Dinesh Kumar Paliwal, J
1. The applicant has filed this petition under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity 'The Code'), against the order dated
12.09.2020 passed in Criminal Revision No. 9/20 by ASJ Sonsar District Chhindwada whereby order dated 25.01.2020 passed in Criminal Case No.
461/2019 by learned JMFC Sonsar was affirmed. Learned JMFC has dismissed applicant's application under Section 451/457 of Cr.P.C. for granting
interim supurdginama of truck (six wheels) bearing registration No.MH-40-BG-8668 seized in Crime No. 273/2018 of P.S. Sonsar, District-
Chhindwada on the ground that confiscation order of the vehicle has been passed by the Collector.
2. Brief facts of the case are that on 17.12.2018 police Sonsar intercepted truck (red color six wheels) belonging to the present applicant at around
4:45 am at Baggu Bichhua railway crossing. Driver and others left the vehicle by parking it near Bichhua railway crossing. When search of the truck
was taken, truck was found transporting cattle (cow progeny). Cattle of cow progeny were being transported in the truck in cruel manner, their legs,
mouth and horn were found tied on the rope. Some of the cattle were dying. In search, total 21 gowansh (cow progeny) i.e. 8 calf, 7 cows and 6 she
calf were found. Case was registered for commission of offence under Section 279 of IPC, Sections 4, 6, 9 of M.P. Govansh Vadh Pratishedh
Adhiniyam, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the ""2004 Act"") Section 11(gha)(jha)(j)(cha) of Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (for short ""the
1960 Act"") Section 11 MP Krishak Pashu Parirakshan Adhiniyam and Sections 184, 187, 66/192 of Motor Vehicle Act. After completion of
investigation, charge sheet has been filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sonsar, District-Chhindwara and trial is not completed.
3. During the pendency of the trial, the applicant moved an application under Section 451/457 of the Code before learned JMFC for taking interim
custody of the vehicle bearing registration No. MH-40-BG-8668, which was dismissed vide order dated 25.01.2020 holding that cow progeny was
being transported in the vehicle in a cruel manner and that vehicle is the subject matter of offence, confiscation proceeding is pending before the
District Magistrate, therefore it is not justified to release the vehicle on supurdginama. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the applicant had
preferred the revision petition before additional Sessions Judge Sonsar, District Chhindwada who found that the District Magistrate has already passed
the order of confiscation of the vehicle under question vide order dated 06.08.2019. Hence, disposed off the revision petition finding no illegality,
incorrectness and impropriety in the order. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the applicant has preferred this application under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. before this Court for quashment of the impugned order passed by the Courts below.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that applicant is the registered owner of the seized vehicle. The order passed by the Courts below
are illegal, unjust, arbitrary and are against the settled principles of law. He further submitted that if vehicle remains in custody of the police for a long
period same shall get rot to rust and applicant shall be deprived of his livelihood. Learned Courts below have not considered the fact that Collector has
illegally passed the order of confiscation of the vehicle as trial is still pending before the learned JMFC. Therefore, Collector should have not passed
the order of confiscation on 06.08.2019 before the conclusion of the trial by Criminal Court. It is further submitted that order of confiscation under
M.P. Govansh Vadh Pratishedh Adhiniyam and Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act can be passed only if the criminal Court found the violation of
Sections 4,5, 6 and 6-B of the 2004 Act have been committed by the accused. It is submitted that Collector should have refrained from passing any
order of confiscation of vehicle during the pendency of criminal case.
5. Learned Courts below have not considered the fact that till trial is not completed and person who are facing trial are not convicted for the
commission of offence, Collector should have not passed the order of confiscation during the pendency of the criminal case and it was not fair on the
part of the Collector to finalize confiscation proceedings and even if Collector had passed such order, criminal Courts were not ousted from the power
by the releasing the vehicle on supurdgi till conclusion of trial. Learned counsel has placed reliance on order dated 25.01.2019 passed in M.Cr.C. No.
34086/2018 (Riyaj Khan Vs. The State of M.P.), order dated 28.01.2022 passed in M.Cr.C. No. 60156/2021, order dated 04.01.2022 passed in
M.Cr.C. No. 47172/2021(Anshu Singh Vs. State of MP), order dated 06.01.2022 passed in M.Cr.C.No. 45989/2021 (Meera Jaiswal Vs. State of
MP), order dated 30.01.2020 passed in M.Cr.C. No. 52142/2019 (Devendra Dohar Vs. The State of M.P.) and Raees Vs. State of MP, 2013(5)
MPHT 233 and Sheikh Kalim Vs. State of MP, 2015(II) MPWN 157 and Moin Vs. State of MP, 2016 (III) MPWN 119.
6. On the other hand, learned Panel Lawyer for the respondent/State has opposed the application contending that the order of confiscation of the
vehicle has already been passed by the District Magistrate Chhindwada, therefore, the Courts below have rightly dismissed the prayer for releasing
the vehicle to the applicant on interim custody. Hence, placing reliance on order dated 04.07.2019 passed in M.Cr.C. No. 19384/2019 (Rajendra
Kumar through Nisar Mohammad Vs. The State of MP) and State of MP Vs. Uday Singh, 2020 (12) SCC 733 has prayed for rejection of the present
application.
7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties perused the record.
8. After hearing the rival submissions advanced by the learned Counsel fo r the parties and to advert such contention the relevant provision of the
Adhiniyam, 2004 is required to be seen. As per Section 11(5) of the Adhiniyam, 2004, it is clear that in case of any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6-A and
6-B, the Police Authorities is empowered to seize the vehicle or cow progeny and beef.
The District Magistrate is having power to confiscate the same in a manner prescribed. Rules 5 and 6 of the Rules of 2012, which deals, confiscation,
and appeal are relevant, however, it is reproduced as under:-
Rule-5. Confiscation by District Magistrate.--
In case of any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 6-A and 6-B, the police shall be empowered to seize the vehicles, cow progeny and beef and the District
Magistrate shall confiscate such vehicles, cow progeny and beef as per the provisions of Section 100 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (No. 2 of
1974) in following manner:--
(i) He shall take possession of the vehicle.
(ii) He shall intimate the Veterinary Department to cow progeny and beef.
(iii) The beef of cow-progeny shall be disposed of by the Department by such procedure as he deems fit.
Rule 6. Manner of Appeal.-- Any person aggrieved by an order of confiscation under sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act, may prefer an appeal
in writing to the Divisional Commissioner within thirty days of the date of knowledge of such order. Every appeal shall be made under sub-section (1)
of Section 11-A of the Act.
9. On a perusal of the aforesaid, rules, it is apparent that in the aforesaid rules, the procedure has been prescribed for confiscation and against the said
order the appeal may be maintained before the Divisional Commissioner. After going through the provisions of the Act, 2004 as well as the Rules of
2012 the bar of jurisdiction of the Criminal Court to grant interim custody of property as specified in Section 451 of Cr.P.C. is not there. Similarly,
under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, there is no bar to grant interim custody. Therefore, it reveals that the application under Section
451/457 of the Cr.P.C. filed by any person aggrieved, seeking interim custody of the vehicle, cow progeny and beef can be entertained by the Criminal
Courts. As far as the argument of the learned counsel for the State that when confiscation proceedings are pending before the District Magistrate or
confiscation order has been passed by the District Magistrate recourse under Section 451/457 of the Cr.P.C. for grant of interim custody by the
Criminal Court is not permissible, is concerned as for the same learned counsel for the State has placed reliance on the judgment of the State of
Madhya Pradesh Vs. Uday Singh and others, 2020 (12) SCC 733 and M.Cr.C. No. 19384/2019 (Rajendra Kumar through Nisar Mohammad Vs.
State of MP) vide order dated 04.07.2019 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court. Learned counsel for the State has also placed reliance on the
judgment of State of MP Vs. Smt. Kallo Bai, 2017(14) SCC 502 and has submitted that during the pendency of confiscation proceeding or after
passing of confiscation order, Criminal Court cannot release the vehicle under Section 451/457 of Cr.P.C. though person aggrieved may file an appeal
as per Rule 6 before the Divisional Commissioner after confiscation. Therefore, Courts below have rightly refused the interim custody by passing the
impugned orders.
10. As far as the judgment of Smt Kallo Bai (supra) is concerned in this case it was clarified that confiscatory proceedings are independent of the
main criminal proceedings and its main purpose is to provide a deterrent mechanism and to stop further misuse of the subject vehicle. In that case
confiscation proceedings under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and the Madhya Pradesh Van Upaj (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969 were involved
and in that case it was observed by the Apex Court that under Section 15(c) of the Adhiniyam, a jurisdictional bar on Courts and tribunal are provided.
It was further held that the jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts, regarding disposal of property, are made subject to the jurisdiction of the authorized
officer under the Act.
11. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Abdul Vaha Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 262 where accused were acquitted of
charges under the 1960 Act and also the charge under Section 4 read with Section 9 of 2004 Act held as under:-
14 . The learned Judge in the impugned judgment, also placed reliance on State of M.P Vs. Uday Singh, wherein it was held that the High Court
erred in directing the Magistrate to release the seized vehicle in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. Since the confiscation
proceedings were initiated under Section 52(3) of the Forest Act, 1927 (as substituted by the MP Act 25 of 1983), further procedure was governed by
the relevant provisions of the said act (and the M.P amendments to the Forest Act) and the jurisdiction of the criminal courts stood excluded. 3 (2020)
12 SCC 733 Further, the non-obstante clause in Section 52-C(1) gave overriding effect to the legislation. Resultantly, the powers vested in the
magistrate under the CrPC were taken away. The relevant passage in the relied upon judgment reads as under:-
29.3. Section 52-C stipulates that on the receipt of an intimation by the Magistrate under sub-section (4) of Section 52, no court, tribunal or authority,
other than an authorised officer, an appellate authority or Court of Session (under Sections 52, 52-A and 52-B) shall have jurisdiction to pass orders
with regard to possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of the property in regard to which confiscation proceedings have been initiated. Sub-section
(1) of Section 52-C has a non obstante provision which operates notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Forest Act, 1927 or in any
other law for the time being in force. The only saving is in respect of an officer duly empowered by the State Government for directing the immediate
release of a property seized under Section 52, as provided in Section 61. Hence, upon the receipt of an intimation by the Magistrate of the initiation of
confiscation proceedings under sub- section (4)(a) of Section 52, the bar of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 52-C is clearly attracted.
29.4. The scheme contained in the amendments enacted to the Forest Act, 1927 in relation to the State of Madhya Pradesh, makes it abundantly clear
that the direction which was issued by the High Court in the present case, in a petition under Section 482 CrPC, to the Magistrate to direct the interim
release of the vehicle, which had been seized, was contrary to law. The jurisdiction under Section 451 CrPC was not available to the Magistrate, once
the authorized officer initiated confiscation proceedings.
15. The above would show that the powers of seizure, confiscation and forfeiture of produce illegally removed from forest is vested exclusively in
Authorized Officers. As such, once the confiscation proceedings are initiated under the provisions of the aforenoted legislation, the jurisdiction of
criminal courts is ousted, since it is the authorized officer who is vested with power to pass orders for interim custody of vehicles and the Magistrate is
kept away.
12. In the Abdul Vaha (Supra), Hon'ble Apex Court held that in the case of the Kallo Bai (Supra) and Uday Singh (Supra) the provisions of the Forest
Act were involved and in the forest Act power are vested exclusively in authorized officer. Thus, judgments of Kallo Bai (supra), Uday Singh (supra)
and Rajendra Kumar through Nisar Mohammad (supra) have no application in case under Act 2004 and under the 1960 Act.
13. Learned counsel for the applicant has contended that in this case although confiscation order has already been passed by the Collector under Rule
5 of the 2012 Rule but same is not sustainable because vehicle cannot be confiscated by the Collector so long as criminal case is pending. Thus,
learned Collector was not justified in passing the order of confiscation before the conclusion of the trial. For this purpose reliance has been placed on
the judgment of Sheikh Kalim Vs State of MP 2015 (II) MPWN 157 and Moin Vs. State of MP, 2016 (III) MPWN 119 . Undisputedly the Collector
has passed the order of confiscation on 23.04.2020 i.e. before the conclusion of the trial by the Criminal Court. The criminal case is still pending for
the adjudication. As per the provision of Section 11(5) of the Adhiniyam, the Collector can confiscate the vehicle only when a competent Court has
found proved any violation of the Sections 4, 5, 6, 6-A and 6-B of the Act 2004. Where trial is pending and charges have yet to be proved by
prosecution. The Collector should have refrained from passing any order of confiscation of vehicle during pendency of the criminal case.
14. In Sheikh Kalim (supra) case, a Coordinate Bench of this Court in similar circumstances held as under:-
7 . That in the similar circumstances this Court while dealing a case under the Indian Forest Act read with the MP Vanopaj Vyapar Viniyaman
Adhiniyam 1969 in the Premdas (Supra), held that confiscation of the vehicle is unsustainable until and unless the criminal proceedings are finalized.
8. The full Bench of this court in the case of Madhukar Rao Vs. State of MP (2000(1) JLJ 304), has laid down the principle that during pendency of
the criminal case, confiscation proceedings should not be held and be finalized. This judgment has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of State of MP Vs. Madhukar Rao (2008 (1) JLJ 427), wherein the Court observed that:-
...... The submission was carefully considered by the Full Bench of the High Court and on an examination of the various provisions of the Act it was
held that the provision of Section 39(1)(d) would come into play only after a Court of competent jurisdiction found the accusation and the allegations
made against the accused as true and recorded the finding that the seized article was, as a matter of fact, used in the commission of offence.
9 . The aforesaid principle laid down i n Madhukar Rao (supra), reiterated and affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Principal Chief
Conservator of Forest Vs. J.K. Johnson (AIR 2012 SC 61).
11. Thus, in absence of any finding with regard to violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 6A and 6B of the Adhiniyam, by the criminal Court, the order passed by
the Collector, confiscating the said vehicle under the Section 11(5) of the Adhiniyam is bad in law.
15. In Moin (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this case has held as under:-
5. Legal side of this matter was considered in detail by this Court in the case of Sarvan S/o Prahalad Suraha and another v. State of M.P. in
M.Cr.C.No.593/2015 dated 24.08.2015. In this case in para 14 of the order, this Court expressed the following observations:-
14. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the manner in which the property is to be confiscated, is not provided by the Act and the rules
and, therefore, applying the principles laid down in the case of Madhukar Rao (Supra), the District Magistrate has no power to confiscate the vehicle
till it is held by the competent Court of Magistrate that offence was in fact committed and the vehicle was used in commission of the offence. In this
view of the matter, the questions framed in para 4 may be answered thus:-
(i) The proceedings for confiscation before the District Magistrate can continue, however, no final order can be passed.
(ii) Final order in the proceedings can be passed only after conclusion of trial before the Judicial Magistrate in which it was held that offence under the
Act was committed and the vehicle was used for transporting cow progeny for slaughter.
16. In Abdul Vaha (Supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
1 6 . The aforenoted cases were cited in the impugned judgment to hold that the Court did not have jurisdiction under Section 482, CrPC to grant
relief to the appellant. This in our view is unacceptable since the applicable provisions in the aforementioned cases are not pari materia to the
provisions of the 2004 Act. Most significantly, the 2004 Act with which we are concerned here, does not have any non obstante clause as in the
Section 52-C(1) of the Forest Act,1927 (as amended in relation to the State of Madhya Pradesh by M.P Act 25 of 1983) or Section 15-C o f the
Madhya Pradesh Van Upaj (Vyaapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1969 which create bar on jurisdiction of the criminal courts. Returning to the present
matter and the law that was invoked, we may gainfully notice that Section 11(4) of the 2004 Act, specifically applies the provisions of CrPC, in
relation to search and seizure and Section 11 A(4) empowers the Appellate Authority to release the vehicle at interim stage itself. The Rules 5 and 6
of the MP Govansh Vadh Pratishedh Rules, 2012 empower the police to seize vehicle, the cow progeny and beef in case of violation of Sections 4, 5,
6,6A and 6B of the 2004 Act, as per Section 100 of the CrPC. As is discernible, the provisions of CrPC are specifically made applicable in the 2004
Act and the 2012 Rules. Therefore, an erroneous conclusion was drawn on absence of power, to entertain the petition of the vehicle owner. In the
context of the proceedings initiated under the M.P. Prohibition of Cow Slaughter Act, 2004 and there being no bar to exercise of jurisdiction of
Criminal Courts including the High Court, under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court in our opinion was competent to entertain the petition under Section
482 CrPC.
17. We find support for the above view, from the ratio in the State of M.P Vs. Madhukar Rao4, wherein this Court while adverting to the provisions of
another legislation i.e. the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 opined that the power of the Magistrate to order interim release of confiscated vehicle
under Section 451 CrPC, is not affected. The Court reasoned that withdrawal of the power of interim release conferred on the Authorities under
Section 50(2), cannot be construed to mean a bar on the powers of the Magistrate under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was next
noted that a clear intention to the contrary can be found in the Act in Section 50(4) under which, any person detained, or things seized shall be taken
before a Magistrate to be dealt with according to law (and not according to the provisions of the Act) .
18. Pertinently, State of M.P Vs. Madhukar Rao5 affirmed the decision of the High Court in Madhukar Rao v. State of MP6, wherein Justice D.M
Dharmadhikari, writing for the Full Bench, opined that the provision of Section 39(1)(d) of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, providing for absolute
vesting of seized property with State Government, without a finding by the Competent Court that the property was being used for the commission of
an offence, runs afoul of the Constitutional provisions. It is succinctly observed in Para 18,
18.... If the argument on behalf of the State is accepted a property seized on accusation would become the property of the State and can never be
released even on the compounding of the offence. The provisions of Clause (d) of section 39 have to be reasonably and harmoniously construed with
other provisions of the Act and the Code which together provide a detailed procedure for the trial of the offences. If, as contended on behalf of the
State, seizure of property merely on accusation would make the property to be of the Government, it would have the result of depriving an accused of
his property without proof of his guilt. On such interpretation Clause (d) of section 39(1) of the Act would suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality.
The interpretation placed by the State would mean that a specified officer under the Act merely by seizure of property of an accused would deprive
him of his property which he might be using for his trade, profession or occupation. This would be serious encroachment on the fundamental right of a
citizen under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry on his trade, occupation or business.
1 9 . By reason of an order of confiscation, a person is deprived of the enjoyment of his property. Article 300A of the Constitution provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. Therefore, to deprive any person of their property, it is necessary for the State, inter-
alia, to establish that the property was illegally obtained or is part of the proceeds of crime or the deprivation is warranted for public purpose or public
interest.
20 . At this stage, we may usefully refer to this Courts opinion in State of W.B vs. Sujit Kumar Rana7. Here it was emphasized on the need to
maintain balance between statutes framed in public interest such as the Forest Act, 1927 (and the relevant insertions under W.B Act 22 of 1988) and
the consequential proceedings, depriving a person of his property, arising therefrom. It was accordingly observed that "" commission of an offence"" is
one of the requisite ingredients for passing an order of confiscation and an order of 7 (2004) 4 SCC 129 confiscation should n o t be passed
automatically. The relevant passage is reproduced below:
2 6 . An order of confiscation of forest produce in a proceeding under Section 59-A of the Act would not amount either to penalty or punishment.
Such an order, however, can be passed only in the event a valid seizure is made and the authorized officer satisfies himself as regards ownership of
the forest produce in the State as also commission of a forest offence. An order of confiscation is not to be passed automatically, and in terms of sub-
section (3) of Section 59-
A a discretionary power has been conferred upon the authorized officer in relation to a vehicle. Apart from the ingredients which are required to be
proved in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 59-A by reason of the proviso appended to Section 59-B, a notice is also required to be issued to the
owner of the vehicle and furthermore in terms of sub-section (2) thereof an opportunity has to be granted to the owner of the vehicle so as to enable
him to show that the same has been used in carrying forest produce without his knowledge or connivance and by necessary implication precautions
therefor have been taken.
21. Insofar as the submission of the State Counsel that the burden of proof is on the truck owner in the process of confiscation, we must observe that
Section 13A of the 2004 Act, which shifts the burden of proof, is not applicable for the confiscation proceedings but for the process of prosecution. By
virtue of Section 13A of the 2004 Act, the burden on the State authority to legally justify the confiscation order, cannot be shifted to the person facing
the confiscation proceeding. The contention to the contrary of the State's counsel, is accordingly rejected.
22. In the present case, the appellants truck was confiscated on account of the criminal proceedings alone and therefore, under the applicable law, the
vehicle cannot be withheld and then confiscated by the State, when the original proceedings have culminated into acquittal. It is also not the projected
case that there is a likelihood that the appellant's truck will be used for committing similar offence.
23. It should be noted that the objective of the 2004 Act is punitive and deterrent in nature. Section 11 of the 2004 Act and Rule 5 of M.P Govansh
Vadh Pratishedh Rules, 2012, allows for seizure and confiscation of vehicle, in case of violation of sections 4,5,6, 6A and 6B. The confiscation
proceeding, before the District Magistrate, is different from criminal prosecution. However, both may run simultaneously, to facilitate speedy and
effective adjudication with regard to confiscation of the means used for committing the offence. The District Magistrate has the power to
independently adjudicate cases of violations under Sections 4, 5, 6, 6A and 6B of the 2004 Act and pass order of confiscation in case of violation. But
in a case where the offender/accused are acquitted in the Criminal Prosecution, the judgment given in the Criminal Trial should be factored in by the
District Magistrate while deciding the confiscation proceeding. In the present case, the order of acquittal was passed as evidence was missing to
connect the accused with the charges. The confiscation of the appellant's truck when he is acquitted in the Criminal prosecution, amounts to arbitrary
deprivation of his property and violates the right guaranteed to each person under Article 300A. Therefore, the circumstances here are compelling to
conclude that the District Magistrate's order of Confiscation (ignoring the Trial Courts judgment of acquittal), is not only arbitrary but also inconsistent
with the legal requirements.
17. Thus, in the light of above pronouncement by Apex Court and discussion made herein above, it would not be out of place to mention here that in
the provisions of the Act even after passing an order of confiscation by Collector statutory bar to entertain the application for interim custody by the
criminal Court has not been specified in the rules. In such circumstances, Collectors are required to refrain from passing any confiscation order before
the conclusion of trial by the Criminal Court because as per the provision of the Act, Collector can confiscate the vehicle only when a competent
Court has found proved the violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 6-A and 6-B of the Act 2004. As in the case on hand, trial is still pending and guilt of the
accused have not been proved so far. Therefore, in such circumstances, vehicle may be released on interim custody.
18. It is to be noted here that the keeping the custody of the vehicle for a long time with the police or Court, is not required and is also not in the fair
administration of justice. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case o f Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai Vs. State of Gujarat AIR 2003 SC 638 has emphasized
the need of disposal of the property pending trial. It has been observed by the Apex Court that the Court should exercise such power expeditiously and
judiciously because it would serve various purposes, namely:-
1. Owner of the article would not suffer because of its remaining unused or by its misappropriation.
2. Court or the police would not be required to keep the article in safe custody;
3 . If the proper panchanama before handing over possession of article is prepared, that can be used in evidence instead of its production before the
Court during the trial. If necessary, evidence could also be recorded describing the nature of the properly in detail; and
4. The jurisdiction of the Court to record evidence should be exercised promptly so that there may not be further chance of tampering with the
articles.
19. This Court, in the case of Sheikh Kalim (Supra) and Moin (Supra) had directed to release the vehicle, which were seized under Section 11(5) of
the Act, 2004. In case of Abdul Vaha (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has made it clear that the the objective of 2004 Act is punitive and deterrent in
nature.
Section 11 of the 2004 Act and Rule 5 of M.P Govansh Vadh Pratishedh Rules, 2012 allows for seizure and confiscation of vehicle, in case of
violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 6-A and 6-B of the Act. As in case on hand, the trial is still pending and applicant and others have not been held guilty for
commission of offences under Sections 4,5, 6, 6-A and 6-B of the Act. Hence, passing of confiscation order is not proper. Therefore, I am of the view
that even after passing of the confiscation order by the Collector vehicle in question can be released on Supurdagi as there is no statutory bar to
release the same.
20. Therefore, in view of the forgoing discussion, as in the case on hand the trial is still pending and guilt of accused has not been proved so far under
the 2004 Act and Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. Therefore, in absence of findings of guilt with regard to violation of Sections 4, 5, 6. 6-A and
6-B of the Act by the Criminal Court, the order passed by the Collector, confiscating the said vehicle under Section 11(5) of Act is bad in law., hence
not sustainable. Consequently, confiscation order dated 23.04.2020 passed by the Collector Chhindwada is erroneous and bad in law. Therefore, this
petition under Section 482 is allowed and the orders passed by the Courts below are set aside.
21. It is directed that the seized vehicle bearing registration No.MH-40-BG-8668 be released on interim supurdagi of its register owner upon furnishing
a Supurdginama to the tune of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Fifteen Lakh) alongwith one solvent surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned
Judicial Magistrate, subject to following condition:-
(i) that applicant/registered owner vehicle shall not alienate or transfer the vehicle during pendency of trial.
(ii) that he will not commit similar crime under the provision of 2004 Act and 1960 Act till the matter is finally decided by the Criminal Court.
(iii) that he shall also not change its machinery, color, outward appearance make etc.
(iv) If in the judgment passed by criminal Court accused are convicted
fo r commission of offence under the provisions of M.P. Govansh Vadh Pratishedh Adhiniyam, 2004, registered owner shall produce the vehicle
within a period of 7 days from date of delivery of judgment before the police Sonsar or Collector, Chhindwada and Collector Chhindwada shall be at
liberty to pass the confiscation order regarding seized vehicle as per law.
(v) Registered owner of vehicle shall produce the vehicle before Criminal Court or the District Magistrate whenever and wherever, he is directed to
do so.
22. Breach of the any of the aforementioned condition would entail cancellation of Supurdginama automatically. This petition is disposed off
accordingly.
