Sudhir Agarwal, J.@mdashHeard Sri Rahul Sahai, Advocate for the petitioners and Sri Komal Mehrotra, Advocate for respondents. It is contended that though eviction proceedings were initiated against petitioners on the ground of section 21(1)(b) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1972"), i.e., the building is in dilapidated condition and requires to be reconstructed after demolition but the proceedings were initiated by respondents No. 1 to 4 through power of attorney holder, Sri Padam Prakash and two more persons, namely, Sri Sanjay Prakash and Sri Amit Prakash, both sons of Sri Padam Prakash, who were also impleaded as plaintiffs No. 5 and 6, though they had no right to the property in dispute.
2. It is said that the entire proceedings in fact were initiated, controlled and persuaded by holder of power of attorney of respondents No. 1 to 4. Admittedly the respondents No. 1 to 4 were landlords and owner of accommodation in question but the real owners and landlords never come forward and it is only the holder of power of attorney who has prosecuted entire matter, so much so that, in respect of such matters where the evidence relating to status and position of landlords and owners was to be seen, there the power of attorney holders have adduced evidence of their own status and position etc. and the Courts below accepting the same have recorded a finding in favour landlords owners and passed impugned orders. It is thus contended that entire approach of Courts below in passing impugned orders is patently erroneous and illegal.
3. In order to appreciate the objection and serious contention raised by learned Counsel for the petitioners, it would be apt to have a bird eye view of brief facts of this case.
4. The dispute relates to House No. 157 Shivaji Marg, Meerut City, which is owned by respondents No. 1 to 4. The respondent No. 1 is the mother of respondents No. 2, 3 and 4, who are son and daughters. They entered into an "agreement to self" of the house in question, on 10.3.1999, with respondents No. 5 and 6. The symbolic possession of property was also given to them with further right to recover rent from tenants. Respondents No. 1 to 4 as also 5 and 6 instituted eviction proceedings by filing PA Case No. 112 of 1999 vide plaint dated 30.8.1999 alleging that house in question is in dilapidated condition and, therefore, is required to be vacated by petitioners for the purpose of demolition and new construction. Smt. Pramodini Srivastava, respondent No. 1, herself and in the capacity of holder of power of attorney of respondents No. 2, 3 and 4, vide power of attorney dated 17.12.1998, executed attorney in favour of Padam Prakash son of Raghunandan, as a holder of general power of attorney in respect of disputed property.
5. The petitioners contested the matter, denied any valid attorney in favour of respondents No. 5 and 6 and any relationship of landlord and tenant with them, through written statement dated 9.12.1999. It is also said that there was no compliance of Rule 17 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules, 1972"). The respondents No. 1 to 4 did not adduce any evidence either by filing their own affidavits or otherwise and instead an affidavit was filed by Padam Prakash, father of respondents No. 5 and 6, stating that he is the holder of power of attorney executed by respondents No. 1 to 4 and that a registered agreement to sell dated 10.3.1999 has been executed in favour of respondents No. 5 and 6 and that the applicants are financially strong having financial capacity to bear expenses to be incurred in property demolition and reconstruction etc. He filed income tax returns and bank accounts of himself to show sound financial position of respondents No. 1 to 4.
6. The Small Cause Court, Meerut vide judgment dated 22.2.2002 allowed the application, filed u/s 21(1)(b) of Act, 1972. It had treated affidavit of Padam Prakash, holder of power of attorney, as affidavit of respondents No. 1 to 4 themselves and considering the same, as also the affidavit of Smt. Shama Mehra (Architect) and one Vijay Kshetrapal, held that disputed building is in dilapidated condition. Thereafter relying upon affidavit of holder of power of attorney and his own bank statement, i.e., Padam Prakash, it held that applicants i.e., respondents No. 1 to 4 have enough financial capacity to bear expenses of demolition and reconstruction and accordingly allowed application. There against petitioners preferred Rent Control Appeal No. 70 of 2002, which has been dismissed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 4, Meerut vide impugned order dated 10.4.2006, though the operative part of Trial Court''s order has been slightly modified, which, for the purpose of present dispute, is not relevant.
7. It is contended that the owner-landlord did not adduce any evidence whatsoever and on the evidence adduced by power of attorney holder and that too in respect of himself, the Courts below have allowed application filed u/s 21(1)(b) of Act, 1972, which is patently illegal. An "agreement to sale" does not confer any ownership right and the property continued to be owned by earlier owner. Similarly a holder of power of attorney represent the owner himself but that does not mean that the status and position of power of attorney, individually, can be looked into as that of the owner, and this approach of Courts below is patently illegal.
8. The first question which has to be looked into, in this matter, is, as to the effect of execution of an agreement to sell by a power of attorney holder.
9. Sale of immoveable property is defined in section 54 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1882"). It says that sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part promised. The procedure to give effect to sale of immoveable property is also stated in the aforesaid provision. Section 54 as amended in State of Uttar Pradesh clearly provides that such transfer can be made only by a registered instrument. Then there is a provision for "contract of sale" also and as amended in State of Uttar Pradesh, this also required to be a registered instrument. Since the sale can be effective only by registered instrument of sale of immoveable property, the property itself shall pass on to vendee and the sale is complete as soon as the deed is registered and not otherwise.
10. In
11. Be that as it may, whenever it would be executed, only then one can say that sale is complete and not otherwise.
12. Now I come to the legal status and consequences flowing from document, namely, the agreement for sale or contract for sale.
13. The agreement for sale or contract for sale, by itself is not an instrument giving effect to sale of immoveable property. The title to property agreed to be sold continued to vests in the vendor, in case of agreement for sale, but in case of sale, title or property vests with purchaser. In other words an agreement for sale is an executory contract whereas sale is an executed contract. An agreement for sale does not create an interest in the proposed vendee in the suit property but only creates an enforceable right in parties. An agreement for sale of property, and promise to transfer the property convey the same meaning and effect in law. A promise to transfer property is an agreement for sale of property.
14. In
15. Again in
16. In English Law, there is recognition of two classes of ownership, legal and equitable but this has not been recognized in Indian Law. Here the Legislature has recognized, in its wisdom, only one owner. There has been a catena of authorities including that of Privy Council in
17. It is thus evident that the law as it stand is very clear that contract for sale would not make the purchaser/vendee to be owner in equity of estate so long as the sale-deed is executed and registered. Mere execution of contract for sale by itself would not create any right or interest in property.
18. In
...a mere contract for sale of immovable property does not create any interest in the immovable property and it therefore follows that the rule of perpetuity cannot be applied to a covenant of pre-emption even though there is no time limit within which the option has to be exercised.
(Emphasis added)
19. The Court also noticed, when agreement itself recited with that sale-deed would be executed within three years, the purchaser had a right to sue for specific performance and this by itself mean that agreement for sale does not create any right or interest in property.
20. In
10. ...the law in India does not recognise any such estate. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act in specific terms provides that a contract for sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Such contract is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document in the form of sale-deed to be registered in accordance with law. In other words, a contract for sale is a right created in personam and not in estate, No privity in estate can be deduced there from which can bind estate, as is the position in cases of mortgage, charge or lease. Of course, such personal right created against the vendor to obtain specific performance can ultimately bind any subsequent transferee who obtains transfer of the property with notice of the agreement of sale.
11. Till, therefore, a decree for specific performance is obtained, the vendor or a purchaser from him is entitled to full enjoyment of the property. In fact, even if a decree for specific performance of contract is obtained, and no sale-deed is actually executed, it cannot be said that any interest in the property has passed.
21. In
7. ...a contract for sale does not, by itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Such contract is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document in the form of sale-deed to be registered in accordance with law. In other words, a contract for sale is a right created in personam and not in estate. No privity in estate can be deduced therefrom which can bind the estate, as is the position in cases of mortgage, charge or lease. Of course, such personal right created against the vendor to obtain specific performance can ultimately bind any subsequent transferee who obtains transfer of the property with notice of the agreement of sale. Till, therefore, a decree for specific performance is obtained, the vendor or a purchaser from him is entitled to full enjoyment of the property. In fact, even if a decree for specific performance of contract is obtained, and no sale-deed is actually executed, it cannot be said that any interest in the property has passed.
22. A Division Bench in
6. In our opinion, the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that as a result of agreement to still dated the 1st May. 1970 in respect of the properly in question, entered into between the petitioner and M/s. Goodwill India Limited, the petitioner had acquired a ''vested right'' not only in the property in question bill also to claim a ''No Objection Certificate'' on that basis, is devoid of substance.... In
(Emphasis added)
23. A person who has contracted to buy land is not the owner of any interest in the land and is, therefore, not competent to apply to set aside an execution sale of the same land.
24. Section 54 itself says that a contract for sale does not create any interest in or charge upon such property. This is what has been noticed by this Court in Indira Fruits and General Market, Meerut v. Bijendra Kumar Gupta AIR 1995 All 316.
25. In other words, a person having an agreement for sale in his favour does not get any right in the property except the right of litigation on that basis. Sometimes it is also described that a contract for sale is merely a document, creating a right to obtain another document.
26. In
27. Similarly, the power of attorney executed in favour of Padam Prakash, father of respondents No. 5 and 6 for collecting rent also does not confer any ownership upon him and he also would not become landlord in his own capacity.
28. In any case, the authorization of collection of rent at the best can be said to be an interest creating in respect to property in dispute but not that any interest was created in property. Whatever may be the contention, but it cannot go to the extent of claiming that stipulations contained in agreement for sale went to the extent of creating right and interest of respondents No. 5 and 6 so as to confer upon them any indicia of ownership of property in dispute or permit them entry into shoes of real owners.
29. Now coming to the second aspect, when the landlords were respondents No. 1 to 4, could bank statement and other financial documents of Padam Prakash, holder of power of attorney can substitute real owners, for the purpose of determining whether real owners were financially strong enough to undergo the expenses of demolition and reconstruction. In my view, the documents relating to Padam Prakash were totally irrelevant. He was only authorized to collect rent from tenants in the building in question as per the case set up by him. The landlords continued to be respondents No. 1 to 4.
30. The definition of "landlord" u/s 3(j) reads as under:
(j) "landlord", in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building, were let would be, payable, and includes, except in Clause (g), the agent or attorney, of such person.
(Emphasis added)
31. The definition of "landlord" is inclusive in the sense that it is extended to "agent" or "attorney" also. But for the words "agent" or "attorney" of such person, as stated in section 3(j) of Act, 1972, it may not be doubted that definition of "landlord" otherwise refers to the owner of building or a lessee of the building, who inducts a person as tenant and, therefore, rent is payable to such a person, namely, the owner or lessee (principal). The term "rent payable" means, as a matter of legal right. One can enforce his claim for realization of rent from tenant. The term "payable" means payable in law. "Payable" means someone who, in law, has right to receive, and can enforce such right. Such a right undoubtedly shall vest in the owner of building or co-owner of building. I do not find that qua owner, there can be any two opinions.
32. Next is, there may be a situation where an owner leased out his premises to a person with a further right of sub-lease. In such a case a sub-lessee would be liable to pay rent to the principal lessee inasmuch as vis-�-vis sub-lessee the principal lessee would stand in the shoes of lessor and would be entitled to receive rent, therefore, rent would be payable to him. But when sub-lessee leased out premises to anyone else, in that case he would become a landlord to whom rent is/would be payable.
33. The only expansion and deviation from the normal capacity of landlord as owner, as discussed above, provided by section 3(j) is by extending the term "landlord" to the "agent" or "attorney" of such person, i.e., the landlord to whom rent is payable.
34. In other words it can be said that a landlord (owner) to whom rent is payable, if has authorized an agent or attorney for the aforesaid purpose of collection of rent, such agent or attorney qua tenant, would also satisfy the definition of landlord u/s 3(j) of Act, 1972 against all others but not the real owner.
35. It goes without saying that a definition Clause is applicable whenever the term "landlord" has been used in the statute, unless the context otherwise requires. The context in which the term "landlord" has been used can be classified in more than one. The first is in the context of collection of rent. A rent would be payable in respect to a building to owner of building and he would undoubtedly qualify and satisfy the term "landlord". Then comes a lessee having right to further lease out the building and qua the person to whom he let out the premise, such sub-lessee would be ''landlord''. Then comes the third category. If such owner of building has authorized an agent to collect rent, vis-�-vis tenant, such agent of owner of building would also be a landlord within section 3(j) of Act, 1972. Similar is the position in respect to attorney.
36. Then comes the capacity in which an action can be taken or may be taken against a tenant. Section 21 permits a landlord to move an application. Where the owner is the landlord the mere fact that subsequently another person has been authorized only to collect rent, that would not render such authorized person to be a landlord or owner of the premises in dispute to whom the rent is payable. Here the term "payable" is in the context of status of the person vis-�-vis the premises in dispute. Looking to wider perspective of the statute, if a ground to evict tenant as enumerated in section 21(1) exist, a suit can be filed by owner of premises and he can also get the suit filed through his agent or attorney.
37. The authorization of agent or attorney is to act on behalf of principal. Therefore, it would have to be seen, whether such an agent or attorney can act on his own without keeping his Principal at forefront. One of the problems which may arise in case, a suit is allowed to be filed only by an agent or attorney, on the touchstone of fact that though he satisfies the definition of "landlord" u/s 3(j), but a complex situation may arise when such attorney or agent dies during pendency of case. The heirs and legal representatives of such agent or attorney cannot satisfy on their own, definition of "landlord" unless they are also, subsequently, so authorized by landlord, i.e., the owner, to act his/their agent or attorney. The substitution of heirs or legal representatives of agent or attorney, therefore, cannot be justified since they will have no cause of action or authority to continue to proceed against tenant. In a Court, a party may act through a recognized agent or attorney, as is provided under Order III, Rule 1, C.P.C. but here also the context in which this provision is made is different.
38. A second situation may arise when we come to the proceedings u/s 21. Here an application can be filed by a ''landlord'', in case he requires the building, bona fide, for demolition and new construction, or for occupation by himself or any member of his family. Here the term "demolition", "new construction" and "occupation" all refers to the capacity of a person, who, in law, has the status to do so. A demolition of a building shall result in cessation of relationship of tenant and landlord unless it is a case covered by section 24 of Act, 1972. Moreover, an agent or attorney, authorised to let out a building and collect rent, cannot be held competent to seek demolition of such building.
39. A building can be demolished under the orders of owner of building, or, if there is a statutory authority and in exercise of its power under some statute, if such a situation has arisen, vide a statutory order, but not by a stranger. However, such power of demolition or new construction can be exercised by owner through an agent or attorney but here the agent and attorney do not have their independent status as such, even though, they may satisfy definition of "landlord" but they stand to represent the owner.
40. Therefore, vis-�-vis tenant, the agent or attorney, who satisfies definition of "landlord" u/s 3(j), would be a person who holds authority as agent or attorney, to represent the true owner of property, to do or not to do, or to act or not to act, in a particular manner, as authorized by owner. The attorney and agent by himself cannot claim to be the owner of property and simultaneously to claim that they satisfy definition of "landlord".
41. In the context of the words "occupation by himself or any members of family" there is a divergence in the opinion; whether these words would apply to anyone and not confined to only owner of property.
42. One of the earliest decision in this regard is
''Landlord'' as defined in section 3(j) of the Act in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building, were let would be payable and includes, except in Clause (g) the agent or attorney, of such person. In cases where there is a privity of contract between two persons in pursuance of which rent is payable by one person to the other in respect of a building occupied by him in the capacity of a tenant, the person to whom rent is payable, in view of the agreement, would be the landlord of the person by whom the rent would be payable irrespective of the fact as to who was the actual owner of the property. It would be a case covered by the first part of the definition viz., the landlord would be such person to whom the rent of the building is payable. The position in law would, however, be different of an accommodation falls vacant and the question arises as to who is the landlord to whom notices as contemplated by Rules 8 and 9 of the rules aforesaid are to be given before passing an order of allotment. At this stage the second part of the definition would be attracted, viz., the landlord would be the person to whom rent, if the building were let, would be payable. It may be emphasised that in either event landlord would be such person to whom rent is or would be payable as the case may be and not the person by whom rent is physically collected on behalf of the landlord would himself become the landlord. Who would be the person to whom rent, if the building were let, would be payable is the crucial question. It would be the person authorised to let out the building and to recover rent from the tenants. Normally such person would be the owner of the building. However, if the owner has entered into a contract with some other person authorising him to let out the vacant building and to recover rent from the tenants either as his agent or attorney it may be that person who would be called landlord within the definition of the said term under the Act. Similar may be the case when for the time being either by an order of the Court or by operation of some law the right to let out the building and recover rent from the tenants vests in some person other than the owner.
(Emphasis added)
43. Then in
44. The next decision is Prem Chandra Pachit v. Second Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and others 1978 ARC 394, a decision by Hon''ble K.C. Agrawal, J. Therein Prem Chandra Pachit was not owner of building. He claimed to have obtained a Theka of building so as to use the same as lodging house. He filed an application u/s 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972 for eviction of one, Ram Lal, a tenant in the building. An objection was raised that Prem Chandra Pachit being not an owner of building, was not a landlord so as to get a right to file application u/s 21(1)(a) of Act, 1972. The Court held that Sri Prem Chandra Pachit being only manager, did not satisfy requirement of section 21(1)(a) which contemplates that an application can be filed only by a landlord, who needs the accommodation for himself or a member of his family. He (Prem Chandra Pachit) was not member of family of landlord, i.e., the owner of building.
45. The comes a decision of Apex Court in
Therefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision enacted in section 11(1)(c), the person claiming possession on the ground of his reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression landlord in its wide amplitude cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of section 11(1)(c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the sub-section. By restricting the meaning of expression landlord for the purpose of section 11(1)(c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can seek possession for his own use. The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the buildings for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for whose benefit he holds the building. The second Clause contemplates a situation of trustees and cesti qua trust but when the case is governed by the first part of sub-clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 11, the person claiming possession for personal requirement must be such a landlord who wants possession for his own occupation and this would imply that he must be a person who has a right to remain in occupation against the whole world and not someone who has no subsisting interest in the property and is merely a rent collector such as an agent, executor, administrator or a receiver of the property. For the purposes of section 11(1)(c) the expression landlord could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore, a landlord within the expanded inclusive definition of the expression landlord, nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants to personally occupy the house. He cannot claim such a right against the real owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants possession of the premises for his own occupation. That can be the only reasonable interpretation one can put on the ingredients of sub-clause (c) of section 11(1) which reads: "Where building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for Ms own occupation...." Assuming that the expression ''landlord'' has to be understood with the same connotation as is spelt out by the definition clause, even a rent collector or a receiver of the property appointed by the Court in bankruptcy proceedings would be able to evict the tenant alleging that wants the building for his own occupation, a right which he could not have claimed against the real owner. Therefore, the explanation to Clause (d) which cuts down the wide amplitude of the expression ''landlord'' would unmistakably show that for the purposes of Clause (c) such landlord who in the sense in which the word ''owner'' is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant for his own occupation.
(Emphasis added)
46. Here in the above case, the Court read the explanation to be only classificatory but on principle held that eviction proceeding must be initiated by a landlord, who is the owner of property.
47. Then comes a decision of learned Single Judge (Hon''ble K.C. Agrawal, J.) in Smt. Sughra Begum v. Sri Ram and others 1983(2) ARC 143. Following Apex Court''s decision in M.M. Quasim (supra), the Court in paras 8 and 10 said:
8. ...Under section 21 a landlord can move an application for occupation by himself or any member of his family. The fact that only a person who is entitled to occupy can alone move an application indicates that. one who is not entitled to occupy or has no right to occupy in his own right cannot apply for release u/s 21. An agent or attorney of an owner of the house may realize the rent of the house in respect of which power is conferred upon him by the owner to do so and for that purpose he may be considered to be landlord within the meaning of that expression defined in section 3, but such a person would not be entitled to more an application u/s 21.
10. ...For being entitled to apply u/s 21(1), that person must be entitled to occupy the premises in his own right. The expression "occupation for himself or for family members" has been deliberately used by the legislature to manifest its intention that the landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building.
(Emphasis added)
48. In Naseeruddin and others v. Prescribed Authority, Meerut and others 1988(1) ARC 517, Hon''ble R.P. Singh, J., in para 5 of the judgment also took the view, "thus an agent or attorney of an owner of a house may realise the rent of house but such a person would not be entitled to make an application u/s 21(1)."
49. The above phrase in section 21(1)(a), in the context of bona fide need of persons, for whose benefit such application can be filed, the definition of family was given an expansion, in some authorities, namely, Misri Lal v. Special judge (Additional District judge), Gorakhpur and others 1988 (2) ARC 430. Hon''ble R.K. Gulati, J., extended it to the domestic servants of landlord. The Court said, though technically, he may not satisfy the definition of family, u/s 3(g) of the Act yet it may be included in spirit. Similarly it was extended to mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, grandchildren etc.; but in the context of the meaning of the word "landlord", who can initiate the proceedings, the position remains slightly complex.
50. In
7. ...The word ''landlord'' in the context of section 21(1)(a) will mean only such person who is not only entitled to realise the rent but also has a right under law to occupy for his personal use and such person alone can file application u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act. Respondent No. 4 is owner and landlord of the premises in question and if she has authorized her husband to realise the rent, he cannot file an application for release u/s 21(1-A) of the Act in his own right.
(Emphasis added)
51. In
The term "landlord" in section 21(1-A) of the Act connotes landlord in the sense of being the owner of the building.
52. In
10. There is no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition as submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. A person who has been authorised to realize the rent on behalf of the landlord becomes the landlord as contemplated u/s 3(f) of the Act. But the said agent cannot file a release application for his own need or for his family members u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act inasmuch as he is hot the owner of the premises in question. The expression "occupation for himself or for family members" as provided u/s 21(1) of the Act means that the person must be entitled to occupy the premises in his own right. Obviously, the agent is not authorized to occupy the premises in his own right. Therefore, the agent could not file an application for release of the premises for his own personal need.
(Emphasis added)
53. A discordant note, I find in
20. In the cases of Smt. Sughra Begum, Smt. Ved Rani Viwan and M.M. Quasim (supra), this Court held that an ''agent'' or such other person cannot maintain release application u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act. The facts of the above cases are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand. In the present case in hand. ''Kunj Behari Tewari'', who filed release. application, was authorised to realise rent as ''landlord'' and thus his status as the owner/landlord of the accommodation as already discussed above, cannot be questioned or assailed in the present proceedings.
(Emphasis added)
54. For the purpose of section 21 this Court finds that when statute says that a landlord can file application, it does not appear that an application can be filed by a mere agent or attorney or he can substitute the real owner of landlord for the purpose of adducing evidence in his own context instead of the real owner/landlord. If the tenant has been inducted by owner and he is the landlord it cannot be accepted that his tenancy can be terminated by an agent or attorney or he can succeed in a proceeding by showing his own status and position instead of the real landlord. When the statutes says that financial capacity of "landlord" has to be seen, it means the person who has inducted tenant in the building. When more than one person satisfies the definition of landlord, it is the person who has better right and title over property, who would exclude others. The right to get a building demolished and reconstructed cannot be allowed to be exercised at the instance of a person who has been authorized to collect mere rent though he has no authority over the building in dispute as such. Here the authority of the person concerned must be more than the mere collection of rent. I am not equating the word "landlord'' with "owner" as such but it has to be looked into in the context of the matter.
55. The submission, in the manner it is sought to be advanced, I find difficult to accept. The definition of "landlord" contained in definition clause has to be read in the context as discussed above. When somebody is authorised to collect rent, he is merely a collector of rent. The rent though is payable to him, in view of instructions issued by landlord-owner, to the tenant, that the rent should be paid to such an agent or attorney, and, in that sense, the agent or attorney may also be included or covered within the definition of "landlord", but his status is fortuitous and with the change of instructions of landlord-owner to tenant, he may/can loose such status at any point of time.
56. There may be another case where an owner has authorised or appointed an agent or attorney to deal with his property in any manner, i.e., let out by inducting tenant, collect rent and do other such functions as are required ill the facts and circumstances. A tenant inducted by such an agent or attorney, may not claim his direct relationship of landlord-tenant vis-�-vis the principal landlord, i.e., owner but for such a tenant it is the agent and attorney who, assumes in its entirety, the capacity of "landlord" for all purposes.
57. Therefore, the term "landlord", as defined, has to be read in the context and that is how the definition clause also provides. It depends on the cumulative reading of statutory provisions, the intention, object and import of statute, and the purpose making provision. No universal principle can be applied hereat.
58. Recently, in the context of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the "East Punjab Act, 1949") the question, whether the term "landlord" will include only the owner or others came to be considered in
Section 2(c).--''landlord'' means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who subjects any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord.
59. It is a very wide definition which includes any person having status of various shades. It is in this context, and interpreting definition of "landlord", in aforesaid statute, the Court in para 7, said:
7. A perusal of the provision, quoted above, shows that the following categories of persons fall within the meaning of landlord: (1) any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land; (2) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person; (3) a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner authorised under the Act and (4) every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord. Among these four categories of persons, brought within the meaning of ''landlord'';, Mr. Sharma sought to derive support from the last category. Even so that category refers to a person who derives his title under a landlord and not under an owner of a premises. For purposes of the said category the transferor of the title referred to therein must fall under any of the categories (1) to (3). To be a landlord within the meaning of Clause (c) of section 2 a person need not necessarily be the owner; in a vast majority of case an owner will be a landlord but in many cases a person other than owner may be as well be a landlord. It may be that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord under the Act need not be the owner. It may be noted that for purposes of the Act the legislature has made a distinction between an owner of a premises and a landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of the Act.
60. The Court also noticed its earlier decision in M.M. Quasim (supra), and in para 11, while distinguishing aforesaid judgment, said, that to understand the observation in a judgment, it is necessary to look into the factual context and the provision which has fallen for consideration of Court. It also observed that looking to the wide definition of "landlord" u/s 2(c) of East Punjab Act, 1949 and having regard to the width of language and also the fact that there is no other provision in the Act to restrict its meaning for the purpose of section 13(3)(a) to an owner of premises alone, there was no reason to confine it to the owners only.
61. The above decisions fortify the view now being taken that a person when would satisfy the term "landlord", has to be looked into, in the light of statutory provisions, and in the context of other provisions of the Act concerned and the relevant facts of the case in hand. No universal principle can be applied in this regard.
62. In the present case Padam Prakash was a stranger for the purpose of adducing evidence before Courts below. He was though authorized to collect rent but wherever the statute required evidence in the context of landlord, the evidence has to be adduced in respect of respondents No. 1 to 4 and none else. Admittedly, the income tax return, bank statements etc. which have been considered by Courts below, in order to record a finding with respect to financial condition in favour of landlord, it has relied on such documents which pertain to Padam Prakash who was a total stranger in that proceedings and, therefore, in my view the Courts below have decided the matter without having any valid and lawful evidence at all and, therefore, the impugned judgments suffer serious error of law, inasmuch as the application u/s 21(1)(b) of Act, 1972 has been decided without any evidence adduced by landlords, i.e., respondents No. 1 to 4.
63. In view of above discussion, the impugned orders cannot sustain. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders dated 22.2.2002 and 10.4.2006 are hereby set aside. No costs.
