Sanjeev J.Thaker, J
1.1 Feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of acquittal, dated 19.03.2008, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Fast Track Court No.4, Morbi, in Sessions Case No.50 of 2007 for the offences punishable under Sections 306, 498A and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the appellant – State of Gujarat has preferred this appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “the Code”).
1.2 It is noted that since the respondent No.1 – Sureshchandra Jerambhai has expired during the pendency of this appeal, this appeal is disposed of as abated, vide order dated 25.04.2025, qua respondent No.1 only.
2. The prosecution case, as unfolded during the trial before the lower Court, is that, accused No.2 married with the deceased; and that after the marriage, the deceased was tortured mentally by the respondents - in-laws for dowry; and that since the said mental and physical torture was continued at the hands of the respondents, the deceased poured kerosene over her body and set ablaze and thereby, committed suicide. Therefore, the complainant – Hotilal Fatehsinh Yadia has lodged a complaint before the Morbi City Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 306, 498(A) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
3. After investigation, sufficient prima facie evidence was found against the accused person/s and therefore charge-sheet was filed in the competent criminal Court. Since the offence alleged against the accused person/s was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court where it came to be registered as Sessions Case No.50 of 2007. The charge was framed against the accused person/s. The accused pleaded not guilty and came to be tried.
4. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution has examined the witnesses and also produced various documentary evidence before the trial Court, which are described in the impugned judgment.
5. After hearing both the parties and after analysis of evidence adduced by the prosecution, the learned trial Judge acquitted the accused for the offences for which they were charged, by holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
6. Learned APP for the appellant – State has pointed out the facts of the case and having taken this Court through both, oral and documentary evidence, recorded before the learned trial Court, would submit that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in true sense and perspective; and that the trial Court has committed error in acquitting the accused. It is submitted that the learned trial Court ought not to have given much emphasis to the contradictions and/or omissions appearing in the evidence and ought to have given weightage to the dots that connect the accused with the offence in question. It is submitted that the learned trial Court has erroneously come to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. It is also submitted that the learned Judge ought to have seen that the evidence produced on record is reliable and believable and it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed an offence in question. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court may allow this appeal by appreciating the evidence led before the learned trial Court.
7. As against that, learned advocate for the respondent/s would support the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court and has submitted that the learned trial Court has not committed any error in acquitting the accused. The trial Court has taken possible view as the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal by confirming the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court.
8. In the aforesaid background, considering the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, independently and dispassionately and considering the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court, the following aspects weighed with the Court :
8.1 The prosecution has examined P.W.1 – Hotilal Fatehsinh at Exh.10, in which, he has stated that he met her daughter in August, 2006 and at that point of time, the deceased - daughter has complained that there is regular harassment by the in-laws. It has also been testified that on 15.07.2007, his daughter called him, but the fact remains that there is neither any mobile data and/or any evidence coming forward to prove the fact that there was any discussion between him and his daughter on 15.07.2007.
Further, from the said evidence, it transpires that the father had gone and stayed at the residence of the in-laws of the deceased and at that point of time also, the deceased had not informed that it was impossible for her to reside with the in-laws and she was harassed and tortured to an extent that she would end her life. P.W.2 –
The prosecution has examined Ohamkumar Shrivisveshwarsinh vide Exh.12, who is the nephew of the complainant and according to his testimony, there were trivial issues between the in-laws and the deceased.
The prosecution has examined P.W.3 – Ferising Satpalsing vide Exh.13, who is the brother- in-law of the complainant and from his deposition, it comes out that after much insistence, the deceased had informed that the mother-in-law was harassing her.
When the complainant had gone to the hospital and though the police was present, the prosecution has failed to justify as to why the complainant did not file any complaint at that point of time.
The Court has also taken into consideration the fact that the father of the deceased had stayed for six days at the matrimonial home of the deceased and during that period also, he did not find anything which could lead to his daughter to commit suicide.
8.2 Further, the overall evidence produced by the witnesses of the prosecution, there are lot of contradictions and discrepancies. The prosecution has also examined P.W.9 - Ranjanben Sanjaybhai Shukla (neighbour of the deceased) vide Exh.27, who, in her deposition, has stated that the deceased was being given treatment at Sadbhav Hospital for her headaches; and that her treatment was going on; and that the deceased was going to Sadbhav Hospital for treatment.
If the case of the prosecution is taken into consideration, P.W.12 – Chandrakant Bhavanbhai Patel, who is an investigating officer, has stated that during her last rites, all the relatives of the deceased were present.
P.W.9 - Ranjanben Sanjaybhai Shukla (neighbour of the deceased) vide Exh.27 has stated in her deposition that the father was present during the last rites of the deceased; whereas the father of the deceased – P.W.1 – Hotilal Fatehsinh, who has been examined vide Exh.10, P.W.2 – Ohamkumar Shrivisveshwarsinh, who has been examined vide Exh.12 and P.W.3 – Ferising Satpalsing, who has been examined vide Exh.13, have stated that they had not gone for the last rites of the deceased. There were also contradictions as to who had accompanied the complainant when he had filed a complaint.
8.3 The Sessions Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has not established by cogent, convincing and overwhelming evidence that the accused intended to act as abetting the suicide within the meaning of Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code.
8.4 This Court has also taken into consideration the fact that the complainant himself has stated that he was not in a good financial position when he got his daughter married and there is also no proof that the accused had demanded the amount of Rs.2 lakhs. The fact of meeting his daughter in the month of August, 2006 has also not been disclosed by the complainant to anybody, including the investigating officer. The fact that the deceased had gone with the accused to the matrimonial home in presence of the father who has made allegations of harassment, which itself shows that the conduct of the accused was not of such a nature which is likely to drive the deceased to commit suicide. The prosecution has failed to establish that there was a demand of dowry or any abetment of suicide or cruelty by the respondents to the deceased.
8.5 The trial Court has rightly held that there was no positive evidence on record to prove that the accused by way of the conduct or spoken words, overtly or covertly, actually aided and abetted or instigated the deceased in such a manner that it leaves no other option for the deceased but to commit suicide.
9.1 In the case of Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka and another, [ (2022) 2 SCC 129], it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the essence of abetment lies in instigating a person to do a thing or the intentional doing of that thing by an act or illegal omission. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.
9.2 In the case of Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh , 2025 (1) Crimes 347 (SC), the observations are made with regard to abetment of suicide. It has been held that in order to bring a case within purview of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in commission of said offence, person who is said to have abetted commission of suicide must have played active role by act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate commission of suicide. It has been further observed that the act of abetment by person charged with said offence must be proved and established by prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC. It is further observed that to satisfy requirement of instigation, accused by his act or omission or by a continued course of conduct should have created such circumstances that deceased was left with no other option, except to commit suicide.
10. Further, learned APP is not in a position to show any evidence to take a contrary view in the matter or that the approach of the Court below is vitiated by some manifest illegality or that the decision is perverse or that the Court below has ignored the material evidence on record. In above view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Court below was completely justified in passing impugned judgment and order.
11. Considering the impugned judgment, the trial Court has recorded that there was no direct evidence connecting the accused with the incident and there are contradictions in the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. In absence of the direct evidence, it cannot be proved that the accused are involved in the offence. Further, the motive of the accused behind the incident is not established. The trial Court has rightly considered all the evidence on record and passed the impugned judgment. The trial Court has rightly evaluated the facts and the evidence on record.
12. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate court is not required to re-write the judgment or to give fresh reasoning, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Hemareddy, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1417 wherein it is held as under:
“… This court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Chaudhary (1967)1 SCR 93: (AIR 1967 SC 1124) that it is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice.”
13. Thus, in case the appellate court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower court, then the discussion of evidence at length is not necessary.
14. In the case of Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1995 SC 280, Supreme Court has held as under:
“The powers of the High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions under Sections 378 and 379, Cr.P.C. are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of conviction. But as a rule of prudence, it is desirable that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the view of the Trial Court with regard to the credibility of the witness, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of appellate Court in justifying a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witness. It is settled law that if the main grounds on which the lower Court has based its order acquitting the accused are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal."
15. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394, while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view.
16. In the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:
“42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
17. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no case is made out to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.
18. In view of above facts and circumstances of the case, on my careful re-appreciation of the entire evidence, I found that there is no infirmity or irregularity in the findings of fact recorded by learned trial Court and under the circumstances, the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondents - accused for the elaborate reasons stated in the impugned judgment and I also endorse the view/finding of the learned trial Court leading to the acquittal.
19. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Criminal Appeal fails to prove its case and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly. Record & Proceedings be remitted to the concerned trial Court forthwith.
