1. We are of opinion that the appellant in the present case did appeal against the decree, within the meaning of Section 591 of the CPC (Act XIV
of 1882), though the only reason for the appeal was the erroneous decision in regard to the interlocutory order. But the terms of the section in our
opinion allow such an appeal. The decision of the Subordinate Judga as to the construction of Section 591 of the CPC is, no doubt, in accordance
with the decisions in Sher Singh v. Diwan Singh ILR (1900) All. 366 and Caussanal v. Soures ILR (1900) Mad. 260. But the former is based on
an obiter dictum in Sheo Nath Singh v. Ram Din Singh ILR (1896) All. 22 and the decision in Caussanal v. Soures ILR (1900) Mad. 260 is
doubted in Godavari Samulo v. Gajapathi Narayana Deo ILR (1900) Mad. 494 where it is pointed out that it is doubtful if it can be reconciled
with the earlier decision reported in Sankaralinga Mudali v. Ratnasabhapati Mudali ILR (1898) Mad. 324. The decisions in Googlu Sahoo y.
Premlall Sahoo ILR (1881) Cal. 148 and Savitri v. Ramji ILR (1890) Bom. 232, are directly in favour of the appellant''s contention and they are,
we think, in accordance with the language of the section and the principle on which it is based as explained by the Privy Council in Maharajah
Mohesur Singh v. The Bengal Government (l859) 7 M.I.A. 283. at P.302. ""We are of opinion that this objection cannot be sustained. We are not
aware of any law or regulation prevailing in India which renders it imperative Upon the suitor to appeal from every interlocutory order by which he
may conceive himself aggrieved, under the penalty, if he does not so do, of forfeiting for ever the benefit of the consideration of the Appellate
Court. No authority or precedent has been cited in support of such a proposition, and we cannot conceive that anything would be more
detrimental to the expeditious administration of justice than the establishment of a rule which would impose upon the suitor the necessity of so
appealing; whereby on the one hand he might be harassed with endless expense and delay, and on the other inflict upon his opponent similar
calamities. We believe there have been very many cases before this Tribunal in which their Lordships have deemed it to be their duty to correct
erroneous interlocutory orders, though not brought under their consideration until the whole cause had been decided and brought hither by appeal
for adjudication."" We therefore set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge and remand the appeal to the District Judge for decision on the
merits. Costs will abide the event.
