Gurjeet Singh And Others Vs State Of H.P

Rakesh Kainthla, J

1. The petitioners have filed the present petitions for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 138 of 2025, dated 15.08.2025, registered at Police Station Shimla West, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 25(1) (a) of the Arms Act, 1959. Since both the petitions have arisen out of the same FIR; therefore, they are being taken up together to avoid repetition.

2. It has been asserted that the petitioners, Gurjeet Singh and Jagpal Singh, were arrested n 15.08.2025. They were remanded to judicial custody. The pe itioner, Jagpal is lodged at Model Central Jail, Kanda and the petitioner, Gurjeet Singh is lodged at Central Jail, Ganganagar, Rajasthan. The petitioners were falsely implicated. The petitioners had earlier filed bail petitions, which were dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge -II, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. Three FIRs (FIR No. 90 of 2024, under Sections 331(8), 305, 333, 351(2) and 125 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 at Khundiyan, Fazilka, Punjab & Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, Police Station Khaiya Sarwar, Tehsil Avohar, District Fazilka, Punjab, FIR No. 344 of 2022 under Sections 341, 323, 382, 506 and 143 of Indian Penal Code, Police Station Kotwali, Shri Ganga Gunnar, Rajasthan and FIR No. 114 of 2025, dated 17.08.2025, under Sections 308(2), 351(2) BNS, Police Station City -2, Abohar, Fazilka, Punjab) are pending against the petitioner, Jagpal Singh and four FIRs (FIR No. 183 of 2023, dated 12.09.2023, under Sections 336, 160, 149 and 427 of IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, FIR No. 169 of 2024, dated 15.08.2024, under Sections 118(1), 309(6), 3(5) BNS, Police Station City – 1, Abohar, FIR No. 232 of 2024, dated 06.11.2024, under Section 25/54/59 of Arms Act, Police Station City -1, Abohar and FIR No. 114 of 2025, dated 17.08.2025, under Sections 308(2) and 351(2) of BNS, Police Station City- 2, Abohar, Fazilka, Punjab) are pending against the petitioner, Gurjeet Singh. They would abide by all the terms and conditions that the C urt may impose. Hence, the petitions.

3. The petitions are opposed by filing separate status reports asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 15.08.2024. They received a secret information at 12:00 p.m. that three persons were selling heroin in the building owned by Babu Ram. A huge quantity of heroin could be recovered by their search. The police reduced the information into writing and sent it to the supervisory officer. The police associated Diwakar Dev Sharma and Mehar Singh Negi & went towards the building. Pradeep Singh, Jagpal Singh and Gurjeet Singh were found present in the room. The police searched the room and recovered one pistol and eleven live cartridges. The occupants could not produce a license to possess the pistol. The police seized the pistol and arrested the occupants. The petitioners would intimidate the witnesses in case of their release on bail. Hence, the status reports.

4. I have heard M/s. Ravi Tanta and Shakti Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate Gene al for the respondent/State.

5. Mr Ravi Tanta, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petiti ners are innocent, and they were falsely implicated. The conscious possession of the petitioners has not been proved, and there is no material to connect the petitioners with the commission of the crime. Therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on bail.

6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioners were found in possession of an unlicensed pistol. They were earlier found to be involved in the commission of offences under the Arms Act. They would intimidate the witnesses in case of their release on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed.

7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: -

(i)Broad principles for the grant of bail

56.InGudikantiNarasimhuluv.High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the onstitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that s ould be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is there ore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)

57. In Prahlad Singh Bha i v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (C i) 674 , his Court highlighted various aspects that the cou ts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis f well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)

58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reas n cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the con ex ual facts of the matter being dealt with by the cou and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be c upled with other circumstances warranting the grant f bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)

59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

“9. …It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application f r bail are:

(i)whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe hat he accused had committed the offence;

(ii)nature and g avity of the accusation;

(iii)severity of the punishment in the event of c nvicti n;

(iv)danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

(v)character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi)likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii)reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

(viii)danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)

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62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)

“35.While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be alse, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on rec rd so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the g ant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by easons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. D e consideration must be given to facts suggestive f the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)

9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308:

2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.

3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….”

10. The present petition have to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

11. The status report shows that the police searched the room in the petitioners’ presence and rec vered a pistol kept be-neath the gas stove inside a carry bag. The petitioners were present in the house at the time of the search; therefore, they were in a position to exercise control over the pistol. In similar circumstances when her in was recovered from the house, this Court held in hampa vs. State of H.P.: 2025:HHC:28899 that all the occupants of the house would be deemed to be in possession of t e contraband. This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Criminal) 19120 of 2025 titled Champa Devi vs. State of H.P., decided on 27.11.2025. Thus, the submission that the petitioners cannot be treated as being in possession of the pistol cannot be prima facie accepted at this stage.

12. The police registered the FIR for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act; however, this Section deals with the weapons possessed in con-travention of Section 5 of the Arms Act, which deals with manu-facture, sale, etc. As per the prosecution, the petitioners were found in possession of a firearm without the license required under Section 3 of the Arms Act; hence, prima facie, the petition-ers would be liable under Section 25(1B)(a) of the Arms Act.

13. The status reports show that the petitioners have criminal antecedents; earlier FIRs were registered against the petitioners under the Arms Act. This Court dealt with the rele-vance of criminal antecedents while granting bail in Champa vs. State of H.P.: 2025:HHC:28899 and held that the criminal an-tecedents would disentitle an accused from the concession of bail, especially when an FIR was registered against the accused related to the commission of a similar offence. This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Criminal) 19120 of 2025 titled Champa Devi vs. State of H.P., decided on 27.11.2025. Therefore, the relevance of criminal an-tecedents cannot be ignored, and the petitioners’ criminal an-tecedents would disentitle them from concessions of bail.

14. Consequently, the present petitions fail and are dismissed.

15. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petitions and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.