A.P. Chowdhri, J.
1. Facts necessary for the disposal of this petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) areas follows.
2. The occurrence, took place on 2111986 in which one Dharam Singh is alleged to have fired two shots from his licensed gun at Baljinder Singh. A case under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against Dharam Singh. Accused Dharam Singh was acquitted after trial by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Faridkot on 141989. With regard to the same occurrence it was alleged that Sarbjit Singh, Sub Inspector, who was Station House Officer of Police Station, Gidderbaha, at the material time had accepted a bribe of Rs. 500/ from Dharam Singh in order to help him with regard to the above occurrence. A case FIR No. 117 dated 371987 was registered under section 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, against the said, Sarbjit Singh. He was tried and acquitted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Faridkot, vide order dated 17101989. In continuation of the same occurrence, further FIR being FIR No. 96 dated 2161989 has been registered under sections 217 and 218 of the Indian Penal Code against Sarabjit Singh aforesaid. It is alleged that a telegram was received in the Police Station by, Kulwant Chand, Assistant Clerk in the police station, at about 6.30 P.M. on 2111986 with regard to the main occurrence of firing and attempt to murder. In order to help the accused therein, Sarbjit Singh who was otherwise present in the Police Station at that time in the presence of ASI Bhim Singh asked Kulwant Chand, Assistant Clerk, to make a false entry in the D. D. register to the effect that the Station House Officer had left the Police Station earlier at 5.00 p.m. that evening and he was unwell and that further action on the telegram would be taken on his return after papers had been put up to him. No further action was taken and the allegation made in the aforesaid FIR was that this had been done by Sarbjit Singh, Sub Inspector, in order to save Dharam Singh from legal punishment. The stand of the petitioner is that the registeration of the present case is an abuse of the process of the Court and the FIR should be quashed.
3. In the return filed by the State the above mentioned facts are not disputed.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has taken me through final report submitted under section 173 of the Code with regard to FIR No. 117 dated 371987 under section 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Even though the above mentioned facts regarding entry of D.D. report at the instance of Sarbjit Singh, Sub Inspector, are not mentioned in the F.I.R. itself, these facts are expressly mentioned in the aforesaid final report under section 173 of the Code. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to section 300 of the Code. Subsection (1) of section 300 of the Code which is material reads as under :
"300(1). A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under subsection (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under subsection (2) thereof."
5. It will be seen that the latter part of subsection (1) debars second trial of a person once he has been tried and either convicted or acquitted on the same facts which, might be disclosing any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under subsection (1) of Section 221 or for which he might have been convicted under subsection (2) thereof. There cannot be dispute that reference to facts in the above section is not confined to the facts mentioned in the F.I.R. The facts referred to obviously are fact''s mentioned in the F.I.R. and those collected as a result of investigation carried out on that F.I.R. Section 300 (1) of the Code, therefore, bars a further trial. The above principle is based on public policy so that there is finality to prosecution lodged on certain facts found against a person and the Court having tried the case on the basis of those facts. Apart from the provisions referred to above, it has been laid down in Pritam Singh and another v. The State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1956 Supreme Court 415, that the principle of res judicata is no less applicable to criminal than to civil proceeclings. In the facts of that case an acquittal of an accused in a trial under section 19(f) of the Arms Act was held to tantamount to a finding that the prosecution had failed to establish the possession of a certain revolver by the accused. That fact having become final could not be proved against the accused in subsequent proceedings between the State and the accused under a charge of murder. The evidence regarding the recovery of the revolver was, therefore, excluded in the subsequent trial of murder held against the accused.
6. For the reasons mentioned above, prosecution of the petitioner is barred under section 300 of the Code and permitting the prosecution to go on will necessarily amount to abuse of process of the Court. For the reasons mentioned above, F.I.R. in question and proceedings based thereon are here by quashed.
