Deputy Commissioner Of Police & Anr Vs Neelam Rani & Ors.

Delhi High Court 14 Oct 2022 First Appeal From Order No. 153 Of 2022, Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 25757 Of 2022 (2022) 10 DEL CK 0081
Bench: Single Bench
Acts Referenced

Judgement Snapshot

Case Number

First Appeal From Order No. 153 Of 2022, Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 25757 Of 2022

Hon'ble Bench

Manoj Kumar Ohri, J

Advocates

Anupam Srivastava, Sarita Pandey, Kirti Uppal, Randeep Singh, Ujala Vishnoi, Riya Gulati, Chandan Singh, Arun Panwar, Mahak Rankawat

Acts Referred
  • Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 96(2), 104, Order 43 Rule 1(d), Order 9 Rule 13
  • Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5

Judgement Text

Translate:

Manoj Kumar Ohri, J

1. By way of the present appeal filed under Section 104 read with Order XLIII Rule 1(d) CPC, the appellants/defendants have assailed the order

dated 06.05.2022 passed by the learned ADJ-02, Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in Misc DJ No. 731/2021, whereby application filed on behalf

of the appellants under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC and Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 was dismissed.

2. Before proceeding to deal with the contentions, the facts in a nutshell are that respondents No.1 to 3/plaintiffs, while claiming themselves to be co-

owners and shareholders of property bearing No. 148, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi part of Khasra No.690/605/326/62/7/1/8/14/6/7/5/1 in the area of village

Seelampur, in the abadi of Gandhi Nagar, Delhi, had filed a suit bearing CS No. 626/2018 against the defendants for possession, mesne profits and

permanent injunction. The plaintiffs claimed that they had purchased their respective shares by virtue of separate sale deeds and that the Suit Property

being adjacent to Gandhi Nagar Police Station had been illegally trespassed in the year 2008 by police officials, who were using it for parking

junk/unused and confiscated vehicles.

3. Records reveal that the appellants were served with the summons of the Suit. One SI Deshpal had appeared on 17.01.2019. As no written

statement came to be filed, the appellants were proceeded ex-parte on 20.08.2019. The plaintiffs led evidence and after conclusion of the trial, an ex-

parte judgment came to be passed on 16.03.2021. On an execution petition being filed, the appellants received summons on 06.09.2021 whereafter

they preferred an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC read with Section 5 of Limitation Act on 30.11.2021, resulting in passing of the impugned

order.

4. Mr. Anupam Srivastava, learned ASC for the appellants, assailed the impugned order by contending that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the

appellants had shown sufficient cause for not appearing in the Suit as well as for condonation of delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13

CPC. Insofar as non-appearance in the Suit is concerned, it was contended that although SI Deshpal appeared on 17.01.2019, the Presiding Officer

was on leave and as such, the officer could not understand the proceedings, resulting in failure to communicate the same to the senior officers.

 It was also submitted that having received the summons, the appellants acted diligently in issuing Brief Transmission Form (BTF) on 07.08.2019 in

favour of the Government counsel appointed for appearing in the suit proceedings. The Government counsel, however, could not appear as he did not

receive the BTF or any other instructions. It is urged that in this backdrop, the appellants were proceeded ex-parte resulting in passing of the

impugned order/judgment.

 Learned counsel for the appellants also argued that the appellants acquired knowledge of the passing of the impugned judgment only on 06.09.2021,

when summons in the execution petition were received by them. Lastly, it was submitted that the expression sufficient cause in Order 9 Rule 13 CPC

is to be construed liberally, as no negligence is imputable to the appellants and the appellants were rather vigilant enough to not only send the

concerned SI, but also to appoint a counsel by issuing a BTF prior to even passing of the order, whereby the appellants were proceeded ex-parte.

5. Insofar as the dismissal of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned, learned ASC referred to the orders passed by the

Supreme Court in Suo Motu W.P. (C) No. 3/2020 to submit that the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was filed within limitation.

6. Mr. Kirti Uppal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents No.1 to 3, on the other hand, contended that the appellants had been callous in

their conduct, inasmuch as none appeared on their behalf in the Suit despite service of summons. He further contended that the explanation offered

that SI Deshpal could not understand the proceedings and that the Government counsel appointed did not receive BTF/instructions, does not

sufficiently explain as to why the appellants failed to appear on the relevant dates.

 Learned Senior Counsel submitted that while the captioned suit was filed with respect to one portion of the plot, the owners of the other three

portions have preferred another suit, which came to be decreed on 11.02.2020. He also argued that the appellants would not gain any advantage in

contesting the present suit as the decree in the other suit has remained unchallenged.

 Alternatively, it was contended that the appellants cannot be relegated to the stage prior to the passing of the order dated 20.08.2019, whereby they

were proceeded ex-parte. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the appellants in the present case have not challenged the ex-parte judgment on

merits till date.

7. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and have also gone through the case records.

8. Although a contention has been raised on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to the effect that the ex-parte judgment remains unchallenged on merits,

the law in this regard is well settled. A defendant who has suffered an ex-parte decree can either file a regular appeal from the decree challenging the

same on merits, or alternatively, he can file an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC to seek setting aside of the decree on the ground that (i) the

summons were not duly served or; (ii) the person who was served was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing in the suit when the suit was

called for hearing.

 The appellants have premised their case on the alternative, by submitting that after being summoned, they were prevented by sufficient cause from

appearing in the Suit when it came up for hearing. While underlining the availability of remedies to defendants such as those in the present case, the

Supreme Court in Bhivchandra Shankar More v. Balu Gangaram More and Others reported as (2019) 6 SCC 387 has held as under:-

“11. It is to be pointed out that the scope of Order 9 Rule 13 CPC and Section 96(2) CPC are entirely different. In an application filed

under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, the Court has to see whether the summons were duly served or not or whether the defendant was prevented by

any “sufficient cause†from appearing when the suit was called for hearing. If the Court is satisfied that the defendant was not duly

served or that he was prevented for “sufficient causeâ€, the court may set aside the ex parte decree and restore the suit to its original

position. In terms of Section 96(2) CPC, the appeal lies from an original decree passed ex parte. In the regular appeal filed under Section

96(2) CPC, the appellate court has wide jurisdiction to go into the merits of the decree. The scope of enquiry under two provisions is

entirely different. Merely because the defendant pursued the remedy under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, it does not prohibit the defendant from

filing the appeal if his application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC is dismissed.â€​

9. The expression ‘was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing’ as mentioned in Order 9 Rule 13 CPC has to be construed in the

facts and circumstances of each case. Indeed, it has to be construed liberally, especially if the explanation offered is justifiable. In this regard, the

Supreme Court in Bhivchandra Shankar More (Supra) has opined that the term sufficient cause should be given liberal construction so as to advance

sustainable justice when there is no inaction, no negligence nor want of bonafide on the part of the appellant.

10. To similar extent are the observations in G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada and Others reported as (2000) 3 SCC 54, where the Supreme Court

while

considering the scope of sufficient cause under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC observed thus:-

“7. Under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC an ex parte decree passed against a defendant can be set aside upon satisfaction of the Court that

either the summons were not duly served upon the defendant or he was prevented by any “sufficient cause†from appearing when the

suit was called on for hearing. Unless “sufficient cause†is shown for non-appearance of the defendant in the case on the date of

hearing, the court has no power to set aside an ex parte decree. The words ""was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing"" must be

liberally construed to enable the court to do complete justice between the parties particularly when no negligence or inaction is imputable to

the erring party. Sufficient cause for the purpose of Order 9 Rule 13 has to be construed as an elastic expression for which no hard and

fast guidelines can be prescribed. The courts have a wide discretion in deciding the sufficient cause keeping in view the peculiar facts and

circumstances of each case. The “sufficient cause†for non-appearance refers to the date on which the absence was made a ground for

proceeding ex parte and cannot be stretched to rely upon other circumstances anterior in time. If “sufficient cause†is made out for

non-appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when ex parte proceedings were initiated against him, he cannot be

penalised for his previous negligence which had been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier. In a case where the defendant approaches

the court immediately and within the statutory time specified, the discretion is normally exercised in his favour, provided the absence was

not mala fide or intentional. For the absence of a party in the case the other side can be compensated by adequate costs and the lis decided

on merits.â€​

11. Again, in Secretary, Department of Horticulture, Chandigarh and Another v. Raghu Raj reported as (2008) 13 SCC 395, it was held by the

Supreme Court that a party should normally not suffer on account of default or non-appearance on behalf of its counsel. Relevant extract from the

decision is reproduced hereunder:-

“28. From the case law referred to above, it is clear that this Court has always insisted on advocates to appear and argue the case as

and when it is called out for hearing. Failure to do so would be unfair to the client and discourteous to the court and must be severely

discountenanced. At the same time, the Court has also emphasized doing justice to the cause wherein it is appropriate that both the parties

are present before the court and they are heard. It has been noted by the Court that once a party engages a counsel, he thinks that his

advocate will appear when the case will be taken up for hearing and the court calls upon the counsel to make submissions. It is keeping in

view these principles that the Court does not proceed to hear the matter in absence of the counsel.â€​

12. Recently, this Court, in Hira Sweets & Confectionary Pvt. Ltd. and Others v. Hira Confectioners reported as 2021 SCC OnLine Del 1823 also

reiterated the above legal position and held:-

“11. Insofar as the scope of an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is concerned, the Court has to see whether the summons in the

suit were duly served or not and/or whether the defendant was prevented by any “sufficient cause†from appearing when the suit was

called for hearing. In the present case, the defendant was duly served with the summons in the suit and had appeared.

12. “Sufficient Cause†is an elastic expression and no hard and fast guidelines are prescribed. The Court, in its discretion, has to

consider the “sufficient causeâ€​ in the facts and circumstances of every individual case. Although in interpreting the words “sufficient

causeâ€​, the Court has wide discretion but the same has to be exercised in the particular facts of the case.

xxx

14. In Sudarshan Sareen (Supra), a Division Bench of this Court while holding that the appellant therein, was wilfully negligent in not

appearing and thus rejecting his prayer for setting aside of an ex-parte decree, relied on the following passage in the case of Parimal v.

Veena reported as (2011) 3 SCC 545, where the expression “sufficient causeâ€​ was interpreted as under:

 “13. “Sufficient cause†is an expression which has been used in a large number of statutes. The meaning of the word

“sufficient†is “adequate†or “enoughâ€, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, word

“sufficient†embraces no more than that which provides a platitude which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose

intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case and duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious

man. In this context, “sufficient cause†means that the party had not acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its

part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to have been “not acting diligently†or

“remaining inactiveâ€. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned

to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. (Vide Ramial v. Rewa

Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361], Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi [AIR 1968 SC 222], Surinder Singh Sibia v. Vijay Kumar

Sood [(1992) 1 SCC 70] and Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn. [(2010) 5 SCC 459].)

xxx xxx xxx

15. While deciding whether there is sufficient cause or not, the court must bear in mind the object of doing substantial justice to all the

parties concerned and that the technicalities of the law should not prevent the court from doing substantial justice and doing away the

illegality perpetuated on the basis of the judgment impugned before it. (Vide State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh [(2000) 9 SCC 94],

Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535], Davinder Pal Sehgal v. Partap Steel Rolling Mills (P) Ltd. [(2002) 3 SCC 156], Ram Nath Sao v.

Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195], Kaushalya Devi v. Prem Chand [(2005) 10 SCC 127], Srei International Finance Ltd.v. Fairgrowth

Financial Services Ltd. [(2005) 13 SCC 95] and Reena Sadh v. Aniana Enterprises [(2008) 12 SCC 589].)

16. In order to determine the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, the test that has to be applied is whether the defendant honestly and

sincerely intended to remain present when the suit was called on for hearing and did his best to do so. Sufficient cause is thus the cause for

which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. Therefore, the applicant must approach the court with a reasonable defence.

Sufficient cause is a question of fact and the court has to exercise its discretion in the varied and special circumstances in the case at hand.

There cannot be a straitjacket formula of universal application.â€​

15. Recently, the Supreme Court in A. Murugesan v. Jamuna Rani reported as (2019) 20 SCC 803 affirmed its earlier view in G.P.

Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada reported as (2000) 3 SCC 54, which is reproduced as under:

“7. Under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC an ex-parte decree passed against a defendant can be set aside upon satisfaction of the Court that

either the summons were not duly served upon the defendant or he was prevented by any “sufficient cause†from appearing when the

suit was called on for hearing. Unless “sufficient cause†is shown for non-appearance of the defendant in the case on the date of

hearing, the court has no power to set aside an ex-parte decree. The words “was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearingâ€

must be liberally construed to enable the court to do complete justice between the parties particularly when no negligence or inaction is

imputable to the erring party. Sufficient cause for the purpose of Order 9 Rule 13 has to be construed as an elastic expression for which no

hard and-fast guidelines can be prescribed. The courts have a wide discretion in deciding the sufficient cause keeping in view the peculiar

facts and circumstances of each case. The “sufficient cause†for non-appearance refers to the date on which the absence was made a

ground for proceeding ex-parte and cannot be stretched to rely upon other circumstances anterior in time. If “sufficient cause†is made

out for non-appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when ex pate proceedings were initiated against him, he cannot be

penalised for his previous negligence which had been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier. In a case where the defendant approaches

the court immediately and within the statutory time specified, the discretion is normally exercised in his favour, provided the absence was

not mala fide or intentional. For the absence of a party in the case the other side can be compensated by adequate costs and the lis decided

on merits.â€​

13. In the present case, it is apparent that the appellants put an appearance through SI Deshpal on 17.01.2019, however, the Presiding Officer was on

leave that day. The appellants did not appear on next three dates, however, they had taken sufficient steps of appointing Government counsel to

represent them in the said proceedings. The counsel engaged could not appear for want of BTF and necessary instructions, resulting eventually in

passing of the ex-parte judgment/decree.

14. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the position of law as discussed hereinabove, the present appeal is allowed and the

matter is remanded back to the concerned Court for proceeding with the Suit in accordance with law. Miscellaneous application is disposed of as

infructuous.

15. A copy of this judgment be communicated to the concerned Court for information.

From The Blog
Madras High Court to Hear School’s Plea Against State Objection to RSS Camp on Campus
Feb
07
2026

Court News

Madras High Court to Hear School’s Plea Against State Objection to RSS Camp on Campus
Read More
Delhi High Court Quashes Ban on Medical Students’ Inter-College Migration, Calls Rule Arbitrary
Feb
07
2026

Court News

Delhi High Court Quashes Ban on Medical Students’ Inter-College Migration, Calls Rule Arbitrary
Read More