Shyamal Kumar Sen, C.J.@mdashIn the Instant writ petition, the petitioner an advocate, claiming to espouse the cause of the public in the form of Public Interest Litigation, has prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the letter of respondent No. 2 as contained in Annexure-3 dated 11th January. 2000, to the writ petition. He further prayed for a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to clarify to all the State Governments that there cannot be an Additional Advocate General and to advise them to remove the Additional Advocate General appointed by them. Third prayer made in the writ petition is for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 not to allow respondent Nos. 5 to 8 to work as Advocate General and Additional Advocate General respectively and to cancel the order of appointment of respondent Nos. 5 to 8.
2. The contention of the writ petitioner is that the Constitution only contemplated for the appointment of Advocate General and there exists no provision in the Constitution of India for the appointment of Additional Advocate General. In that regard, the petitioner cited the example of the President. Vice-President, Prime Minister. Attorney General of India and other constitutional offices and has submitted that there cannot be an Additional President. Additional Vice-President or Additional Prime Minister or like that there cannot be an Additional Advocate General.
3. Thus, the argument of the petitioner, in nutshell, appears to be is that although the Constitution of India does not provide for the appointment of Additional Advocate General for the State, the appointment of respondent Nos. 6 to 8 is non-est, inasmuch as. Article 165 of the Constitution of India only mandates for the appointment of Advocate General. The office of the Advocate General, which is constitutional in nature, cannot be bifurcated. It was asserted by the petitioner that the Office of the Advocate General is one of the fifteen Constitutional offices of the Country. When the framers of the Constitution have not created the Office of Additional Advocate General, the Government of U. P. can in no case appoint the Additional Advocate General.
4. It was averred that the petitioner, with a view to remove the lacuna, addressed several letters to Attorney General of India in that regard. The Attorney General of India, in reply to the aforesaid petitions made by the petitioner, by means of his letter dated 11.1.2000. addressed to the petitioner, stated that it would be appropriate for him to deal with the matter, which concerned a State High Court. The appropriate person with whom the petitioner should be in communication, is the Advocate General of Uttar Pradesh.
5. Surprisingly, the petitioner wants that the letter written by Attorney General of India to him, be quashed. Thereafter, the petitioner also addressed the letters to the Advocate General of the State and the Law Minister of the State in that regard.
6. When the petitioner was confronted with the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in M. K. Padmanabhan v. State of Kerala 1978 Lab IC 1336 , and another judgment of the Gauhati High Court passed in
7. Mr. Umesh Chandra, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State Government, vehemently urged that the Office of Additional Advocate General in the State of U, P. was created, for the first time, in the year 1965 and to that effect a notification was issued by the State Government, which was produced before this Court. In the aforesaid notification issued in the year 1965, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, who was then holding the office of the Senior Standing Counsel, was designated as Additional Advocate General. In the said Notification, specific functions were assigned to the Additional Advocate General, Mr. Umesh Chandra also referred to the Notification dated 14.1.1985, which is a sort of general notification, containing specific functions to be performed, which were allotted to the Additional Advocate General. It was urged that the Government Orders and the Notification clearly clarified that the Additional Advocate General was not to discharge the functions of the Advocate General in terms of Article 165 of the Constitution of India.
8. Since 1965, the Government of U. P., intermittently, have been appointing the Additional Advocate Generals. Respondent Nos. 6 to 8 were first appointed in the year 1997 as Additional Advocates General by Government Notification dated 23.3.1997, which specified functions to be performed by them. When in the year 1997 the then Chief Minister Mr. Kalyan Singh resigned, according to practice. Advocate General as well as Additional Advocates General tendered their resignations, but as soon as the present Chief Minister has taken over. Advocate General as well as Additional Advocates General were appointed in the year 1999.
9. It is pertinent to mention here that the Notification dated 4.1.1985, which was Issued by the State Government for the appointment of Additional Advocate General indicating specific functions to be performed by the Additional Advocate General, has not been assailed in the present writ petition.
10. Similar question was involved in the case of M. K. Padmanabhan v. State of Kerala (FB). (supra) where the Full Bench observed :
The scheme of Article 165 is to some extent at any rate, to keep the appointment to the office as separate from the functions and responsibilities appertaining to it. While clause (1) of the Article deals with the appointment, clause (2) provides for functions and responsibilities, and clause (3), for the duration of the office. It is here that we have to take note of Article 367(1) of the Constitution, which provides :
"367. Interpretation-- (1) Unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act. 1897, shall subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under Article 372 apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India."
No adaptations and modifications having relevance have been brought to our notice. Turning to the General Clauses Act. 1897, Section 13 thereof enacts :
"13. In all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.-
(1) words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females ; and
(2) words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa."
"The above provision was relied on by the State to contend that the provision in the singular for appointment of an Advocate-General would include the plural. Both on the terms of Article 367 and on the language of Section 13 of the General Clauses Act. this implication is to be read "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context". Is there, then, anything repugnant in the subject or context preventing the appointment of two incumbents to the office of Advocate General? May be, such appointment/ appointments may provoke unseemly scrambles or conflicts or clashes in the discharge of functions. These, however, are not insurmountable, and may be left to resolve themselves by adjustment of human relationships, by development of healthy conventions, or by the delineation by rules and instructions. In the case on hand, we have Government Notification No. 368/B1/76/Law dated August 20, 1976, which makes certain amendments to the notification dated 1.11.1956 relating to the rules regarding the duties, remuneration etc. of the Advocate General. In the preamble itself to the parent notification, the words "Additional Advocate General", were to be added after the term ''Advocate General''. By clause (2] of the proceedings (sic) (notification?) duties and functions of the Advocate General were defined by sub-clause (i) to (xix). Sub-Clauses (xviii) and (xix) read as follows :
"(xviii) to perform such other duties of a legal character as may, from time to time, be referred or assigned to him by the Governor :
(xix) to discharge the functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution or any other law for the time being in force :"
Clause 3 is as follows :
"3. Duties and functions of the Additional Advocate General.--(1) The Additional Advocate General shall perform the same duties and functions as are assigned to the Advocate-General in Items (i) to (xvii) (both inclusive) of rule 2, subject to the allocation of work by the Advocate General except the power to supervise and control the work of the Law Officers attached to the High Court referred to in item (xi) of that rules ;
(2) the functions conferred on the Advocate General by or under the Constitution or any other law for the time being in force may be discharged by the Additional Advocate General also ;
(3) In part II, for the heading "The Advocate General shall receive remuneration as specified below" : the following heading shall be substituted, namely :
"Remuneration of the Advocate General."
It was further observed that ;
"In view of the above delegation of functions, the constitutional statutory and legal functions are to be performed by the Advocate General. Sub-clause (2) of Rule 3 merely enables the Additional Advocate General to discharge the constitutional and legal functions of the Advocate General. But this is an enabling power to be exercised during the temporary absence or non-availability of the Advocate General, and certainly not in antagonism to his powers. In the face, particularly, of this demarcation of responsibilities, as between the two incumbents for the Office, we are unable to find any clash or conflict of duties, which should compel a conclusion that a duality of the office cannot be thought of at all. On the language of the constitutional provisions, it is difficult to countenance such an argument. The provisions of the Rules framed under Articles 165(2) and (3) which we have extracted above, persuade us to hold that in actual practice it is possible to secure a smooth and harmonious functioning of two incumbents in the same office."
More or less similar view was taken by Hon''ble single Judge in Badreshwar a. S. N. Chaudhari [supra) of the Gauhati High Court.
11. As indicated in the foregoing paragraphs, it is evident that first appointment for the post of Additional Advocate General in this State took place in the year 1965 by means of the Notification dated 22.9.1965 and from that date, except for an year or two, the appointment of Additional Advocate General/Generals have been continuing in the State. General Notification dated 14.1.1985 has specified responsibilities of the Additional Advocate General/ Generals, which may be assigned to him/them by the Advocate General. By means of the said notification, the powers of the Additional Advocate General/Generals have been specified, which are not in conflict with the powers, functions and duties of the Advocate General. Hence, it cannot be said that the appointment of Additional Advocate General/ Generals in any way violates Article 165 of the Constitution of India. Since 1965, and particularly from 1985 the appointment of Additional Advocate General/Generals have been made by the State Government in this State. Respondent Nos. 6 to 8 were appointed in the year 1997. The appointment of Additional Advocate General/Generals has, for the first time, been assailed by means of the instant writ petition. Respondent Nos. 6 to 8 since their appointment, have been performing the functions of Additional Advocate General by virtue of the notifications appointing them as well as under the Notification dated 14.1.1985, which has assigned certain powers and responsibilities to be discharged by the Additional Advocate General, which is outside the purview of Article 165 of the Constitution of India. It is significant that during the last about three and a half years, no challenge was thrown to such appointments. Present writ petition suffers from laches of gross nature and for that reason as well the writ petition can be thrown out.
12. Surprisingly, the appointment of the Advocate General-respondent No. 5 has not been challenged but a prayer has been made for the issuance of a writ in the nature of quo-warranto asking the present Advocate General, as to how he has been holding the office of Advocate General in the State Assembly. The only reason for making such a prayer, according to the writ petitioner, appears to be is that he failed to advise the State Government that there cannot be Additional Advocates General for the State. We are of the view that such a prayer does not require consideration by this Court as the Advocate General, who holds the constitutional office, was appointed by the State Government.
13. Prayer for quashing the letter alleged to have been written by the Attorney General of India, which was in reply to the representation submitted by the petitioner, is devoid of merits, inasmuch as, the Attorney General of India, only indicated that it would not be appropriate for him to deal with the matter which concerned a State. The appropriate person whom the petitioner ought to be in communication is the Advocate General of U. P.
14. The prayer for quashing the order of appointment at such a belated stage does not arise merit any consideration, as the Advocate General as well as Additional Advocate General have been discharging their functions and responsibilities assigned to them by the State of U. P. since the year 1997. Neither their appointments during all those period nor the notification issued in the year 1985 has been assailed in the past.
15. We are of the view that the decisions of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in M. K. Padmanabhan''s case (supra) and the decision of Gauhati High Court in Badreshwar''s case (supra), do not require reconsideration as we respectfully agree with the observations made by the Hon''blc Judges.
16. We are of the view that the Public Interest Litigation should be filed with great care and caution. Generally, only the person who has suffered injuries by reason of legal right or interest, is entitled to seek the judicial redress, but the law regarding locus standi of the person who approach the Court, has, in the recent past, been liberalized by enlarging the concept of a ''person aggrieved'' to include any public spirited individual or association or social action group, provided they act for the enforcement of constitutional and legal rights of some other person and such a person is unable to approach the Court for redress ; owing to such person being in custody, or such person belongs to a class or group of persons who are in a disadvantaged position on account of poverty, disability or other social and economical impediments and are unable to enforce their rights. Public Interest Litigation can also be initiated by a person when public injury has been caused by violation of constitutional principles such as Independence of judiciary, or any person who is likely to be affected by such public injury such as a lawyer, would be allowed to complain of such violation. Public Interest Litigation is an instrument for administration of justice to be used properly in appropriate cases, but it cannot be used for settling disputes between individual parties. The Court generally discouraged the Public Interest Litigations where a person has filed a Public Interest Litigation to settle personal disputes. We are of the view that the present Public Interest Litigation was not a fit case where powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can be invoked. Such frivolous public interest litigation instead of vindicating the cause of justice or ensuring the benefits for the public life, amounts to settling personal grouse. Hence, before filing this Public Interest Litigation, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to have applied his mind over the ramification of such an exercise. Such a Public Interest Litigation should be discouraged as it is actuated with a motive to gain unnecessary publicity. Therefore, we dismiss the instant writ petition with a cost of Rs. 500, which will be deposited by the petitioner in the account of State Legal Aid and Authority, within one month from the date of production of a certified copy of this order.
