Sabina, J.@mdashVide this order, the above mentioned two petitions would be disposed of as in both the petitions, the petitioners have sought
quashing of FIR No. 106 dated 29.4.2010 (Annexure P-1) registered at Police Station DLF Phase II District Gurgaon under Sections 420, 406,
120 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (''IPC'' for short), and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom in view of the compromise arrived at
between the parties. Vide order dated 17.7.2012 passed in CRM-M No. 35262 of 2010, parties were directed to appear before the trial court
on 2.8.2010 and the trial Court was directed to record their statements and submit its report qua the genuineness of the compromise effected
between the parties.
2. In pursuance to the said order, the trial Court, after recording the statements of the parties, has reported that the compromise effected between
the parties is genuine and voluntary.
3. As per the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Kulwinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab, 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 1052, High Court
has power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to allow the compounding of non-compoundable offence and quash the prosecution where the High Court felt that the
same was required to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. This power of quashing is not
confined to matrimonial disputes alone.
4. Hon''ble the Apex Court in the case of Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another, has held as under:-
23. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them
whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What,
however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facilities
beyond the limit to which the Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The
question which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this court to quash the criminal
proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised?
24. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi''s case (supra) and the
compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filled by the Bank, we are
satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our
view, the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise.
In case of Shiji @ Pappu and others Vs. Radhika and another 2012 (1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 9, the Hon''ble Apex Court in para No. 13 has held as
under:-
13. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable u/s 320 IPC is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its
power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the
accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by
the parties before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution u/s 482 Cr.P.C.
On the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence
based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable u/s 320, the High Court may quash the
prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High
Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C. are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the
power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the
nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear
view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to
enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power u/s 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for
securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court
may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing
with a petition u/s 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of
each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.
5. Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing these
proceedings to continue. Accordingly, these petitions are allowed. FIR No. 106 dated 29.4.2010 (Annexure P-1) registered at Police Station
DLF Phase II District Gurgaon under Sections 420, 406, 120 IPC and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.
