@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
Arun Kumar Goel, J.@mdashThis revision is directed against the order dated 1-8-2003, whereby learned trial Court has dismissed the application under Order VI, Rule 17 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. filed by the petitioners, hereinafter referred to as "the defendants", for amendment of their written statement.
2. With a view to properly understand and appreciate the controversy involved in this revision, case set up by the parties, out of which this revision has arisen, and on which, learned Counsel for the parties were not at variance at. the time of hearing, need to be briefly noted. These are :--
3. That a suit was filed by the respondent, hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff on the basis of title qua the land as detailed in the plaint again the defendants for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining them from in any manner, interfering with his possession and ownership. This suit was filed on 19-9-1995. Written statement was filed on 29-9-1995. Issues were framed on 7-4-2000 by the trial Court. This suit is being contested and resisted by the defendants. They have claimed passage, but from which particular parcel of land and where it exists and whether it is over the land in suit belonging to the plaintiff, there was no averment in the written statement. Another fact that needs to be rioted here is, that the defendants have not disputed the title of the plaintiff to the suit land. Plaintiff concluded his evidence. Thereafter, it was listed for the first time for evidence of the defendants on 3-1-2003. No steps had admittedly been taken by the defendants by either filing list of witness and/or by depositing the process fee as well as road and diet money of the witnesses intended to be summoned by them.
4. Learned counsel for the parties were further not at variance that the trial Court from 3-1-2003 adjourned the case to 27-3-2008. Then it was adjourned to 8-5-2003. It was also adjourned to 3-7-12003, subject to costs of Rs. 200/-. This was the last opportunity to the defendants for producing evidence. Again it was adjourned to 1-9-2003 as last opportunity. It was also again adjourned to 10-11-2003. Again, this was the last opportunity allowed to lead evidence by the defendants, subject to costs of Rs.500/-.
5. When the case was listed on 3-7-2003, application under Order VI, Rule 17 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. was filed, wherein amendment was proposed to be carried out in the written statement by the defendants claiming passage over a part of the suit land owned and possessed by the plaintiff. Plea claiming passage over part of plaintiff s land by way of prescription was also intended to be set up by amending the written statement. Plaintiff contested this application on the ground that no amendment was necessary and the application was not bona fide. It will change the nature of the defence. Number of other pleas were also set up while opposing this amendment application of the defendants,
6. Trial Court by means of the impugned order, has dismissed the application.
7. What is stated in the application, seeking amendment of the written statement is being extracted hereinbelow for ready reference :--
"That the plaintiff/non-application has filed a civil suit for permanent prohibitory injunction, restraining the defendants/respondents, from interfering in the land, as entered against Khata Khauni No. 41/69, Khasra Nos. 445, 448, 449, 489, 492, 493, 495, 496, 497 and Khata Khatuni No. 41/ 70, Khasra No. 494, Khata 10, total measuring 219-43 Square Meters, situated at MaujaTutikandl, Tehsil and District Shinila, H. P. The defendants/applicants have denied the allegations, as levelled by the plaintiff in the plaint and it has been specifically pleaded by the applicants that there exists a passage which links to the houses of the applicants through the land owned by the non-applicant and the said passage is in existence much prior to the year 1954 and the same is being used as passage by the applicants. The applicants inadvertently despite their due diligence have failed to mention the details with respect to the identification of the passage at the time when the written statement on their behalf was filed in the Court. As a matter of fact, at that relevant time, though the passage was in existence in the land as entered against Khasra No. 515/383, yet the same was not recorded in the revenue record. Therefore, the factum regarding the identification of the passage could not be mentioned earlier in written statement filed by the applicants. It will be pertinent to mention here that the applicants applied for correction of entries prepared by the Settlement Authorities and on the application of the applicants, the learned Settlement Collector ordered to record the passage in the Records-of -Rights over the land, as entered against Khata Khatunl No. 41 min, Khasra No. 515/383 (old), Khasra Nos. 445, 448, 449, 489 489/2 (new).
The defendants have been using the said passage continuously for a period of more than 20 years and they have been using the same within period of 2 years from the date of filing of the written statement and the applicants have acquired the right of use of the passage by way of prescription. It is submitted that the applicants have constructed their houses about 30 years ago and right from the date of purchase of the land and thereafter during the course of construction and thereafter when the applicants started residing in the house built by them, their tenants and other occupants of the buildings have been using this passage and the said passage is being used by the defendants for statutory period of more than 22 years and the same is open, continuous and without interruption from the plaintiff or any other period.
That the above amendment is necessary in order to decide the real point of controversy between the parties. The said amendments cannot be incorporated by the applicants, despite their due diligence. No prejudice is going to be caused to the opposite party in case the amendment is allowed to be incorporated in the written statement, moreover it will help this Ld. Court in rightly and effectively deciding the case on merits."
8. Shri G. D. Verma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendants submitted that trial Court has fallen into error in dismissing the application for amendment of the written statement. According to him, it was necessary to be carried out with a view to set at rest the controversy between the parties and it was also necessary to settle the disputes between them for all times to come. While advancing the case of the defendants further, Mr. Verma also urged that rules of procedure are meant to advance the cause of justice, and not to thwart it. Per him, while considering application for amendment of pleadings particularly of writ ten statement, the approach of the Court needs to be liberal and technicalities should always be ignored in a given situation. C.P.C. amendment Acts of 1999 and 2002 being prospectively applicable are not attracted to the facts and circumstances of this case, and proviso to Order VI, Rule 17 of the C.P.C. is to be considered with reference to the main provision, i.e. Rule 17 of Order VI. Golden rule of interpretation while examining a provision of law by giving simple meaning to the words used in it, is to be adhered to. As such, he prayed for allowing this revision and thereby allowing the amendments as prayed for.
9. All these pleas were controverted by Shri Ashok Sood, learned Counsel for the plaintiff. According to him, application for amendment was wholly misconceived and was an attempt to gain time when it was filed on 3-7-2003. Reason being that no list of witnesses, process fee, diet, money etc. had been filed despite numerous opportunities having been allowed in that behalf and with a view to overcome this lapse, present mala fide application was filed. No witness was present on this date on behalf of defendants. According to him, trial Court, also fell prey to the device set up by the defendants and allowed last opportunity one after the other. He further pointed out, that even if it be assumed for the sake of argument without being conceded that the application was maintainable, in such a situation, on the averments made in the application, defendants having not come to the Court with clean hands, were not entitled to the grant of discretionary relief. Trial in the suit had commenced and application being highly belated and mala fide, the trial Court had correctly exercised its discretion while dis missing it. He further pointed out that in case the proposed amendments are allowed, it will change the nature of the defence of the defendants. By referring to the proposed amendments, he pointed out that no right whatsoever was claimed over the suit land by the defendants which was now intended to be set up. He further submitted that right by way of prescription was never claimed in the original written statement where in its Para-6, passage was claimed for ten years only. According to him, if proposed amendments are allowed, it will not only give a breather to the defendants (though not envisaged under law), but will further defeat the purpose of the amendment of Rule 17 of Order VI of the C.P.C. as it stood after its amendment.
10. For ready reference, Order VI, Rule 17 of the C.P.C. both unamended and amended, respectively are reproduced here-inbelow :--
Before. Amendment
"17. Amendment of pleadings. The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may he necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties."
After Amendment,
"17. Amendment of pleadings. The Court may may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such mariner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties :
Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter be fore the commencement of trial."
(Emphasis supplied).
11. Comparative study of the above provisions makes it clear that after the amendment of Rule 17 of Order VI of the C.P.C., no application for amendment is to be allowed alter the trial has commenced, unless Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, parties could not raise the matter before commencement of the trial.
12. In this behalf, it may be appropriate to observe, that so far power of the Court to allow amendment or alteration of the pleadings at any stage is concerned, it is there. However, this power of the Court by no stretch of imagination can be said to be either unguided or unbridled Such power has to be exercised, in my considered view, with due circumspection and it must be shown being based on sound judicial discretion. Further Court cannot assume arbitrary and capricious powers to exercise such discretion.
13. With a view to first ensure whether the defendants had exercised due diligence so as to enable the Court to examine their application for amendment or not, in Para-1 of the application, existence of passage over particular Khasra numbers is alleged. Reason given is that the defendants had applied for correction of entries which was allowed by the Settlement Authorities on their application. Settlement Collector ordered to record the passage. Thus, a right over the land was entered against Khasra number as extracted hereinabove, In this behalf, it may be noted that, this order of Settlement Collector, was challenged in appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, who vide its order dated 11-8-1997 in Revenue Appeal No. 55/97, set aside the order of the Settlement Collector. The matter was before the Financial Commissioner. This factual position was not disputed at the time of hearing of this petition.
14. While filing the application for amendment, except for mentioning regarding recording of passage by the Settlement Collector in the record-of-rights, there is not. a murmur either regarding the said order having been set aside or the matter being further (sic) before the Financial Commissioner. When specifically questioned regarding this omission, learned Senior Counsel was unable to say anything in this behalf Necessity for asking him arose when the application was filed on 3-7-2003, long after passing of the order by the Settlement Collector, and its having been set aside by the Divisional Commissioner, that in order to seek equitable and discretionary relief from the Court, least that was expected of the defendants was to have come straight and clean by bringing all the correct, facts to the notice of the Court. In this background, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the omission to mention about the order of the Collector having been set aside and the matter being pending before the Financial Commissioner, was intentional and wilful.
15. Reason for omitting these facts is not difficult to find. Trial Court might have favourably considered the prayer for amendment of the written statement based on an order of a competent revenue authority, as in the present case. It is well settled by different authorities relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the defendants that the Court while considering proposed amend merit particularly to the written statement, would be liberal and its approach should be justice-oriented. Reason being that the purpose for amending the pleading is to determine the real controversy between the par ties so that litigation is set at rest forever. If a case is otherwise made out for allowing the amendment of the pleadings, then for technical reasons, it will not be declined, as it will subserve the purpose, i.e. to minimize the litigation, as also to set at rest the controversy between the parties. But, as already observed, the discretion vested with the Court, has to be exercised judiciously. Amendment is not to be allowed at the askance of a party and as a matter of course. Legislature in its wisdom and with a view to curb menace of the litigation being prolonged felt necessity to circumvent the same. And with a view to achieve this object, amended C.P.C. vide CPC (Amendment) Act, 2002 adding proviso to Order VI, Rule 17.
16. On a bare perusal of this proviso, it is evident that ordinarily amendment of pleadings is not. to be allowed after the trial had commenced, unless of course, the Court was satisfied that the party concerned, could not apply after exercise of due diligence for such amendment before the commencement of the trial. Admittedly, in. the facts and circumstances of the case, trial had commenced when application under Order VI, Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. was filed. Rather it was at the stage of defendants" evidence, In these circumstances, again when a reference is made as to what is set out in the application seeking amendment, material portion whereof is extracted hereinabove, it is evident that except for using the words "after exercise of due diligence" averments in the application are not enough to enable the Court to consider the application to the light of the amended provisions, particularly proviso to Order VI, Rule 17 as it. stands after the CPC (Amendment) Act, 2002.
17. For taking this view, again at the cost of repetition, It may be appropriate to observe that grounds set out for claiming passage over the plaintiffs" land by giving Khasra numbers is based on the order of Settlement Collector which is dated 27-10-1995. Application was filed for amendment on 3-7-2003 that too by suppression of material facts. This is another reason to hold that defendants raised the plea for amendment after the gap of about more than 7% years. It is a different matter that after setting aside the said order and being in the know of it, defendants still choose to withhold the material fact from the Court. Here the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 2002, Section 16(2b), assumes significance, which is reproduced hereinbelow :--
"(b). the provisions of Rules 5, 15, 17 and 18 of Order VI of the First Schedule as omitted or, as the case may be, inserted or substituted by Section 16 of the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1999 and by Section 7 of this Act shall not apply to in respect of any pleading filed before the commencement of Section 16 of the CPC (Amendment.) Act, 1999 and Section 7 of this Act."
18. Suit was pending. Proceedings in it commenced and amended Order VI, Rule 17 was applicable on and with effect from 1-7-2002, therefore, to say that it is being retrospectively applied, is not correct. It is being prospectively applied to the proceedings in a case like the present one as it stood as on 1-7-2002.
19. Application for amendment was filed on 3-7-2003. Therefore, unless due diligence was shown, no benefit can be derived by the defendants from the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in
"6. The entire object of the said amendment is to stall filing of applications for amending a pleading subsequent to the commencement of trial, to avoid surprises and the parties had sufficient knowledge of the other''s case. It also helps in checking the delays in filing the applications. Further once the trial commences on the known pleas, it will be very difficult for any side to reconcile. Yet, under the same proviso, an exception is made where it is shown that in spite of diligence, he could not raise a plea. Therefore, it is not a complete bar nor shuts out entertainment of any later application. Otherwise, the proviso would be in direct conflict to the expression "at any stage" used in the Rule. Even the object as enunciated in the amending Act, is to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings, where it is satisfied that either new facts have come into existence subsequent to the institution of the suit. The restriction imposed under this amended provision could at the most relate to the facts, events and circumstances which are existing or available either on the date of filing the suit or on the date of filing of the pleading i.e. written statement. It further goes in support that the Court is always entitled to take note and allow any amendment in regard to any subsequent event. Therefore, the said provision would not apply for addition to the pleadings of any new facts or material based on subsequent event."
20. When a reference is made to this decision, it negatives the plea urged on behalf of defendants. A reading of the above shows that it has been held that the petitioner-defendant in spite of due diligence could not raise the plea that was intended to be raised and had been declined by the trial Court. In fact, it was based on something that had transpired during the pendency of the case and all the facts had been clearly stated before the Court while applying for the amendment of the written statement.
21. In case the argument of Mr. Verma is taken to its logical end, result would be disastrous. Thus, after applying the golden rule of interpretation, language of proviso, (supra) to Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C, needs to be given its ordinary meaning. In this case, language of the proviso is plain and simple. It calls for no external aids for interpreting the same.
22. To observe the useful rule in the construction of a statute is to adhere to the original meaning of the words used, and to adhere to its grammatical construction, unless of course, that is at variance with the legislative intent. This is to be gathered from the provision itself.
23. In addition to this, question of interpretation of a statute could only arise, when it is capable of two interpretations. However, in the face of the clear language, as also its plain meaning, effect needs to be given to the letter of law. Legislative purpose and intent has always to be found in the words used in the legislation itself. And in case words used therein are capable of one construction only, then it is not the Courts job to go in for hypothetical construction on the plea that it is more consistent with the. object and policy of the Act. Words used in particular provision of the statute have to be interpreted on their plain grammatical meaning.
24. One can safely assume that legislature was very well aware of the rules of grammar. Such rules should be considered by the Courts in their effect to ascertain meaning of a statutory enactment. Language of a provision of law has to be interpreted on the assumption that legislature was aware of the existing statute and it was aware what it intended by amending the law.
25. Another rule of interpretation is to ascertain as to what was the law prior to its amendment, as in the present case. What remedy the legislation resolved and carried out by way of amendment and true reason therefor.
26. While interpreting a provision, the Courts have to give effect to the provision of law as enacted by the legislation. Reason being that power to legislate is not conferred upon the Courts. As such, Courts can neither re-write nor re-cast or re-frame the legislation for the simple reason that it has no such power.
27. It is also a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent, all constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of Act. As such, in my view the title and preamble, whatever their value may be, as aids to the construction of a statute, undoubtedly throw some light on the intent and design of the Legislature, as also is indicative of the scope as well as of the legislative intent.
28. Matter regarding the interpretation of the provisions of law has been inviting the attention of different Courts including the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India. To some of such decisions, reference is being made hereinbelow :--
"In
(1) The first and foremost rule, to which all other are subordinate, is that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation. If a statute speaks for itself clearly any attempt by the Court to make it clearer by imposing another meaning would not be constructing the statute but enacting one.
(2) The second rule is that the words appearing in a statute must be presumed to have been used in their popular sense and should be given their ordinary natural and familiar meaning.
(3) The third rule is that the Courts are not at liberty to create an imaginary ambiguity in the terms of a statute and later to clear it up by a long and tedious process of subtle analysis. The Courts proceed on the assumption, that the Legislature knew its own mind, that it understood the meaning of the terms employed by it and that those terms do not contain a hidden meaning which only the study of a powerful intellect can discover.
In
"It is a recognized rule of interpretation of a statutes that the expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislature. If an expression is susceptible of a narrow or technical meaning, as well as a popular meaning the Court would be justified in assuming that the Legislature used the expression in the sense which would carry out its object and reject that which renders the exercise of its powers invalid. In interpreting a statute, the Court cannot ignore its aim and object."
In
"Now, if there is one principle of interpretation more well settled than any other, it is that a statutory enactment, must ordinarily be construed according to the plain natural meaning of its language and that no words should be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. This rule of literal construction is firmly established and it has received judicial recognition in numerous cases. Crawford in his book on "Construction of Statutes" (1940 Edn.) at page 269 explains the rule in the following terms :
"Where the statute''s meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. In the first place, in such a case, they are not needed. If they should be interpolated, the statute would more than likely fail to express the legislative intent, as the thought intended to be conveyed might be altered by the addition of new words. They should not be interpolated even though the remedy of the statute would thereby be advanced, or a more desirable or just result would occur. Even where the meaning of the statute is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word, interpolation is improper, since the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the statute."
In Rib Tapes (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 2014, in the context of Interpretation of Statute, it was held as under :--
"It was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that in fact in the decision of this Court in
In
"If we are to hold that every declaration which does not state accurately the full export value of the goods exported is a contravention of the restrictions imposed by Section 12(1) then all exports on consignment basis must be held to contravene the restrictions imposed by Section 12(1). Admittedly Section 12(1) governs every type of export. Again it is hard to believe that the Legislature intended that any minor mistake in giving the full export value should be penalised in the manner provided in Section 23-A. The wording of Section 12(1) does not support such a conclusion. Such a conclusion does not accord with the purpose of Section 12(1). It is true that the regulations contained in the Act are enacted in the economic and financial interest of this country. The contravention of those regulations which we were told are widespread are affecting vital economic interest of this country. Therefore, the rigor and sanctity of those regulations should be maintained but at the same time it should not. be forgotten that Section 12(1) is a penal section. The true rule of construction of a section like Section 12(1) is, if we may say so with respect, as mentioned by Plowman, J. in Re H.P.C. Productions Ltd. (1962) Ch D 466 ...."
It is, therefore, clear that their Lordships relied on the rule of construction holding that penal provision has to be strictly construed and held that where the provision itself did not require the value to be stated for any error in respect of that, no penalty could be imposed. Learned Counsel contended that it was because of this decision that the Amendment Act, 1973 was passed by the Parliament and the term Value'' was inserted in Section 111(m) of the Act, Learned Counsel referred to Objects and Reasons for the amendment mentioned in the Bill, which resulted in Act No. 36 of 1973. The material words mentioned in the Objects and Reasons for the amendment as stated in the Bill reads as under :--
"The amendments to these Acts proposed in the Bill mainly seek to make the punishments prescribed thereunder more severe and to make certain those provisions therein with regard to the rules of evidence and procedure with a view to removing the loopholes noticed in the working of these Acts and making their enforcement more effective.
2. The notes on clauses explain in detail the various provisions of the Bill.
Clause (2). This clause seeks to amend Section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962, with a view to providing for the confiscation of goods in cases of mis-declaration of value or imported goods irrespective of whether or not such goods are dutiable or prohibited, in order to cover cases of over-involved imports."
It is not in dispute that in order to interpret a particular provision and to Infer the intention of the Legislature, the Objects and Reasons stated in the Bill, when it is presented to the Legislature, could be used. In this view of the matter, it appears that before the amendment in 1973, Section 111(m) did not contemplate any difference in material particulars in respect, of value but it referred matters other than the value."
To similar effect is a three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in
"The object of enacting Section 13-A by the Legislature was to confer benefit on all tenants against whom suits for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent were pending. To achieve the object, Section 13-A has been given overriding effect.
In this case provision of Section 13(a) of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act was being examined. What is relevant for the purpose of the present case, it was held as under :--
In construing the terms of Section 13-A, the Court has to bear in mind the object underlying the introduction of the section by the Legislature. It is a settled principle that the interpretation of the legislative intent as far as possible and the Courts should not take a narrow or restricted view which will defeat the purpose of the Act."
In Shashikant Laxman Kale v. Union of India, : [1990]185ITR104(SC) , it was held as under :---
"14. It is first necessary to discern the true purpose or object of the impugned enactment because it is only with reference to the true object of the enactment that the existence of a rational nexus of the differentia on which the classification is based, with the object sought to be achieved by the enactment, can be examined to test the validity of the classification. In Franchise Bennion''s Statutory Interpretation, 1984 Edition, the distinction between the legislative intention and the purpose or object of the legislation has been succinctly summarised at p. 237 as under :--
"The distinction between the purpose or object of an enactment and the legislative intention governing it is that the former relates to the mischief to which the enactment is directed and its remedy, while the latter relates to the legal meaning of the enactment."
15. There is thus a clear distinction between the two. While the purpose or object of the legislation is to provide a remedy for the malady, the legislative intention relates to the meaning or exposition of the remedy as enacted. While dealing with the validity of a classification, the rational nexus of the differentia on which the classification is based has to exist with the purpose or object of the legislations so determined. The question next is of the manner in which the purpose or object of the enactment has to be determined and the material which can be used for this exercise.
16. For determining the purpose or object, of the legislation, it is permissible to look into the circumstances which prevailed at the time when the law was passed and which necessitated the passing of that law. For the limited purpose of appreciating the background and the antecedents factual matrix leading to the legislation, it is permissible to look into the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill which actuated the steps to provide a remedy for the then, existing malady. In A.
In
"8. The language of Sub-rule (4) of Rule 10 is absolutely clear and does not permit any artificial rule of interpretation to be applied. It is well established that if the words of a statute are clear and free from any vagueness and are, therefore, reasonably susceptible to only meaning, it must be construed by giving effect to that meaning, irrespective of consequences. The language of the Sub-rule here is precise and unambiguous and, therefore, has to be understood in the natural and ordinary sense. As was observed in innumerable cases in India and in England, the expression used in the statute alone declares the intent of the Legislature. In the words used by this Court in State of U.P. v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the acts speaks for itself. Reference was also made in the reported judgment to Maxwell stating:
"The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words."
The comparison of the language with that of Sub-rule (3) reinforces the conclusion that Sub-rule (4) has to be understood in the natural sense. It will be observed that in Sub-rule (3) the reference is to "a Government servant under suspension" while the words under suspension", are omitted in Sub-rule (4). Also, the Sub-rule (3) directs that on the order of punishment being set aside, "the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force" but in Sub-rule (4) it has been said that "the Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension". The departure made by the author in the language of Sub-rule (4) from that of Sub-rule (3) is conscious and there is no scope for attributing the artificial and strained meaning thereto. In the circumstances, it is not permissible to read down the provisions as suggested. We, therefore, hold that as a result of Sub-rule (4), a Government servant, though not earlier under suspension, shall also be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, provided of course, that the other conditions mentioned therein are satisfied."
In
In
"21, However, that is not the end of the problem. The question that remains to be considered is whether the Division Bench was right in setting aside the Judgment of the learned single Judge holding inter alia that the petitioner respondent No, 2 herein was not entitled to retain the land in dispute because he was not in Khas possession of the same. In our considered view the Division Bench was right in setting aside the judgment of the learned single Judge.
22. Section 6(1) does not lay down that intermediary should be in Khas possession of the land comprised in or appertaining to building or structures, whether erected by him or not. On a close look at Section 6 it is manifest that wherever the Legislature intended to lay down the requirement of "Khas possession" as a condition precedent for the claim of right of retention it expressly stated so. In this connection the provisions of Section 6(1)(c) and (d) may be seen. Section 6(1)(b) clearly and unambiguously lays down that the intermediary shall be entitled to retain the land comprised in or appertaining to the building or structure whether erected by the intermediary or not. It is a well accepted principle of interpretation of statutory provisions that if the plain language of the section is clear or unambiguous it is not open to a Court to interpret it giving a meaning different from plain grammatical meaning of the provisions. The learned single Judge, in view of the plain and ambiguous language of the provisions of the Act, was in error in introducing the condition of Khas possession in Section 6(1) (b) even through the section made no such provision. Equally incorrect was the reasons by the learned single Judge that if the requirement of Khas possession by the intermediary is not read into that section it will result in the crimination between different categories of lands which the intermediary may be entitled to retain. Each clause of Section 6(1) refers to a separate category of land. The reason for and the wisdom of the Legislature in insisting on Khas possession in respect of certain categories of land while not insisting upon the same in. others, cannot be questioned. We are, therefore, of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court rightly set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge."
In
"7. Clearly, the language of sub-section (7) of Section 6 above said, is plain and simple. There are two manners of reading the provisions. Read positively, it confers a right on a retiring member to seek renomination. Read in a negative manner, the provisions speaks of a retiring member not being eligible for renomination for more than one term. The spell of ineligibility is cast on "renomination" of a member who is "retiring". The event determinative of eligibility or ineligibility is renomination, and the person, by reference to whom it is to be read, is "a retiring member", "Retiring member" is to be read in contradistinction with a member/person retired sometime in the past, and so, should be called a retired or former member "Re" means again, and is freely used as a prefix. It gives colour of "again" to the verb with which it is placed. "Renomination" is an act or process of being nominated again, Any person who had held office of member sometime in the past, if being nominate now, cannot be described as being "again nominated". It is only a member just retiring who can be called" being again nominated" or "re-nominated". No other meaning can be assigned except by doing violence to the language employed. The Legislature does not waste its words. Ordinary, grammatical and full meaning is to be assigned to the words used while interpreting a provision to honour the rule, the Legislature chooses appropriate words to express what it intends, and therefore, must be attributed with such intention as is conveyed by the words employed so long as this does not result in absurdity or anomaly or unless material --intrinsic or external is available to permit a departure from the rule.
8. The provision is cast in the present tense, A retiring member is ineligible for re-noromation. "Not more than one term" qualifies "re-nomination." The words "retiring", vised in the present tense, and "re-nomination" speak aloud of the intention of the Legislature. If the word "retiring" was capable of being read as "retired" (sometime in the past) then there would have been no occasion to use "re-nomination" in the construction of the sentence. If the intention of law-framers would have been not to permit a person to be a member of the Council for more than two terms in his lifetime then a different, better and stronger framing of the provision was expected. It could have been said : "no member shall be eligible for nomination for more than two terms", or it could have been said : "a retired member shall not be eligible for nomination for more than two terms."
9. Cross in Statutory Interpretation 3rd Edn. (1995), states :--
"The governing idea here is that if a statutory provision is intelligible in the context of ordinary languages, it ought, without more, to be interpreted in accordance with the meaning, an ordinary speaker of the language would ascribe to it as its obvious meaning, unless there is sufficient reason for a different, interpretation....
Thus, an ''ordinary meaning'' or ''grammatical meaning'' does not imply that the Judge attributes a meaning to the words of a statute independently of their context or of the purpose of the statute, but rather that he adopts a meaning which is appropriate in relation to the immediately obvious and unresearched context and purpose in and for which they are used. By enabling citizen (and their advisers) to rely on ordinary meaning unless notice is given to the contrary, the Legislature contributes to legal certainty and predictability for citizens and to greater transparency in its own decisions, both of which are important values in a democratic society." (P 32 ibid).
The learned author cites three quotations from speeches of Lord Reid in the House of Lords Cases, the gist whereof is : (1) in determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute, ask for the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute and follow the same unless that meaning leads to some result which cannot be reasonably be supposed to have been the legislative intent; (ii) rules of. construction are our servants and not masters, and (iii) a statutory provision cannot be assigned a meaning which it cannot reasonably bear if more than one meanings are capable you can choose one but beyond that you must not go. Justice G. P. Singh in his celebrated word Principles of Statutory Interpretation (8th Edn. 2001) states (at P. 54) :
"The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be said to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence of construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided."
The learned author states at another place (at p. 74, ibid) that the rule of literal construction whereby the words have to be assigned their natural and grammatical meaning can be departed from but subject to caution. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. A departure is permissible if it can be shown that the legal eon-text, in which the orders are used or the object of the statute in which they occur requires a different meaning. To quote :
"Such a meaning cannot be from by the Judges ''In the light of their own views as to policy'' although they can adopt a purposive interpretation if they can find in the statute read as a whole or in material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an expression of Parliament''s purpose or policy''. A modern statement of the rule is to be found in the speech of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Suthendran v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, All ER at p. 616, to the effect-- ''Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless Courts seek whenever possible to apply "the golden rule" of construction, that is to read the statutory language, grammatically and termino-logically, in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context, without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense, so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further".
29. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, there is no difficulty in interpreting the proviso to Order VI, Rule 17, added by CPC (Amendment), 2002, particularly keeping in view the background whereunder it was added. Reason for adding proviso to Rule 17 of Order VI, C.P.C. is to curtail delay in and to expedite hearing of the case. In case the submission of Mr. Verma is accepted, by ignoring the proviso supra, it would be firstly making the proviso redundant, and secondly even if no due diligence having been shown particularly when .the trial and commenced, still the Court must allow the amendment as in the present case. Thus, the very purpose of inserting the proviso would be defeated.
30. It hardly needs to be reiterated that Court has to follow the letter of law in its spirit, as it exists, unless the same is either repugnant to the main provision or is found to be superfluous. With the addition of proviso to Rule 17 of Order VI/C.P.C., it can safely be said that the Legislature was well aware of its consequence. Still it chose to add it. This shows that the object that was sought to be achieved, was to curtail the delay once the trial had commenced. Exception to this was that if it is shown that after due diligence it could not be applied for before commencement of the trial, which is not the situation in this case. And language of the proviso being simple and clear, ordinary meaning is required to be given to it. Therefore, submission of Mr. Verma to the contrary must fail.
31. Decisions relied upon by Mr. Verma pertain to the principles governing rejection/ grant of amendment of pleadings. As already observed there is hardly any dispute with these principles. They are all in the context of Order VI, Rule 17, as it stood prior to its Amendment Act, 2002. Only decision relied upon by Mr. Verma, after the amendment, . was in the case of E. Prasad Goud v. B. Lakchmana Goud (supra). It is clearly distinguishable being on its own facts which had admittedly come into existence after the filing of the written statement and immediately after such subsequent events, party in that case approached the trial Court for allowing the amendment. High Court in this background had allowed the amendment. However, to be fair to Mr. Verma, decisions relied upon by him are being noted. These are :--
32. Another plea urged by Mr. Verma in this case may also be noted. Accordingly to him, plaintiff took number of years to complete his evidence. Therefore, similar opportunity needs to be allowed to his client also.
33. For the reasons set out hereinafter, this plea cannot be accepted. CPC as it stood after its amendment right from 1976, prescribes the mode as to how the proceedings in the suit are to make progress from the stage of its filing till its conclusion. How the parties have to file their pleadings and documents in their power and possession as well as summoning of the witnesses etc. No list of witnesses was admittedly filed by the defendants till 27-8-2003. This case shows the seriousness with which the Courts as well as litigants are following the provisions of procedural law. I have no hesitation in observing that those are being followed more in breach the compliance.
(Emphasis supplied).
34. Admittedly, list of witnesses, process fee and road and diet money was deposited on 27-8-2003 on behalf of defendants. Why it could not be done earlier within the time allowed after framing of issues, no explanation was given by learned senior counsel. It is the high time that the Courts themselves become sanguine and alert that the procedural law is followed in its letter and spirit. This will be a step in aid towards expeditious disposal of the cases. This is not the first case where the lapse on the part of the parties as well as the Courts has been observed by this Court in this behalf.
35. With a view to ensure that after framing of issues, list of witnesses etc. is duly filed, one way is that a date be fixed by the Court below to verify whether needful has been done by the parties or not. In case, there is any lapse on the part of either of the parties, Court can proceed further in accordance with law. This will at least be a step in aid towards expeditious disposal of the cases. And as already noted, till 27-8-2003, no steps had been taken and prior to this date as well as after it, opportunities with costs as also least opportunity have been allowed by the trial Court. With a view to achieve the object with which the amendments had been carried out in the years 1976, 1999 and 2002 in the C.P.C., it is imperative upon the Court concerned that where a party fails to do the needful, in such a situation, Court must follow the provisions of law and then pass appropriate orders.
36. No other point is urged.
37. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this revision petition. It is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. Ex parte interim order dated 30-8-2003 shall stand vacated forthwith. Pending application, if any, shall also stand disposed of. Trial Court is directed to proceed further in the matter with utmost expedition and despatch.
38. This judgment is ordered to be circulated to all the Courts in the State by the Registry.
