M. Katju, J.@mdashHeard learned Counsel for the parties.
2. The petitioner has prayed for a writ of mandamus/certiorari to quash clause (9) of the lease deed dated 29101996 (Annexure 6 to the petition) and for a mandamus restraining the respondents from interfering with the management of Sophia Girls School, Meerut Cantt., Meerut including the direction towards admission of the wards of the Defence Personnel.
3. It is alleged in paragraph 3 of the writ petition that the Catholic Diocese of Meerut approached the Central Government for taking on lease plot o. 267 situate at Meerut Cantt. Accordingly on 581964 a lease deed was executed between the President of India and the Catholic Diocese of Meerut for granting lease hold rights over the said plot for 30 years from 3111963. True copy of the lease deed is Annexure 1 to the writ petition. In paragraph 6 of the writ petition it is alleged that the Diocese of Meerut permitted the Fatima Society, petitioner No. 1 to establish its institution over the plot in dispute. Accordingly the petitioner established the school known as Sophia Girls School and it is alleged in paragraph 7 of the writ petition that this institution has become a premier educational institution at Meerut. The institution is recognized and affiliated to ICSE and ISC Board, New Delhi. The school is run by a Society which is run by Christians known as the Mission Society of Ajmer and it is alleged that it has been established by the minority community.
4. It is alleged in paragraph 10 of the writ petition that on expiry of term of the lease in 1993 the Diocese of Meerut again approached the respondents for grant of a fresh lease. However, it is alleged in paragraph 11 of the writ petition that the respondents started putting unreasonable terms and conditions for grant of a fresh lease. They insisted that 70% of admissions in the institution would be reserved for the children of Defence Service Personnel including civilians in Defence Services. The Additional Director General, Defence Estates wrote letter dated 461996 Annexure 2 to the writ petition expressing willingness to grant fresh lease for educational purposes provided the school authorities reserve 70% of the vacancies for the children of Defence Service Personnel including civilians in Defence Services. The Director of General, Defence Estates communicated this letter to the petitioner through letter dated 1861996 Annexure 3 to the writ petition. The Defence Estates Officer, Meerut directed the petitioner to submit an undertaking for reservation of 70% vacancies in the institution for the children of Defence Service Personnel including civilians in Defence Services vide Annexure 4 to the writ petition. In paragraph 15 of the writ petition it is alleged that the institution had no option as it had invested lacs of rupees in bringing up the institution and employed staff. Hence, they gave undertaking to the respondents through letter dated 1271996 Annexure 5 to the writ petition. Ultimately a formal lease deed was executed between the Catholic Diocese of Meerut and the Central Government on 29101996 vide Annexure 6 to the writ petition. The said lease was for 90 years and renewal after 30 years. The premium too was considerably hiked.
5. In paragraph 18 of the writ petition reference has been made to clause (9) of the lease deed which states:
�(9) that the School Authorities will reserve 70% of the vacancies every year for the children of Defence Service Personnel including Civilians in Defence Services.�
6. It is alleged in paragraph 20 of the writ petition that this clause is obnoxious and destroys the right of minorities under Article 30 of the Constitution. The petitioner has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, 2002(2) LBESR 933 & 1059 (SC) : 2002 (8) SCC 481. It is alleged that imposing this condition of clause (9) is illegal and in violation of Rule 28 of the Cantonment Land Administration Rules,1937. In paragraph 45 of the writ petition it is alleged that the Defence Authorities are interfering with the petitioner institution.
7. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties we find no merit in this petition. Admittedly, the land on which the institution is situate belonged to the Central Government and is Cantt. Area belonging to the defence services. Thus, the Central Government is the lessor and the petitioner is the lessee of the said land. If the petitioners do not want the land they can vacate it but if they want to occupy it obviously they have to abide by the terms of the agreement which is contained in the lease deed dated 29101996 Annexure 6 to the writ petition. The matter is purely contractual and has nothing to do with Article 30 of the Constitution. If the petitioner did not want to abide by the condition mentioned in clause (9) of the lease deed they should have refused to take the land on lease and should have vacated the land. The owner of the land is the Central Government, and for letting it out it can impose such conditions, as it deems fit and proper. We find nothing illegal or unjustified in Clause (9) because it is well known that the defence personnel are serving the nation is time of war and peace even by risking their lives and they can do this properly only if their families are looked after properly. A soldier fights well when he knows that even if he dies his family will be looked after. Giving education to the children is an essential part of looking after the welfare of the family of the solider.
8. The petitioner voluntarily entered into the agreement with the respondents and hence they cannot resile from the same.
9. In United States, ex rel, International Contractiong Co. v. Denial S. Lamont, Secretary of the Department of War, 155 US 160, the company had made two bids to perform the same work in response to two separate advertisements issued by the Department and the second bid made in response to later advertisement, which was lower, was accepted. The company commenced an action for a direction to the Secretary of War to sign the contract with it for the work as covered by the first proposal and the bid made thereunder. The Court observed as under on page 64
�The writ of mandamus cannot be used to set aside a contract which has been voluntary entered into ..... But even if the writ of mandamus could be so perverted as to make it serve the purposes of an ordinary suit, the relator is in no position to avail himself of such relief. He entered of his own accord into the second contract and has taken advantages which resulted from his action under it, having received the compensation which was to be paid under its terms. Having done all this, he is estopped from denying the validity of the contract......�
10. In Greenfield Corporation Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation, 2002(2) LBESR 314 (All); 2002 (2) UPLBEC 1789, it was held by a Division Bench of this Court (per G.P. Mathur, J.) that where the petitioner wants that an agreement which it voluntary and willingly entered into should not be enforced no writ will be issued (vide paras 11 and 12 of the said decision). It was also held in the same decision (vide para 13) that the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing a suit under Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act for rescission of the contract, and normally the relief of cancellation of a contact cannot be investigated or enquired into in a writ petition under Article 226.
11. Moreover, this petition is highly belated as it seeks to cancel a clause in a lease deed of 1996. Hence, also the petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches.
12. We cannot see what objection the petitioner should have in rendering service to the defence forces, and thus to the nation rather they should be proud to do so.
13. There is no merit in this petition and it is dismissed accordingly.
