inquiry and issuance of charge memorandum was taken from the competent authority i.e. the

concerned Minister on 16.03.2011. In this regard, the Tribunal placed reliance upon the proposal forming part of the notings of the Assistant Director

General (Vig.-I) dated 04.03.2011, which reads as follows:

“6. Shri M.S. Bali is an HAG level officer of the Indian Postal Service and Presidential approval is required for disciplinary proceedings

against the officer. In view of the circumstances explained above, it is proposed that the case may be submitted to the Hon’ble MOC&IT

for his kind consideration and approval for acceptance of the CVC advice dated 02-12-2010 discussed in the first part of this note, for

institution of disciplinary proceedings under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 against Shri M.S. Bali, the then CPMG, Maharashtra &

Goa Circle currently under suspension, for the prima-facie irregularities on his part as discussed in detail in para 3 above, on the charge

as in para 5 above, and for taking necessary ancillary action as per the rules. Draft memo of charges along with proposed Articles of

Charge, Statement of Imputations of misconduct or misbehavior, and lists of documents and witnesses in support of charges, are placed at

Flat ‘A’.â€​

10. The notings made on the file by the DDG (Vig.), the CVO, the Secretary (Posts) and, finally, the approval granted by the Minister on 16.03.2011

were taken note of by the Tribunal in the impugned order. The Tribunal held that the decision in Dr. Sahadeva Singh (supra) does not suggest that

composite approval of the decision to initiate the departmental proceedings, and of the charge memorandum is impermissible.

11. The Tribunal then considered the alternate submission of the petitioner that the draft charge memorandum, as approved by the Competent

Authority, was amended and what was issued to the petitioner was the amended charge, which was not approved by the Competent Authority. In this

regard, the draft charge â€" as approved by the Competent Authority, namely the Minister concerned on 16.03.2011, and the charge memorandum as

eventually issued to the petitioner, were compared. The original charge memorandum, as approved by the Competent Authority on 16.03.2011, reads

as follows:

“Shri M.S. Bali, HAG level officer of the Indian Postal Service, at present under suspension, while working as Chief Postmaster General,

Maharashtra & Goa Circle, Mumbai between 14.7.2008 and 24.2.2010 misused his official position by taking on 24.02.2010 the decision

to issue NOC in respect of plot no.177 of Mira Bhayander Municipal Corporation for Posts & Telegraph under the Mira Bhayander

Development Control Regulations, in undue haste without taking into account all the relevant facts, which resulted in an injudicious

decision as regards the shifting of Mira Road Post Office, and also failure in addressing major issues related to the reserved plot no.177,

and then in undue haste got the NOC letter no.Bldg/4-37/MaujeBhayander/82-83 issued on 24.02.2010 itself by Shri G.R. Nagrale,

Assistant Director, Office of PMG Mumbai Region, in an irregular manner to an unauthorized person, with ulterior motive. It is, therefore,

alleged that the said Shri M.S. Bali by committing the said grave misconduct, failed to maintain absolute integrity, failed to maintain

devotion to duty, and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant, and thereby violated Rule 3(1)(i), Rule 3(1)(ii) and Rule 3(1)

(iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.â€​

12. The charge memorandum, as issued to the petitioner, on the other hand, reads as follows:

“Shri M.S. Bali, HAG level officer of the Indian Postal Service, at present under suspension, while working as Chief Postmaster General,

Maharashtra & Goa Circle, Mumbai between 14.7.2008 and 24.2.2010 misused his official position by taking on 24.02.2010 the decision

to issue NOC in respect of plot no.177 of Mira Bhayander Municipal Corporation for Posts & Telegraph under the Mira Bhayander

Development Control Regulations, in undue haste without taking into account all the relevant facts, which resulted in an injudicious

decision as regards the shifting of Mira Road Post Office, and also failure in addressing major issues related to the reserved plot no.177,

and then in undue haste got the NOC letter no.Bldg/4-37/MaujeBhayander/82-83 issued on 24.02.2010 itself by Shri G.R. Nagrale,

Assistant Director, Office of PMG Mumbai Region, in an irregular manner to an unauthorized person, with ulterior motive of obtaining

illegal gratification. He was arrested by the CBI CAN Mumbai on 25.02.2010 on being caught while accepting the brib.e It is, therefore,

alleged that the said Shri M.S. Bali by committing the said grave misconduct, failed to maintain absolute integrity, failed to maintain

devotion to duty, and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant, and thereby violated Rule 3(1)(i), Rule 3(1)(ii) and Rule 3(1)

(iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.â€​

13. The words underlined and printed in bold letters in the charge memorandum as issued to the petitioner, were the one’s which were inserted

and did not form part of the charge memorandum as originally approved by the Competent Authority.

14. The Tribunal did not find any merit in the petitioner’s submission since, in the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior â€" which

elaborates on the charge itself, the allegation that the petitioner had the ulterior motive of accepting illegal gratification stood clearly mentioned.

Moreover, the fact that the petitioner was arrested by the CBI CAN, Mumbai on 25.02.2010 on being caught while accepting the bribe, was not only

the matter of fact but also incorporated in the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior â€" the draft whereof had been approved by the

Competent Authority. In this regard, para 26 of the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior was relied upon, which reads as follows:

“26. As per CBI letter No.DP 026 2010/96/RC.6(A)/2010-Mum dated 26-02-2010 addressed to the Chief Vigilance Officer, Shri M.S.

Bali, the then CPMG, along with Shri Harish Dalmia and Shri Arun Dalmia were arrested on 25-02-2010 while demanding and accepting

bribe amounting to Rs.2 crores for giving the aforesaid NOC. As per FIR No.RCBA1/2010/A0006 dated 18-02-2010 received with the said

CBI letter, written complaint had been made to the CBI on 16-02-2010, 17-02-2010 & 18-02- 2010. According to the FIR, it is alleged in the

complaint dated 16-02-2010 made by Smt. Rita R. Shah that Shri M.S. Bali, the then CPMG, Maharashtra & Goa Circle demanded a bribe

of Rs. 1.5 crore, though Shri Harsh Dalmia and Arun Dalmia, Maker Chambers V, Nariman Point, Mumbai, for issuing a “No Objection

Certificate†for development of plot no.82, 83, Reservation No.177 “Post and Telegraph†reserved for a Post Office, and that as the

complainant did not want to pay the said demanded bribe for getting the said NOC from the postal department, written complaint was made

to the CBI. The FIR further states that during verification of the complaint and from the recorded conversations, it was found that Shri

M.S.Bali had demanded illegal gratification of Rs.2 crores from the complainant to issue NOC for land of Shri Pravin Trivedi situated at

Mira Road. As per the CBI letter dated 26- 02-2010, Shri M.S. Bali was produced in court on 25- 02-2010 before the Ld. Spl. Judge,

Mumbai and he was remanded to police custody upto 03-03-2010.â€​

15. The Tribunal held that the addition of the words in the charge memorandum, as eventually issued to the petitioner, which were missing in the draft

charge memorandum approved by the Competent Authority, was merely clarificatory and that it did not substantially alter the charge. Therefore, it did

not require fresh approval of the Competent Authority. The reasoning adopted by the Tribunal in the impugned order reads as follows:

“17. Now, if we read both the articles of charge as well as para 26 of the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior, both

seem in complete harmony and consonance with each other, and it does seem that the expression ‘ulterior motive’ has been clarified

and elaborated by adding the words ‘of obtaining illegal gratification. He was arrested by the CBI CAN Mumbai on 25.02.2010 on being

caught while accepting the bribe’ after the same. Paragraph 26 of the statement of imputations of misconduct and misbehavior clearly

mentions that the applicant along with S/Shri Harish Dalmia and Arun Dalmia were arrested on 25.02.2010 while demanding and accepting

bribe amounting to Rs.2 crores on giving the aforesaid NOC. It further mentions that “it was found that Shri M.S. Bali had demanded

illegal gratification of Rs.2 crores from the complainant to issue NOC for land of Shri Pravin Trivedi situated at Mira Road. As per the CBI

letter dated 26-02-2010, Shri M.S. Bali was produced in court on 25.02.2010 before the Ld. Spl. Judge, Mumbai and he was remanded to

police custody upto 03.03.2010â€. If the charge memorandum is critically seen along with paragraph 26 of the statement of imputations of

misconduct and misbehavior, it becomes abundantly clear that the addition of these words does not at all change the nature and scope of

the charge against the applicant. In fact, they need to be deemed as a mere clarification or elaboration of the charges without, in any way,

altering the basic nature of the charge or the basic facts on which the charge has been framed. The fact that the same has been mentioned

in the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior, which also has the approval of the competent authority, makes such

conclusion correct and justified. Therefore, we are of the clear opinion that the addition of a few words as discussed in preceding

paragraphs in the charge memorandum does not alter the nature of the charge memorandum.

18. The next question then is whether such a modification can be a ground for the charge memorandum to have become illegal and

untenable because these small amendments have not had the approval of the competent authority? We cannot, in fact, agree with this line of

reasoning. The Minister’s approval was taken both for issuance of charge memorandum as well as statement of imputations of

misconduct or misbehavior. Both these documents supplement each other and, therefore, the amendments being clarificatory and

elaborative in nature should not be taken as material or substantive amendment in the charge memorandum and, therefore, absence of fresh

approval on this amended charge memorandum does not lead to its becoming illegal or vitiated. Hence, our considered view on this issue is

that the charge memorandum has not become vitiated or lacking in legal validity just because it has not been again shown to the competent

authority and his approval not sought on the same.

19. If we go deeper into the question of relief in this OA and assume that the charge memorandum is quashed on the ground that it is an

amended charge memorandum without the approval of the Competent Authority, what would be the implication of such an order? The

implication of such an order, to our mind, would mainly be that the so-called amended charge memorandum after having been quashed is

again put up to the competent authority and approval sought on the same. Such a situation is analogous to circumstances which qualify to

be covered under the “doctrine of unnecessary formalityâ€. The distinct possibility of the respondent re-initiating departmental

proceedings on the amended charge memorandum, at the end of the day, does not take the matter any further. The applicant will still be

proceeded against departmentally except that the whole process will get further delayed by at least a few months. Does this help the

applicant? Well, in our view this does not help the applicant at all. Quashing of the charge memorandum on the grounds placed before us

by the applicant will not, in any way, terminate the process of the departmental enquiry except for delaying it further-a situation which may

not be desirable either for the applicant or the respondent.

20. Given the fact that initiation of departmental proceedings, charge memorandum and the statement of imputations of misconduct and

misbehavior has the approval of the competent authority, and given the fact that the amended charge memorandum does not in any

significant manner alter the nature and scope of the charge, we are of the clear and considered view that the charge memorandum finally

issued to the applicant by the respondent must be taken to be in order and there is no justification for quashing the same on the grounds

taken by the applicant in the OA. Resultantly, the OA being deficient in merit deserves to be dismissed, and is accordingly dismissed.â€​

16. Before us, Mr. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the petitioner has, once again, firstly sought to rely upon the decision of the Division Bench of this

Court in Dr. Sahadeva Singh (supra) â€" to submit that at two distinct and separate stages the approval of the Competent Authority should have been

obtained by the respondents, namely, at the stage of taking a decision to initiate the departmental inquiry, and secondly, at the stage of approval of the

charge-sheet in terms of Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules.

17. In Dr. Sahadeva Singh (supra), the Division Bench referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Others Vs. B.V. Gopinath,

(2014) 1 SCC 351, and observed that the said decision had laid down the principle that there are two distinct and separate stages of conducting

disciplinary inquiry:

“which are as follows:

Stage I Granting of approval for initiation of disciplinary proceedings

Stage II Approval of framing of charges.

17. We may also note that the rationale for dividing the disciplinary proceedings in two distinct and separate stages emanates out of Article

311 of the Constitution. If we presume that once the disciplinary authority approves the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, the

chargesheet can be prepared by any other authority. The same would severely undermine the protections enshrined under Article 311 (1)

and 311 (2) of the Constitution. They ensure that a public servant is not dismissed, removed or suspended without following a fair

procedure and giving him a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations against him. Coming to the dichotomy of Sections 14 (2) and 14

(3) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, it is not necessary that initiation of every disciplinary

proceedings will inevitably result in the issuing of charges. It may be that after initiation of disciplinary proceedings it may come to light

that charges need not be issued as charges may not be made out or lesser charge may be made out. Consequently, it would necessitate the

application of mind by the disciplinary authority on the stage of issuance of charge as well. Thus, approval of the disciplinary authority is

required upon both the stages of Section 14 (2) and Section (3).â€​

18. Recently, we had occasion to consider the decision of the Supreme Court in B.V. Gopinath (supra) in the light of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA)

Rules in Suresh Sharma Vs. NTRO Through Its Chairman & Ors., W.P.(C) 3937/2017 & connected matters decided on 18.08.2017. This Court after

detailed examination of B.V. Gopinath (supra) in the light of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules observed as follows:

“29. Thus, on a plain reading of Rule 14, it is evident that sub rule (2) of Rule 14 does not imply that the Disciplinary Authority should

first grant his approval/ sanction on the record to “initiate†disciplinary proceedings against the government servant. In fact, under the

Rules, there is no such requirement prescribed â€" obliging the Disciplinary Authority to first sanction/ approve the “initiation†of the

disciplinary proceedings, and thereafter to again approve the charge memo/ charge sheet in terms of sub rule (3) of Rule 14. Sub rule (2) of

Rule 14, in fact, would get invoked only after the procedure under sub rules (3) and (4) have been exhausted, and at the stage when the

procedure under sub rule (5) is being implemented by the Disciplinary Authority.

30. When the Disciplinary Authority, after consideration of all the relevant material, approves the charge memo, it is implicit therein that the

Disciplinary Authority has also approved the “initiation†of Disciplinary Proceedings against the government servant. It is obvious that

the Disciplinary Authority would grant approval to the charge memo/charge-sheet, only if he has formed the opinion that there are grounds

available for initiation of Disciplinary Proceedings against the government servant. The general and initial approval â€" that the petitioner

talks about on a plainly erroneous reading of sub rule (2) of Rule 14, even if granted, would be a non specific approval â€" with no clarity

on the specific articles of charge that may, or may not, eventually be framed. This is not mandated by the Rules. On the other hand, the

approval of the charge memo/ charge sheet under sub rule (3) of Rule 14 is in respect of definite and distinct articles of charge which are

drawn up against the government servant on the basis of the imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour. The Disciplinary Authority is

obliged to draw up, or cause to be drawn up, with his approval, the substance of the imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour into definite

and distinct articles of charge; the statement of the imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each articles of charge which

shall contain a statement of the relevant facts including any admission/ confession made by the government servant, and; a list of documents

by which, and a list of witnesses by whom the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained.

31. Thus, in our view, it is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to give its separate/ distinct and initial approval for “initiationâ€

of disciplinary proceedings. Once the Disciplinary Authority grants its approval to the charge memo/ charge sheet after perusing the entire

material, it would be sufficient compliance of the Rules, and the same would completely safeguard the interests of the government servant

concerned.

32. Till the time a charge memo/ charge sheet is issued to the government servant under Rule 14(3) i.e. with the approval of the Disciplinary

Authority, the preliminary exercise â€" to gather evidence or process the case, that may be undertaken by the government, by itself, does

not prejudice the government servant. No government servant can raise a grievance that such a preliminary exercise should not be taken

either at the behest of the Disciplinary Authority, or at the behest of any other authority without the express approval of the Disciplinary

Authority. In our view, it may amount to putting the cart before the horse, to require the Disciplinary Authority to grant his sanction/

approval to a generalised and initial decision to “initiate†disciplinary proceedings against the Government servant. It is only when a

proposal to hold an inquiry against a government servant is prepared on the basis of the materials and evidences that may be gathered

during the preliminary inquiry (which is an exercise undertaken to gather facts and to determine whether a prima facie case for a formal

departmental inquiry is made out â€" See Constable Rajendra Kumar v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors, 2009 (111) DRJ 320 (FB)), that the

Disciplinary Authority would be called upon to apply his mind to the specific, definite and distinct articles of charge to accord his approval.

33. In the facts of B.V. Gopinath (supra), it appears that there was a general and initial approval taken from the Disciplinary Authority to

“initiate†an inquiry against the government servant. On that basis, without approval of the Disciplinary Authority, the charge memo/

charge sheet was issued containing the substance of the imputations of misconduct and misbehaviour formulated into definite and distinct

articles of charge along with the documents referred to in sub rule (3) (ii) of the Rules. It is this procedure adopted by the government in

B.V. Gopinath (supra), which was disapproved of by the Supreme Court. The initial and general approval granted for “initiation†of

disciplinary proceedings, even if obtained in a given case â€" which is not a statutory requirement, cannot be construed as an approval to

the issuance of charge memo/ charge sheet under Rule 14(3).

34. Thus, the reliance placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of B.V. Gopinath (supra) is completely misplaced as, in the

said case, the Supreme Court was dealing with a situation where there was an initial and general approval granted by the Disciplinary

Authority for initiation of Disciplinary Proceedings, but there was no approval to the charge memo/ charge sheet by the Disciplinary

Authority. It was in this backdrop that the Supreme Court held that a charge memo â€" which is not approved by the Disciplinary Authority,

was non-est in the eyes of law.

35. A perusal of the decision in B.V. Gopinath (supra) would show that the Supreme Court considered the submissions advanced before it in

the light of Office Order No.205/2005 which has been reproduced herein above by us. The said Office Order, firstly, has to be read and

understood in the context of the Rules and, in particular, Rule 14 thereof. The said Office Order was issued by the Ministry of Finance,

Department of Revenue, and it was relevant in the case of B.V. Gopinath (supra), since he was serving in the Ministry of Finance and his

Disciplinary Authority was the Finance Minister. In the present case, that is not the position. As noticed herein above, the petitioner is

serving in the NTRO and the Prime Minister of India is his Disciplinary Authority.

x x x x x x x x x x

46. The decision in B.V. Gopinath (supra), thus, cannot be considered as an authority for the proposition that the Disciplinary Authority is

first obliged to accord his general approval/ sanction for initiation of disciplinary proceedings. That was not the issue that arose for

consideration before the Supreme Court in B.V. Gopinath (supra), as noticed herein above.

47. We, therefore, find no merit in the submission of the counsel for the petitioner that distinct approvals from the Disciplinary Authority are

required, firstly, to the “initiation†of the departmental proceedings in a general form and, secondly, to the issuance of the charge

memo/ charge sheet. In our view, there is no such requirement of a general “initial approval/ sanction†by the Disciplinary Authority on

the file.

From K.V. Jankiraman (supra), and on a reading of Rule 14, it is clear that the disciplinary proceedings get initiated only upon issuance of

the charge memo/ charge sheet, and not before that. Though this decision was rendered in the context of adoption of the sealed cover

procedure, we are of the view that the same holds true even generally, as is evident from a reading of Rule

14. In the present case, as noticed herein above, in respect of all the three charge sheets, the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India granted

his approval in compliance of Rule 14(3). Thus, there is sufficient compliance of the Rules by the respondent. â€​

19. This Court, therefore, concluded that under the scheme formulated by Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, and in the light of the judgment of the

Supreme Court in Union of India & Others Vs. K.V. Jankiraman & Others, (1991) 4 SCC 109, the initiation of the departmental proceedings takes

place only with the issuance of the charge memorandum to the delinquent government servant, and not before that. This Court also explained the

background in which certain observations came to be made by the Supreme Court in B.V. Gopinath (supra), which give the impression that at two

separate and distinct stages â€" namely, at the stage of initiation of the departmental proceedings, and at the stage of approval of the charge

memorandum, the approval of the Competent Authority is imperative to be obtained. This Court, inter alia, observed:

“38. The petitioner seeks to rely on the observation of the Supreme Court, made in para 44, which reads as follows:

“44. ... ... ... When the decision is taken by the Finance Minister that the departmental proceedings are to be held (initiation), only then

the question of approval of charge memo arises. The department would thereafter complete the necessary formalities and then place the file

before the Finance Minster, for “approval ofâ€​ charge memo... ... ...â€​ (emphasis supplied)

39. Reliance is also placed by the petitioner on the observations made in para 49, which read as follows:

“49. ... ... ... Initially, when the file comes to the Finance Minister, it is only to take a decision in principle as to whether departmental

proceedings ought to be initiated against the officer... ... ...â€​

40. In our view, reliance placed by the petitioner on the above extracts from B.V. Gopinath (supra) has no force. The Supreme Court was

not examining the issue whether â€" as a matter of law, the “initial†sanction/ approval of the Disciplinary Authority is required to be

obtained â€" failing which the Disciplinary proceedings would be vitiated. The Supreme Court was dealing with a fact situation where â€

as a matter of fact, such general/ initial sanction/ approval for “initiation†had been obtained. The observations made by the Supreme

Court, thus, have to be viewed in that light, and in the light of the submissions advanced before it â€" particularly by the learned ASG. The

above observations were made in response to those submissions, which we have taken note of herein above.â€​

20. Thus, this Court held in Suresh Sharma (supra) that the observations made by the Supreme Court in B.V. Gopinath (supra) in paras 44 and 49

were in the nature of a rebound to the submissions advanced by the learned ASG.

21. In Dr. Sahadeva Singh (supra), the aforesaid aspects were not raised or canvassed before the Court and, consequently, were not touched upon by

the Court. It is in this light that the observations made in para 16 of Dr. Sahadeva Singh (supra) relied upon by the petitioner, have to be seen.

22. Even otherwise, we do not find any infirmity in the finding recorded by the Tribunal that there is nothing in Dr. Sahadeva Singh (supra) to suggest

that the grant of approval for initiation of disciplinary proceedings has to be separately obtained from the approval for framing of charges. The note put

up by the Assistant Director General (Vig.-I) dated 04.03.2011 talks about both the aspects, namely the institution of departmental proceedings under

Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 against the petitioner, as well as approval of the draft memo of charges along with the proposed article of

charge, statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior, and list of documents and witnesses in support of the charges â€" which were placed

before the Minister/ Competent Authority for his considered approval.

23. Mr. Bhardwaj has also stressed his submission â€" as advanced before the tribunal, that the amendment of the article of charge by the

respondents, after obtaining approval of the Competent Authority, was illegal, since the amendment was not got approved by the Competent Authority.

24. No doubt, it emerges from the record that the charge memorandum as issued to the petitioner contained the amended charge, when compared to

the charge memorandum â€" draft whereof was approved by the Competent Authority. The extent to which the charge memorandum was amended,

has already been highlighted hereinabove.

25. We find that the Tribunal has applied the correct principle when it observed that, in substance, there was no amendment and the substantive nature

and scope of the charge, even after amendment, remained the same. No new allegation was made in the charge, as amended and issued to the

petitioner. The words “of obtaining illegal gratification. He was arrested by the CBI CAN, Mumbai on 25.02.2010 on being caught while accepting

the bribe.â€, which were incorporated in the amended memorandum of charge form part of the statement of imputations of misconduct or

misbehavior, which was approved by the Competent Authority. There was no change in the said statement of imputations of misconduct or

misbehavior from the one approved by the Competent Authority, while it was issued to the petitioner.

26. The statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior is issued for the purpose of elaborating on the memorandum of charge. The whole

purpose of issuing the said statement is to enable the delinquent/ charged employee to understand the substance of the charge clearly, so that he

knows the charge that he is required to meet. The premise on which the charge is framed, is what is contained in the statement of imputations of

misconduct or misbehavior. Therefore, the two documents, namely the memorandum of charge, and the statement of imputations of misconduct or

misbehavior have to be read together as one document, and not as separate documents. Para 26 of the said statement of imputations of misconduct or

misbehavior elaborates on the aspect of the ulterior motive alleged against the petitioner in his taking the decision to issue the NOC in respect of the

aforesaid plot in undue haste, without taking into account all the relevant facts â€" which resulted in an injudicious decision as regards the shifting of

Meera Road Post Office, and; his failure in addressing major issues related to the said plot. He was charged with issuing the NOC letter dated

24.02.2010 in undue haste in an irregular manner to an unauthorized person. The ulterior motive alleged against the petitioner was already explained in

the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior, by stating that the same was to demand and obtain illegal gratification of Rupees Two

Crores to issue the NOC. Thus, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal, that the amendment in the

memorandum of charge after the same had been approved by the Competent Authority was not of such a nature, and to such an extent, as to require

a fresh approval by the Competent Authority. This is for the reason that the amendment merely incorporated, in the memorandum of charge itself,

something that had been elaborated in the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior. It did not tantamount to either changing the nature

of the charge, or incorporating a new or different charge than what was initially framed/ drafted and got approved by the Competent Authority. Rule

14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules is incorporated to safeguard the rights and interest of the government servant so that he is not subjected to an

arbitrary, mindless or malafide disciplinary proceedings unless the memorandum of charge and all the relevant facts, allegations, evidences and

witnesses which are proposed to be relied upon to establish the charge, are brought to the notice of the competent authority and he has applied his

mind to the matter. When the draft charge sheet has been approved by the competent authority, if any minor, clarificatory or inconsequential changes

are made in the memorandum of charge, which do not impact the nature and scope of the charge, and the charge remains the same, no prejudice can

be said to have been caused to the delinquent government servant on account of the amendment in the memorandum of charge not again being

approved by the competent authority.

27. Lastly, Mr. Bhardwaj has submitted that even the approval of the Competent Authority, namely the Minister concerned granted on 16.03.2011 to

the draft memorandum of charge along with the proposed Articles of Charge, statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior and the list of

documents and witnesses in support of the charge, was granted perfunctorily and without application of mind. The submission of Mr. Bhardwaj is that

there is nothing on record to show due application of mind by the Hon’ble Minister, since he had merely put his signatures on the file â€" which

does not evidence the fact that he had applied his mind to the draft charge memorandum. This submission of Mr. Bhardwaj is premised on the

judgment of the Supreme Court in CMD, Coal India Limited (supra).

28. We have considered the judgment of the Supreme Court in CMD Coal India Ltd. (supra) and, in the facts of the present case, we are of the view

that the said decision does not come to the aid of the petitioner. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court, that it is the ratio of a

decision which forms a binding precedent. It is also equally well settled that the ratio of a decision has to be gathered in the light of the facts of the

case, and not de-hors the relevant and material facts. Even a slight but material difference in the relevant facts may render an earlier decision

inapplicable as a binding precedent when deciding a later case. Therefore, it is essential to first take notice of the relevant and material facts in which

the decision in CMD Coal India Ltd. (supra) was rendered, and contrast the same with the facts of the present case.

29. In CMD Coal India Ltd. (supra), the respondent delinquent was employed as a Medical Officer in Coal India Limited (CIL). He was charged with

the allegation that he had abused, and made an attempt to assault his superior without provocation while he was posted at Central Hospital, Asansol

established under the control of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. (ECL). Initially, a charge sheet dated 26.07.1991 was issued to him. After the conclusion of

the proceedings, the I.O. found the delinquent guilty of the charges. Consequently, he was dismissed from service on 17.06.1993 by the CMD of ECL

â€" a subsidiary of CIL. The delinquent challenged his dismissal by filing a writ petition which was allowed by the learned Single Judge on 22.02.2001

on the premise that the order of dismissal was passed in contravention of statutory rules. It was held that the competent authority under the

disciplinary rules was the CMD, CIL, who had not passed the order of punishment. Other issues raised by the delinquent were left open and the

employer was permitted to initiate proceedings de novo with adequate opportunity to the delinquent himself.

30. The appeal preferred before the Division Bench by the employer failed vide order dated 08.08.2001. Consequently, the delinquent was reinstated

and the disciplinary proceedings were initiated. The disciplinary proceedings went ex parte since the delinquent did not participate. Once again, the

charges against the delinquent were proved vide inquiry report dated 18.09.2003. After granting an opportunity to the delinquent to represent against

the inquiry report â€" to which he did not respond, the CMD, CIL â€" acting as the disciplinary authority, passed the punishment order of dismissal

from service against the delinquent vide order dated 24.02.2004.

31. The delinquent preferred his statutory appeal, but without waiting for its outcome, he also preferred a writ petition before the High Court

challenging the order of punishment. The writ petition was allowed on 16.08.2007 on the ground that the Disciplinary Authority did not ensure

compliance of the order of the High Court dated 08.08.2001, which was confirmed by the Division Bench, and also on the ground that fresh inquiry

was not initiated by the competent authority, as it was initiated by the OSD and had been merely seen by the CMD, ECL. The proceedings could have

been initiated only by the CMD, CIL and, consequently, they were vitiated.

32. The employer preferred an appeal before the Division Bench, which too was dismissed on the ground that disciplinary proceedings had been

initiated by an authority not competent to initiate the same, and that no person other than CMD, CIL could initiate the same. The inquiry had been

initiated by the OSD in ECL and the CMD, ECL did not approve it. Rather, he put his signatures without making any observation whatsoever. The

CMD, ECL was not the competent authority. The Court also observed that the Disciplinary Authority was biased and prejudiced towards the

delinquent and that the proceedings were initiated with a premeditated mind to punish the delinquent.

33. Against the said decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, the employer had approached the Supreme Court and the decision in CMD

Coal India Ltd. (supra) came to be rendered in this background. The Supreme Court held in favour of the appellant upon examination of the rules, that

the disciplinary proceedings could be initiated by the CMD of the subsidiary company concerned i.e. ECL. Since the delinquent was working in the

subsidiary company, the CMD, ECL was competent to initiate the proceedings. The Supreme Court took note of the directions issued by the learned

Single Judge of the High Court in his judgment dated 22.02.2001 wherein, after quashing the orders impugned in the said writ proceedings, namely, the

order of dismissal of the delinquent, the learned Single Judge had given liberty to the employer/ appellant to start proceedings de novo giving adequate

opportunity to the delinquent. The said direction had been upheld by the Division Bench in its order dated 08.08.2001. In the light of the aforesaid, the

Supreme Court at the end of para 26 observed “Therefore, the question does arise as to what is the meaning of de novo inquiryâ€. The Supreme

Court held that it was not permissible for the appellant to proceed on the basis of the charge sheet issued earlier. The question of initiating fresh

inquiry without giving a fresh charge sheet could not arise. The Supreme Court them examined the manner in which the proceedings were purported

to be revived by the CMD, ECL. The noting recorded by the OSD (PA&PR) dated 17.08.2002 which was put up for approval of the CMD, ECL was

reproduced, and the same reads as follows:

“ In the matter of WP CR No. 11177(W) of 1993, Ananta Saha (Dr.) v. ECL the Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta has passed an order upon

the appellant to start enquiry proceedings, de novo, giving adequate opportunity to the petitioner and in the light of the order passed by the

Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta on 8-8-2001, it will depend on a fresh order to be passed by the disciplinary authority/CMD, ECL.

In the above circumstances, it is proposed that an inquiring authority and a presenting officer may be appointed to conduct the

departmental enquiry in terms of the order dated 8-8-2001 of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court for a fresh enquiry into Charge-

sheet No. ECL-5(D)/113/1070/320 dated 26-7-1991 issued to Dr. Ananta Saha, MO, Kalla Hospital, for this purpose the following names

are furnished:

1. Dr. R.N. Kobat, CMO, Sanctoria Hospitalâ€"Inquiring Authority

2. Shri M.N. Chatterjee, SO, Admn. Dept.â€"Presenting Officer

Put up for kind approval.

sd/-

OSD (PA and PR)

17-8-2002

sd/-

CMDâ€​

(emphasis supplied)

34. The aforesaid note was signed by the CMD, ECL. The appellant sought to rely upon the said approval granted by the CMD, ECL to claim that de

novo proceedings stood initiated against the respondent delinquent. The Supreme Court, as aforesaid, held that de novo proceedings could only be

initiated by issuing a fresh charge sheet and not on the basis of the charge sheet earlier issued. In this context, the Supreme Court observed:

“30. The aforesaid order reveals that the OSD had prepared the note which has merely been signed by the CMD, ECL. The proposal has

been signed by the CMD, ECL in a routine manner and there is nothing on record to show that he had put his signature after applying his

mind. Therefore, it cannot be held in strict legal sense that the proceedings had been properly revived even from the stage subsequent to the

issuance of the charge-sheet. The law requires that the disciplinary authority should pass some positive order taking into consideration the

material on record.

31. This Court has repeatedly held that an order of dismissal from service passed against a delinquent employee after holding him guilty of

misconduct may be an administrative order, nevertheless proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to

determine whether he is guilty of the charges framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings. The authority has to give

some reason, which may be very brief, for initiation of the enquiry and conclusion thereof. It has to pass a speaking order and cannot be

an ipse dixit either of the enquiry officer or the authority. (Vide Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 395] , Union of India v.

H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364] , Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer [(1985) 3 SCC 378 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 815 : AIR 1985 SC 1121] and Union

of India v. Prakash Kumar Tandon [(2009) 2 SCC 541 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 394].) Thus, the abovereferred order could not be sufficient

to initiate any disciplinary proceedings.â€​

35. The observations made in para 30 and 31, as aforesaid, are what are sought to be relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner. The aforesaid

observations, in our considered view, have to be read in the context that the earlier inquiry proceedings were quashed by the High Court; the High

Court permitted initiation of de novo proceedings; the initiation of de novo proceedings entailed issuance of a fresh charge sheet and de novo

proceedings could not be initiated on the basis of the charge sheet in respect whereof the proceedings already stood quashed; the OSD (PA&PR) in

his note dated 17.08.2002 expressly proposed to hold a fresh inquiry into the same charge sheet dated 26.07.1991 issued to the delinquent and not in

respect of a fresh charge sheet. It is in the aforesaid light that the Supreme Court observed that the competent authority, namely, the CMD, ECL by

putting his signatures on the note prepared by the OSD did not portray application of mind. Had the CMD, ECL applied his mind â€" particularly to the

order dated 08.08.2001 of the Division Bench of the Kolkata High Court which permitted holding of a de novo inquiry, he would not have granted his

approval to start a fresh inquiry on the basis of the same charge sheet issued as early as on 26.07.1991 to the delinquent.

36. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that in every case the competent authority must record some reasons â€" which may be very

brief, for initiating the inquiry against the delinquent government servant cannot be universally applied in all fact situations. There is a presumption in

favour of official acts being done in a legal manner with due application of mind.

37. In Indu Bhusan Chatterjee Vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1958 SC 148, the issue raised before the Supreme Court was in relation to the validity

of the sanction for prosecution accorded under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The sanctioning authority was one Mr. Bokil. In

his cross-examination, he stated that the sanction was prepared by the police and it was put up before him by the Personnel Branch of his office. He

stated that he did not call for any record in connection with this matter from his office. He did not call for the connected claim cases nor did he make

inquiry about the position of those claim cases. The High Court was impressed by the statement of Mr. Bokil that the sanction Ex.6 was prepared by

the police and put up before him by the Personnel Branch of his office and the High Court observed:

“I can hardly imagine the duty of granting the proper sanction being properly discharged by merely putting one's signature on a ready-

made sanction presented by the policeâ€​.

38. Consequently, the High Court granted certificate under Article 134 (1)(c) of the Constitution of India to the appellant. The Supreme Court,

however, did not find any merit in the appellant’s submission that the sanctioning authority had not applied his mind while granting sanction for

prosecution. The Supreme Court observed that the sanctioning authority “was an officer of high rank in the Railway and must have been fully

aware that the responsibility of according the sanction against an official of the Railway subordinate to him lay upon him. It is

inconceivable that an officer of the rank of Mr Bokil would blindly sign a ready-made sanction prepared by the police. Apparently, the

sanction already drafted contained all the material facts upon which the prosecution was to be launched, if at all, concerning the

acceptance of the bribe by the appellant on 12-5-1952. When Ex. 6 was placed before Mr Bokil other relevant papers were also placed

before him. … … … Mr Bokil said, and we see no reason to distrust his statement, that before he accorded his sanction he went through

all these papers and after being satisfied that sanction should be given he accorded his sanctionâ€​.

39. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi & Others Vs. State of U.P. & Others, (1991) 1 SCC 212, in paragraph 33, the Supreme Court, inter alia, observed:

“33. No doubt, it is true, as indicated by us earlier, that there is a presumption of validity of the State action and the burden is on the

person who alleges violation of Article 14 to prove the assertion. However, where no plausible reason or principle is indicated nor is it

discernible and the impugned State action, therefore, appears to be ex facie arbitrary, the initial burden to prove the arbitrariness is

discharged shifting onus on the State to justify its action as fair and reasonable. If the State is unable to produce material to justify its

action as fair and reasonable, the burden on the person alleging arbitrariness must be held to be discharged. â€​ (emphasis supplied)

40. Thus, it is only when the action taken by the competent authority representing the State appears to be arbitrary, whimsical, mala fide or illegal, that

the burden to prove that the State action is valid would shift on the State, and not otherwise.

41. The petitioner, in the present case, has not been able to point out any arbitrariness, illegalities, or mala fide in the matter of grant of approval/

sanction to the charge-sheet issued to him under Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules. Thus, the petitioner has not been able to dislodge the

presumption of validity of State action in the facts of the present case.

42. In view of the fact that there is a presumption of validity of State action, the Supreme Court has, inter alia, held in Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India,

(1994) 6 SCC 651, that the “modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative actionâ€​.

43. Similarly, in Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Haldia & Others, (2005) 7 SCC 764, the Supreme Court

in paragraph 56, inter alia, observed that “there is evident presumption in favour of the administration that the power has been exercised bona fide

and in good faithâ€​.

44. We may now look at a few decisions rendered by this Court and by the other High Courts on the same aspect.

45. Gurbachan Singh Vs. State, AIR 1970 DELHI 102, was a case where the appellant questioned the sanction granted under Section 6 of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The appellant contended that the sanctioning authority had not been examined as a witness and the witness

examined, namely PW-1 had only proved the signatures of the sanctioning authority but there was no evidence to establish that the officer according

sanction had applied his mind to the facts of the case. This Court rejected the said submission by observing that the sanction order sets out material

facts and “There is a presumption about official acts having been regularly performed. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it cannot be

held that the officer granting the sanction acted mechanically without applying his mind to the material placed before himâ€​.

46. In Md. Salauddin & Another Vs. State of A.P., 1996 SCC OnLine AP 602 : 1996 (3) ALT 836 (DB), a similar submission was advanced before

the Court in relation to the grant of approval by the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad to add the provision of the Terrorist And Disruptive Activities

(Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) in the FIR. The Inspector of Police submitted a letter dated 11.11.1993 to the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad

seeking approval to add provisions of the said Act in the FIR, enclosing a copy of the complaint lodged by the complainant Inspector of Police (SIT)

from the previous date. The Commissioner of Police made an endorsement on the said letter dated 11.11.1993 itself to the following effect: “Seen.

Permittedâ€. The Division Bench of the High Court observed in respect of the said approval that “Since a copy of the complaint lodged by Sri T.V.

Raju on 10-11-1993 was appended to the letter, we have no reason to suppose that the Commissioner of Police read the letter only and not the copy of

the complaint. The complaint taking it on its face value, clearly discloses commission of offences under the Act. If that is so, then what is the meaning

of the endorsement of the Commissioner of Police in the letter? The endorsement ‘Seen’ in the context of the case, meant that the

Commissioner perused both the letter and the copy of the complaint. There was sufficient as well as relevant materials before the Commissioner to

record his subjective satisfaction about the commission of offences under the Act and for according approval under sub section (1) of Section 20-A.

This is borne out from the original records. Therefore, it cannot be said that the sanction accorded by him is invalid merely because he did not record

reasons for according the approval. Approval under Section 20-A (1) not being a judicial or quasi judicial act, it need not be based on any legal

evidence nor is it legally necessary to give reasons for according approval for lodging the complaint. After perusal of the original records, we are fully

satisfied that the Commissioner of Police accorded approval after due application of mind and satisfying himself that the offences under the Act were

committedâ€​. (emphasis supplied)

47. At this stage, we may observe that grant of approval under Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules is a stage prior to initiation of the disciplinary

proceedings, since the disciplinary proceedings came to be initiated only when the charge-sheet is issued under Rule 14(3). The disciplinary

proceedings are quasi-judicial proceedings. However, grant of approval to the charge-sheet by the Competent Authority is a stage prior to initiation of

disciplinary proceedings, and is a purely administrative act.

48. We may now refer to the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in State of Punjab Vs. Bhim Sain, 1985 Crl.L.J. 1602. In this case as well,

the issue raised was with regard to the validity of the sanction granted under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The learned Special

Judge held that the sanction was not properly granted for prosecution of the accused by, inter alia, observing that there was nothing on the file from

which it could be disclosed that the Sanctioning Authority had applied his mind while according sanction, and merely appending his signature does not

necessarily mean that he had applied his mind and accorded the sanction under the law. The High Court did not agree with this view of the learned

Special Judge. By invoking the presumption raised by Section 114 Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act, the High Court observed:

“There is a presumption that all official acts have been done by the respective functionaries in discharge of the duties enjoined on them

under the law. When the sanction file had been put up before the Minister, containing a self-explanatory note, Whereupon he appends his

signatures, it is presumed that he had applied his mind thereto and thereafter as a token of accord put his signatures thereon. The view

taken by the learned Special Judge, appears to me in the circumstances, overly technical, requiring rectification at this end.†(emphasis

supplied)

49. A similar view was taken by the Karnataka High Court in T.A. Ramababu Vs. State of Karnataka & Others, 2009 Crl.L.J. 629. In this case as

well, the validity of the sanction granted under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was questioned. The High Court rejected the

submission of the petitioner accused by observing as follows:

“17. Though it is sought to be contended that the sanction is only by an Under-Secretary to the Government and therefore it is not a sanction in the

eye of law as contemplated under the provisions, it is overlooking the very order which reads that it is ‘by order and in the name of the

Governor of Karnataka’.There is a presumption of official acts to have done in the proper manner and in accordance with the

procedure. When the order itself recites that it is ‘by order and in the name of the Governor of Karnataka’, there is no question of

doubting the genuineness of such order by this Court, unless something more is pointed out. I find the sanction order is one accorded by the

Governor in the normal course of business transaction. â€​ (emphasis supplied)

50. This Court in Darshan Lal Vs. State (CBI), Crl. Appeal No.73/2001 decided on 31.07.2009 : MANU/DE/3460/2009 rejected a similar plea with

regard to grant of sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act by observing that the sanction order, which reproduces the draft sanction letter

could not be said to have been passed without application of mind. Lastly, we may take note of another decision of this Court in Hawa Singh Vs. CBI,

2012 (130) DRJ 124, where a same view has been taken by the Court. In fact, this decision has noticed most of the decisions taken note of

hereinabove.

51. Thus, unless there is anything to indicate a mechanical exercise of power or jurisdiction by an administrative authority, without due application of

mind, it cannot be presumed that the competent authority while granting his approval/ sanction has not applied his mind, merely because he has himself

not recorded the facts, his reasons, or his satisfaction before granting his approval/ sanction to the detailed proposal put up before him.

52. In CMD Coal India Ltd. (supra), the facts portrayed the lack of application of mind by the competent authority, namely, the CMD, ECL inasmuch,

as, he did not notice the fact that the Division Bench of the High Court of Kolkata in its order dated 08.08.2001 had permitted holding of a de novo

inquiry and not the reinitiation of inquiry on the basis of the same charge sheet dated 26.07.1991. It is in this background that the Supreme Court

observed that the proposal put up by the OSD had been signed by the CMD, ECL in a routine manner, and that there was nothing on record to show

that he had put his signature after applying his mind.

53. Pertinently, paragraph 31 of its decision in CMD, Coal India Limited (supra), shows that the Supreme Court made the observations in relation to

“an order of dismissal from service passed against a delinquent employee after holding him guilty of misconductâ€. In respect of such an order, the

Supreme Court observed that though such an order may be an administrative order, the nature of proceedings undertaken against the public servant to

establish his guilt are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and that the authority has to give some reason, even if briefly. While making the said

observation, the Supreme Court placed reliance on the earlier decisions in Bachhittar Singh (supra), H.C. Goel (supra), Anil Kumar (supra), and

Prakash Kumar Tandon (supra). We have examined all these aforesaid decisions and what we find is that they all relate to disciplinary proceedings,

i.e. post the initiation of disciplinary proceedings.

54. In Bachhittar Singh (supra), the Supreme Court held that departmental inquiry held against the Government servant cannot be divided into: (a) the

inquiry which involves a decision on the question whether the allegation made against the servant are true, or not, and; (b) taking action on the basis of

the inquiry report. The Supreme Court held that the entire proceedings are judicial in nature.

55. Similarly, in H.C. Goel (supra), the Supreme Court observed that though the order of dismissal which may be passed against a Government

servant found guilty of misconduct can be described an administrative order, nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the

statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charges framed against him, are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings. Thus, once again, it

was in respect of the disciplinary proceedings that the Supreme Court observed that they are quasi-judicial in nature.

56. We may re-emphasis that the disciplinary proceedings get initiated only upon issuance of the charge-sheet, and not before that. The exercise

undertaken to seek the approval of the Competent Authority for issuance of charge-sheet does not form part of the disciplinary proceedings, as that is

a stage prior to initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The obtainment of the approval/ sanction to the charge-sheet is not a quasi-judicial proceedings by

any stretch of imagination.

57. Similarly, in Anil Kumar (supra), the observation made by the Supreme Court was in relation to a disciplinary inquiry. The Supreme Court held that

such a disciplinary inquiry has to be a quasi-judicial inquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice.

58. In Prakash Kumar Tandon (supra), the observations made by the Supreme Court are to the effect that a “disciplinary proceedings must be

fairly conducted. An Inquiry Officer is a quasi-judicial authority. He, therefore, must perform his functions fairly and reasonably, which is even

otherwise, the requirement of principles of natural justiceâ€. In this decision, the Supreme Court also noticed its earlier decision in M.V. Bijlani Vs.

Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 88, wherein also the Supreme Court observed that the Inquiry Officer in the departmental proceedings performs quasi-

judicial functions.

59. Pertinently, it is not even the petitioner’s case that the process whereby the sanction/ approval of the Competent Authority is obtained in

respect of the draft charge-sheet under Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, are quasi-judicial in nature. If that were so, the petitioner would have

demanded compliance of principles of natural justice even before issuance of charge-sheet to him, which is not the case.

60. The observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 31 of the decision in CMD, Coal India Limited (supra) have to be read and understood

in the context of the four decisions cited by the Supreme Court in the same paragraph. There is no discussion in the said judgment to indicate that the

Supreme Court consciously sought to widen the scope of application of the principles of natural justice to the stage even before issuance of a charge

sheet under Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules.

61. In the facts of the present case, there is nothing at all to show that when the Minister concerned granted his approval on 16.03.2011, the said

approval was granted mechanically without application of mind in a routine manner. The file notings contained in File No.16-5/2011-Vig of the

Department of Posts on the subject “RDA for major penalty against Shri M.S. Bali, the then CPMG Maharashtra Circle†has been placed on

record by the petitioner. The same refers to a letter received from the CBI on 22.10.2010, wherein the CBI recommended initiation of regular

departmental action for imposition of major penalty against the petitioner, apart from proceeding with the prosecution in the criminal case. The note

also refers to the prosecution sanction accorded on 13.12.2010. A detailed note prepared by the Asst. Director General (Vig.I) dated 04.03.2011

starting from page 2/N and going upto page 9/N is placed on record. The said note begins by referring to the CVC advice contained in the O.M. dated

02.12.2010 for prosecution as well as RDA against the petitioner. The said note refers to the file notings and correspondence exchanged in relation to

the grant of NOC by the petitioner, as aforesaid. It also refers to the statement of several persons recorded in relation to the grant of the said NOC.

62. Para 6 of this note prepared by the ADG (Vig.I) dated 04.03.2011 reads as follows:

“6. Shri M.S. Bali is an HAG level officer of the Indian Postal Service and Presidential approval is required for disciplinary proceedings

against the officer. In view of the circumstances explained above, it is proposed that the case may be submitted to the Hon’ble MOC&IT

for his kind consideration and approval for acceptance of the CVC advice dated 02-12-2010 discussed in the first para of this note, for

institution of disciplinary proceedings under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 against Shri M.S. Bali, the then CPMG, Maharashtra &

Goa Circle currently under suspension, for the prima-facie irregularities on his part as discussed in detail in para 3 above, on the charge as

in para 5 above, and for taking necessary ancillary action as per the rules. Draft memo of charges, along with proposed Articles of Charge,

Statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior, and list of documents and witnesses in support of the charges, are placed at Flag

‘A’.â€​ (emphasis supplied)

63. The said note prepared by the ADG (Vig.I) is followed by another detailed note prepared by DDG (Vig.), which begins at page 9/N and goes uptill

11/N. The DDG (Vig.) and CVO in the said note dated 08.03.2011, inter alia, record as follows:

“7. It is, therefore, proposed that kind approval of Hon’ble MOC(IT), on behalf of the President, may be solicited for the following:

a) The proposal for institution of disciplinary proceeding against Shri M.S. Bali, as in para 6 of office Note on p.9/N.

b) For directing that Shri Bali will remain under suspension until termination of both the criminal and disciplinary proceedings against him,

as proposed in para 3 above, for the reasons recorded in para 5 & 6.

(Ashutosh Tripathi)

DDG(Vig) & CVO

08/03/2011â€​

(emphasis supplied)

64. The file was further put to Secretary (Posts), who also recommended the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, as in para 6 of

office note on page 9/N. It is only thereafter the file was put upto the Hon’ble MOC & IT, who granted his approval on 16.03.2011. Thus, before

the Hon’ble Minister â€" who is the competent authority, all the aforesaid file notings were placed along with the draft memo of charges along

with proposed articles of charge, statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior and list of documents and witnesses in support of the

charges. There is nothing emerging from the file notings in question, to even remotely suggest that there is non-application of mind by the competent

authority, or that he granted his approval in a mechanical or routine manner without considering the proposal placed before him. The Hon’ble

Minister is presumed to have applied his mind to the file placed before him which included the detailed file notings along with the proposed Articles of

Charge, statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior and list of documents and witnesses in support of the charges proposed to be framed

against the petitioner, and there is no material produced by the petitioner to dislodge the said presumption.

65. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the reliance placed by the petitioner on CMD Coal India Ltd. (supra) is misplaced in

the facts of the present case.

66. The petitioner is an accused in a serious trap case involving demand and acceptance of illegal gratification of a huge amount of Rs.2 crores. He

has also been proceeded departmentally. The petitioner has been able to obtain stay of the criminal prosecution by raising the issue of jurisdiction

under section 6A of the Delhi Police Establishment Act. Clearly, his present endeavour is to evade and delay the conclusion of even the departmental

proceedings. Since we find absolutely no merit in the present petition, and we are also of the view that the petitioner is trying to put spokes in the

conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings by raising frivolous technical pleas, which have no merit whatsoever, we are inclined to dismiss the petition

and subject the petitioner to costs of Rupees One Lakh. The costs be paid to the Delhi State Legal Services Authority within eight weeks. A copy of

this order be communicated to the Delhi State Legal Services Authority, so that, in case the petitioner does not deposit the costs as directed, the

matter may be brought to the notice of the Court for further orders.

67. The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.