1. By medium of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for setting aside the order passed by the trial court on 2.4.2016 whereby the application filed by it for rejection of the plaint came to be dismissed.
2. The bare minimal facts, as are necessary for determination of this petition, are that the plaintiffrespondent filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the petitioner-defendant from using the name of "M/s D.P. Jagan Hardware Pvt. Ltd." or any similar name in any manner as the name M/s D.P. Jagan & Sons, which was being used by the plaintiff since 1985 and in addition thereto damages of Rs. 20 lakhs were also claimed.
3. The petitioner preferred an application under order 7 rule 11 of the of the Code of Civil Procedure with a prayer to reject the plaint filed by the respondent mainly on the ground of maintainability as according to it, the plaint was not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (for short the "Act").
4. Learned trial court vide impugned order upheld the contention of the petitioner qua the applicability of section 134 of the Act, but concluded that the plaint could not be rejected but was required to be returned to be presented to the court of competent jurisdiction. It is this order, which has been assailed by the petitioner on the ground that the learned trial court ought to have rejected the plaint instead of ordering return of the same.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would heavily bank upon the provisions of section 27 of the Act to contend that the suit filed by the plaintiffrespondent is not at all maintainable. What appears to have been ignored is sub-section (2) of section 27 of the Act and, therefore, it is necessary to reproduce the entire section 27, which reads thus:
"27. No action for infringement of unregistered trade mark.
(1) No person shall be entitled to institute any proceeding to
prevent, or to recover damages for, the infringement of an
unregistered trade mark.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect rights of action
against any person for passing off goods or services as the goods
of another person or as services provided by another person, or
the remedies in respect thereof."
7. From the reading of sub-section (2) of
section 27 of the Act, it is clear that the right of action
of any person for passing off the goods/services of
another person and remedies thereof are not affected by
the provisions of the Act. Thus, the rights in passing off
emanate from the common law and not from the
provisions of the Act and they are independent from the
rights conferred by the Act. This is evident from the
reading of opening words of sub-section (2) of section
27) which are "Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to
affect rights...."
8. Similar issue came up recently before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in S. Syed Mohideen vs. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683, wherein the Hon''ble Supreme Court has been held as under:
"[24] Effect of registration is provided in Chapter IV of the Act in
Section 27. This Section provides that no infringement will lie in
respect of an unregistered trade mark. However, Section 27(2)
recognises the common law rights of the trade mark owner to
take action against any person for passing of goods as the goods
of another person or as services provided by another person or
the remedies thereof. Section 27 reads as under:
"27. No action for infringement of unregistered trade mark.
(1) No person shall be entitled to institute any proceeding
to prevent, or to recover damages for, the infringement of an
unregistered trade mark.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect rights of
action against any person for passing off goods or services as the
goods of another person or as services provided by another
person, or the remedies in respect thereof."
25. Section 28 which is very material for our purpose, as
that provision confers certain rights by registration, is
reproduced below in its entirety:
28. Rights conferred by registration.-(1) Subject to the
other provisions of this Act, the registration of a trade mark shall,
if valid, give to the registered proprietor of the trade mark the
exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to the
goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered
and to obtain relief in respect of infringement of the trade mark
in the manner provided by this Act.
(2) The exclusive right to the use of a trade mark given
under Sub-section (1) shall be subject to any conditions and
limitations to which the registration is subject.
(3) Where two or more persons are registered proprietors
of trade marks, which are identical with or nearly resemble each
other, the exclusive right to the use of any of those trade marks
shall not (except so far as their respective rights are subject to
any conditions or limitations entered on the register) be deemed
to have been acquired by any one of those persons as against any
other of those persons merely by registration of the trade marks
but each of those persons has otherwise the same rights as
against other persons (not being registered users using by way of
permitted use) as he would have if he were the sole registered
proprietor."
26. A bare reading of this provision demonstrates the
following rights given to the registered proprietor of the trade
mark.
"(i) Exclusive right to use the trade mark in relation to the goods
or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered.
(ii) To obtain relief in respect of infringement of trade mark in the
manner provided by this Act."
27. Sub-section (3) of Section 28 with which we are
directly concerned, contemplates a situation where two or more
persons are registered proprietors of the trade marks which are
identical with or nearly resemble each other. It, thus, postulates
a situation where same or similar trade mark can be registered in
favour of more than one person. On a plain stand alone reading
of this Section, it is clear that the exclusive right to use of any of
those trade marks shall not be deemed to have been acquired by
one registrant as against other registered owner of the trade
mark (though at the same time they have the same rights as
against third person). Thus, between the two persons who are the
registered owners of the trade marks, there is no exclusive right
to use the said trade mark against each other, which means this
provision gives concurrent right to both the persons to use the
registered trade mark in their favour. Otherwise also, it is a
matter of common-sense that the Plaintiff can not say that its
registered trade mark is infringed when the Defendant is also
enjoying registration in the trade mark and such registration
gives the Defendant as well right to use the same, as provided in
Section 28(1) of the Act.
28. However, what is stated above is the reflection of
Section 28 of the Act when that provision is seen and examined
without reference to the other provisions of the Act. It is stated at
the cost of repetition that as per this Section owner of registered
trade mark cannot sue for infringement of his registered trade
mark if the Appellant also has the trade mark which is
registered. Having said so, a very important question arises for
consideration at this stage, namely, whether such a Respondent
can bring an action against the Appellant for passing off invoking
the provisions of Section 27(2) of the Act. In other words, what
would be the interplay of Section 27(2) and Section 28(3) of the
Act is the issue that arises for consideration in the instant case.
As already noticed above, the trial court as well as High Court
has granted the injunction in favour of the Respondent on the
basis of prior user as well as on the ground that the trade mark
of the Appellant, even if it is registered, would cause deception in
the mind of public at large and the Appellant is trying to encash
upon, exploit and ride upon on the goodwill of the Respondent
herein. Therefore, the issue to be determined is as to whether in
such a scenario, provisions of Section 27(2) would still be
available even when the Appellant is having registration of the
trade mark of which he is using. After considering the entire
matter in the light of the various provisions of the act and the
scheme, our answer of the aforesaid question would be in the
affirmative. Our reasons for arriving at this conclusion are the
following:
30. "(A) Firstly, the answer to this proposition can be
seen by carefully looking at the provisions of Trade Marks Act,
1999 (The Act). Collective reading of the provisions especially
Section 27, 28, 29 and 34 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 would
show that the rights conferred by registration are subject to the
rights of the prior user of the trademark. We have already
reproduced Section 27 and Section 29 of the Act.
30.1. From the reading of Section 27(2) of the Act, it is
clear that the right of action of any person for passing off the
goods/services of another person and remedies thereof are not
affected by the provisions of the Act. Thus, the rights in passing
off are emanating from the common law and not from the
provisions of the Act and they are independent from the rights
conferred by the Act. This is evident from the reading of opening
words of Section 27(2) which are "Nothing in this Act shall be
deemed to affect rights...."
30.2. Likewise, the registration of the mark shall give
exclusive rights to the use of the trademark subject to the other
provisions of this Act. Thus, the rights granted by the registration
in the form of exclusivity are not absolute but are subject to the
provisions of the Act.
30.3. Section 28(3) of the Act provides that the rights of
two registered proprietors of identical or nearly resembling
trademarks shall not be enforced against each other. However,
they shall be same against the third parties. Section 28(3) merely
provides that there shall be no rights of one registered proprietor
vis- -vis another but only for the purpose of registration. The said
provision 28 (3) nowhere comments about the rights of passing
off which shall remain unaffected due to overriding effect of
Section 27(2) of the Act and thus the rights emanating from the
common law shall remain undisturbed by the enactment of
Section 28(3) which clearly states that the rights of one registered
proprietor shall not be enforced against the another person.
30.4. Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 provides
that nothing in this Act shall entitle the registered proprietor or
registered user to interfere with the rights of prior user. Conjoint
reading of Section 34, 27 and 28 would show that the rights of
registration are subject to Section 34 which, can be seen from the
opening words of Section 28 of the Act which states "Subject to
the other provisions of this Act, the registration of a trade mark
shall, if valid, give to the registered proprietor.." and also the
opening words of Section 34 which states "Nothing in this Act
shall entitle the proprietor or a registered user of registered trade
mark to interfere..". Thus, the scheme of the Act is such where
rights of prior user are recognized superior than that of the
registration and even the registered proprietor cannot disturb
interfere with the rights of prior user. The overall effect of
collective reading of the provisions of the Act is that the action for
passing off which is premised on the rights of prior user
generating a goodwill shall be unaffected by any registration
provided under the Act. This proposition has been discussed in
extenso in the case of N.R. Dongre and Ors. v. Whirlpool
Corporation and Anr, 1995 AIR(Del) 300 wherein Division Bench
of Delhi High Court recognized that the registration is not an
indefeasible right and the same is subject to rights of prior user.
The said decision of Whirlpool [supra] was further affirmed by
Supreme Court of India in the case of N.R. Dongre and Ors v.
Whirlpool Corporation and Anr, 1996 3 RCR(Civ) 697
30.5. The above were the reasonings from the provisions
arising from the plain reading of the Act which gives clear
indication that the rights of prior user are superior than that of
registration and are unaffected by the registration rights under
the Act.
31. Secondly, there are other additional reasonings as to
why the passing off rights are considered to be superior than that
of registration rights.
31.1. Traditionally, passing off in common law is
considered to be a right for protection of goodwill in the business
against misrepresentation caused in the course of trade and for
prevention of resultant damage on account of the said
misrepresentation. The three ingredients of passing off are
goodwill, misrepresentation and damage. These ingredients are
considered to be classical trinity under the law of passing off as
per the speech of Lord Oliver laid down in the case of Reckitt &
Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc, 1990 1 AllER 873which is
more popularly known as "Jif Lemon" case wherein the Lord
Oliver reduced the five guidelines laid out by Lord Diplock in
Erven Warnink v. Townend & Sons Ltd, 1979 AC 731(the
"Advocate Case") to three elements: (1) Goodwill owned by a
trader, (2) Misrepresentation and (3) Damage to goodwill. Thus,
the passing off action is essentially an action in deceit where the
common law rule is that no person is entitled to carry on his or
her business on pretext that the said business is of that of
another. This Court has given its imprimatur to the above
principle in the case of Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah
and Anr, 2002 3 SCC 65.
31.2. The applicability of the said principle can be seen as
to which proprietor has generated the goodwill by way of use of
the mark name in the business. The use of the mark/carrying on
business under the name confers the rights in favour of the
person and generates goodwill in the market. Accordingly, the
latter user of the mark/name or in the business cannot
misrepresent his business as that of business of the prior right
holder. That is the reason why essentially the prior user is
considered to be superior than that of any other rights.
Consequently, the examination of rights in common law which
are based on goodwill, misrepresentation and damage are
independent to that of registered rights. The mere fact that both
prior user and subsequent user are registered proprietors are
irrelevant for the purposes of examining who generated the
goodwill first in the market and whether the latter user is
causing misrepresentation in the course of trade and damaging
the goodwill and reputation of the prior right holder/former user.
That is the additional reasoning that the statutory rights must
pave the way for common law rights of passing off.
32. Thirdly, it is also recognized principle in common law
jurisdiction that passing off right is broader remedy than that of
infringement. This is due to the reason that the passing off
doctrine operates on the general principle that no person is
entitled to represent his or her business as business of other
person. The said action in deceit is maintainable for diverse
reasons other than that of registered rights which are allocated
rights under Recent Civil Reports the Act. The authorities of
other common law jurisdictions like England more specifically
Kerry''s Law of Trademarks and Trade Names, Fourteenth
Edition, Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell South Asian Edition
recognizes the principle that where trademark action fails,
passing off action may still succeed on the same evidence. This
has been explained by the learned Author by observing the
following:--
15-033 "A claimant may fail to make out a case of
infringement of a trade mark for various reasons and may yet
show that by imitating the mark claimed as a trademark, or
otherwise, the Defendant has done what is calculated to pass off
his goods as those of the claimant. A claim in "passing off'' has
generally been added as a second string to actions for
infringement, and has on occasion succeeded where the claim for
infringement has failed"
32.1. The same author also recognizes the principle that
Trade Marks Act affords no bar to the passing off action. This has
been explained by the learned Author as under:--
15-034 "Subject to possibly one qualification, nothing in
the Trade Marks Act 1994 affects a trader''s right against another
in an action for passing off. It is, therefore, no bar to an action for
passing off that the trade name, get up or any other of the badges
identified with the claimant''s business, which are alleged to have
been copies or imitated by the Defendant, might have been, but
are not registered as, trade marks, even though the evidence is
wholly addressed to what may be a mark capable of registration.
Again, it is no defense to passing off that the Defendant''s mark is
registered. The Act offers advantages to those who register their
trade marks, but imposes no penalty upon those who do not. It is
equally no bar to an action for passing off that the false
representation relied upon is an imitation of a trade mark that is
incapable of registration. A passing off action can even lie against
a registered proprietor of the mark sued upon. The fact that a
claimant is using a mark registered by another party (or even the
Defendant) does not of itself prevent goodwill being generated by
the use of the mark, or prevent such a claimant from relying on
such goodwill in an action against the registered proprietor. Such
unregistered marks are frequently referred to as "common law
trade marks"
32.2. From the reading of aforementioned excerpts from
Kerly''s Law of Trademarks and Trade Names, it can be said that
not merely it is recognized in India but in other jurisdictions also
including England/UK (Provisions of UK Trade Marks Act, 1994
are analogous to Indian Trade Marks Act, 1999) that the
registration is no defense to a passing off action and nor the
Trade Marks Act, 1999 affords any bar to a passing off action. In
such an event, the rights conferred by the Act under the
provisions of Section 28 has to be subject to the provisions of
Section 27(2) of the Act and thus the passing off action has to be
considered independent Truttukadai Halwa'' the provisions of
Trade Marks Act, 1999.
33. Fourthly, It is also well settled principle of law in the
field of the trade marks that the registration merely recognizes
the rights which are already pre-existing in common law and
does not create any rights. This has been explained by the
Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Century
Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar Company, 1978 AIR(Del) 250in the
following words:
"First is the question of use of the trade mark. Use plays
an all important part. A trader acquires a right of property in a
distinctive mark merely by using it upon or in connection with
his goods irrespective of the length of such user and the extent of
his trade. The trader who adopts such a mark is entitled to
protection directly the article having assumed a vendible
character is launched upon the market. Registration under the
statute does not confer any new right to the mark claimed or any
greater right than what already existed at common law and at
equity without registration. It does, however, facilitate a remedy
which may be enforced and obtained throughout "THE State and
it established the record of facts affecting the right to the mark.
Registration itself does not create a trade mark. The trade mark
exists independently of the registration which merely affords
further protection under the statute. Common law rights are left
wholly unaffected."
33.1. The same view is expressed by the Bombay High
Court in the case of Sunder Parmanand Lalwani and Ors. v.
Caltex (India) Ltd, 1969 AIR(Bom) 24in which it has been held
vide paras ''32'' and ''38'' as follows:
"32. A proprietary right in a mark can be ''Iruttukadai Halwa"
obtained in a number of ways. The mark can be originated by a
person, or it can be subsequently acquired by him from
somebody else. Our Trade Marks law is based on the English
Trade Marks law and the English Acts. The first Trade Marks Act
in England was passed in 1875. Even prior thereto, it was firmly
established in England that a trader acquired a right of property
in a distinctive mark merely by using it upon or in connection
with goods irrespective of the length of such user and the extent
of his trade, and that he was entitled to protect such right of
property by appropriate proceedings by way of injunction in a
Court of law. Then came the English Trade Marks Act of 1875,
which was substituted later by later Acts. The English Acts
enabled registration of a new mark not till then used with the like
consequences which a distinctive mark had prior to the passing
of the Acts. The effect of the relevant provision of the English Acts
was that registration of a trade mark would be deemed to be
equivalent to public user of such mark. Prior to the Acts, Prior to
the Acts, one could become a proprietor of a trade mark only by
user, but after the passing of the Act of 1875, one could become
a proprietor either by user or by registering the mark even prior
to its user. He could do the latter after complying with the other
requirements of the Act, including the filing of a declaration of
his intention to use such mark. See observations of Llyod Jacob
J. in 1956 RPC 1. In the matter of Vitamins Ltd.''s Application for
Trade Mark at p. 12, and particularly the following:
"A proprietary right in a mark sought to be registered can
be obtained in a number of ways. The mark can be originated by
a person or can be acquired, but in all cases it is necessary that
the person putting forward the application should be in
possession of some proprietary right which, if questioned, can be
substantiated". Law in India under our present Act is similar."
33.2. We uphold said view which has been followed and
relied upon the courts in India over a long time. The said views
emanating from the courts in India clearly speak in one voice
which is that the rights in common law can be acquired by way of
use and the registration rights were introduced later which made
the rights granted under the law equivalent to the public user of
such mark. Thus. we hold that registration is merely a
recognition of the rights pre-existing in common law and in case
of conflict between the two registered proprietors, the evaluation
of the better rights in common law is essential as the common
law rights would enable the court to determine whose rights
between the two registered proprietors are better and superior in
common law which have been recognized in the form of the
registration by the Act.
34. When we apply the aforesaid principle to the facts of
the present case, we find that the impugned judgment of the
High Court, affirming that of the trial court is flawless and does
not call for any interference. From the plethora of evidences
produced by the Respondent she has been able to establish that
the trade mark Truttukadai Halwa'' has been used of by her/her
predecessors since the year 1900. The business in that name is
carried on by her family. It has become a household name which
is associated with the Respondent/her family. The Court has also
noted that the Halwa sold by the Respondent''s shop as
Truttukadai Halwa'' is not only famous with the consumers living
in Tirunelveli, but is also famous with the consumers living in
other parts of India and outside. Reference is made to an article
published in Ananda Viketan, a weekly Tamil magazine dated
14.9.2003, describing the high quality and the trade mark
Iruttukadai halwa sold by the Plaintiff, the findings and
conclusions reached by the Court below is perfectly in order,
hence, the same does not call for interference, carries more merit,
for, this name has been further acknowledged in a Tamil song
from the movie "Samy" as follows:
"Tirunelveli Halwada, Tiruchy Malai Kottaida (Rock Fort)
Tirupathike Ladduthantha Samyda Iruttukadai Alwada, Idli
Kadai Ayada (grandma)"
9. From the aforesaid exposition of law, it is
abundantly clear that the suit of the plaintiff was
maintainable in view of sub-section (2) of section 27 of
the Act and, therefore, the application filed by the
petitioner for rejection of the plaint was misconceived
and not maintainable.
10. As regards the return of the plaint, the course adopted by the learned court below is perfectly in tune with the provisions of Section 134 of the Act, which reads thus:
"134. Suit for infringement, etc., to be instituted before
District Court.
(1) No suit-
(a) For the infringement of a registered trade mark;
or
(b) Relating to any right in a registered trade mark;
or
(c) For passing off arising out of the use by the
defendant of any trade mark which is identical
with or deceptively similar to the plaintiffs trade
mark, whether registered or unregistered, Shall be
instituted in any court inferior to a District Court
having jurisdiction to try the suit.
(2) For the purpose of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section
(1), a "District Court having jurisdiction" shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 or any other law for the time being in
force, include a District Court within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the
suit or other proceeding, the person instituting the suit or
proceeding, or, where there are more than one such
persons any of them, actually and voluntarily resides or
carries on business or personally works for gain.
Explanation: For the purposes of sub-section (2), "person"
includes the registered proprietor and the registered
user."
11. Admittedly, the case of the respondent-plaintiff
is based upon unregistered trade mark and as per its
own saying, the application for registration of trade
mark is lying pending before the Registrar, Trade Mark,
Ludhiana and, therefore, in the given facts, the
provisions of section 134 (1) (c) of the Act would clearly
come into operation.
12. In view of aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.