M.N. Shukla, J.
This writ petition arises out of a dispute between the landlord and the tenant for allotment. It is directed against the order of the State Government passed under Section 7F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (Act No. Ill of 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act) allowing an application made by the landlord Thakur Paras Nath Ji Maharaj, Agarwal Digamber Jain Samiti and releasing the accommodation in dispute in its favour.
The short facts of the case are that the petitioner applied for allotment of the accommodation on the ground floor of house No. 91675, Moti Katra, Agra of which respondent No. 3, which is a trust, is the owner and landlord. The petitioner based his claim on the ground that he was at present residing with his family in the accommodation which consisted of only a room and a kitchen, not sufficient for his family comprised of five members and hence he was in dire need of a suitable accommodation. It appears that the landlord also applied for release of the accommodation on April 28, 1971. The application was made by Sri Rekhab Das as Managing Trustee on behalf of Thakur Paras Nath Ji Maharaj, Agarwal Digambar Jain Samiti on the ground that the accommodation was needed for purposes of temple and Dharamshala. The allegations made by the landlord were that the accommodation applied for was required for purposes of the trust and moreover since another portion of the same premises was in occupation of the trust both Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules framed under the Act were applicable to the facts of the case. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by his order dated March 30, 1972 rejected the release application of the landlord and allotted the accommodation in question to the petitioner. The findings recorded by him were that the need of the landlord was not bona fide and genuine and further that the accommodation with the temple,
Dharamshala and the institution was quite distinct and separate from the accommodation in dispute and that there was nothing in common between them and hence Rule 7 was not attracted. The landlord preferred a revision to the State Government under Section 7F of the Act and the same was allowed by the State Government by its order dated May 11, 1973 which has been impugned in the present writ petition.
Sri N.C. Upadhayo, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted before me firstly that'' Rule 7 was not applicable to the facts of the case and secondly that the landlord had failed to make out any case under Rule 6 and hence the order of the State Government under Section 7F was manifestly erroneous. As regards the first point, it would suffice to say that the State Government has not based its order on a consideration of Rule 7 but proceeded on the basis of Rule 6. It cannot be doubted that if the landlord''s case under Rule 6 is accepted, the impugned order must be upheld and, therefore, it is not necessary to examine the first question whether Rule 7 was applicable to the instant case. I, therefore, proceed to test the impugned order only on the touch stone of Rule 6.
Rule 6 reads as follows:
"When the District Magistrate is satisfied that an accommodation which has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant is bona fide needed by the landlord for his own personal occupation the District Magistrate may permit the landlord to occupy himself."
Sri N. C. Upadhaya, learned counsel for the petitioner, made an endeavour to put a literal construction on the language of Rule 6 and submitted that it could not be applied to a case where the landlord was a trust. According to him the language of this provision was inconsistent with its applicability to a trust such as the one in the instant case. He laid stress on the words ''his own personal occupation'' and ''occupy himself. The use of these pronouns in his submission clearly indicated that this Rule was not intended to be applied to inanimate entities bearing the character of landlord. In my opinion in this case the literal interpretation of Rule cannot be accepted. Even though relative pronouns may have been grammatically used, it is the tenor and spirit of the whole Act and the background and the context in which the Rule is placed which must be regarded as decisive for gathering its true import. The only object of Rule 0 appears to have been to give a preference to the landlord in the matter of release of an accommodation in the event of his proven bona fide need. There is no paucity of decisions of this Court on the point that where such bona fide need is established, the consideration that the need of the tenant for allotment is pressing becomes irrelevant. There is no manner of doubt that the Act puts a premium on the claim of the landlord where he or it has succeeded in proving its or his bona fide need. Therefore, it would be repugnant to the object of Rule 6 if a literal construction was put on its provisions and the bona fide need of the landlord, which happens to be a trust, was brushed aside. According to the definition contained in the Act a landlord is one to whom rent is paid or payable. It cannot be denied that in the case of a property owned by a trust rent is payable to the trust which functions through its Mutwalli or trustee. The mere application of an institutional lable to the owner and the employment of an inanimate entity in describing the landlord would not exclude it from the category of landlord. In such cases where an application is made by a Mutwalli or other authorised or competent person on behalf of the trust for release of an accommodation on the grounds which are germane to the objects or purposes of the trust or other institution, it must be considered to be a need of the landlord for the purposes of Rule 6. An interpretation dictated solely by the grammatical terminology of a provision, if it does violence to the spirit and substance of that provision, must be rejected. It is true that there is no direct authority on the point, nevertheless I find support for the view which I am expressing indirectly from the observations of this Court made in Sheikh Rafiuddin v. Government of V. P., Lucknow 1956 A.L.J. 329. It was observed by V.D. Bhargava, J. in that case while dealing with Rule 6 that the Mutwalli possessed a dual capacity one as a Mutwalli and the other his individual capacity. He had asked for allotment to him personally as he wanted to carry on business not on behalf of the Waqf but in his individual capacity. Under the circumstances it was held that the accommodation was not bona fide needed by the landlord and the applicant was not entitled to the benefit of Rule 6. It follows by necessary implication from the above observation that if the Mutwalli had applied for release for any of the purposes which could be construed as the need of the Waqf, Rule 6 would have been attracted. I, therefore, find no substance in the petitioner''s argument that Rule 6 is not applicable to the facts of this case.
Secondly, Sri N.C. Upadhaya appearing for the petitioner contended that the view expressed by the State Government in its impugned order giving the benefit of Rule 6 to the landlord respondent No. 3 and its Rent Secretary, Kailash Chand Jain, respondent No. 4 was patently erroneous. I am unable to accede to this contention either. As I have already observed, the only requirement of Rule 6 is that the need of the landlord should be bona fide. There is a categorical finding recorded by the State Government that the need of the landlord for the purposes of the temple and the Dharamshala maintained by the trust was genuine and bona fide. In other words, it upheld the contention raised on behalf of the trust that it required the disputed accommodation for the purposes of the temple and the Dharamshala associated with the trust. In the face of such categorical finding I do not find it possible to find any infirmity in the State Government''s order which may disentitle the landlord from the benefit of Rule 6.
It was in the last resort urged on behalf of the petitioner that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had given reasons for coming to the conclusion that the need of the trust for the disputed accommodation was not genuine and since the State Government had passed an order of dissent, it should have given its own reasoning in support of its conclusion and also the reasons for overruling the conclusions reached by the subordinate authority. I am not impressed by this argument. In the instant case I am satisfied that the orler of the State Government was passed on application of mind. It is surely not a case of nonapplication of mind. The respective cases of the parties have been succinctly stated by the State Government in its order and it has been repeatedly mentioned that the landlord''s representation, the present petitioner''s reply and other documents on the record of the case were carefully examined and thereafter its own findings were recorded. In this state of affairs it cannot be held that the order was passed on nonapplication of mind. It is true that it would have been better if the reasonings had been set out more elaborately. Since, however, the crucial point for decision and the conclusion have been stated with sufficient precision and the respective contention raised on behalf of the parties have also been noted with clarity and even the reasoning in its essence is clearly noticable, it is not a fit case in which the order of the State Government deserves to be set aside on the ground of a technical objection.
Thus, the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity.
In the result I find no force in this writ petition which is dismissed with costs. The stay order passed on July 18, 1973 and confirmed on April 1, 1975 is hereby vacated.
