Subrat Kumar Behera Vs State Of Odisha (Vig.)

Savitri Ratho, J

1. This CRLMC has been filed for quashing the FIR in Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No. 53 of 2010, the chargesheet dated 25.07.2017 and the proceedings qua the petitioner pending before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance in T.R. Case No. 08 of 2018. Chargesheet has been submitted against the petitioner and six others for commission of offences punishable under section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (in short “ PC Act”), Sections 420, 468, 471, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (in short “the IPC”) and Section 3-B of the Forest Conservation Act (in short “FC Act” ). The application filed by the petitioner under section 239 of the Cr.P.C on 24.08.2021 for discharging him has been rejected by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Cuttack.

BRIEF FACTS

2. The prosecution case in brief is that on 01.03.2008, the Petitioner took charge as Tahasildar at Vyasanagar (Jajpur Road), District-Jajpur. On 24.10.2008, one Sri Sitaram D, Director of M/s Mohan Projects Constructions Pvt Ltd of Hyderbad, had purchased two plots in Mouza Jamuposi and Dhanurjayapur under Vyasanagar Tahasil, under two registered sale deeds ( in short “RSDs”). As per the record of rights published in the year 1928, their kisam was “Salua Jungle”. In the sale deeds their kisam was mentioned as “Biali” which is agricultural. The Sub Registrar in charge registered the sale deeds without verifying the kisam of the land as required under the guidelines issued by the Inspector General of Registration (in short “IGR”). Sri Sitaram applied for conversion of the lands on 28.01.2009 for industrial use. Upon receipt of the applications, the Petitioner instituted OLR Cases No. 66/2009 and 67/2009 on the same day and directed the Revenue Inspector ( in short “RI”) Duburi to verify the field position and ROR and submit a detailed report. The provisions of Rule – 29 and 39 of the Orissa Mutataion Manual were not followed. The petitioner did not obtain clearance from the Kalinga Nagar Development Authority under Rule 8-A(1) (I) and without perusing the tenant ledgers or the Sabik RoRs. He allowed the conversion within a period of ten days (29.01.2009 and 06.02.2009). On the direction of the Collector, Jajpur, the Additional Collector enquired into matter on 04.09.2009 and submitted a report on 23.09.2009 regarding the illegalities fixing the blame on the Tahsildar (petitioner), the R.I., in charge Sub Registrar.

3. On 08.10.2009, the Revenue Supervisor, Danagadi tahasil preferred an appeal against the conversion orders dated 30.01.2009. On 04.12.2009, the Sub Collector Jajpur set aside the conversion orders dated 30.01.2009. The applicant-Sri Sitaram D filed appeal in the Court of the Additional District Magistrate (in short “ADM”) Jajpur. On 19.12.2012, the appeals were rejected by the ADM and the orders of the Sub- Collector were upheld.

4. On receipt of the allegation of showing of undue official favour and passing illegal orders on 30.01.2009 for conversion of forest land for industrial purpose by the Tahasildar Vyasangar and his staff, an enquiry was taken up by the State Vigilance. Thereafter Vigilance P.S. Case No. 53 of 2010 was registered on 20.08.2010 against the petitioner and three others or commission of offences punishable under Section 13(2) read with 13(l)(d) of the of PC Act and Section 2 of the FC Act. After completion of investigation, and receipt of sanction, chargesheet dated 25.07.2017 was submitted against the petitioner and seven others for commission of offences punishable under section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, Section 420, 468, 471, 120-B of the IPC and Section 3-B of the FC Act.

5. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the Petitioner on three charges namely (i) without scrutiny, the conversion cases were registered and conversion allowed basing on the report of the R.I. in violation of provision of Section 2 of the FC Act, 1980. The order were passed with unusual haste without application of mind; (ii) gross dereliction in duties by disposing the aforesaid case without following applicable rules and procedure; and (iii) misconduct by allowing conversion of lands in violation of laws.

6. The Enquiring Officer held that the first two charges were proved and misconduct was not proved. In his report dated 02.05.2014, the Additional District Magistrate, Jajpur suggested that as the petitioner did not have ready access to the suit land record and had to depend on the R.I., he committed a blunder. But as he did so in good faith, he may be awarded stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect. This report was sent to the Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Revenue and Disaster Management Department on 22.05.2014.

ORDER DATED 20.10.2023

7. On 20.10.2023, the Petitioner’s application u/s 239 of Cr.P.C, discharge from the alleged offences was rejected by the learned court of Special Judge Vigilance, Cuttack. On 24.08.2021, the Petitioner filed an application u/s-239 of Cr.P.C. in T.R Case No. 08 of 2018, in the Court of the Ld. Special Judge Vigilance, Cuttack, praying for discharge from the alleged offences. His application has been rejected on 20.10.2023, by the learned Special Judge Vigilance, Cuttack. The operative portion of the order is extracted below : -

“ Taking into consideration of submissions of both sides, perused the case record. It is revealed that on the allegation of showing favour and illegal conversion of Forest and for dustrial purpose by the Tahasildar and his staff of Vyasnagar Tahasil in the district of Jajpur an enquiry was taken up. During enquiry and on verification of documents it is revealed that the present accused petitioner who was working as Tahasildar, Vyasnagar received a Conversion Application dt.28.01.2009 of Sitaram D, instituted OLR Case No.66 and 67 dt.28.01.2009 and ordered R.I, Duburi for enquiry and report and Sri Narahari Mohanta, R.I., Duburi connived with the OLR Clerk Sudarsan Mishra and under his direction submitted his enquiry report on 30.01.2009 mentioning the kissam of land as "Biali" intentionally without making any verification with the Tenant ledger and the present accused on the same date passed order for conversion of kissam of land in an unusual hasty manner as he was aware of the fact that Vyasnagar tahasil was going to be bifurcated with effect from 08.02.2009 and the alleged land would come under the new Tahasil namely Danagadi, violating the provision of section-2 of Forest Conservation Act, 1980. Accordingly basing on the written report of the informant-B.K.Pattnaik, Dy. S.P, Vigilance, Jagatsinghpur unit, Cuttack Vigilance P.S Case No.53 dt.20.08.2010 has been registered against the present accused and three others, which include Ex R.I, Duburi Revenue Circle, Ex in-charge Sub Registrar, Sukinda and Ex-OLR Clerk of Vyasnagar Tahasil for the offence U/s-13 (2) r/w 13 (1) (d) of P.C.Act, 1988 and offences U/s-420/468/471/120-B of Indian Penal Code and section-3-B of Forest Conversation-Act, 1980. After completion of investigation charge sheet has been submitted for the aforementioned sections of law as against the present accused and six others. In the meantime out of the seven charge sheeted accused persons, due to death of one accused namely Subhansu Kumar. Seal, case against him has been abated vide order dt. 24.08.2021. From the allegation as per FIR, it is revealed that there is allegation of direct involvement of the accused-petitioner in the alleged crime.

In the case of Nilakantha Muduli and another Vrs State of Orissa, (2013) (Supp-I) OLR 581, it has been held that at the time of framing of charge, the Court is not required to enter into a detailed discussion of materials placed by prosecution and if prima-facie materials are placed in support of the offence alleged to have been committed, charge has to be framed for commission of those offences. Neither a detailed discussion of the materials placed before the Court by the prosecution is required to be proved nor the defence of an accused can be considered at the stage of framing of charge. Similarly, in the case of Mir Khairat Ali and others Vrs State

of Orissa, 2013 (Supp-II) OLR 1109, it has been held that at the stage of framing of charge the court has to consider the materials with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offences or that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against him nor for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. Law is well settled that fishing and roving enquiry is not required at the time of framing of charge.

Having regard to the observations of the Hon'ble Court as mentioned above, perused the available materials of the case record. The statement of the witnesses recorded U/s-161 Cr.P.C by the Investigating Officer revealed about involvement of the accused-petitioner in the alleged crime.

In the case of Nimain Charan Pattnaik Vrs State of Orissa, 2006 (Supp-I) OLR 121, it has been held that allegation is clearly supported by the FIR and statement of some of the witnesses. Whether the allegation is true or false will be decided after the trial. FIR was registered after the retirement of the petitioner but, there is no material anywhere to suggest that FIR or investigation was actuated with malice against the petitioner. No good ground for quashing of the charge sheet or the proceeding.

In the present case the allegation is clearly revealed from the FIR and the statement of the witnesses as discussed above against the accused-petitioner. There is no material to suggest that FIR or investigation was actuated with malice against the accused-petitioner. Besides the above, the grounds for discharge of the present accused-petitioner contended in the petition under disposal of course are mixed questions of fact and law, which will be taken judicial notice during course of trial. As such, it is held that the petition filed on behalf of the accused-petitioner, Subrat Kumar Behera has no merit to be considered and the same being devoid of merit stands rejected. Put up on 16.12.2023 when prosecution to furnish the correct corresponding address of accused-Sitaram D so as to issue summons to him.”

SUBMISSIONS

8. I have heard Mr. Sovan Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. N. Moharana, learned Addl. Standing Counsel (Vigilance) and perused the records, the written notes of submissions and the decisions relied on by the learned counsel.

9. Mr. Sovan Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the FIR bearing Vigilance P.S. Case No. 53 of 2010; chargesheet dated 25.7.2017 under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988 and Section 2 of the FC Act, 1980 and Sections 420/468/471/120B of the IPC, 1860 and all ancillary proceedings qua the Petitioner pending before the Court of the Ld. Special Judge Vigilance, Cuttack are liable to be quashed and set aside due to the following grounds:

(i) Conversion order dated 30.1.2009, which was stated to be the basis for initiation of the Vigilance case has been set aside following due process of law, and as such the basis of the charges against the Petitioner has been extinguished. Therefore, since the basis of the alleged criminality has been nullified by operation of law, it would tantamount to an abuse of process of law if the present proceedings are allowed to continue.

(ii) The conversion order was passed in a 'quasi-judicial capacity and has already been set aside by the appellate authority. So, there is no basis for the continuation of the criminal proceedings. The petitioner has not been expressly named or directly involved in the transaction had acted in good faith throughout.

(iii) There is no whisper of any dishonest intention which would justify prosecution of the Petitioner for offences under the PC Act. Dishonest intention being sine qua non and a condition precedent for institution of any proceedings under Section 13 of the PC Act and the same being apparently missing in the present FIR/ Charge-sheet to the extent that it has never been the case of the prosecution that the Petitioner had received or sought for any advantage to confer any undue favour to anyone.

(iv) The Investigating Agency has not discovered any evidence that the Petitioner gained any pecuniary advantage. No substantive evidence links the Petitioner to the alleged offence. There is no mention of the fact that the Petitioner even knew the private person in any capacity. In fact, in the present case no pecuniary advantage was passed on to anybody as the conversion order was set aside, therefore the question of wrongful loss or wrongful gain did not arise.

(v) The Petitioner relied on the Revenue Inspector's Report , which was the basis for passing the order of conversion as per the established procedure. The Disciplinary Proceedings had also recorded that the Petitioner could not have any access to the records otherwise.

(vi) In the Disciplinary Proceedings, the petitioner has been exonerated and the Disciplinary Authority found that the Petitioner had acted in "good faith".

(vii) Section 70 of the OLR Act protects the Petitioner from any proceeding/prosecution instituted against him on the basis of an action performed by him in 'good faith'. This indemnity, in view of the Disciplinary Proceeding's finding ought to be extended to the Petitioner in the present case.

(viii) The Disciplinary Proceedings had acknowledged that the Petitioner had performed his duties 'without any wrongful intent' and any error in the decision was not due to malafide motive but due to reliance on official records / report of the Revenue Inspector. The absence of mens rea negates any potential charges for criminal conduct or misconduct, making the present criminal proceedings untenable in law. He has relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions :

i) Chittaranjan Shetty vs. State by CBI Bangalore, (2015) 15 SCC 569

ii)Neeraj Dutta vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731

iii) C. Surendranath and Another vs. State of Kerala, Represented by the public prosecutor,(representing the deputy Superintendent of police and another) 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 210,

iv) Narinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another (2014) 6 SCC 466

v) State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335

10. Mr. N. Moharana, learned Additional Standing Counsel Vigilance has submitted that the CRLMC is misconceived. The discharge application of the petitioner has been rejected by a reasoned order, but instead of challenging the said order, he has challenged the FIR, the chargesheet and the entire proceedings. He submitted that the findings recorded in the disciplinary proceedings cannot be used to quash the criminal proceedings, as the nature, scope, and standard of proof in departmental and criminal proceedings are different. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Ajay Kumar Tyagi vs C.B.I.: 2012(9) SCC 685, he submitted that the standard of proof in a disciplinary proceeding is not the same as the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding and hence cannot be relied upon to discharge the petitioner or quash the criminal proceedings against him.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

11. To decide this case, it would be apposite to extract the relevant statutory provisions is extracted below:

PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988.

“13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant. —

(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct, —

(a)x x

(b) xx

(c) xx

(d) if he, —

(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or

(e) xx

(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine .”

(emphasis supplied)

ORISSA LAND REFORMS ACT

“Section 70. Indemnity - (1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended or purported to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rules or orders made thereunder. (2) No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Government or any officer or authority for any damage caused or likely to be caused, for any injury suffered or likely to be suffered by virtue of any provision of this Act or by anything in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rules or orders made thereunder.”

FOREST CONSERVATION ACT

“(ii) Section 3B .Offences by the Authorities and Government Departments:-

“(1) Where any offence under this Act has been committed –

(a) by any department of Government, the head of the department; or

(b) by any authority, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was directly in charge of, and was responsible to, the authority for the conduct of the business of the authority as well as the authority; shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render the head of the department or any person referred to in clause (b), liable to any punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence punishable under the Act has been committed by a department of Government or any authority referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of; or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any officer, other than the head of the department, or in the case of an authority, any person other than the persons referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1), such officer or persons shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”

JUDICIAL PRONUNCMENTS

12. In the case of Chittaranjan Shetty (supra) the Supreme Court held that;-

"22. On a perusal of the abovementioned judgments, it can be concluded that in order to prove the offence under Section 13(1) (d) (ii) of the Act, it must be established that a public servant has abused his position in order to obtain for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, and that, in this context, the "abuse" of position must involve a dishonest intention."

In the case of Neeraj Dutta (supra), the Supreme Court held that:-

"88.1.(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

88.2 (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.

88.3 (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.

88.4 (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(iii) In both cases of (1) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13(1) (d), (1) and (ii) respectively of the Act."

In the case of C. Surendranath ( supra), the Kerala High Court held that:-

"21. To attract the term 'abuse as contained in Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, the prosecution has to establish that the official concerned used his position for something it is not intended. The sum and substance of the discussion is that dishonest intention is the gist of the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act…”

“27. Dishonest intention is sine qua non to attract the offence punishable under Section 13(1) (d) of the Act. Mere conduct and action of the accused contrary to rules and departmental norms would not amount to criminal misconduct by a public servant.”

“30. Dishonest intention is the crux of the offence under Section 13(1) (d) of the PC Act. The question of whether violation of the rules and departmental norms would amount to the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act was considered by the Apex Court in C.K. Jaffer Sharief v. State [(2013) 1 SCC 205]. The Apex Court held thus:

"If in the process, the rules or norms applicable were violated or the decision taken shows an extravagant display of redundance it is the conduct and action of the appellant which may have been improper or contrary to departmental norms. But to say that the same was actuated by a dishonest intention to obtain an undue pecuniary advantage will not be correct. That dishonest intention is the gist of the offence under Section 13(1) (d) is implicit in the words used i.e. corrupt or illegal means and abuse of position as a public servant."

31. In the case of M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala (AIR 1963 SC 1116), while dealing with Section 5 of the 1947 Act, the Apex Court held that dishonest intention is the gist of the offence.

32. In the present case, the prosecution records reveal only a violation of the rules and departmental norms or procedural norms for the tender process. The prosecution failed to produce any material to show that the petitioners with dishonest intention, committed any acts.

33. It is also important to note that there is absolutely no allegation in the prosecution case that the petitioners obtained any pecuniary advantage.

34. The FIR and the Final Report do not disclose the offences alleged. There is not even a suspicion of the commission of any offences by the petitioners. Allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court, or the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed."

In the case of Narinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Supreme Court held that:-

"29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases."

In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335,the Supreme Court held that:-

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

In the case of Ajay Tyagi (supra), the Supreme Court has held that:

“24. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court quashed the prosecution on total misreading of the judgment in P.S. Rajya case. In fact, there are precedents, to which we have referred to above, that speak eloquently a contrary view i.e. exoneration in departmental proceeding ipso facto would not lead to exoneration or acquittal in a criminal case. On principle also, this view commends us. It is well settled that the standard of proof in a department proceeding is lower than that of criminal prosecution. It is equally well settled that the departmental proceeding or for that matter criminal cases have to be decided only on the basis of evidence adduced therein. Truthfulness of the evidence in the criminal case can be judged only after the evidence is adduced therein and the criminal case cannot be rejected on the basis of the evidence in the departmental proceeding or the report of the inquiry officer based on those evidence.

25. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the exoneration in the departmental proceeding ipso facto would not result in the quashing of the criminal prosecution. We hasten to add, however, that if the prosecution against an accused is solely based on a finding in a proceeding and that finding is set aside by the superior authority in the hierarchy, the very foundation goes and the prosecution may be quashed. But that principle will not apply in the case of the departmental proceeding as the criminal trial and the departmental proceeding are held by two different entities. Further, they are not in the same hierarchy.”

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

13. It is a well settled principle of law is that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and only to prevent abuse of the process of Court or to secure the ends of justice. When the case is at the stage of framing of charge, it would not be proper for this Court to conduct a mini trial or evaluate the sufficiency or reliability of evidence or reject the material collected during investigation relying on the findings in a disciplinary proceeding.

14. The learned trial court while considering the discharge application of the petitioner has found materials to frame charge against him and the other accused persons and has rejected the application for discharge by a reasoned order by referring to the materials on record.

15. As it has been alleged that the orders for conversion had been passed by the petitioner, in undue haste on 30.01.2009 as Vyasanagar Tahasil was going to be bifurcated with effect from 08.02.2009, it is difficult to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was a bona fide mistake of the petitioner who relied on the report of the R.I., so as to attract the protection under Section 70 of the OLR Act.

16. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no allegation that the petitioner gained any pecuniary advantage for which the offence under Section – 13 (1) (d) of the PC Act will not be attracted, is bereft of merit as the advantage was obtained / given to the applicant in the conversion applications, before they were set aside.

17. The submission that the orders of conversions have been set aside for which no loss has been caused to the State also has no merit as the orders were not set aside or recalled at the instance of the petitioner. After the matters had been enquired into, the orders were challenged in a higher forum at the instance of the State and set aside.

18. After amendment of Section 13 of the PC Act in 2018, the scope of Section-13 has been narrowed down by removing Section 13 (1) (d) of the PC Act. As this case is based on an occurrence of the year 2008, the submission that the petitioner had acted in good faith is of no consequence. In the facts of the case, it cannot prima facie be said that there is no suspicion that the petitioner has committed the offences. Hence the decision in in the case of C. Surendranath (supra) cannot come to the aid of the petitioner.

19. Disciplinary proceedings are not statutory adjudication proceedings. The standard of proof in a disciplinary proceeding is lower than that in a criminal proceeding. That apart, the witnesses examined/to be examined in the two proceedings are/will be different. This has been explained in the case of Ajay Kumar Tyagi (supra), where the orders of the Delhi High Court quashing the proceedings had been set aside by the Supreme Court. Therefore the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the criminal proceedings qua him should be quashed as he has been given a clean chit in the disciplinary proceedings is misconceived and is therefore rejected.

20. The case of Narinder Singh (supra), was a case where the injured and accused had settled the matter amicably and the Supreme Court had quashed the proceedings observing that in offences under the PC Act, proceedings cannot be quashed on the ground of compromise between the victim and the offender. The facts of this case are entirely different and as evidence has not yet been led, it cannot be decided at this stage that the chances of conviction are bleak.

21. The facts of this case do not fall in category (3) in the case of Ch Bhajan Lal (supra), as claimed by learned counsel for the petitioner as the uncontroverted allegations and materials collected during investigation disclose commission of offence under Section 13 (1) (d) of the PC Act by the petitioner.

22. In view of the above discussion, I am not satisfied that this is a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the FIR, charge-sheet and proceedings in Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No.53 of 2010 which corresponds to TR Case No.08 of 2018 in the Court of learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Cuttack, qua the petitioner.

23. The CRLMC is accordingly dismissed.

24. As the criminal proceeding is pending since long, the learned trial Court shall do well to complete the trial expeditiously without granting unnecessary adjournments.

25. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Cuttack, forthwith.