1. This is a Civil Revision Petition put in on behalf of the Secretary of State in Council u/s 622 of the CPC against the decision of the District Judge
of Tanjore and the assessors in Compensation Case No. 4 of 1890.
2. The first question which arises is whether the High Court has power to entertain the petition u/s 622, Civil Procedure Code. The Judge and
assessors agreed as to the amount of compensation to be awarded, and, u/s 29, Act X of 1870, their decision is final. But u/s 34, the Judge and
assessors are bound to state the grounds of their award under Clauses 1-4 of Section 24, and if it can be shown that they have refused to take into
consideration any of the matters prescribed by that section or have improperly taken into consideration any of the matters prohibited u/s 25, we
think such procedure would amount to material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction which would justify interference u/s 622, Civil Procedure
Code. We find, moreover, that, in a case in which a question rose u/s 55 of the Land Acquisition Act, the High Court of Calcutta held that though
there was no appeal from what the Judge had decided, it could be set aside as being in excess of his jurisdiction. Taylor v. The Collector of Purnea
ILR 14 Cal. 423.
3. Passing to the grounds for the award stated u/s 34, we find that the Judge and assessors state that they award u/s 24, Clause 1, the sum of Rs.
42,500 ""on the ground of that being its market value judging (i) by the amount actually expended upon the property, (ii) by the amount fetched at
sales in neighbouring pans, and (iii) at the average value per pan arrived at with reference to the estimate of the several witnesses.
4. Prima facie there is no illegality or irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction in this award, the ''market value of the land'' being the first matter
which the Judge and assessors were bound to consider u/s 24, Clause 1.
5. It is contended, however, for the Government that the Judge and assessors were wrong in estimating the market value of the land as a salt
factory, because the Salt Commissioner could, at any time, withdraw the licence to make salt under Madras Act IV of 1889, that the land could
not, therefore, have any market-value as a salt factory, and that the soiling price of the land itself was the proper criterion for value.
6. It is true that Section 16, Madras Act IV of 1889, directs that, when on, cancellation of a licence the Commissioner resolves to retain the salt
works, and to acquire the proprietary rights of the late licensee, the value of the land as a site for salt manufacture shall not be taken into account in
acquiring the proprietary right, but that compensation shall be paid to the late licensee at the rate fixed in Section 18. But this Act did not receive
the assent of the Governor-General till 30th December 1889, subsequent to this land being taken up under Act X of 1870, and, in the former Salt
Act I of 1882, we find no corresponding provision. We observe that the lands were purchased by the company in 1885 and 1886 for about Rs.
3,000, and that in making his offer of Rs. 18,002-11-6 for acquiring them under the Act the Collector has taken into consideration the cost of
converting them into salt pans. At the time, therefore, the land was acquired, there was no direction that the Government should only be called
upon to pay the value of the land alone and that compensation for its special value should only be paid for at fixed rates. Looking to the definition
of ''land'' in Section 3, Act X of 1870, we are not able to say there was any illegality in the Judge taking into account the value of the works which
made the place suitable for a salt-factory, and even if, in making his estimate of market value, the Judge was in error in taking into consideration the
price paid for neighbouring pans, the mistake would at most be only one concerning the principles of valuation and not an irregularity in the exercise
of jurisdiction. We must dismiss the petition with costs.
