P.C. Balakrishna Menon, C.J.@mdashThis revision petition by the tenant is against the order for his eviction passed by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the appellate authority under the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971. Eviction was ordered on proof of the bona fide need landlord for his own occupation and also on the ground that the tenant had been allotted a residence for his occupation by the Government The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (the Act for short) came into force during the pendency of the revision before this Court with retrospective effect from 17th day of November 1971. The landlord does not press his claim for eviction on the ground of bona fide need for the reason of the embargo contained in Sub-section (6) of Section 14 of the Act The landlord, however, seeks to sustain the order passed by the courts below on the ground mentioned in Section 14(3)(a)(iv) of the Act extracted below:
A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession--
(a) in the case of a residential building, if...
(iv) the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built or acquired vacant possession of or been allotted, a residence reasonably sufficient for his requirement.
This revision was argued by Counsel on both sides on the aforesaid Clause (iv) which replaces a similar clause contained in Section 14(3)(f) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971.
2. The building involved in these proceedings belonged to one Meghnath and another and was in occupation of the revision Petitioner as a tenant under them. The tenant was the Welfare Officer in the Accountant General''s Office in Himachal Pradesh. He was allotted a government accommodation in Simla on 3-10-1979 and he occupied the allotted premises on 11-10-1979. The present landlord purchased the premises by a registered sale-deed Ex. P-l, dated 23-9-1982 from Meghnath and another and issued Ex. P-3 notice to the tenant on 20-10-1982, to vacate the premises The tenant had in the meanwhile by Ex. P-10 letter dated 11-10-1982 informed the Government that he intends to surrender the accommodation allotted to him on 30-10-1982. The accommodation allotted by the Government was accordingly surrendered by the tenant on 30-10-1982 and he reverted back to the building involved in these proceedings on the same day. The present petition for eviction was filed by the landlord on 2nd December 1982. There is no dispute that the tenant was in occupation of the accommodation allotted by the government during the period 11th October 1979 to 30th October, 1982. This Court after the new Act came into force by order dated 28th April, 1989 called for a finding from the Rent Controller as to whether the accommodation allotted by the Government was reason ably sufficient for the requirements of the tenant. The Rent Controller after recording fresh evidence adduced by the parties has submitted a finding to this Court that the accommodation allotted by the Government was reasonably sufficient for the requirements of the tenant. Even though the tenant has filed objections no serious attempt is made to challenge the correctness of the finding. The very fact that the tenant was in occupation of the allotted premises for a period over three years for the residence of himself and his family is itself indicative of the fact that the accommodation allotted by the Government was reasonably sufficient for the requirements of the tenant.
3. Learned Counsel for the tenant, Shri Rajiv Sharma, has urged that the accommodation allotted by the Government had been surrendered on 30th October, 1982 and no such accommodation was available on 2nd December, 1982 when the landlord filed the present petition for eviction. Learned Counsel places strong reliance on the decision of a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Ved Prakash v. Chuni Lal 1971 DLT 59. In that case, construing a similar provision in Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the learned single Judge held that the word ''has'' in the sub-section preceding the word ''built'', ''acquired vacant possession of and ''been'' allotted contains in itself the meaning of presently possessing and unless the tenant is in possession of the alternative accommodation referred to in the sub-section on the date of the petition, the landlord is not entitled to--On order for eviction of the tenant on that ground. This decision of the learned single Judge was over-ruled by a Division Bench in Hem Chand Baid v. Smt. Prem Wati Parekh 1979 (2) RCR 328. In that case it was held that the learned single Judge had not noticed an earlier decision of a Division Bench of the same High Court in Battoo Mal v. Rameshwar Nath 1970 RCR 532, wherein it was held that the protection of the Rent Control Act lost for the reason of the tenant acquiring an alternative accommodation will not be revived on surrender of the accommodation at a later date. The Division Bench in Hem Chand Betid''s case (supra) has summarised the proposition laid down in Battoo Mal''s case at page 333 of the reports as follows:
Two propositions appear to be well settled by the Division Bench in Battoo Mal''s case:
(1) that once protection is lost by a tenant by his default, under
Clause (h) it is lost for ever and cannot be revived at any point of time or under any circumstances:
(2) that the landlord''s right of eviction might get defeated by v. application of general principles of waiver or laches in exceptional cases.
Considering also the decision of the Supreme Court in Gajanan Dattatraya Sherbanu Hosang Patel 1976 RCR 33 the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court came to the following conclusion at page 336:
Once a default is committed by a tenant he ceases to enjoy the protection of law permanently and at no point of time and under no circumstances, the protection of law is revived. In view of this answer in regard to the interpretation of Clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14, the stage in the litigation at which the default should continue, became irrelevant.
4. In a later decision of the Delhi High Court in Ganpat Ram v. Smt. Gyatri Devi 1980 (2) RCR 707 , also the question raised related to the interpretation of Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In that case the landlord claimed eviction of the tenant Ganpat Ram on the ground that he had been allotted a residential quarter in Shahdara, Delhi. This fact was denied by the tenant. On the evidence however, it was found that the tenant had obtained such an allotment and possession was also delivered to him. The mere fact that he had later parted with possession was held to be not sufficient to restore the protection of Rent Control Act to him. This decision of the Delhi High Court was up-held by the Supreme Court in
The landlady claimed eviction of Ganpat Ram, Appellant-tenant, on another ground also, namely, that he has been allotted residential quarter at 317, Seelampur III, Shahdara, Delhi. This fact was denied by the tenant. AW-1 Naresh Chand, an official of the D.D.A. brought the official record relating to the allotment of this quarter. It was proved that the said quarter was allotted to him in 1958 and that possession was delivered to him. It was deposed that it was residential in nature. On behalf of the tenants, it was submitted before the High Court that the same was in possession of Sushila Devi. Sushila Devi had appeared as a witness. She admitted that the said quarter was allotted to the tenant, Ganpat Ram, the Appellant After allotment Ganpat Ram, was entitled to occupy the allotted accommodation and possession was delivered to him. According to the said witness, he was not now in possession and somebody else was in possession. Evidence was adduced on behalf of the tenant that he was not in possession and somebody else was in possession. According to the High Court, if once the condition stipulated in Clause (h) was fulfilled by the tenant, he was disentitled to protection under the Act. He cannot thereafter claim that he should be protected. We are of the opinion that the High Court was right.
After considering several decisions bearing on subject, the Supreme Court held at page 2021:
Before we discuss the other aspect the result of the several decisions to which reference has been made above indicate that the position in law is that the landlord in order to be entitled to evict the tenant must establish one of the alternative facts positively, either that the tenant has built, or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence. It is essential that the ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession or has been allotted a residence, whether it is suitable or not and whether the same can be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not, are within the special knowledge of the tenant and he must prove and establish those facts. The other aspect apart from the question of limitation to which we shall briefly refer is that the landlord must be quick in taking his action after the accrual of the cause of action, and if by his inaction the tenant allows the premises to go out of his hands then it is the landlord who is to be blamed and not the tenant. In the light of these, we have now to examine whether the suit in the instant case was barred by the lapse of time. But quite apart from the suit being barred by lapse of time this is a beneficial legislation, beneficial to both the landlord and the tenant. It protects the tenant against unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent. It also ensures certain limited rights to the landlord to recover possession on stated contingencies.
5. On the facts adverted to above, it cannot be said that the landlord in the present case was not quick in taking action for the eviction of the tenant. The surrender by the tenant of the accommodation allotted by the Government in this case was after the landlord had issued Ex. P-3 notice requiring the tenant to vacate the premises. It cannot, therefore, be said that the landlord had lost his right to evict the tenant under Sub-section 14(3)(a)(iv) of the Act for the reason of waiver or laches on his part. Considering a similar provision in Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the Supreme Court in
...The purpose of the Act is to control rents and eviction, in other words, to control unreasonable evictions and to ensure that in an atmosphere of acute shortage of accommodation, there is proper enjoyment of available spaces by those who want and deserve. In other words, to ensure that there are no unreasonable and unnecessary spaces in the hands of one tenant and other tenants and landlords'' need of occupation of spaces remains unsatisfied, Clause (h) of Section 14(1) is an attempt in a way to ration out accommodation between tenants and landlords. Looked at from that point of view unless acquisition of a premises or a flat or allotment of a premises or part of a premises by the tenant in which he had domain which he can reasonably and alternatively use as a substitute for the place he is using in the tenancy it cannot lead to a forfeiture of his right to occupy his tenanted premises. The case could be otherwise, however, if a tenant comes into possession of a premises or is allotted a piece of residence or acquires vacant possession of the premises than such a tenant cannot prevent, if other conditions are fulfilled u/s 14(1)(h) of the Act being liable to forfeiture of his tenancy.
6. It was a case where the tenant''s wife being a Government servant was allotted a Government accommodation for her occupation and an allotment of the accommodation to the wife, it was held, is not sufficient to forfeit the husband''s tenancy, as the tenant cannot be said to have domain over the premises allotted to his wife A recent decision of the Supreme Court in Mohini Badhwar v. Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran (1983) 3 SCC 72, also related to the interpretation of Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In that case the tenant had acquired vacant possession of her own house on November 20, 1973, sometime before the petition for the eviction of the tenant was filed. The Supreme Court after considering the facts of the case held that the mere fact that the tenant had parted with possession of the premises prior to the institution of proceedings for eviction, will not protect the tenant against Section 14(1)(h) of the Act. It was accordingly held at page 74:
It is apparent that on November 20, 1973, the Appellant came into the house belonging to her and it was available to her for her occupation. The circumstances that she lost possession on the date when the eviction petition was filed does not protect the Appellant against Section 14(1)(h) of the Act.
7. For the aforesaid reasons, I am clearly of the view that the surrender of the Government accommodation by the tenant prior to the institution of the proceedings will not absolve him of his liability for eviction u/s 14(3)(a)(iv) of the Act.
8. Learned Counsel for the tenant has made a further submission that the allotment of Government accommodation for the residence of the tenant cannot be accepted as an allotment of ''residence'' referred to in Section 14(3)(a)(iv) of the Act. The submission is that the allotment of Government accommodation at Simla is coterminous with his employment as a Government servant and that under the rules of allotment he is obliged to vacate the premises on his retirement or on transfer to some other place. I find it difficult to accept this submission. I am clearly of the view that an allotment of a Government accommodation falls within the ambit of Section 14(3)(a)(iv) of the Act. The intention of the legislature appears to be clear that in these days of acute shortage of accommodation there should be some attempt in a way to ration out available accommodation between tenants and landlords. Protection granted to the tenant under the Act is subject to the rights of the landlord for his eviction on grounds specified therein. As stated by the Supreme Court in Ganpat Ram v. Gayatri Devi (supra), the Act is beneficial to both the landlords and tenants. It protects the tenant against unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent. It also ensures certain limited rights to the landlord to recover possession on specified grounds.
9. In Ganpat Ram''s case 1980 (2) RCR 707 referred to above, the High Court at page 711 observed:
In any case I am of the view that the landlady is entitled to claim eviction under Clause (h) as soon as she proves that a residence has been allotted to a tenant within urban area of the Union Territory of Delhi irrespective of the question whether the Rent Control Act is applicable to the allotted residence. There is no mention in the Rent Control Act that the Act must be applicable to the allotted residence. The whole purpose would be frustrated if it is held that the allotted residence within the Union Territory of Delhi must also be governed by the Rent Control Act. The premises belonging to the Government are not governed by the Rent Control Act u/s 3 of the Act. It is very well known that several Government servants are tenants occupying various tenancy premises in the Union Territory of Delhi and they have been allotted Government accommodation i.e. the premises belonging to the Government to which the Rent Control Act is not applicable. If Clause (h) means as suggested, the Government servants who are allotted Government accommodation i.e. premises belonging to the Government would be protected against eviction. In other words, they would continue to occupy the tenancy premises as well as Government allotted premises. This is not the purpose of the Rent Control Act. The intention of Clause (h) is that if a tenant has been allotted a residence he is not entitled to be protected under the Rent Act.
10. I. therefore, over-rule the contention that allotment of a government accommodation does not fall u/s 14(3)(a)(iv) of the Act.
11. The learned Counsel for the tenant submits that the tenant had retired from Government service on 31st October, 1985 and this subsequent event should be taken into consideration in disposing of this civil revision. Counsel relies on the following observations of the Supreme Court in
We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed.
12. That was a case where the landlord sought eviction of a tenant on the ground of his personal requirement. He had, however, obtained possession of some other accommodation sufficient for his requirements during the pendency of the proceedings. The ground for eviction of the tenant for the personal requirement of the landlord thus became not available to him.
13. In the present case the protection of the Act that was lost to the tenant on his obtaining allotment of government accommodation will not be revived either for the reason of the surrender of the government accommodation or for the reason on his retirement from government service pending the proceeding for his eviction.
14. For the aforesaid reasons, I see no merit in the civil revision and it is accordingly dismissed.
