Tarun Agarwala, J.@mdashThe controversy involved in all the writ petitions is common and the same is being decided by a common judgment. For facility and convenience, the facts of Mohan Singh''s case are being taken into consideration.
2. The Petitioner was reinstated as a Constable in the Provincial Armed Constabulary and was involved in an incident along with others, which became known as the P.A.C. revolt, which occurred on 21/22 5.1973. An F.L.R. was lodged and the Petitioner along with others were charged in Case Crime No. 506 of 1973, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 324, 326, 330, 457, 492, 395, 121, 120B and 409, I.P.C.
3. Notwithstanding the Petitioners involvement in the aforesaid subversive activity, the services of the Petitioner was terminated by an order of the Governor of U.P. dated 14.11.1973 exercising the powers under Article 311(2)(c) the Constitution of India on the ground that it was not in the interest of security of the State to keep the Petitioner in service, and on the same reasoning, the enquiry contemplated under the proviso to Sub-clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India was also dispensed with.
4. The services of some of the other Petitioners in connected writ petitions were terminated by providing one month''s notice treating them to be a temporary Government servant.
5. The Petitioner alongwith others were convicted by a judgment of the trial court dated 23.12.1981. The Petitioner filed an appeal along with others being Government Appeal No. 70 of 1982, which was allowed by the High Court by a judgment dated 21.12.1992 and the Petitioner was acquitted. The State of U.P. preferred a special leave petition, which was dismissed.
6. After his acquittal, the Petitioner has filed the present writ petition for quashing of the order of termination dated 14.11.1973 and praying further that he should be reinstated with continuity of service and with full back wages.
7. Some of the Petitioners in the connected writ petitions made a representation to the authority concerned for reinstatement on the ground that they have been acquitted in the criminal case and, therefore, they are entitled to be reinstated. Their representations were rejected on the basis of which those Petitioners have filed the writ petition praying also for quashing of the representations in addition to the quashing of the termination order 8. Heard Sri R. B. Tripathi, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner assisted by Ms. Ekta Kaur and the learned standing counsel appearing for the Respondents.
9. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that the Petitioner was dismissed from the service without giving any notice or charge-sheet and that no opportunity of hearing was provided. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that after the acquittal from the criminal court, the Petitioner was liable to be reinstated. In support of his submission the Petitioner has relied upon the decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 45931 of 1992, Chabi Nath Singh v. U.P. Public Service Tribunal, decided on 13.3.1997 and in Writ Petition No. 46061 of 1993, Vijai Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. decided on 26 9.1997 as well as other judgments which are based on the aforesaid two judgments.
10. In my view, the aforesaid decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner are distinguishable. In Chabi Nath Singh''s case (supra), it was found that he was falsely implicated in the criminal trial as he was found to be hospitalised on the date of the incident and therefore, could not be convicted on the charges of unlawful assembly. The said person thereafter approached the Tribunal against the order of termination, which was rejected. This Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that the order of dismissal without holding an inquiry was based on the whims of the authority and that the same suffered from arbitrariness. Based on this decision, the case of Vijai Bahadur Singh and Ors. were allowed. The facts in Chhabi Nath Singh case is totally distinguishable from the present facts.
11. In the present case, the Petitioner was involved in Criminal Case No. 506 of 1973 and was convicted by the trial court. In appeal the Petitioner had been acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt. The contention of the learned Counsel for the ''Petitioner that since he had been acquitted by a criminal court he was liable to be reinstated is wholly erroneous. The acquittal by a criminal court is not a ground for reinstatement. Even if a person is acquitted by a criminal court, it cannot be a ground for automatic reinstatement. In
The nature and scope of a criminal case are very different from those of departmental disciplinary proceeding and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceeding.
12. In State of Karnataka and Anr. v. T. Venkataramanappa 1996 (6) SC 455, the Supreme Court held that an acquittal in a criminal case cannot be held to be a bar to hold a departmental inquiry for the same misconduct for the reasons that in a criminal trial the standard of proof was different inasmuch as the offence had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that in a departmental proceeding such strict proof of misconduct was not required. In the said case the departmental proceedings were quashed by the Tribunal on the ground that the delinquent had been acquitted by the criminal court. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment holding that the acquittal of the delinquent in a criminal case could not restrain the disciplinary authority to hold a departmental inquiry.
13. In
that acquittal of the Respondent shall not be construed as a clear exoneration of the Respondent, for the allegations called for departmental proceedings, if not already initiated against him.
14. In Indar Chandra Gupta v. State Bank of India and Ors. 2004 (2) AWC 1488, the Division Bench of this Court held that an acquittal in a criminal case is not relevant to a departmental inquiry as the standard of proof is different.
15. In
The question of considering reinstatement after decision of acquittal or discharge by a competent criminal court arises only and only if the dismissal from services was based on conviction by the criminal court.
The Court further held:
Thus, there can be no doubt regarding the settled legal proposition that as the standard of proof in both is quite different and the termination is not based on conviction of an employee in a criminal case, the acquittal of the employee in criminal case cannot be the basis of taking away the effect of the departmental proceedings.
16. In
It is true that the Respondent was acquitted by the criminal court but the acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be reinstated into the service. It would still be open to the competent authority to take decision whether the delinquent Government servant can be taken into service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or under the temporary service Rules.
17. In
Mere acquittal of Government employee does not automatically entitle a Government servant for reinstatement.
18. In Anglo-American Direct Tea Trading Co. Ltd. v. Labour Court, Coimbatore and Ors. 1970 (1) LLJ 481, it was held that the subsequent acquittal of the employee in a criminal proceeding could not affect the validity of the order of dismissal passed by the employer as a result of the employee having been found guilty in a domestic inquiry. Similar view was again held in Management Kottabomman Transport Corporation v. M. Lucas and Ors. 1983 (1) LLJ 458.
19. Thus, from the aforesaid it is clear that an acquittal in a criminal case does not give an automatic right to the Petitioner for reinstatement. It is still open to the department to consider his case as to whether he should be reinstated or not after acquittal. In the present case, the Petitioner has not approached the department for reinstatement and has directly come to this Court. It is not open for the Court to step into the shoes of the department and consider the case of the reinstatement of the Petitioner merely on the ground of acquittal from a criminal court. Such power only vests with the disciplinary authority.
20. However, in the present case, the termination is not based on the conviction of the Petitioner in a criminal case. The Petitioner''s services had been dispensed on various charges by invoking the provisions of Article 311(2)(c) of the Constitution of India. The provisions of Article 311(2)(a) of the Constitution of India was not invoked while dismissing the services of the Petitioner. Article 311 of the Constitution of India reads as under:
311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.-(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an All India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges:
[Provides that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed:] Provided further that this clause shall not apply:
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge ; or
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry ; or
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.
(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry'' as is referred to in Clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.]
21. From the aforesaid, it is clear, that Article 311(2)(a) and Article 311(2)(c) operate in different areas. Whereas, under Article 311(2)(a) a person can be dismissed without holding an enquiry on the ground of his conviction in a criminal case, on the other hand a person could be dismissed under Article 311(2)(c) where the President or the Governor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it was not expedient to hold such an enquiry.
22. In the present case, the Petitioner was dismissed on the ground that his continuance in employment was not in the interest of the security of the State. Therefore, in my view, the acquittal of the employee in a criminal case could not be made the basis of reinstatement. It would have been a different matter, if the dismissal of the service of the Petitioner was based on a conviction by a criminal court and subsequently the delinquent was acquitted in an appeal.
23. Accordingly, the Petitioner is not entitled to be reinstated merely because he has been acquitted by a criminal court.
24. The Petitioner is also not entitled to any relief on the ground of laches. The services of the Petitioner was terminated on 14.11.1973. After his dismissal, the Petitioner did not stir in the matter and remained quiet for almost 20 years and filed the present writ petition after his acquittal from a criminal court. The ground of acquittal is different from the ground of dismissal of the Petitioner. If the Petitioner was aggrieved by the order of dismissal, he should have challenged the said order of dismissal before the appropriate forum. The delay of 20 years cannot be condoned on the ground that the Petitioner has now been acquitted by a criminal court. In similar circumstances a large number of petitions were dismissed by judgment dated 24.10.2003 in Writ Petition No 3676 of 2003, Ram Briksha Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. wherein this Court held that the Petitioners were not entitled to any relief of reinstatement or back wages as they have slept over their rights and no explanation of delay had been given in the petition. The Court held:
The negligence or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to the opposite parties operates as a bar in a Court of equity. Although Article 226 of the Constitution does not prescribe any period of limitation, but ordinarily no application can be entertained after a reasonable period of time. The discretionary relief cannot be granted to a person who does not seek his remedy with due diligences. Any person who invokes extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must be vigilant and must approach the Court at the earliest.
25. Ram Briksha''s case (supra) is fully applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case and I am in complete agreement with the said decision. In the present case, no explanation whatsoever, has been given explaining the delay in filing the writ petition. Merely because the Petitioner has been acquitted in a criminal case could not condone the delay in filing the writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches.
26. In view of the aforesaid there is no merit in the writ petition and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.
