H. N. Tilhari, J.@mdashThis is defendant''s revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act from the judgment and decree dated 3151993 passed by XII Additional District Judge, Lucknow, being S. C. C. Suit no. 10 of 1986. Plaintiffopposite party had filed the suit for the decree for recovery of possession by ejectment of defendant Puran Singh i. e. revisionistapplicant from the accommodation in dispute more speci�fically described in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the plaint The plaintiff had further claimed a decree for a sum of Rs 7613/as arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation of the premises in dispute against the defendant and has further claimed pendente lite and future damages for use and occupation of the accommodation in dispute by the defendant till he is actually ejected and further has prayed for anyother relief as court deems fit.
2. The plaintiff''s case in the nutshell is that plaintiffopposite party has been the owner landlord of the building in dispute bearing No. A66, situate in Avas Vikas Colony, Talkatora (now known as Rajajipuram) Lucknow. According to the plaintiff''s case defendantrevisionistPuran Singh approached the plaintiff oppositeparty and the building in dispute was let out by the plaintiffopposite party to the defendantrevisionist originally on 2761984 on a monthly rental of Rs. 1500/ for a period of 11 months commencing from 2761984 and it was also agreed as a term of contract of lease that if defendant wanted thereafter to continue as a tenant then instead of Rs. 1500/per month he would have to pay Rs. 2,000/per month as rent for the said accommodation that had been let out to him. The plaintiff alleged further that for 11 months the defendant paid the rent at the rate of Rs. 1500/ per month and after the expiry of 11 months period he started paying the rent at enhanced rate of Rs. 2,000/ per month but inspite of repeated requests the defendant failed to enter into fresh agreement. The plaintiffopposite party''s further case has been that the defendant has not been paying rent since 2791985 and inspite of several requests being made to clear off the entire arrears of rent and to vacate the premises in dispute, the defendant did neither pay the rent nor vacate the premises and, therefore, there being no other remedy available to the plaintiff the plaintiff issued a notice of demand of arrears of rent as well as of termination of tenancy of the defendantrevisionist and that notice was served on defendantrevisioniston 12121985 but even then the defen�dant did neither pay anything towards rent nor vacate the premises so the cause of action did arise to the plaintiff to file the suit for the decree for ejectment against the defendant as well as for recovery of arrears of rent for the period from 2791985 to 811986 as well as for damages from 911986 to 2011986 which comes to Rs. 774.24. The plaintiff further claimed himself to be entitled to pendente lite and future damages as has been mentioned above. The defendant filed a written statement denying the plaint case. According to the defendant plaintiff has not been the owner of the house referred to in paragraph 1 of the plaint, instead Avas Vikas Parishad, U, P., Lucknow was its owner but he admitted that the plaintiff occupied the position of landlord of the house. The defendant had taken the plea that plaintiff ought to have given the date of construc�tion of the house and that of its first assessment. The defendant further took the plea that defendant is only Manager of the Pioneer Montessori School, 227, Rajendra Nagar, Lucknow which is a registered society and that in that capacity he approached the plaintiff to let out the premises to the said society. In paragraph 2 of the written statement it has been stated :
"The defendant took the said premises on lease for and on behalf of the said society, Hence the said society is the tenant of the premises in suit and not the defendant."
3. It has further been averred that lease had started on 2761984 and expired on 2661985 and thereafter Commeneed from 2761985 and ended on 26th of subsequent month as per English calendar month till the terms of new tenancy were finalised. The defendant admitted that he agreed to enhance the rent from Rs. 1500/ per month to Rs. 2,000/per month but for and on behalf of the society and that he did not pay personally or in his individual capacity any rent to the plaintiff. His case is that the rent was paid through cheque and was paid on behalf of the Pioneer Montessori School''s society. According to defendant''s case the terms of fresh lease with effect from 2761985 were finalised orally between plaintiff and defendant on behalf of the society. The defendant has also taken the plea that the suit was not maintainable on the date it was filed as the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 72 did apply and the building had already completed 10 years period prior to the filing of the suit. The defendant further took the plea in paragraph 12 where he has stated that on 2661985 the defendant agreed to pay Rs. 2000/ as enhanced rent after 26th June, 1985, the plaintiff agreed to the following terms and conditions :
(i) that the tenancy will be liable to be determined by six months'' clear notice on either side as it was a matter of an educational institution ;
(ii) that the tenancy will be terminable by 26th May only and not in midsession of the school.
4. The defendant''s case is that the suit was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. Plea of nonjoinder of the society in this suit was also raised to the effect that the Pioueer Montessory School was not impleaded as a party to this suit and the real tenant being the Pioneer Montessory School and not the defendant the plaintiff was not entitled to get any decree against the defendant.
5. In support of their respective case the plaintiff and defendant led oral evidence as well as filed the documentray evidence. Plaintiff examined himself as P. W. 1 and he also examined Bishambhar Nath Misra, an Inspector of Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow and on behalf of defendantrevisionist Ramesh Tewari was examined as D. W. 1 as also the defendant himself appeared in the witness box as D. W. 2. On a consideration of the evidence and materialon record the trial court decreed the plaintiff''s suit for ejectment of the defendantrevisionist as well as for recovery of a sum of Rs. 7613/ as arrears of rent with costs. The trialcourt further decreed the plaintiff''s claim for compensation and damages at the rate of Rs. 2,000/ per month against the defendantrevisionist for use and occupation of the accommodation in dispute pendente lite and future, till actual delivery of vacant possession of the building in dispute or accommodation in dispute to the plaintiff It also held that the plaintiff is entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum. The trial court i.e. the learned Additional District Judge recorded the follow ing findings :
(a) that the construction of the building in dispute will be deemed to have been completed on 1476 and so the Act did not apply to the building on the date of institution of the suit;
(b) that it is proved that the building in dispute was taken on lease by Puran Singh, the revisionist in personal capacity ;
(c) that the suit is not bad for nonjoinder of Pioneer Montessory School as a party ;
(d) that the defendant has failed to prove that any new tenancy was created or entered into ;
(e) that the evidence on record proves that in between plaintiff and defendant there did exist relationship of lessor and lessee or landlord and tenant ;
(f) that the notice dated 281185 relied by the plaintiff in the plaint had been served on the defendant and that the said notice of termination of tenancy unner section 106 of Transfer of Property Act has been legal and valid and it did not suffer from any illegality.
6. With these findings as raentianed above, the trial court decreed the plaintiff''s suit.
7. Feeling aggrieved from the Judgment and decree of the trial court passed in S.C.C. Suit No. 10 of 1986 the defendanttenant has filed the revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and has challenged the decision i. e. the judgment and decree of the court below and had asserted the same to be not in accordanee with law. Caveat having been filed by Shri D.C. Sinha, an Advocate on behalf of plaintiffopposite party. Notice of the revision was served by the counsel for the revisionist on Sri D. C. Sinha who put in appearance and desired to be heard on the merits of the case and wanted that the revision may be heard and decided on merits straightaway instead it is being admitted and the matter being delayed. The learned counsel for the revisionist had no objection to the same and thereafter the dates were fixed and the matter has been heard.
8. I have heard Shri Umapati Rai, Faragh, learned counsel for the revisionisttenant as well as Shri D. C. Sinha, learned counsel for the plaintiffopposite party at length. Learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that originally the lease was for 11 months and that on the expiry of the lease dated 27684, the new lease came into being on the tenant''s paying enhanced rent at the rate of Rs. 2,000/ per month and continuing to occupy the accommodation and the landlord''s accepting the same at Rs. 2000/ per month i. e. as enhanced rate of rent which under the original lease was only Rs. 1500/ per month. Shri Umapati Rai submitted that it was in pursuance of clause (6) of the original lease dated 27784 that the defendantrevisionist paid Rs. 2,000/ per month and the landlordopposite party accepted the said rent and allowed the defendantrevisionist to continue to occupy and make use of the premises, and, as such, a fresh lease deed came into existence and such the lease was a new lease. He further submitted that an oral fresh agreement of lease was entered into on the expiry of the written lease. Shri Umapati Rai laid much emphasis on the expression "fresh tenancy or fresh agreement of lease" and submitted that even after expiry of lease term of the tenancy under the lease when he continued to be in occupation of the accommodation in dispute and landlord accepted the rent advanced by him at the rate of Rs. 2,000/ per month under section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, the revisionist''s possession was as a tenant under a new contract of tenancy. In support of his contention Shri Umapati Rai made reference to certain decisions which may be referred later on. He laid emphasis on this aspect of the matter that tenancy under section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act was a new tenancy with the object to challenge the notice of determination of lease. Shri Umapati Rai in this regard submitted that notice of determination of tenancy was invalid as '' by the notice dated 281185, the new tenancy was not determined and it was not terminated, instead terms of old tenancy and old tenancy was terminated and when the new tenancy had not been terminated, Shri Umapati Rai submitted, the suit was not maintainable for eviction.
9. Shri Umapati Rai, learned counsel for the revisionist further submitted that the notice was invalid. His contention has been that the notice is invalid because thereby the landlord, by using the expression "my client terminates your tenancy with immediate effect" intended to terminate and did terminate the tenancy on the very day he gave the notice and thereafter the notice giver intended the tenant to remain in possession at sufferance for 30 days and to vacate the premises, so according to the learned counsel for the revisionist the notice was bad as it was not a notice of termination of tenancy by 30 days. In this connection Shri Umapati Rai further submitted that the notice per se appears to be addressed to defendantrevisionist in his personal capacity and not to the institution i e. Pioneer Montessori School nor being addressed to him as the Manager of Pioneer Mortessory School so the notice was illegal and bad according to revisionist. The learned counsel submitted the real tenant was the institution or the society i. e. the Pioneer Montessory School. Shri Umapati Rai further submitted that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant, instead real relation�ship of landlord and tenant was between the plaintiff and Pioneer Montessory School Society and in this connection he invited my attention to Paper no. C31 and to the description of the parties and in particular to the Manager of Pioneer Montessory School which was mentioned in the description after the mentioning of his address. He also invited my attention to the assessment list dated 10886 to contend that the real tenant was the institution and not the revisionist. Shri Umapati further contended and took a very technical objection with respect to the lease dated 27784 Paper no. C41 on the record of the court below. He submitted that the lease deed is on a stamp paper of Rs. 5/ and not on a stamp paper of Rs. 11 and odd which according to him have been the proper stamp payable for the purpose of entering into written lease. He submitted that vide applications C37 and C44 on record of the court below he raised objections to the admissibility of the lease deed itself and as such, his submisssion has been that the learned court below ignored this objection and did not decide and instead it, without disposing of the revisionist''s objection, illegally took the lease deed dated 27784 into consideration and admitted the same into evidence. Shri Rai submitted that in so admitting the said deed in evidence without deciding the question of proper stamp fee and impounding etc. the learned court telow acted illegally as well as not in accordarce with the law in admitting this deed into evidence ar.d relying upon it while deciding the case and so the decision was not in accordance with law instead it was in breach of section 35 of the Stamp Act. Shri Umapati Rai further submitted that the finding of the court below that the building in dispute was constructed on 1476 and that U. P. Act No. XIII of 72 did not apply to the building or accommodation in dispute on the date the suit, giving rise to this revision, was filed is really a finding on jurisdictional question because if the building had not completed 10 years on the date of suit. no doubt, the suit would have been maintainable but if by arriving at a wrong decision on an illegal basis or wrong basib the trial court holds that the Act did not apply to the building in dispute then in that case it usurp the jurisdiction in entertaining the suit as in cases where the Act applies, no suit for eviction of a tenant is maintainable until and unless any of the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) of section 20 of U. P. Act XIII of 72 are shown to exist. Thus by giving a wrong finding on a jurisdictional question, Shri Umapati Rai submitted, the court usurped the jurisdiction to entertain the suit and decreed it, so he submitted the decree is not in accordance with law. In this connection Shri Rai farther submitted that the finding regarding the date of construction is not in accordance with law and is erroneous in law as is itself based on nonconsideration of certain admissions of P. W. 1 as well as other material evidence to which he made reference and will be referred later on, if necessary. He also submitted that on the question of tenancy also the court did not consider certain material evidence.
10. On behalf of plaintiffopposite party, Shri D. C. Sinha, learned counsel for the oppositeparty assisted by Shri R. K. Nigarn submitted that the case is concluded by pure findings of fact. It is not a fit case for interference under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Elaborating his contention Shri D. C. Sinha submitted that as regards the date of construction and the nature of construction that it is a new cons�truction and U. P. Act no. XIII of 72 did not apply to it there is a clear admission of the defendant vide clause (3) of the lease deed i. e. paper no. C 41 on the record of the court below. He, in this regard, invited my attention to paragraph 3 in which it has been stated :�
"That the house in question no. A66 situate at Talkatora Avas Vikas Colony is a new construction and is beyond the purview of Act XIII of 1972."
Shri Sinha laid a great emphasis on this admission. Shri Sinha also invited my attention to the notice issued by the Municipal Board and in particular to the portion in which it was mentioned that objections to the provisional assessment sent by him in pursuance of that notice shall be considered on 9276 or thereafter. It may be mentioned here that on this very document, the certified copy of which has been filed by the re�visionist in the trial court, great emphasis has been laid on 1475 as contained on printed form, particularly on the following sentence of that document which I am transliterating as under :
You are hereby informed that house..situate at .....Lucknow of which annual value..................is determined/proposed
to be............... on the basis of which, on the present rates
you will have to pay the general tax............water tax.........
water sewer charges and sanitary charges .............. .. annual value with effect from 1475.
11. The learned counsel for the revisionist has emphasised on these expressions to submit that 1475 is the date taken to be the date with effect from which the assessment was to be effective while Shri Sinha referring 9276 mentioning in that notice as the date for hearing and consideration etc. of the objections to the proposed valuation and proposed tax submit�ted that the tax could be assessed and determined finally by or on or after 9276 and therefore, in accordance with law i. e. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam the tax assessed had to become effective immediately in next conse�cutive year i. e. with effect from 1476 and not retrospectively.
12. Shri Sinha further submitted that the evidence was admissible in view of provisions of section 2 and in particular explanation thereto, so there was no illegality. With regard to the question as to who has been the tenant Shri Sinha submitted that the lease deed per se shows that agreement of lease was entered into between the plaintiff opposite party, First Party and Puran Sir.gh, the revisionist. There is no reference 10 the institution itself nor it has been indicated by the defendant at that time that he was taking the lease for and on behalf of some institution i. e. Pioneer Montessory School and so privity of contract was in between plain�tiff and defendant. Shri Sinha submitted that if merely in some receipts it has been mentioned (as C31) that the plaintiff had received, a cheque from M/S Pioneer Montessory School that did not by itself make the School to be its tenant and in this connection he invited my attention to another document i. e. paper no. C 51 on the record of the trial court in which it is written, received a cheque of Rs. 2,000/from Shri Puran Singh, and submitted that in this view of the matter receipt paper C31 by itself is not a proof nor on the basis of C31 it can be said that the institution i. e. Pioneer Montessory School was the tenant and he submitted that the real tenant had been Puran Singh as appears from the deed itself He submitted that finding recorded on the question of relationship of landlord and tenant by the court below is a pure finding of fact. With regard to the question of legality of the notice Shri Sinha submitted that notice should be construed not with an intention to find faults but it should be construed in a manner and in order to see if the notice did communicate the intent of the notice giver to the addressee and if it did communicate the intent of lessor to determine the lease in accordance with law it should be taken to be valid. He further submitted that in view of clause (6)''of the lease deed a new contract or a new lease could come into being had a fresh agreement been entered into between the parties in writing on the expiry of period of 11 months. He further submitted that use of expression second party "wants to continue his tenancy" communicates the idea that there was no question of creating a new tenancy but the intent of the parties was merely to continue the tenancy and, therefore, there was no question of a new tenancy or fresh tenancy, He submitted that the document i. e. lease deed even though it was unstamped one had been admitted it was not open to the revisionist to raise that objection about its admissibility or any objection on the finding recorded on the basis thereof. At the most under Section 36 there would have been impounding of the deed and in the alter�native he submitted that if for a moment the lease deed paper C41 is taken and held to be an inadmissible piece of evidence and it is to be ignored from consideration on the ground that it is inadmissible as it is insuffi�ciently stamped and no secondary evidence can be led the same does not make any difference because admittedly the accommodation in dispute was taken on rent by the defendant originally at the rate of Rs. 1500/per month which rent was later on increased to Rs. 2,000/ per month. He submitted that in paragraph 2 of the written statement the defendant himself has stated that he took the premises in dispute on lease. He has no doubt, added few more words that he took the premises on lease for and on behalf of the society, so taking of building on lease by the defendant is an admit�ted fact. In his defence also rate of rent has been admitted, so even if that deed is not admitted in evidence it will make no difference. Whether the society or the Pioneer Montessory School is a tenant or has been a tenant is a question to be proved by defendant and not by plaintiff and what is admitted is that derendant had taken the building on lease. Shri Sinha disputed the contention that the suit is bad for nonjoinder of the scciety. He submitted that unless this court comes to a different finding than that of the trial court that the defendant has been the tenant, which this court is not entitled to reverse ordinarily under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, it cannot be said or held that the suit is bad for nonjoinder of the institution. As such, Shri Sinha contended that the revision filed by the defendantrevisionist does not satisfy the basic require�ment of Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act that the judgment and decree given by the court below is not according to law, This having not been established, the revision is liable to be dismissed with costs.
13. I have given my full consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel for the defendantrevisionist, namely, Shri Umapati Rai and that of the plaintiffopposite party Shri D. C. Sinha. I have also, perused the record of the case and have gone through the decision of the court below.
14. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act as originally enacted reads as under :
"Revision of decrees and orders of Courts of Small Causes,The High Court for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes, was according to law, may call for the case and paes such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit. ;
In its application to U. P. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Canse Courts Act as amended by U. P. Act no. 17 of 66. The amended Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act reads as under :
"The District Judge for the purpose of satisfying himself that a decree or order made in a case decided by Court of Small Causes was according to law, may, on his motion, or on the application of an aggrieved party make within 30 days from the date of such decree or order call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit.'''' By U. P. Act No. 37 of 72 a proviso was added to section 25 of the Provin�cial Small Cause Courts Act which reads as under :
"Provided that in relation to any case decided by a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising the jurisdiction of Judge Small Causes, the power of revision under this section shall vest in the High Court."
15. A glance of section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act whether original or as amended by U. P Act per se shows that the juris�diction of the revisional court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is confined to the question where the case has been deci�ded by Court of Small Causes, according to law. The phrase "according to law" in Section 25 refers to the decision as a whole and is not to be equated with errors of law or facts simplicitor It refers to over all decision which must be according to law which would not be until and unless a decision suffers from mistake of law or error of law and the error of law is such that it has got the effect of resulting in substantially erron�eous decision in law as well as it results in the denial of justice or mis�carriage of justice. Right of revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act depends upon existence and establishment of the fact that the decision is not according to law. The scope of revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is wider than the revi�sional jurisdiction of the Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but it is to be taken note of that it is not to be equated with that of the first appellate court. If it is established that decision of the court below is not according to law it is open to this court to interfere with the same under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. In the case of Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj (40 Born . IR 125 (AIR 1938 Bom. 223) Beaumont, C.J. (as he then was) dealing with Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act had observed, which observations have been quoted with an approval of their Lordship of the Supreme Court in the case of Hari shankar & v. Girdhari Lai reponed in (AIR 1963 SC 698) which reads as under :
"The object of section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was according to law. The section does not enumerate the eases in which the court may interfere in revision, as does section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference ; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the un�successful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at." this decision of Bombay High Court had been followed with approval by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case of Hari Shankar v. Girdhari Lal (supra). Later on their Lordship of the Supreme Court in the case of Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth Manghraj reported in (AIR 1969 SC 1344) followed with approval the observations of Beaumort, C. J. referred to above as regards what the phrase "according to law" means and in what circumstances a case may be said to have been decided not in accordance with law. The decision is illustrative when a decision may be said to be one as having been arrived at not in accordance with law. In the case of Jagdish Prasad v. Angoori Devi reported in (AIR 1984 SC 1447) their Lordship of the Supreme Court while dealing with section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act has been pleaded to observe as under :
"The revisional jurisdiction under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is not as wide as appellate jurisdiction under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, yet in a case of this type we do not think fault could be found with the revisional court for pointing out legal error committed by the trial court in its approach to this material aspect. The legal position having been totally misconceived by the trial court and there being an assumption of the position which the landlord was required to prove by evidence the revisional authority was entitled to point out the legal error and rectify the defect. This is all that has been done by the Additional District Judge."
16. In this case the Supreme Court has also taken the view that if some evidence which ought to have been taken into consideration by the trial court has not been scrutinised and considered by the trial court under some misapprehension or erroneous impression of legal position and the same evidence is looked into and considered by the revisional court along with other evidence the said act of revisional court will not be an attempt to reassess the evidence but to take into consideration the evidence which had not been looked into by the trial court. The relevant observations of the Additional District Judge need be quoted again which read as under:
"The trial court unwarrantedly drew the presumption and looked on the evidence of the tenant to find out whether the presumption had been rebutted. There is no warrant in law for such a situation. The Additional District Judge rightly took exception to this approach to the matter by the trial court and since the evidence of the plaintiff had not been scrutinised under the erroneous impression of the legal position the same was looked into to find out whether the claim of subtenancy was established. This was not an attempt to reassess evidence but to take into consideration the evidence which had not been looked into by the trial court."
17. The above mentioned quotation clearly indicates that if the trial court on a wrong assumption of law or on the basis of erroneous impression of legal position, may be, regarding admissibility or otherwise of certain piece of evidence ignores from consideration then in that case it is open to the revisional court to consider that evidence along with other, that will not be an attempt to reassess the evidence but to take into consideration the evidence that has not been looked into by the trial court and that is open in the same way if the trial court records the finding after taking into consideration the evidence which is not admissible but on the basis of erroneous impression or opinion about admissiblity the trial court treats inadmissible evidence and records a finding which it should not have taken into consideration, the revisional court may and has power to exclude piece of that evidence and then it is open to it to consider the effect of exclusion of inadmissible evidence and after having excluded that inadmissible evidence the revisional court considering the effect of exclusion comes to a different finding it cannot be said to be a case of reassessment of evidence. Keepirg these broad principles in view I proceed to examine the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties.
18. The first question I take up for consideration is the question of date of construction of the building Whether on the date of filing of the suit the building had already completed 10 years or not and did the Act apply on that date ? This is rather a question of jurisdictional fact i. e. a question upon a finding on which the trial court entertained the suit. If the building had completed 10 years on that date and the trial court had recorded an incorrect finding and on the basis thereof it has usurped the jurisdiction not vested then the decision of the trial court and the decree passed by the trial court can be said to be without jurisdiction and to be one as not in accordance with law as no suit would have been maintainable on that date in such a case unless any one of the grounds mentioned in section 20 of U. P. Act XIII of 72 is shown to exist. Under section 115 of the Code the jurisdiction of the civil court is limited and more limited in comparison to the revisional jurisdiction under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Again while dealing with section 115 of the Code in the case of S. Rama Iyer v. Sundaresa reported in (AIR 1966 SC 1431) their Lordships of the Supreme Court have been pleased to observe that in respect of question of a jurisdictional fact upon the existence of which depends jurisdiction of a court to entertain a suit or a claim is not final in one way or the other, it is open to revisional court to review that finding because that finding touches the jurisdiction of the court to decree the case. The material observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Rama Iyer v. Sundaresa (supra) reads as under :
"The decision of the subordinate Court on all questions of law and fact not touching its jurisdiction is final and, however, erroneous such a decision may be, it is not revisable under sub. ss. (a) and(b) of Section 115 C.P.C On the other hand, if by an erroneous decision on a question of fact or law touching its jurisdiction e.g. on a preliminary fact upon the existence of which its jurisdiction depends, the subordinate Court assumes a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or fails to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, its decition is not final, and is subject to review by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under the sub sections, (a) and (b) of sectien 115."
19. When that is the position under section 115 of the Code where jurisdiction of this Court is very limited and confined to the jurisdictional error there could be no doubt that in cases under section 25 of the Pro�vincial Small Cause Courts Act in respect of findings of jurisdictional facts, it can also be said that it is open to the revisional court to review that finding i. e, finding on Jurisdictional Facts.
20. With regard to the date of construction, the finding recorded by the court below is that the building shall be deemed to have been constructed on 1476 and the suit having been filed on 21/2311986 was not barred and it was maintainable. The learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that the court below did not take into consideration the deposition of P.W.1 i.e. plaintiff that this house was allotted to him by Avas Vikas Parishad on 10375 and his further statement that after allotment he got possession on 2675, firstly, the material statement of P. W, 1 in this regard is:
"YAH MAKAN MUJHE 10375 KO AVAS VIKAS SE ALLOT HUA THA. 10375 KE BAD BHI MAKAN MEN NIRMAN KARYA CHALTA RAHA. MAKAN 1976 MEN COMPLETE HUA. ALLOTMENT HONE KE BAD MUJHE INCOMPLETE MAKAN KA KABJA 2675 KO MILA. SAN 1976 MEN MAKAN COMPLETE HO JANE KE BAD KIRAYE PER CHADHA DIYA. PRATIVADI KO MAKAN KIRAYE PAR MAINE 27684 KO DIYA."
21. Firstly, when I examine this statement and law of admission which is that the entire statement has to be taken into consideration, the state�ment is that Avas Vikas Parishad allotted the house to the plaintiff in March, 1975 and the possession thereof i. e. incomplete house was given to him under allotment order on 2675. The construction work continued thereafter even and the same was completed in 1976, so this statement or deposition of P. W. 1 towards which my attention has been invited by the learned counsel for the defendantrevisionist has got no material bearing. The statement is that the house of which possession was given on 2675 to the plaintiff by Avas Vikas Parishad under allotment order dated 10375 had not been completed instead it was going on and the construction of which was completed in 1976 so this statement firstly does not give any help to the defendantrevisionist or to his case because there is no admis�sion of the plaintiff in it that the construction of the house had been completed prior to its allotment or delivery of its possession to the plain�tiff. Secondly, the taking of possession or date of taking of possession would not be material if construction is not complete and thirdly if we look to the scheme of the provisions of the Act itself and in particular explanation to Section 2 of of U. P. Act No. XIII of 72, the construction of a building is be deemed to have been completed on either :
(a) the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority, or
(b) in the case of a building subject to assessment, construction is deemed to have been completed on the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect and if the two dates are different the earliest of the said dates i. e. the date of Teporting or recording and the date of the first assessment becoming effective.
"(c) in the absence of the reporter record or assessment referred to above the date on which it is actually occupied, but not for the purpose of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction, for the first time.
28. A reading of explanation per se shows that date of first occupation of the building, otherwise than for supervising the construction or guard�ing the building under construction will be material and admissible for consideration only in cases where there is absence of reporting or recording or that of assessment of that building. But where there is either reporting or recording or where the case is one of assessment of building and the case is of building subject to assessment then the question of its actual occupation will not be material. Any way, in case where the date of actual occupation is relied or is considered it has also to be considered and proved that the actual occupation of the building was not material for the purpoce of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction. In the present case the trial court rightly did not consider this evidence of P. W. 1 because firstly from evidence it emerges even at the time of allotment and delivery of possession the construction work was going on and secondly, when the case is of a building which is proved to be subject matter of assessment and the record of assessment has been available which had been summoned by the trial court and a perusal thereof clearly indicated that the building had been assessed, notice was given to the plaintiffopposite party of the proposed valuation and proposed assessment and objections were called for from him in that regard and it was directed that objection shall be heard and decided by 9276 and he was also required to inspect the record on 20775 and there could be no question that the assessment of the building could have become effective frym 1475 in view of the provisions of Section 148 of U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 as well as Section 207 to 211 of the Adhiniyam. Section 148 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam reads as under :
"148. Determination of rates of taxes,The Mahapalika shall, on or before February 15, if it is an indebted Mahapalika, but on or before March 15, otherwise, after considering the pro�posal of the Executive Committee, determine, subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed in Chapter IX the rates at which Mahapalika taxes referred to in subsection (1) of Section 172 shall be levied in the next ensuing Financial year."
23. Sections 207 to 211 read as under :
207. Preparation of assessment list,The Mukhya Nagar Adhikari shall cause an assessment list of all buildings or lands or both (in the city or part thereof to be prepared from time to time), containing :
(a) the name of the street or Mohalla in which the property is situated ;
(b) the designation of the property, either by name or by number sufficient for identification ;
(e) the names of the owner and occupier if known ;
(d) the annual letting value or other particulars determining the annual value ; and
(e) the amount of the tax assessed thereon,
208. Publication of list.(When assessment list for whole of the city or of (any part thereof) containing the particulars menti�oned in Clauses (a) to (e) of Section 207 has been prepared); the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari shall give public notice of the place where (that list) or a copy thereof may be inspected, and every person claiming to be either owner or occupier of property included in (that list) and an agent of such person shall be at liberty to inspect (that list) and to make extra extracts therefrom without charge.
209. Objection to entries in list,(1) The Mukhya Nagar Adhikari shall at the same time give public notice of a date, not less than one month thereafter, when the Executive Committee will proceed to consider the valuation and assessments; (entered in the list mentioned in Section 208) and in all cases, in which any property is for the first time assessed or the assessment is increased, he shall also give notice thereof to the owner or occupier of the property, if known.
(2) All objections to valuations and assessments shall be made to the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari, before the date fixed in the notice, by application in writing stating the grounds on which the valuation and assessment are disputed, and all applications so made shall be registered in a book to be kept by the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari for the purpose.
(3) The Executive Committee or a subcommittee thereof appoin�ted by the Executive Committee in this behalf, shall, after allowing the applicant an opportunity of being heard in per�son or by agent :
(a) investigate and dispose of the objections ;
(b) cause the results thereof to be noted in the book kept under subsection (2) ; and
(c) cause any amendment necessary in accordance with such result to be made in the assessment list.
210. Authentication and custody of list,(1) After the disposal of all objections pertaining to the list for the City or of (any part thereof), as the case may be, the Chairman of the Com�mittee or of the SubCommittee concerned, if any, shall authenticate by his signature thal list as well as amendments made therein under subsection (3) of Section 209.
(2) Every list so authenticated shall be deposited in the office of Mahapalika.
(3) As soon as the list for the entire eity is so deposited it shall be declared by public notice to be open for inspection,
211. Revision and duration of list,(1) A new assessment list shall ordinarily be prepared in the manner prescribed by Sec�tion 207 to 210 in every five year.
(a) Subject to any alteration or amendment made under Sec. 213 and to the result of any appeal under Section 471 every valuation and assessment entered in a valuation list shall be valid from the date on which the list takes effect in the City and (in the City or part thereof and until the first day of the month next following the completion of the new list).
Provided that where as a result of any order or adjudication of a court of law the new assessment list or any portion, thereof cannot take effect, the old assessment list or the correspond�ing portion thereof shall, subject to such order or adjudica�tion, be deemed to have continued to be effective)."
24. A reading of these sections i. e. sections 207 to 211 of the Adhiniyam perse shows that the objections have to be disposed of after hearing the persons concerned and after disposal of objections the list is to be authenticated by the Chairman and is to be deposited in the office of Maha�palika and as soon as it is deposited it is to be declared by public notice and every valuation and assessment entered in the list is to become valid from the date on which it takes effect in the City and until the first day of the month next following the completion of the new list. So the record proved that the objections were to be disposed on 9276 or thereafter. Nagar Mahapalika Inspector Sri Bishambhar Nath Misra has stated on oath that the real date of assessment of the building has been 9276 on which date the building in dispute was assessed for the first time. He has further deposed that the assessment made became effective from 1476. Considering the evidence of P.W.2 Shri Bishambhar Nath Misra along with notice referred to above and the provisions of Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, I come to the conclusion that the finding recorded by the trial court that the assessment of the building was made on 9276 and the first assessment of the tax that had been made became effective imme�diately with the next ensuing financial year commencing frcm 1476 and in accordance with the same the trial court had rightly found that the construction of the building in dispute will be deemed to have been done or in other words the construction of the building in dispute will be deemed to have been completed on 1476 and on completion of 10 years from 1476, the Act did apply to the building on and from 1486 and on 20/2311986, when the suit was filed the Act did not apply to the building. The admission of the defendant in this regard referred to by the learned
counsel for the opposite party vide paragraph 3 paper C41 i.e. the alleged deed is not of any material assistance and is not by itself decisive of the matter. That it is an admission that the building was a new construction on the date the agreement of lease was entered into and it was also an admission that on that date U.P. Act XIII of 72 did not apply but this admission by itself is not of any help as it is not an admission to the effect that on the date the suit was filed building had not completed 10 years nor it is an admission that building had been constructed sometimes in 1976. Any way, as I have found earlier that as regards the date of construction the finding of the court below does not suffer from any error of law or illegality, instead finding which had been arrived at on this aspect of the matter is in accordance with law and call for no interference.
25. As regards the second question whether there has been relation�ship of landlord and tenant between plaintiff and defendant i.e. oppositeparty and revisionist i. e. Whether Puran Singhrevisionist has been the tenant of the building in dispute and the plaintiff is the landlord thereof as alleged by the plaintiff or Puran Singh has got nothing to do with the tenancy and the tenant of the accommodation is the Pioneer Montessory School, Avas Vikas Colony, Talkatora, as alleged and asserted by the defendant revisionist and the suit against the defendant revisionist is misconceived. The trial court has recorded a firding to the effect that defendant had taken the building on rent and on a perusal of the evidence on record come to the conclusion that in between plaintiff and defendant the relationship of landlord and tenant has been established. This is a rinding of fact. Under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act this court is not entitled to interfere with the finding of fact on the basis of appreciation of evidence or on the ground of misappreciation of evidence. Shri Rai submitted that while recording the findings the learned court below has failed to consider instead it has ignored C31 and certain portions of statement of P.W.I. He has also referred to the assessment list dated 11086 and the entry contained therein with reference to the building in dispute and submitted that the court below has ignored this evidence also, which according to him does not find reference in the judg�ment of the court below and has been ignored from consideration. As I have said earlier if a finding of fact is based on nonconsideration of material evidence the finding may be said or decision may be said to have been arrived at not in accordance with law but when I examine and consider this evidence i.e. C31 which is a receipt issued in the name of Pioneer Montessori School and the contents of which are "received a cheque of Rs. 1,100/ from M/s Pioneer Montessori School" along with another receipt C51 on the record the contents of which are to the effect "received a cheque for Rs. 2.000/ from Puran Singh." These receipts themselves cannot be deemed to prove that the contract of tenancy was between plaintiff and the Pioneer Montessori School. C31 as appears have been denied by counsel for the plaintiff. C51 is admittedly a receipt of rent and it has been issued in the name of Puran Singh. When I look to the original deed of lease the deed per se appears to indicate that second party therein is described in his personal name as Puran Singh. In the lease deed description of second party is given as under :
�Puran Singh aged about 48 years son of Shri Lai Singh, resident of House no. 227, Rajendra Nagar, Lucknow, Manager Pioneer Montessori, Avas Vikas Colony, Talkatora, Lucknow".
The description is of Puran Singh i.e. his age is 48 years son of Lal Singh and is resident of House No. 227 Rajendra Nagar and further it is written that he is "Manager of Pioneer Montessori School, Avas Vikas Colony, Talkatora, Lucknow". By this it cannot be said that he was acting as the Manager and for and on behalf of Pioneer Montessori School. The expression "Manager Pioneer Montessori School" with his name is only indicative of the fact that he occupies that office but it does not indicate that he was entering into contract of tenancy for and on behalf of Pioneer Montessori School or its society. In contract of tenancy there is always element of privity of contract between the parties to the contract. There is not a single word in the lease deed to indicate that the lease was being taken by the revisionist for and on behalf of or as a representative of the school and not in his personal capacity nor is there any evidence on record that Puran Singh at the time of taking the accommodation in dispute on lease did disclose it to the lessor that he was taking the accommodation in dispute on lease not for himself but for the school. I have gone through the statement of Puran Singh and I have not been able to find anything in his deposition to the effect that while he was taking the accommodation on lease he had anywhere stated or disclosed it to the landlord that he was taking the building on lease for and on behalf of the Pioneer Montessori School. The burden had been on the defendant to allege and to prove that the building in dispute had been taken on lease by him not in his personal capacity but for and on behalf of the Pioneer Montessori School and that at the time of taking the building on lease he has dis�closed it to the plaintiff that building was taken on lease by the shool and that the defendantrevisionist was only acting for and on behalf of the school but there appears no such pleading specifically in the written statement nor there is anything in the deposition of defendant. There are two receipt C31 that is one in the name of school, and C51 that is other in the name of Puran Singh. So the said receipt no. C31 cannot be deemed to be sufficient by itself to prove that the real tenant was someone else than the defendantrevisionist, The plaintiff''s case has been that the building was let out to defendant. The defendant does not dispute but instead he admits that the defendant took the said premises on lease though he alleges to have acted for and on behalf of the said society. The question whether it has been taken for and on behalf of the said society and the burden to prove this did lie on the defendant which he failed to discharge. Thus considered, there is no error of law in the finding of the court below as regards the relationship of landlord and tenant in between the plaintiffopposite party and the defendantrevisionist. The said finding does not suffer from any error of law nor can the said finding be said to have been arrived at not in accordance with law instead the finding, in my opinion, has been, arrived at in accordance with law and this being the position, the Pioneer Montessori School is not the tenant. It is another thing that the defendantrevisionist has been running the school since after taking the same on lease but that will not make that Pioneer Montessori School is tenant or has been tenant. Privity of contract being in between the plaintiffopposite party and the defendantrevisionist, in my opinion, the finding of the trial court that relationship of landlord and tenant existed between plaintiff and defendant is correct and calls for 110 interference and so the suit cannot be said to be bad for misjoinder of parties or to be bad on account of nonjoinder of Pioneer Montessori School.
26. The tenancy originally no doubt was fixed term tenancy, admi�ttedly for a period of 11 months and according to admitted case of the plaintiff and defendant on the expiry of period of 11 months from 27684 it expired on 26585 and that thereafter the defendantrevisionist admittedly paid enhanced rent at the rate of Rs. 2,000/ per month but there is no dispute that no further written fresh agreement of lease was entered into but the defendantrevisionist continued in possession, paid rental enhanced rate of rent i.e. Rs. 2.000/ per month and the lessor accepted the same for subsequent period i.e. from 27585 onwards till 27985 even in accordance with the plaint allegations. According to the defendant the plaintiff had accepted the rent till 26th September, 1985 and thereafter the plaintiff changed his mind and has not been accepting the rent since 27985. Anyway, admitted position appears to be that rent at enhanced rate had been accepted by the landlord on the expiry of the original fixed term lease though, no doubt, any fresh written agreement of lease was not entered into. Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that under clause (6) of the original terms of contract of lease a fresk lease had to be entered into apart from enhanced rate of rent and that it had been provided that the defendant would have to pay Rs. 2,000/instead Rs. 1500/ per month and would have to enter into fresh agreement if wanted to continue the tenancy of said premises. Learned counsel for the plaintiffopposite party submitted that the idea behind the fresh lease was a written lease but no agreement was entered into while the defen�dant''s counsel submitted that there is no such thing as fresh agreement in writing it could also be an oral agreement and that oral agreement came into effect as soon as the defendantrevisionist on the expiry of old lease continued in possession and offered the plaiatiffopposite patty the rent at enhanced rate of Rs. 2,000/ per month and the landlordplaintiff oppositeparty accepted the same. There appears to be some substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the defendantrevisionist. In case of lease for less than one year the same can be entered into by a document in writing or by an oral agreement and act of the parties i. e. landlord and tenant by itself may be taken as an act of offer and acceptance consti�tuting the agreement between the two the lessee''s possession remains that of a lessee and the tenancy did continue, it did not cease. Even otherwise under section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, in view of the above act of offer of Rs. 2,000/ per month as rental for the period after 26585 by the tenant to the landlord and accepting it by the landlord as rent resulted in continuance of tenancy by holdingever. Here, I may mention that even if for a moment lease deed is taken to be inadmissible as has been contended by the learned counsel for the revisienist on account of it being unstamped and is ignored from consideratien but the admitted position being that plaintiff let out the building to defendant who took it on lease earlier and the rental was Rs. 1500/ per month which was later on enhanced te Rs. 2000/ per month. The relationship of landlord and tenant between the''plaintiff and defendant stands established as an admitted fact as there is no evidence on record to prove that lease was taken by the school or by the defendant for and on behalf of the school after having communicated to the lessor that he is net taking the lease in his personal capacity but as a representative of Pioneer Montessori School so there could be no doubt that defendant has been tenant of the accom�modation. Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act even if applied and he continued to be tenant by holdingover the nature of the tenancy did not change, defendant remain the tenant. Argument has been raised that tenancy was a fresh tenancy and not the old tenancy under agreement on 27484. Even if it was a fresh tenancy except that the rate of rent and Term of period, the tenancy continued on old terms but under sections 106 and 116 of the Transfer of Property Act it was a month to month tenancy as the tenancy has not been for agricultural or manufacturing purposes. The defendant in the present case has failed to prove his case which he has taken in paragraph. 12 as regards the terms of tenancy after 26685 and his evidence has not been relied upon. So this question whether after 26585 it was a fresh tenancy or it was a continuation of old tenancy is not a very material question to be decided in this case though a good length of argument had been advanced.
27. So far as regards the plea of validity of the notice is concerned I have gone through the notice served on Puran Singh, the tenant, as has been found to be valid by the court below as well. That the, notice deter�mining the lease sent to Puran Singh was addressed to Puran Singh in his personal name and address does not suffer from misdescription. It is addressed to the right person who has been the tenant and nonmentioning of Pioneer Montessori School in the notice makes no adverse effect on the legality of the notice and the contention raised on this ground by the learned counsel for the revisionist challenging the validity of the notice has got no substance. The relevant portion of the notice reads as under :
"My client terminates your tenancy with immediate effect and soon after the expiration of 30 days next from the service of this notice your tenancy shall stand determined in toto and you are hereby allowed 30 days next from the service of this notice to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the building to my client and also pay the arrears of rent from 27th September to uptodate in the said 30 days next from the service of this notice., failing which my client shall take a suitable action in the court of law."
28, Section 106 of the Transfer of Property reads as under :
"106. Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage, In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing puposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months'' notice and a lease of immo�vable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by thirty days'' notice. Every notice under this section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants, at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property."
29. A perusal of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act disclo�ses that there is no specific form prescribed for giving notice. What is required under law is that notice should be of 30 days. It should be in writing and it should be signed by the person givirg the notice As regards the construction of notice it has been laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Harihar Banerji & others v. Ram Shashi Roy (AIR 1918 PC 102) that principles of English Law and English decisions regarding construction of notice to quit or to terminate tenancy are equally appli�cable in India. It has further been laid down by the Privy Council that such notice should be liberally construed not with a desire to find fault in them which would render them defective but they should be construed utres magis valeat quam pereat.
30. It has also been laid down that the liberal construction of the notice which would deprive a tenant of the facility of having benefit of time allowed by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for vacating is not permissible as has been observed in the case of Mangilal v. Sigan Chand (AIR 1965 SC 101).
31. Keeping these principles in view when I examine this notice and the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the revisionist Shri Umapati Rai, I find that the contentions raised by Shri Umapati Rai are without substance as is being indicated hereinafter. Shri Rai submitted that in this notice it has been stated "my client terminates your tenancy with immediate effect". His first submission on the basis of this expre�ssion was that notice determining the lease is bad as the tenancy has been terminated with immediate effect. He submitted that law requires tenancy to be terminated by 30 days notice i e. the landlord cannot terminate the tenancy with immediate effect or put a rigor or rider over operation of law which provides that the tenancy is to stand terminated on the expiry of the period of notice but when the landlord uses "terminates tenancy with immediate effect" he intends to put a rider to the operation of law and its effect is to allow the tenant to continue in occupation for 30 days at sufferance. He submits that the notice terminates the tenancy at the point of time which is not in conformity with the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and he tried to place reliance in support of his contention on illustration (d) which is contained in para�graph 10 of the decision in the case of Abdul Jalil v. Haji Abdul Jalil reported in (AIR 1974 All. 402) as well as he tried to place reliance on the observations made in paragraph 15 of that decision.
32. It is well settled principle of law as to interpretation of a docu�ment that one has not to rely simply on isolated sentence one way or the other in order to gather the intent of the author of the document one must read the entire document in order to arrive at a conclusion.
33. Keeping this principle in view when I consider this document I find that the contention of the learned counsel is based merely on one portion and it ignores the latter part of the same sentence, which if read together will clearly show that landlord did never intend to terminate the tenancy in a manner as to obstruct the flow of law and the provisions of law, the expression used in the notice is "my client terminates your tenancy with immediate effect and soon after the expiration of 30 days next from the service of this notice your tenancy shall stand determined in toto and you are hereby allowed 30 days from the service of this notice to vacate and to hand over the vacant possession of the building, failing which my client shall take suitable action in court of law. If we read its entire portion it becomes clear that there are two parts in the matter of determination of tenancy, one is the act of landlord to perform his job and obligation i.e. of determining the tenancy by 30 days notice and he must by express or by necessary implication indicate his intention that he is performing his part of act of determining the lease. When he has per�formed his part in the process of determining the lease, when that act will be effective under law is another part, here use of expression immediate effect means that the intention of landlord is not that he will terminate instead he expressed that with immediate effect he is performing his part or his role in the process of determination of lease and then further clari�fies that lease will stand determined on the expiry of 30 days from the date of service of notice and, therefore, calls upon the tenant to hand over vacant possession on the expiry of the lease. Here the expression "immediate effect" only means that he has performed his part but it does not mean that he intends in any manner to say that relationship of land�lord and tenant comes to an end at once and the tenant is given right to
remain in possession as licensee or a tenant at sufferance and this is clear when he says your tenancy shall stand determined on the expiry of 30 days from the date of service of notice. The present case is differentiable from illustration (d) of the case of Abdul Jalil Supra. In the case of notice given under illustration (d) there is no such clear expression in the notice that the tenancy shall stand determined soon after or on the expiry of 30 days period from the date of service of notice. The present case is itself distinguishable from illustration (d) and the observations contained in paragraph 15 will not be applicable. Had it not been mentioned in the notice that tenancy will stand determined after the expiry of 30 days period from the date of service of the notice there would have been some substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist but as mentioned above, the notice very clearly indicates that he never intended to say that law will not operate instead tenancy is atonce termi�nated. A reading of the part indicates that the landlord only indicated that he without fail and delay is exercising his right to determine the lease in accordance with the requirements of law and that the lease will stand determined on the expiry of the relevant period mentioned above i.e. 30 days. So I do not find that notice can be said to be bad or illegal on this ground. The intention of the landlord has been to determine the lease or tenancy as it was then existing on the date the notice was given so it was immaterial whether the lease was old or new it will make no difference whether it was a fresh lease or old teaancy continuing excepting the term of tenancy. The intention of the landlord was to determine the existing contract of tenancy and he did determine the same by the notice.
34. Thus considered, in my opinion, the decision of the court below does not suffer from any error of law and in my opinion the decree of the court below has been passed and the case has been decided in accordance with law. As such, the revision has got no force and is liable to be dismissed. At this stage considering the fact that a school is being run and students are studying there, if in the course of the education session the decree is allowed to be executed the education of the students may suffer, and, as such, it will be just and proper that while dismissing the revision, revisionistapplicant be given sufficient time to find out alter�native accommodation to shift his school. Thus having considered, I hereby dismiss the revision as it has got no merits but cost of this court in revision is made easy. The defendantrevisionist in the interest of the students studying in the school is allowed time upto 3151994 to vacate the accommodation in dispute and till then the trial court''s decree shall not be executed provided :
(a) that the defendantrevisionist Shri Pooran Singh, the tenant furnishes a written undertaking within a period of six weeks from today, in the form of an affidavit before this Court to the effect that by or before 31594, the defendant revisionist tenant will hand over the vacant possession of the accommo�dation in dispute as mentioned in the plaint to the plaintiffopposite party and to none else without any objection :
(b) that he i. e. defendantrevisionist pays, to plaintiffopposite
party or deposits the entire amount of earlier rent and uptodate damages including the damages pendente lite, by an account payee cheque or bank draft within a period of six weeks, in the trial court ;
(c) that he further undertakes to pay in advance the damages for use and occupation of the building during this period i.e. upto 31594 at the rate agreed between the parties i. e, Rs. 2000/ per month by or foefere 7th of the each month concerned, by account payee cheque or bank draft.
35. If the undertaking is furnished as mentioned above or above conditions are complied with the decree for ejectment passed by the trial shall not be executed by the plaintiffopposite party till 31594. Incase of breach of any of the conditions or failure to give an undertaking, it will be open to the plaintiffopposite party to proceed with the execution.
(Revision dismissed.)
