1. This Criminal Revision Case is filed by the petitioner-accused aggrieved by the judgment dated 12.05.2016 passed in Crl.A. No.494 of 2012 by the
Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge for Trial of Communal Offence Cases cum VII Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, in
reversing the judgment of acquittal and convicting him for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short ‘NI Act’)
and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and fine of Rs.3,25,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple
imprisonment for three months and out of the said fine amount, directing him to pay Rs.3,23,000/- as compensation to the respondent - complainant
under Section 357 Cr.P.C.
2. The parties are hereinafter referred as per their array before the trial court.
3. The case of the complainant was that the accused approached him for a hand loan of Rs.3,25,000/- for his daughter’s marriage and the
complainant paid the same to the accused by way of cash. The accused executed promissory note and receipt for the said amount and promised to
clear the loan amount within one year. After repeated demands by the complainant, the accused issued a cheque bearing No.583903 dated 13.08.2007
for Rs.3,25,000/- in favour of the complainant. The said cheque was deposited by the complainant and the same was returned with memo dated
31.08.2007, he issued a notice dated 03.09.2007 to the accused demanding payment of cheque amount within fifteen (15) days. The accused received
the notice on 07.09.2007 and also gave a reply, but failed to pay the cheque amount, as such, filed complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act.
4. The said case was tried by the XII Special Magistrate, Secunderabad vide CC No.91 of 2011 (old CC No.941 of 2010). The complainant examined
himself as PW.1 and got marked Exs.P1 to P5. The accused was examined as DW.1 and Exs.D1 to D3 were marked on his behalf. On considering
the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial court observed that Ex.P2 cheque pertained to ICICI Bank, Kharkhana Branch, it was
presented by PW.1 in his SBI, Mudfort Branch account for clearance and the same was returned with memo and if that was the case, the cheque had
to be sent to ICICI Bank and the said bank had to issue memo returning the cheque with reason, but there was no signature of issuing authority and no
reason was mentioned. The cheque return memo had to be issued by ICICI Bank whereas it was returned by SBI Bank to ICICI Bank. PW.1
admitted in his evidence that Ex.P3 did not bear the signature of the issuing authority and he did not file any proof of presenting the cheque in branch.
In view of the said evidence, PW.1 ought to have taken steps to examine the bank officials to prove presentation of cheque and authenticate its return
for specific reason, as such, opined that there was no legally recoverable debt from the accused to PW1 and Ex.P2 cheque was not issued by the
accused in discharge of the said debt and dismissed the complaint acquitting the accused.
5. Aggrieved by the said acquittal of the accused, the complainant preferred an appeal. The appeal was heard by the Additional Metropolitan Sessions
Judge for Trial of Communal Offence Cases cum VII Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad vide Criminal Appeal No.494 of 2012.
During pendency of the appeal, the complainant filed a petition under Section 391 Cr.P.C. for adducing additional evidence to examine the Assistant
Manager of SBI on his behalf. The said petition was allowed. Aggrieved by allowing the said petition, the accused preferred criminal revision case
before this Court and the same was confirmed by this Court vide Crl.R.C. No.2292 of 2013. The Assistant Manager of SBI was examined as PW.2.
The lower appellate court on considering the said evidence as well as re-appreciating the evidence which was already on record, found the accused
guilty for the offence under Section 138 of NI Act and sentenced him as above.
6. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the accused preferred this revision contending that the appellate court erred in coming to the
conclusion that the signatures on Exs.P1 and P2 were that of the accused. The observation of the Sessions Judge was without any supporting
evidence, DW.1 denied in his evidence that the cheque and promissory note were given to the complainant. The appellate court should have confirmed
the judgment of acquittal by dismissing the appeal in the absence of expert opinion with regard to the signatures on Exs.P1 and P2. The appellate court
failed to consider the plea of the accused that he never borrowed any amount from the complainant and that he never issued any cheque or
promissory note to the complainant. The appellate court ought to have taken into consideration the contention of the accused that he lost the cheque
and directed the bank authorities to stop payment. The appellate court received additional evidence during the course of proceedings. It ought to have
considered that the provisions of the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’) were applicable for adjudication of the appeal.
For unexplained reasons, the appellate court had not considered the provisions of the Act though relied upon the additional evidence in convicting the
accused. The appellate court ought to have considered the contention of the accused that the complainant got issued two notices on 03.09.2007 from
the Advocate office i.e. Exs.P4 and D3. Ex.P4 did not bear the signature of the Advocate. Ex.D3 did not disclose issuing of cheque. There was no
reference of issue of cheque in discharge of debt though the complainant claimed to be in possession of the cheque by that date and presented the
cheque and return of cheque with memo. On receipt of notice, the accused gave reply through Advocate informing the complainant that the cheque in
question was lost by him from his house along with another cheque No.583904 in the first week of August 2007 and he immediately informed to his
bank and filed a photostat copy of the letter addressed to the bank officials on 08.08.2007 containing the seal and signature of the officials of the bank
and prayed to set aside the impugned judgment.
7. Heard Sri B.Arjun Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner â€" accused and Sri K. Sai Babu, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent â€
complainant.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner-accused argued on the same lines as raised in the grounds of revision.
9. Learned counsel for the respondent-complainant submitted that the petitioner-accused had to infact prefer an appeal within (30) days from the date
of the judgment of the lower appellate court, but preferred revision after (90) days. When there was a provision for appeal, filing of revision itself was
not proper. He further supported the judgment of the lower appellate court and contended that the same was in accordance with law and there was no
need to interfere with the same and relied upon various judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court and High Courts.
10. Now the point for consideration is:
Whether the judgment of the lower appellate court in reversing the judgment of the trial court and convicting the accused for the offence under
Section 138 of the NI Act and sentencing him as such, is in accordance with law or needs any interference by this Court?
11. This Court had no authority to appreciate the evidence in revision in the manner as the trial court and the appellate court were required to do and
could exercise its power of appreciation of evidence only in exceptional cases which would require interference for correction of manifest illegality or
for prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The scope of interference in a revision is extremely narrow. This Court in revision would only consider
the material to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of findings, sentence or order and would not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of
the case. However, as the revision petitioner-accused was contending that though he denied borrowing any amount from the complainant and that he
never issued the promissory note or cheque, the appellate court erred in coming to the conclusion that the signatures on Exs.P1 and P2 were that of
him and that the additional evidence was received during the hearing of the appeal, it is considered necessary to go through the evidence.
12. The case of the complainant was that the accused had approached him and requested for an amount of Rs.3,25,000/- for his daughter’s
marriage and executed a promissory note and on his demand, issued a cheque bearing No.583903 dated 13.08.2007 for Rs.3,25,000/-. The said
cheque, when deposited for realization, was returned on the ground that ‘payment stopped by the drawer’ vide banker’s memo dated
31.08.2007. He got issued a legal notice. The said notice was received by the accused, but he gave a reply with false allegations.
13. The defence taken by the accused was that he lost the said cheque along with another cheque and informed the bank officials about the said fact
and requested them to stop payment and he informed the same to the complainant in his reply legal notice, he had not executed any promissory note in
favour of the complainant. The promissory note was marked as Ex.P1 and the cheque bearing No.583903 dated 13.08.2007 for Rs.3,25,000/- was
marked as Ex.P2.
14. The petitioner-accused was examined as DW1 and he admitted in his cross examination that Ex.P2 cheque belonged to his account and it bore his
signature. Ex.P1 promissory note and receipt also contained his signatures. He also admitted that he had not lodged any complaint to the police about
the cheque being lost. He also admitted in his cross examination that the postal acknowledgment bore his daughter’s signature and he did not state
anything about the promissory note in his reply notice under Ex.D1.
15. From the cross-examination, it would disclose that he admitted his signatures on the promissory note as well as on the cheque. When the signature
on the cheque was admitted by the accused, presumption shall be drawn that the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or
liability as per Section 139 of NI Act.
16. Section 139 of NI Act provides for presumption in favour of the holder. It says that:
“139. Presumption in favour of holder.â€" It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of
the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.â€
17. When once the signature on the promissory note was admitted, the presumption under Section 118 (a) of NI Act also would arise that it is
supported by consideration. As per Section 118 of the NI Act, which deals with presumptions as to negotiable instruments: until the contrary is proved,
the following presumptions shall be made:â€
(a) of consideration â€"that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been
accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;
(b) as to date â€"that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date;
18. Both these presumptions are rebuttable presumptions. The accused can prove the non-existence of consideration or that there was no legally
enforceable debt or liability by raising a probable defence.
19. Learned counsel for the petitioner-accused relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of
Kerala and another (2006) 6 SCC 39 on the aspect that the onus of proof on accused was not a heavy as that of the prosecution. For rebutting
presumption what was needed was to raise a probable defence. Even for the said purpose, the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant could
be relied upon. The standard of proof evidently was preponderance of probabilities. The accused would not be required to prove the prosecution case
in its entirety. Interference of preponderance of probabilities could be drawn not only from the material on record but also by reference to the
circumstances upon which the accused relied. It could be compared with that of a defendant in civil proceedings.
20. The learned counsel for the respondent-complainant, on the other hand, relied upon the judgment of the High Court of A.P. in M. Vidyavathi v.
Chandraiah @ Chandra Babu and another 2010 (1) ALT (Cri.)347 (S.B.), on the aspect that the word “unless contrary is proved†in Section 139
of the NI Act would mean that there must be a pleading and evidence to substantiate the same and mere explanation was not sufficient for
discharging the burden placed on record.
21. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan AIR 2010 SC 1898, while examining the presumption under
Section 139 of the NI Act held that:
“In the event, the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the
prosecution can fail.
Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the
credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the
offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a
civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality
should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high
standard or proof.â€
22. The defence taken by the accused in the reply notice given by him marked under Ex.D1 was that the cheque in question was misplaced along with
another cheque from the house of the accused and the same came to the notice of the accused in the first week of August, 2007 and the same was
immediately intimated by him to his bank and the complainant got hold of the cheque by unlawful means. He further contended that the complainant
was totally a stranger to the accused and did not have any acquaintance and he created a false story. But, however, he failed to explain as to how the
promissory note marked under Ex.P1 and the blank signed cheque marked under Ex.P2 came into possession of the complainant. He failed to lodge
any police report about the loss of cheques as contended by him in his reply notice or failed to initiate any criminal action against the complainant even
after receipt of notice from him demanding payment under the said cheque. He failed to give any explanation with regard to the promissory note. He
filed Ex.D2 â€" photostat copy of the letter addressed by him to the Manager of ICICI Bank dated 08.08.2007 stating that he was a Government
Teacher and due to his employment he had to reside away from home and was in the habit of keeping few signed blank cheques in his residence for
facilitating his family members to meet unforeseen expenditure in his absence. He noticed that two blank signed cheques bearing Nos.D583903 and
583904 were missing and he could not trace them anywhere in his house and requested to stop payment of those cheques and not to clear them.
23. The learned counsel for the complainant contended that the photostat copy marked under Ex.P2 could not be relied upon, and relied on the
judgment of the High Court of A.P. in Sama Venkata Subba Rao, Managing Partner of Babu and Company, Machilipatnam and another v. Pillarisetti
Venkata Venugoala Jagannadha Rao 1995 (2) ALT 651 (S.B.) on the aspect that Xerox copies of documents were not admissible in evidence. He
also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh @ Chhotu Singh and another (2009) 6 SCC 681
on the aspect that photostat copy in the absence of original was not admissible in evidence.
24. The learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, contended that this was only a summary proceeding and photostat copies also could be
marked. But, even in summary proceedings, the inadmissible evidence cannot be permitted to be adduced. As such, no reliance can be placed upon
Ex.D2.
25. The learned counsel for the petitioner-accused filed Ex.D3-legal notice issued by the counsel for the complainant to show that he received Ex.P4
as well as Ex.D3, which were issued on the same date i.e. 03.09.2007 and in Ex.P4 there was no signature of the counsel and without the signature of
the counsel, the same could not be considered as a legal notice and that Ex.D3 was not signed by the counsel, the same would not have any reference
to the issuance of the cheque or bouncing of it, as such, they could not be considered as proper issuance of legal notice.
26. The counsel for the complainant appeared to have issued two notices, one under Ex.P4 for cheque bouncing case under Section 138 of NI Act
and another under Ex.D3 calling upon the accused to pay the loan amount or else to initiate civil proceedings against him for recovery of the amount
basing on the promissory note.
27. The learned counsel for the respondent-complainant relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka in Sukumara Pillai S/o. Krishna Pillai
v. Baburaj S/o. Vasudevan 2020 Lawsuit (Ker) 1113 on the aspect whether a lawyer notice issued without signature of the lawyer can be treated as a
defective notice. The Court held that:
“[7] There is no form of notice is prescribed under Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The proviso only
says that ""the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by
giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque"". There is nothing in clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
to show that, it should be a lawyer notice and the notice should be a signed notice. The literal meaning of intimation: announcement: information:
warning: a writing, placard, board etc conveying an intimation or warning."" As per the Oxford Advance Learners Dictionary, New 9th edition, the
'notice' is interpreted as ""paying attention, giving information, announcing, warning etc.."" P.Ramanatha Aiyar's Concise Law Dictionary defines
'notice in writing' like this: ""The word 'notice' denotes merely an intimation to the party concerned of a particular fact. It cannot be limited to a letter.
Notice may take several forms. It must, to be sufficient, be in writing and must intimate quite clearly that the award has been made and signed.
[8] From the above literal meaning of 'notice', it is clear that, nowhere it is stated that, a notice should be in a signed form. As stated above, Clause (b)
of proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act also not stipulates a signed notice in writing. What is stated in the proviso is ""giving a
notice in writing"" and not ""by giving a notice in writing with signature."" For this simple reason, the finding of the learned Magistrate that Ext.P5 notice
issued by the complainant is defective cannot be accepted.â€
In the above judgment, the High Court of Kerala had also extracted the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Central Bank of India v.
M/s.Sexons Farms & Ors. [1993 (3) KerLT 484], wherein it was held that:
“7 Though, no form of notice is prescribed in the above Clause(b) the requirement is that notice shall be given in writing within fifteen days of
receipt of information from the bank regarding return of the cheque as unpaid and in the notice a demand for payment of the amount of the cheque
had to be made.
8. The object of notice is to give a chance to the drawer of the cheque to rectify his omission and also to protect honest drawer. Service of notice of
demand in Clause (b) of the proviso to S.138 is a condition precedent for filing a complaint under S.138 of the Act.†and observed that as held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court, the requirement of giving notice to the drawer of the cheque is to enable him to avoid prosecution under Section 138 of NI
Act. It also took aid of the judgment in B. Surendra Das v. State of Kerala [2019 2 KerLT 895], wherein it was held that:
“It is well settled principle of law that the notice has to be read as a whole. A notice must be construed not with a desire to find fault in it which
would render it defective. It must not be read in a hyper technical manner. It must be construed strictly but in a sensible mannerâ€
and observed that:
“In the light of the above observations of this Court and the Apex Court, I think, the omission on the part of the lawyer to put his signature in the
notice issued under Clause(b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, cannot be treated as defective notice.â€
28. The learned counsel for the complainant relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court (Goa Bench) in Abdul Rehman M. Mulgand v.
Moham-mad Hashan Mulgand and another 2006 Crl.L.J.1159 wherein by placing reliance on another judgment of the Bombay High Court in Prashant
Prabhakarrao Gite v. S.K. Sarkar [2002 (2) Mh LJ 125], wherein it was held that:
“sub-clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act only requires notice to be given in writing by the payee to the drawer in which there should
be a demand made by the payee and that this clause does not prescribe any form or format for such notice. In the absence thereof what has been
contemplated by this clause is the communication in writing by the payee to the drawer asking the drawer to pay the amount involved in the cheque
which is dishonoured.â€
29. Thus, the omission on the part of the counsel for the complainant to put his signature in the notice cannot be considered as a defective notice, as it
was not the technicalities that should be taken into account but the object of notice and there is no specific stipulation of clause (b) of Section 138 of
NI Act that it should be a signed notice in writing
30. As Ex.D3 notice is issued for initiating civil proceedings if the accused failed to pay the amount due, the absence of the details of the cheque and
the bouncing of it is not necessary to be mentioned in it and Ex.D3 is not the basis for initiating action against the accused under Section 138 of NI
Act.
31. The accused failed to probabilize his defence to meet the standard of preponderance of probability. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Kalamani Tex
and another v. P. Balasubramanian (2021) 5 SCC 283, held that:
“15. No doubt, and as correctly argued by senior counsel for the appellants, the presumptions raised under Section 118 and Section 139 are
rebuttable in nature. As held in MS Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala [(2006) 6 SCC 39], which was relied upon in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa
[(2019) 5 SCC 418] a probable defence needs to be raised, which must meet the standard of “preponderance of probabilityâ€, and not mere
possibility. These principles were also affirmed in the case of Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets [(2009) 2 SCC 513] wherein it was further held that
a bare denial of passing of consideration would not aid the case of accused.
17. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the
respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [(2019) 4 SCC 197], where this court
held that:
“Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under
Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a
debt.â€
32. Thus, mere taking the defence that he lost two blank signed cheques is not enough to consider it as a defence to meet the standards of
preponderance of probabilities without adducing any evidence in proof of the same. The letter issued to the Bank to stop payment is not sufficient to
consider the same as a probable defence and the said letter also cannot be taken into consideration being a photostat copy.
33. PW.1 was cross-examined on the aspect that the transactions for more than Rs.20,000/- cannot be in the shape of cash, to countenance his
evidence that he lent the amount of Rs.3,25,000/- by cash. PW.1 also admitted that he was an income tax assessee and stated that he had shown the
lending of said amount in his income tax returns for the year 2007-2008, but had not filed the said statement.
34. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the High Court of A.P. in M. Vidyavathi’s case (2010 (1) ALT (Cri.)347
(S.B.) Â supra) on the aspect that capacity to lend the amount was not an ingredient for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. He
also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat and another 2019 (2) ALD (Crl.) 385 (SC)
on the aspect that:
“The Trial Court proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part of the complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan to
the accused and want of examination of relevant witnesses who allegedly extended him money for advancing it to the accused. This approach of the
Trial Court had been at variance with the principles of presumption in law. After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the
accused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his
favour, any doubt on the complainant's case could not have been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to the
accused-appellant. The aspect relevant for consideration had been as to whether the accused-appellant has brought on record such
facts/material/circumstances which could be of a reasonably probable defence.â€
35. Thus, these judgments would disclose that the capacity to lend the amount cannot be a probable defence to disbelieve the case of the complainant.
36. Some other technicalities were also raised by the revision petitioner â€" accused stating that Ex.P3 cheque return memo was not signed by the
banker who issued it. The trial court acquitted the accused on the said sole ground. As such, the complainant had taken steps to adduce the additional
evidence under Section 391 Cr.P.C. during the course of appeal and got examined the Assistant Manager of SBI as PW.2 on his behalf. PW.2 stated
in her evidence that the complainant and his daughter Lavanya had joint savings account in their branch and the complainant presented a cheque of
ICICI Bank with cheque No.583903 dated 13.08.2007 for an amount of Rs.3,25,000/-. Ex.P2 was the said cheque and the said cheque was presented
before ICICI Bank and they received the cheque endorsement as “stop payment by the drawer’ and consequently issued a memo dated
31.08.2007 which was marked as Ex.P3. She stated that it did not contain the signature but it contained the seal of the bank and it was also entered in
the Cheque Return Register. She further stated that she had brought the Cheque Return Register with her and basing on the request of the
complainant, the Bank authorities issued a letter dated 12.02.2013 marked as Ex.P6. Though it was suggested to her in the cross-examination that as
per Section 146 of the NI Act and Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891, the cheque return memo should contain the seal as well as the signature of the
authorities, the witness stated that it was a practice to put stamp and deliver to the party and Ex.P3 did not contain the signature of the Bank
Manager. She stated that only if party insisted, the Officer would sign on the return memo. She also stated that Ex.P6 also contained the seal of their
bank and there was difference in between the seals on Ex.P3 and Ex.P6, but stated that both the seals were official seals of their bank.
37. The learned counsel for the respondent-complainant had also relied upon Section 4 of the Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1891 wherein the
mode of proof of entries in bankers’ book was stated as follows:
“4. Mode of proof of entries in bankers' books.- Subject to the provisions of this Act, a certified copy of any entry in a banker's books shall in all
legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of the existence of such entry, and shall be admitted as evidence of the matters, transactions
and accounts therein recorded in every case where, and to the same extent as, the original entry itself now by law admissible, but not further or
otherwise.
38. Thus, PW.2 had produced the original cheque return register to the court and also gave her evidence stating that the cheque return memo marked
as Ex.P3 was issued by their bank. Thus, the said evidence of PW.2 and the document marked under Ex.P3 cannot be suspected.
39. Thus, this Court does not find any illegality or irregularity in the judgment of the lower appellate court in confirming the guilt of the accused under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
40. As per the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kalamani Tex’s case ((2021) 5 SCC 283 supra), the three Judge Bench of the
Hon’ble Apex Court stated that there needed to be a consistent approach towards awarding the compensation and unless there existed special
circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest @ 9% per annum, it is considered fit to
modify the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs.3,25,000/- to only payment of fine of Rs.6,50,000/- and the fine amount to be
paid as compensation to the respondent-complainant.
41. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed confirming the judgment dated 12.05.2016 passed in Crl.A. No.494 of 2012 by the Additional
Metropolitan Sessions Judge for Trial of Communal Offences Cases cum VII Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, but however,
modifying the sentence from one year rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.3,25,000/- to payment of fine of Rs.6,50,000/- only and the fine amount
shall be paid as compensation to the respondent-complainant within a period of three (3) months from the date of this order and in default of payment
of the said amount, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
