Chittaranjan Dash, J
1. By means of this application, the Petitioner seeks to quash the criminal proceeding in connection with 1CC No.315 of 2016 pending before the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar initiated at the instance of the Opposite Party No.2.
2. The backkground facts of the case are that the mother of the Opposite Party No.2, namely Pramila Paikray, the sister of the present Petitioner filed a Civil Suit No.825 of 2006 in the court of learned Civil Judge, (Sr. Division), Bhubaneswar against the Petitioner prayinng for decree of partition of the suuit properties allotting 1/4th share in her favour. In the said suit, the mother of the Opposite Party No.2 described the Petitioner as thee son of the Raghunath Samaantray and nor Lokanath Samntaray. Finally, the aforesaid suit waas decreed on the basis of the compro mise filed by the Parties, wherein it was admitted that the Petitioner is the son of Lokanath Samntrray and not Raghunath Samantray. Havving satisfied with the decree passed by the learned court on the basis of the compromise, the mother of the Opposite Party No.2 na mely Pramila Paikray got the properties fell in her share mutated in her name. Subsequently, shhe sold away the said properties in faavour of one Gangadhar Sahoo of Baramunda, Bhubaneswar in thhe district of khurda. It is alleged by the Petitioner that while filing the suit, the said Pramila Paikaray intentionally described the Petittioner as son of Raghunath Saamantray instead of Lokanathi Samanntray but the Petitioner consistently asserted him to be the son of saaid Lokanath Samantray. After about 3 years of the said final decree, the said Pramila Paikray filed CMA No. 35/11 before the learned Civil Court U/s 151 CPC, inter alia, praying to set aside the compromise decree on the ground that the same has been obtained by committing fraudd. The petitioner contested the said prroceeding by submitting his objection. Despite the objection, the learned Trial Court accepted the case of the Petitioner for consideration whereupon the Petitioner preferred Criminal Revission Petition before this Honhle Court in CRP No.3/12. This Court by order dated 03.02.2012 stayed the further proceeding in the aforesaid CMA No. 35/2011. When the matter stood thus, in the year 2015, the said Pramila Paikray filed another CMC No.636 of 2015 under Section 144 (2) Cr.P.C against the Petitioner and some others, inter, alia, seeking for order under the said provision of law not to raise any construction over the scheduled-A land of the said Petition. When an interimm order was passed in the said proceeding, the Petitioner challenged the aforesaid order in CRLREVV No.457 of 2015 before this Court. During pendency of the aforessaid Criminal Revision, the Adddl. DCP-cum-Executive Magistrate, Bhubaneswar vide order dateed 28.07.2015 was pleased to droop the said proceeding, interr alia, mentioning therein that the disppute are civil in nature. It is furrther alleged by the Petitioner that in thhe meantime, Pramila Paikray filed so many cases before the learneed civil court including the saidd CMA No.35 of 2011 but the CMA No.35 of 2011 got stayed by this Court. In the meanwhile, on thee basis of a complaint case filed by the son of Pramila Paikray, inter alia allegeing that the Petitioner is the son of Late Raghunatth Samantray but claimed to be the adopted son of Lokanath Samanntray and has sold certain propperties and further that the Petitioner managed to obtain a comproomise decree in the civil suit against his mother namely Pramila Paikray. His mother Pramila Paikray, being an old lady did not know the implication of putting signature on court paper and her siggnature in the alleged compromise deccree and now she has been suuffering and claiming himself to be the son of Lokonath Samnaatray, the Petitioner sold some properties in the name of Hrusikeh Samantray, S/o. Raghunath Samantray. It is further alleged that the Petitioner sold certain propeerties to one Swarnalata Mohaanty as Ullash Samantray, S/o. Lokantth Samantray and subsequently cancelled the same through a deed of cancellation. In the above ciircumstances, the Petitioner has approached this Court seeking to challenge the initiation of the criminaal proceeding instituted at the behest of the son of Pramila Paikray annd has prayed for quashing of thhe same.
3. Mr. Lenkka, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submitted that the entire set of allegations in the complaint arises ouut of a long-standing propertyy dispute between the parties, which iss purely civil in character, and that the criminal court ought not to entertain matters that esssentially pertain to civil rights overr immovable property. He conntended that right from the institutionn of the civil suit, Opposite Paarty No.2, namely Pramila Paikray, the elder sister of the Petitioner, with the sole objective of appropriatiing the entire properties of Lokanath Samantray, deliberately disputed the parentage of the Petitioner by describing him as the son of Raghunath Sammantray. Ultimately, however, the matter was amicably settled and a compromise decree was passeed wherein it stood acknowleddged that the Petitioner is the son of Lokanath Samantray. Only after alienating the properties that had fallen to her share pursuant to the compromise decree, Pramila Paikray instituted proceedings challlenging the said compromise decree, despite the fact that it had already been fully acted upon. Learned counsel further argued thhat the complaint case discloses no cause of action whatsoever and that the issues raised therein have already been settled between the parties. The land in question, accorrding to him, does not fall within the common hotchpotch nor was it the subject matter of the commpromise decree. Therefore, even assuuming for the sake of argumentt that the Petitioner has executed certaiin documents describing himseelf as the son of Lokanath Samantray, no criminal liability can be attached to him, as no right in the property of Opposite Party No.2 or her son stands affected thereby. It is his specific submisssion of Mr. Lenka that the core of the dispute revolves around whether the Petitioner is the son of Lokanath Samantray or Raghunath Samantray, which is a matter already settled in multiplle unimpeachable records. He drew atttention to the Record-of-Rightss of the year 1962 pertaining to Ploot No. 37-E, wherein the Petiitioner has been recorded as the son of Lokanath Samantray. Likeewise, the matriculation certificate isssued by the Board of Seconddary Education, an unimpeachable document, also reflects the Petitioner’s parentage as the son of Lokanath Samantray. The same description appears consisteently in the Aadhar Card and other official documents issuedd thereafter. Further, in a giift deed executed in the year 1976, Raghunath Samantray himseelf described the Petitioner, Ullash Ch. Samantray, as his nephew, thereby acknowledging that the Petitiooner was not his son. Relying on these materials, Mr. Lenka contendded that there is no manner of doubt that the Petitioner is the son of Late Lokanath Samantray. He therefore submitted that the present criminal proceeding, initiated at the instance of the Petitioner’s nephew, is nothing but an attempt to usurp property and to subject the Petitioner to unwarranted harassment, and is liable to bee quashed.
4. Mr. Sammir Kumar Mishra, learned Senioor Advocate appearing for Opposite Party No.2, vehemently contested the submissions advvanced by Mr. Lenka, learned counsel for the Petitioner. He suubmitted that the property in questionn, which has been alienated byy the Petitioner by impersonating himself as the son of Lokanath Sammantray, squarely attracts the offences alleged in the complaint. Accorrding to him, the averments in the commplaint, taken at their face valuue, clearly disclose the ingredients of the offences alleged and make out a prima facie case against the Petitioner. In such circumstances, it was contended that the reqquest of the Petitioner for quashing the complaint is wholly untenable and does not merit consideeration.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the respeective parties and upon perusall of the documents, it is established thaat the mother of Opposite Partyy No.2 had filed Civil Suit No.825 of 2006, naming the Petitioner as a defendant. In the said suit, the mother of the plaintiff claimed a partition of the property under the common hotchpotch to thhe extent of one-fourth share, which ultimately ended in a comprromise, and a compromise decree was passed under the joint signatuures of all the parties in the suit, including the Petitioners Purnna Chandra Samantray, Swarnalata Badajena, Jharana Baliarsinngh, Urmila Mohanty, and Pramila Paikray. The verification attached to the joint petition specifies the details of the property involveed in the common hotchpotch, fromm which the mother of the plaaintiff claimed her share.
Consideriing the submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that thhe property allegedly sold by the Petiitioner forms part of his share in the common hotchpotch, both partiees were asked to submit affiddavits regarding the properties. Thhe Petitioner submitted an afffidavit providing details of the properrties forming part of the common hotchpotch and covered by the compromise decree. The Oppposite Party, however, filed an affiddavit without giving specific details of the land in the common hottchpotch and reiterated their eaarlier contentions.
6. The joint petition, upon which the compromisee decree was based, was acceppted by the competent court in 2009, granting the mother of Oppossite Party No.2 her one-fourth share in the property of the common hotchpotch. After the decree, the property was mutated in her faavor and has since been alienated by her. It is also not disputed that the mother of Opposite Party No.2 filed a civil application challlenging the compromise decree on thhe ground of fraud, which is still pending before the competentt court. The allegations in thaat civil application form the basis of the complaint case filed by the nephew of the Petitioner, registered as 1CC Case No.315 of 2016.
The Petittioner’s contention that Raghunath Samantray, in his deed of gift in 1976, described the Petitioner as hiss nephew has not been disputed by Opposite Party No.2. Further, the acknowledgment by the mother of Opposite Party No.2 that the Petitioner is the son of Lokanath Samantray, along witth documents reflecting the samme, prima facie shows no material that incriminates the Petitioner or establishes any criminal conduct on hiss part.
7. In the maatter of Usha Chakraborty & anotherr vs. State of West Bengal annd another reported in (2023) 15 SCC 135, the Hon’ble Supremee Court held as follows:-
“8. In Paaramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, this Court held: (SCC p. 676, para 12)
“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not dependds upon the nature of the facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offeence are presentt or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whetheer a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. Inn such a situatioon, if a civil remedy is available and is,, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the Higgh Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal procceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.”
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10. In Kapil Aggarwal v. Sanjay Sharma, thiis Court held thatt Section 482 is designed to achieve the purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to generate into weapons of harassment.
11. In the decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajaan Lal, a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered the statutory provisions as also the earlier decisions and held as under: (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
“102.... (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entiretyy do not prima facie constitute any offfence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanyying the FIR doo not disclose a cognizable offence, juustifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magisttrate within the purview of Section 1555(2) of the Code.
(3) Whhere the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIRR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) W here the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitutee only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permittted by a police officer without an ordder of a Magisttrate as contemplated under Section 1555(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaaint are so absurd and inherently impprobable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficientt ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Whhere there is an express legal bar engrrafted in any off the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeeding is institutted) to the institution and continuancee of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provisiion in the Code or the concerneed Act, providiing efficacious redress for the grievancce of the aggrievved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is maanifestly attendeed with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliiciously instituted with an ulterior mootive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and withh a view to spitee him due to private and personal grudgge.
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20. As noticed hereinbefore, the respondent alleged commissiion of offences under Sections 323, 3884, 406, 423, 4677, 468, 420 and 120-B IPC against the appellants. A bare perusal of the said allegation and the ingredients to attract them, as adverted to hereiinbefore would reveal that the allegations are vague and they did not carry the essential ingredients to constiitute the alleged offences. There is absolutely no allegation in the complaint that the appellants herein had caused hurt on the reespondent so also, they did not reveall a case that the appellants had intentionally put the respondent in fear of injury either to himself or another or by putting him under such fear or injury, dishhonestly induced him to deliver any property or valuable security. The same is the position with respecct to the alleged offences punishable under Sections 4006. 423. 467, 4688, 420 and 120-B IPC. The ingrediients to attract thee alleged offence referred to hereinbeffore and the natuure of the allegations contained in the applicatioon filed by the respondent would undooubtedly make it clear that the respondent had failed to make specific allegation against the appellants heerein in respect off the aforesaid offences.
21. The factual position thus would reveal that the genesis as also the purpose of criminal proceedings are nothing but the aforesaid incident and further that the dispute involved is essentially of civil nature. The appellants b and the respondents have given a cloak of criminal offence in the issue. In such circumstance when the respondent had already resorted to the available civil remedy and it is pending, goingg by the decision in Paramjeet Batra, the High Courtt would have quashed the criminal proceedings to prevvent the abuse off the process of the Court but for the concealment.
22. In the aforesaid circumstances, coupled with the fact that in respect of the issue involved, which is of civil nature, the respondent had already approacched the jurisdictioonal civil court by instituting a civil suit and it is pending, there can be no doubt with respecct to the fact that the attempt on the part of the respondeent is to use the criminal proceedings as weapon of harassment against thhe appellants. The indisputable facts that the respondennt has filed the pending title suit in the year 2015, he got no case that he obtained an interim relief against hiis removal from the office of Secretary of the School Managing Committee as also the trussteeship, that he filed the stated application for an orrder for investigattion only in April 2017 together with absence of a case that despite such removal he got a righht to get informed of the affairs of the school and also the trust, would only support the said conclusion.
23. For alll these reasons, we are of the considered view that this case invites invocation of the poweer under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR registered based on the directtion of the Magistrate Court in the aforestated applicatioon and all further proceeding in puursuance thereof. Also, we have no hesitation to hoold that permitting continuance of the criminal procceedings against thhe appellants in the aforesaid circummstances would ressult in abuse of the process of court and also in miscarriage of justice.”
8. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the respectivve parties and upon perusal of the records, it is evident that the dispute between the parties is primaarily civil in nature, relating to ownership and partition of the propperties under the common hotcchpotch. The allegations in the complaaint arise out of the same civil dispute, and there is no material on reccord to prima facie suggest thhat the Petitioner has committed any criminal offence.
9. It is furrther clear from the documents filled and the compromise decree passed in Civil Suit No. 825 of 2006 that the Petitioner’s parentage as the son of Lokanath Samantray has been consistently acknnowledged, including in official records such as the Record-of-Rightss, educational certificates, and other documents. The initiation of the present criminal proceeding appears to be motivated solely for harassment and to create unnecessary litigation, withouut any genuine criminal cause of action.
10. In view of the above, and the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the view thaat the present complaint constitutes an abuse of the process of law. Accordingly,
