Tamil Nadu Tamil and English Schools Association Vs The State of Tamil Nadu and two others

@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER

Judgement pronounced by A.S. Venkatachalamoorthy, J.@mdashThe State of Tamil Nadu passed G.O.Ms.No.6 (School Education C2

Department), dated 13.1.1999, to the effect that from the academic year 1999.2000 all the nursery and elementary Schools shall teach at least

two out of three subjects i.e. Social Studies (History and Geography) Mathematics and Science through the medium of Tamil, apart from teaching

Tamil as a subject. The Government Order imposed some more conditions and announced certain concessions. It is necessary that the English

translation of the said Government Order, as furnished by the State has to be quoted:

GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU

ABSTRACT

Elementary Education-Tamil as Medium of Instruction in Nursery and Elementary Schools-Implementation/Orders Issued.

SCHOOL EDUCATION, (C2) DEPARTMENT

G.O.Ms.No.6

Dated : 13.1.1999

Read:

1. Letter (Ms.) No.377, School Education, dated 28.8.1997

2. G.O.(Ms.) No.421, School Education, dated 27.11.1998

-------

ORDER

The following orders are issued in continuation of the orders issued in G.O.Ms.No.421, School Education Department, dated 7.11.1998.

1. The Government direct that from the academic year 1999-2000, at least two out of three subjects, that is, Social Studies (History and

Geography), Maths, and Science shall be taught through medium of Tamil apart from teaching Tamil as a subject in Nursery and Elementary

Schools.

2. From the ensuing Academic Year, Recognition for the Nursery and Elementary Schools which are already approved by this Government will be

renewed only to those Schools which teach two out of three subjects mentioned above through the medium of Tamil.

3. Apart from giving 50% concession towards the recognition fees as specified in the G.O. second read above, the students who study in those

Nursery and Elementary Schools which teach through medium of Tamil, will be issued Text Books free of cost.

(By order of the Governor)

M.A. Gowrishanker,

Secretary to Government.

2. The validity of the said Government Oder viz., G.O.Ms. No.6 (School Education C2 Department), dated 13.1.1999 was questioned on various

grounds by some Nursery and Primary Schools (nine in number), all functioning in one District viz., Tirunelveli District by filing Writ Petitions i.e.

W.P.No.5313of 1999 etc.,.

3. While those writ petitions were pending a Tamil Association known as Tamil Sandror Peravai'' which will be hereinafter referred to as

Association), claiming that on behalf of the said Association the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu was met on 21.11.1998 and it made three demands

and that inspite of the fact that several times the said Association reiterated its demands, the same have not been implemented by the State of Tamil

Nadu, sent a communication, dated 12.4.1999 informing the Chief Minister that about one hundred Tamil scholars would observe indefinite fast

from 25.4.1999, if the said demands are not met by them.

4. The details of the three demands as translated by the State can be set out as hereunder:

1. All Educational Institutions in Tamil Nadu should have only Tamil as the medium of instruction upto V Standard. From VI Standard onwards,

English should be taught only as a language subject at all levels;

2. As the text books in Tamil are already available in the stage of introduction in all departments of High Education including Engineering, Medical,

Law and Technologies, Tamil should be introduced as the medium of instruction from the ensuing academic year in all the above field.

3. The priority in employment shall be given to those who nave studied through Tamil Medium of Instruction in the Government /Government

Undertaking Departments.

5. Thereafter, the Government of Tamil Nadu passed G.O.Ms.No.117 (School Education C2 Department) dated 3.5.1999 and the English

translation of the said Government Order, as furnished by the State of Tamil Nadu is as under:

GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU

ABSTRACT

Education-Implementation of Tamil Medium of Instruction from Nursery to Higher Education Level-Constitution of Committee-Orders issued.

School Education (C2) Department

G.O.(Ms.) No.117

Dated: 3.5.1999

Read:

1. G.O.(Ms.) No.421, School Education/dated, 27.11.1998.

2. G.O.(Ms.) No.6, School Education dated, 13.1.1999.

Tamil has been prescribed as a compulsory subject in all Nursery and Government Schools and is being implemented. Besides this. Government

have also decided that approval will be given only to those Nursery Schools, which teach through Tamil Medium. The recognition fees,

endowment fees and approval/renewal fees will be reduced by 50 per cent to all Nursery and Elementary Schools which introduce Tamil as a

subject at all levels and also to those schools which propose to introduce Tamil as medium of instruction. The students studying in these schools

will be supplied with text books free of cost by the Government. Orders were issued in the G.O. read above that these orders will take effect from

the next academic year i.e. 2000-2001.

2. Apart from this, Tamil Scholars have now made the following repre-sentations including introduction of Tamil Medium of Instruction in the

Departments of Higher Education, such as Medical. Engineering, Law and Technologies and to give priority in employment to those who studied

through Tamil Medium of Instruction.

1. All educational institutions in Tamil Nadu should have only Tamil as the medium of instruction upto V Standard. From VI Standard onwards,

English should be taught only as a language subject at all levels.

2. As the text books in Tamil are already available/in the stage of introduction in all departments of Higher Education including Engineering,

Medical, Law and Technologies, Tamil should be introduced as the medium of instruction from the ensuing academic year in the above field.

3. The priority in employment shall be given to those who have studied through Tamil Medium of Instruction in the Government/Government

Undertaking Departments.

2. The Government constitute a Committee with the following Members to examine the above requests;

1. Justice S.Mohan, Retired Justice of Supreme Court - Chairman

2. Dr.V.C.Kulandaisamy,, Former Vice Chancellor - Member

3. Dr.S.Muthu Kumaran, Former Vice Chancellor - Member

4. Dr. Tamilannal - Member

5. Pulavar R.Elankumaran - Member

The Committee shall function as a First Class Committee in all aspects.

The Committee is requested to submit its report before 31.5.1999

Orders regarding the terms and conditions of appointment of the committee Members will be issued separately"".

(By order of the Governor)

M.A.Gowrishankar,

Secretary to Government.

6. The writ petitions viz., W.P.No.5313 of 1999 etc., referred to supra, questioning the validity of G.O.Ms.No.6 (School Education C2

Department), dated 13.1.1999 came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court and this Court by judgment dated 7.6.1999

dismissed the same holding that the said Government Order is valid only for those students, whose mother-tongue is Tamil. Or in other words, the

learned single Judge held that the said Government Order is not applicable to the pupils, whose mother-tongue is not Tamil. Against this judgment,

writ appeals have been preferred by the various Nursery and Primary Schools and these cases also before us i.e. W.A.Nos. 1074, 1075 and

1095 of 1999.

7. A High Level Committee (hereinafter referred to as the committee) headed by Mr.Justice S.Mohan submitted its recommendations somewhere

in June, 1999 to the State of Tamil Nadu. Thereafter, the State of Tamil Nadu passed the impugned Government Order viz., G.O.Ms.No.324 (

School Education (C2) Department), dated 19.11.1999. The full text of the said Government order, as translated by the Slate of Tamil Nadu in

English necessarily has to be quoted:

GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU

ABSTRACT

Education-Committee constituted for Introduction of Tamil as Medium of Instructions from Primary to Higher Level Orders on the

Recommendations of the Committee-Issued.

SCHOOL EDUCATION (C2) DEPARTMENT

G.O.Ms.No.324

Dated: 19.11.1999

Read:

1.G.O.Ms.No.6, School Education, dated 13.1.1999

2.G.O.Ms.No.l 17, School Education, dated 3.5.1999

ORDER

Based on the representations received from the Tamil Scholars, a Committee headed by Mr.Justice S.Mohan was constituted to study the

introduction of Tamil as a medium of instruction from the Primary level to the Higher level. This Committee after discussions with me Tamil

Scholars we well as with the Public, submitted its recommendations to the Government. The Government have examined the recommendations of

the Committee carefully. The views of the Anglo-Indian and Matriculation School Boards were also obtained. After examining the views of the

Matriculation and Anglo Indian School Boards, the Government pass the following orders:-

1. Court has upheld the validity of the executive orders on the policy of the Government on the medium of instruction. The Government consider

that it is not necessary to enact any legislation on this. Orders on the language policy of the Government will continue to be pronounced through

Government orders;

2. In all Schools (Matriculation Schools, State Government Schools, Aided and Unaided recognised Schools) Tamil or Mother tongue shall be the

first language.

3. In all schools from classes 1 to 5 (Matriculation and Schools with the State Board Syllabus) Tamil or mother-tongue shall be the medium of

instruc-tion.

4. The change over to Tamil/mother tongue medium shall be completed within a period of three years. From 2000-2001 onwards, Tamil or

Mother tongue shall be the medium of instruction in the first standard and this shall be extended to higher classes in a phased manner.

5. Students who studied in unapproved/unrecognised schools or through private study shall be admitted to Classes upto 6 based on their perform-

ance in the entrance test conducted at the school level itself.

6. Tamil or mother-tongue shall also be specified as Medium of instruction in the Matriculation School Board Rules, orders amending the rules of

the Matriculation Schools in this regard will be issued separately for students from VI Standard.

7. The first language in all Government aided, unaided approved and Matricu-lation Schools shall be specified as Tamil or Mother tongue.

(By order of the Governor)

M.A. Gowrishankar,

Secretary to Government.

The abovesaid order (i.e.) G.O.Ms.No.324 (School Education C2 Department) dt. 19.11.1999 is impugned in all these writ petitions.

8. Let us briefly set out the various contentions raised by learned Senior Counsel in their own words who appeared and argued in the above case:

A. The impugned Government Order is arbitrary, irrational, vague, inconsistent, unworkable and without proper guidelines apart from being mala

fide and against law.

B. A Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Convention on the Rights of the Child) was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations

on 20th November, 1989 and the Government of India also accepted to this Convention on 11th December, 1992. According to the said

Declaration every one has the right to education; and Article 26(3) of the said declaration is to the effect that the parents have a prior right to

choose the kind of education that will be given to their children. Article 51(c) is of the Constitution of India is to the effect that the State'' shall

endeavour to foster respect for International Law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another. The Apex Court in

Vishka and others v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1997 (7) Supreme 323 has ruled that once the Indian Government accepts the International

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the same shall have the force of law. That being the present legal position, the State has no power to pass

the impugned order.

C. The impugned Government Order which prohibits English from being the medium of instructions and which compels to adopt mother tongue or

Tamil alone as the medium of instructions from Standard I to V with no choice to the parents to educate his children is per se arbitrary and violative

of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India;

D. The impugned Government order which appears to compel Tamil alone to be the medium of instruction is clearly violative/ of Articles 14 and

26 of the Constitution of India, besides Article 30 in the case of a minority institution.

E. Even assuming that the directions of such a nature contained in the impugned Government Order can be validly made by the State, it can only be

made by passing a proper legislation. In fact, the Committee atleast in two places has categorically stated that legislative sanction is necessary.

F. Again the State Government has no legislative competence inasmuch as the State Government has accepted the report filed by the Committee,

which in fact has recommended the introduction of Tamil Medium in the higher standards including colleges and that will be infringing Entry 66 of

the Union List.

G. The Government Order is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in that it handicaps students belonging to numerous

linguistic minorities placing them on par with students having Tamil as their mother-tongue.

H. The Government order is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in that with respect to dignity and quality of life, the children of

linguistic minorities in Tamil Nadu are for ever condemned without choice to the medium of instruction in Tamil. The fundamental rights of the

children conferred under Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India have been violated, more so, because the State failed to take effective

steps as contemplated under Article 350-A of the Constitution of India, according to which every State Government and Local Authority should

endeavour to provide adequate facilities for the instruction in mother-tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic

minorities.

I. Although the Government for the present introduces Tamil/mother tongue only upto V Standard, the preamble of the Government order

envisages step by step total elimination on English language from the education scheme in the State. Hence the Government order is ultra vires of

the constitutional scheme, as laid down in Entry 25 list III relating to Education read with Entry 66 of List I. Hence, the plea of the State

Government that they have not prevented the children who want to prosecute their education from VI Standard onwards in the medium of their

choice is unrealistic.

J. The Government Order is violative of Article 19(1)(a) read with Articles 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e) and Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India. A

combined reading of the said provisions and the various rulings of the Apex Court would show that a citizen shall have the freedom of speech and

expression, which would include the right to educate and to be educated. Such a right has to be understood with reference to the management and

the student.

K. The minority institutions have every right to establish and administer the educational institutions and the various rulings of the Apex Court have

made it clear that administration would include the curriculum and syllabus of their choice, which would include a right to choose the medium of

instruction.

L. The fundamental rights guaranteed to the minority institutions under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India certainly will include the right to

teach the subjects in the medium of their own choice. The right conferred under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India is an absolute right

without any restriction whatsoever and that being so, by an executive order the State cannot infringe the fundamental rights conferred under Article

30(1) of the Constitution of India.

M. The right io education is a fundamental right so also the right to safeguard education which flow from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The

impugned order infringes the fundamental right, as the right to choose the medium of instruction is also a fundamental right.

N. The history of the Matriculation Schools would show that they have been treated as a separate category/entity for over half a century and that

being so, the impugned order treating the Matriculation Schools along with other Schools would amount to treating unequals as equals and thus

violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In fact, the State Government has taken a stand in the counter affidavit filed in W.P.No.5313 of

1999 that the Matriculation Schools in the State form a separate category of their own with separate entity and cater to the special educational

needs of the people.

O. Solely on the basis of the report of the committee the impugned Government order has been passed. Hence, it is necessary to examine the

report from various aspects.

P. The very constitution of the committee is bad for inclusion of Mr.Justice S.Mohan. Dr. Tamilannal and Pulavar R. Elankumaran. Similarly, the

persons who should have been included in the committee have not been included in the said committee.

Q. The committee has filed a report without properly investigating and analysing the matter and it prepared the same in a hurried manner within a

short span of time viz., within three weeks. The committee ought to have given notice to all the Matriculation Schools, since the Matriculation

Schools have been following English as the medium of instruction for the past fifty years.

R. The report of the committee is one sided and it only reflects the views of the members of the committee. The conclusions arrived at and

recommendations made therein are totally without any materials.

S. The committee failed to consider the relevant factors and erred in considering the irrelevant factors and even those irrelevant factors do not lead

to the conclusion arrived at by the committee.

T. The impugned Government Order is again illegal, inasmuch as it is not made applicable to the Central Board of Secondary Education and Anglo

Indian Schools, where the medium of instruction is English but the mother-tongue of most of the students is not English.

U. Even though in the impugned Government Order, it is stated that the Government examined the matter in detail in the counter affidavit it has

been categorically admitted that the Government Order was passed solely on the basis of the recommendations of the committee. The

managements, parents and the students are also entitled to question the correctness and validity of the Government Order on the ground of

legitimate expectation. Hence, at best the impuged Government Order can only be implemented/applied to Schools to be started afresh.

V. The impugned Government Order is illegal and arbitrary since it proceeds on misconception of law that the Supreme Court has upheld the

question relating to the medium of Instruction in the case reported in English Medium Students Parents Association Vs. State of Karnataka and

others, , which in fact is not one dealing with the medium of instruction, but one dealing with the introduction of a language to be a subject.

W. The impugned order which seeks to compel to have mother-tongue as the medium of instruction and which prohibits English from being

adopted as the medium of instruction is violative of the fundamental right of expression, guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and not saved by Article

19(2) of the Constitution of India and therefore liable to be struck down.

X. Under the guise of developing Tamil culture, by the impugned Government Order what has been done is that the culture of other students

whose mother-tongue is other than Tamil has been totally destroyed. The impugned order, even assuming is valid in part, inasmuch as there are

inconsistencies, the same cannot be severed and implemented. The impugned order according to the State Government spells out its policies but it

is not a long term policy.

Y. The Government Order has to be declared as arbitrary, as the Apex Court has ruled that the State must state its policy precisely. Or in other

words, the State must spell out its policies in full and on a long term basis.

9. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the Additional Secretary to the Government, School Education Department on behalf of the

respondents. The various claims/allegations made against the respondents have been categorically denied. At the outset it is stated that the

impugned Government Order is just and valid and it has been passed in conformity with the rules and regulations and in the interest of the public in

general. It is further claimed that the Government has power to control, regulate, reform and improve upon and interfere with the functions of the

School in the interest of the general public. According to the counter affidavit, the Government has been noticing a tendency to virtually

commercialise the field of education., It further refers that by the students learning in English medium are over burdened or in other words, learning

the subjects through a medium of instruction in an alien language is giving too much strain to them and practically stands in the way of their

development. That apart, in view of the students studying in English medium, a new generation of students not knowing their mother-tongue and

alien to their culture is emerging and their future prospect is at stake. In fact, there arose a hue and cry among the academician and Tamil savants

that Tamil must be the medium of instruction upto Standard V and English should be taught as a language only to the students from Standard VI.

Considering the fact that the burden of learning the subjects in an alien language on the students, hampers the learning process, the Government

constituted a committee to go into these aspects under the Chairmanship of Hon''ble Mr.Justice S.Mohan (retired Supreme Court Judge). The

above committee, after a detailed study submitted a report and only on that basis the impugned order has been issued. In the counter affidavit, the

claim of the petitioners that all Matriculation Schools are separate entity and that they enjoy a different status and that these Schools cannot be

equated with other Schools are denied. It is claimed that the impugned Government Order apart from giving relief to the students, whose mother-

tongue is not English will also improve the Tamil language and promote Tamil culture. It is also pointed out that the impugned Government Order

does not in any way cause any change with regard to the curriculum and the restriction, as imposed by the State and that the only change is

introduction of Tamil or mother-tongue as medium from Standards I to V. The counter affidavit makes a mention that from VI Standard onwards it

is open to all the students to study in the medium of their choice. The counter affidavit categorically mentions that the Government is fully aware of

the importance of English as an International language and the study of the language is not banned. Before passing the impugned Government

Order, according to the Government, it obtained the opinions from various quarters.

10. Writ Appeal Nos. 1074, 1075 and 1095 of 1999 have been filed against the Judgment of the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No.5313 of

1996 etc., questioning the validity or otherwise of the G.O.Ms.No.6 (School Education C2 Department), dated 13.1.1999. Learned senior

counsel appearing for the appellants in all those cases apart from reiterating the contentions already raised by the learned senior counsel appeared

for the petitioners in these writ petitions also contended that before passing the impugned Government Order viz., G.O.Ms.No.6, (School

Education C 2 Department) dated 13.1.1999, the Government of Tamil Nadu did not even make a study or assessment and that the said

Government Order came to be passed arbitrarily and without any basis/materials whatsoever. Learned senior counsel further contended that as per

clause 1 of the said Government Order even the students, whose mother-tongue is not Tamil are forced to learn two subjects out of three subjects

in Tamil, which is clearly against the Government''s norms/policies viz., that a child should be taught in his/her own mother-tongue.

11. At this juncture for the purpose of completion of the narration, it is necessary to mention that at the time of arguments Mr.Shanti Bushan,

learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State submitted that the mother-tongue of a child should only be understood for the purpose of

these cases as the language which a child is most familiar with. He reiterated by saying that mother-tongue of a child need not. be the mother''s

tongue or father''s tongue. Generally, the parents are the proper persons who can assess and say as to which is the language, that the child is most

familiar with. Learned counsel however, added that some parents out of over- anxiety, not knowing the limitations of the children, compel them to

study in English medium thereby curtailing the child''s growth in every respect Before we take up the issue viz., whether the Government Order viz.,

Nos.6 (School Education C2 Department) dated 13.1.1999 and G.O.Ms.No.324 (School Education C2 Department) dated 19.11.1999 are

liable to be quashed, it is necessary to briefly set out the background of the case:

12. HISTORY Nursery and Primary Schools:

Imparting education for students in the primary schools is done for students from Standards I to V. Prior to that the children study for two years in

classes known as Lower Kindergarten and Upper Kindergarten in Nursery Schools. Schools both primary and nursery ( writ appellants) were

started during 1980 and they were all unrecognised at the time of starting. The Government in order to regulate all the unrecognised nursery and

primary schools decided to bring all unrecognised and primary schools under the control of the Director of Elementary Education and for that

purpose the Government framed ""the Code of Regulation for unrecognised Nursery and Primary Schools"", as per G.O.Ms.No.484 (Education

Department), dated 24.4.1991, as subsequently amended in G.O.Ms. No.349, (Education Department), dated 31.3.1993. By these orders these

approved nursery and primary Schools are allowed to retain their original structure and they are also permitted to levy fees and hence they are not

liable for any grant in aid from the Government. As per Regulation 7 of the said Code, all the primary schools will continue to be fee based and use

English or Tamil or any other (minority) language as medium of instruction, (as subsequently amended). Under Regulation 7(a) Tamil should be

taught compulsorily in all Nursery Schools. In case of pupil, whose mother-tongue is not Tamil and those who wish to study their own language in

second language, Tamil must be made compulsorily as additional language. By G.O.Ms.No. 421 (Education Department), dated 27.11.1998 the

Government issued orders to the effect that the nursery and primary Schools which are going to implement Tamil as medium of instruction in Part

III subjects, will get fifty per cent concession in registration/renewal fee and entertainment fee. Subsequently, the Government of Tamil Nadu

passed another G.O.Ms.No.6 (School Education C2 Department), dated 13.1.1999, directing that all Nursery and Primary Schools should teach

two subjects out of Mathematics, Science and Social Studies (History and Geography) through the medium of Tamil and that approval will be

granted subject to the fulfilment of the aforesaid requirements.

12 A. Matriculation Schools: Coming to the Matriculation Schools, these schools teach classes from Standards I to XII. Some of Schools in fact

started functioning sometime in 1950 or so. The medium of instruction in these Schools has been English. As on 1977, there were 29 Schools in

the jurisdiction of Madras University and one in the jurisdiction of Madras-Kamaraj University. All these Schools are fee-levying and the medium

of instruction in all these Schools has been English. The Schools were under the control of the University and examinations were then conducted by

the University. The Madras University at its meeting of the Syndicate in August, 1975 proposed that all Matriculation Schools which are under the

control of Tamil Nadu State Government be transferred to the Government Department of School Education, on the ground that the University

should concern itself with higher education and it should bear no responsibility to run the Schools. The Government considering the great

importance of the matter convened a meeting of the management of the Matriculation Schools with Government and University on 19.7.1976 and

in the meeting it was decided that the Government will appoint a Director of Matriculation Schools who will be advised by a Board of

Matriculation School and the said Director would take over the control of all these Schools and that the Schools will continue to be fee based and

also continue to use English as medium of instruction. The schools were given liberty to innovate with regard to their curriculum except for the last

two years. It was also decided that Matriculation Schools be encouraged to start the Higher Secondary Course viz.. Standards XI and XII under

the supervision of the Board of Higher Secondary Education. These proposals were communicated to the Syndicate, which also approved the

same. The Government also considered the proposal and passed Orders, forming a separate Board of Matriculation Schools in G.O.Ms.No.2816

(School Education Department), dated 29th December, 1976. Subsequently, the Government passed another G.O.Ms.No.1720 (Education

Department), dated 25.7.1977, in and by which the Government constituted a Board for the Matriculation Schools and further directed that the

Board be constituted with the members mentioned in the said Government Order. According to the said Government-Order, the Director, School

Education shall be the Chairman and three officials of the Education Department to be Ex-officio members. Apart from them, two members to

represent the University three members each on behalf of managements Heads of Schools, teachers and interested persons. The said Government

Order spells out in detail the various conditions of membership, functions etc., The said G.O.1720 dated 25.7.1977 is still in force. In 1980 the

Government also framed a code for Matriculation Schools and according to clause 7 the schools continue to be fee-based and use English as

medium of instruction. Thus since 1950 English has been the medium of instruction in Matriculation schools. During 1976, as already mentioned

there were only 30 Schools which went upto 200 or so in 1987., 1000 in 1992 and 2000 as on date. Now, the impugned G.O. viz.,

G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 19.11.1999 directs all Schools to switch over to Tamil/mother-tongue as medium of instruction for Standards I to V.

13. Introduction (I) The committee as well as the Government even while passing the impugned G.O. proceeded on the basis that mother-tongue

of the child as the tongue of the mother, since, if they really considered or understood it in a different manner, they would have discussed/referred

about it in one context or other. However, at the time of arguments Sri Shanthi Bushan, learned senior counsel appearing for the State submitted

that for the purpose of considering the issue involved in all these cases the mother-tongue should be understood as the language that a child is most

familiar with. We have to consider the entire matter from both points of view.

(II) According to G.O.Ms.No.324, dated 19.11.1999, the Committee was appointed to study the introduction of Tamil as a medium of instruction

from primary level to the higher level. The committee has submitted a report recommending introduction of Tamil/ mother-tongue at all levels

gradually. The Government has accepted the report. The apprehension expressed by the petitioners at the time of hearing is that the Government

will soon pass another G.O. to direct all Schools to teach all subjects upto XII Standard in Tamil/mother tongue. The State has not dispelled such

an apprehension by making a statement before this Court. Now pending these writ petitions, the Government has announced that a committee has

been constituted in order to consider the implementation of the policy in higher education.

(III) Now before this Court, the Additional Secretary to Government, School Education has filed a counter-affidavit in W.P.No.19452 of 1999

and in paragraph 26 it is stated:

The Committee heard the views of the people including Schools and the G.O. issued only based on the recommendations of this committee.

Hence we have to consider whether there has been any arbitrariness or Irrationality or unreasonableness in the orders/actions/conduct of the

committee as well as the Government.

The Apex Court ruled that judicial review is concerned with, reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application of judicial

review is made, but the decision making process itself. It is only concerned with the manner in which these decisions have been taken Tata Cellular

Vs. Union of India, .

The entire discussion can be under two broad heads namely:

A

The terms of reference, constitution, functioning and report of the Committee etc.

B

Validity or otherwise of the Impugned G.O.324, dt. 19.11.99.

A

14. The Chief Minister received a demand dated 12.4.1999 from an Association known as Tamil Sandror Peravai (hereinafter referred to as

Association) mentioning that some Tamil Scholars met the Chief Minister on 21.11.1998 on behalf of the said Association and placed the demands

before him, namely that Tamil must be the medium of instruction in all classes to start with upto V Standard and English must be taught as a subject

only from VI Standard, in professional courses like Engineering, Medicine, Law etc., Tamil must be the medium of instruction and further in

Government undertaking Departments, only those who studied in Tamil medium should be recruited. According to the said communication, inspite

of the representation, dated 21.11.1998 and subsequent reiterations, the Government refused to implement the above proposal and hence about

100 Tamil Scholars would undertake fast from 25.4.1999, if by then the demands are not met. From the perusal of the said communication dated

21.11.1998, we find that a note is put up thereon, dated 19.4.1999, which appears to have been made by the Secretary to the Government,

directing his Department to forward the same with necessary files to the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. From the file produced before this Court

with reference to G.O.Ms.No.117, (Education Department), dated 3.5.1999, we do not find anything except an approved. G.O.

It is not known whether the said Association is a registered one, how many members are in the Association, the object with which the Association

has been formed and finally when it was formed?

Whenever any representation is received by the Government it is normally expected that first it will examine the same in detail and then depending

upon the overall assessment the Government will take further action. It is upto the Government to direct the department concerned to deal with it.

Similarly, if the issue involved is of a major issue and of great public importance and if the Government considers that the concerned Government

Department may not be able to effectively deal with it and a detailed examination by a high power committee is necessary, it then passes

appropriate/suitable orders. So far as the present case is concerned, we find that there is nothing to show from the files that the Government

gathered materials to examine them even prima facie. Practically within two weeks from the date of receipt of the demand from the said

Association, the Government passed G.O.Ms.No, 117, dated 3.5.1999, appointing a committee. That should only mean that:

(a) After receiving the representation, straight-away the Government constituted a committee, without examining it any further because the

Government realised that it is a very serious problem/ticklish issue/major issue and that the committee should be headed by a person like a retired

ludge of the Supreme Court, so that all the implications both for and against can be analysed in detail with the help of facts and figures. Again it is

because such an exercise will take considerable time and accepting these demands, would mean taking a policy decision varying from the one

which has been there for over half a century,

(b) Even though when the Government introduced G.O.Ms.No.6, (School Education C2 Department), dated 13.1.1999 directing that Tamil

should be the medium of instruction to teach atleast two out of three subjects in all primary Schools and categorically made a statement in the writ

petitions namely W.P.No.5313 of 1999 etc., and that it will be extended to all Schools including Matriculation Schools, the Government thought it

absolutely necessary to request the committee also to examine the request whether Tamil must be the medium of instruction in all classes from

Standards I to V. Such a move by the Government would only show that the Government has been having a re-thinking as to the correctness,

enforcibility etc., of G.O.Ms.No.6 (School Education C2 Department), dated 13.11.1999.

15. TERMS OF REFERENCE As already noticed, the Government received a representation from the Association dated 12.4.1999.

Immediately within a couple of weeks therefrom, the Government straightway constituted a committee. The Government Order simply quotes the

demands of the Tamil Scholars and adds that the committee has been constituted to examine the above request. Normally, whenever a committee

is appointed the order should clearly mention the various issues to be examined i.e. Terms of Reference. In the report (in paragraph 2) submitted

by the committee, it has been stated that the committee was constituted to examine the legal issues including the rights of the minorities. We do not

understand for that purpose what can members 2 to 5 of the committee can contribute. We also note that before passing the impugned G.O. the

Legal Department was not consulted as evident from the files. During the course of arguments while at one point of time it was mentioned that the

committee was appointed to ascertain the views in general and to give its recommendations, at a later stage it was mentioned that the committee

was appointed to study about the implementation of the policy of education in the medium of instruction of mother tongue.

16. CONSTITUTION OF COMMITTEE We are fully aware that the constitution of the committee is not under challenge, but inasmuchas the

Government has simply acted only on the basis of the report given by the committee and passed the impugned G.O., this Court has to go into that

question as well to find out the arbitrariness if any, on the part of the Government in constituting the committee.

There are five members in the committee. The fourth member is one Dr. Tamilannal. Admittedly, the said person came out openly saying that he

would undertake fast, unless the three demands of the Association are met. According to the petitioners, the Government which constituted the

committee should have in all fairness refrained from nominating him as one of the members in the committee. A person cannot be a judge of his

own cause. In this context, it is apt to refer to the ruling of the Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, .

In that case what happened was one Naqishbund at the relevant point of time was the Acting Chief Conservator of Forests. The Central

Government constituted a special selection board for selecting the Officers to the Indian Forest Service in the senior scale of pay as well as from

those who were serving the Forest Department of Jammu and Kashmir State. The said Naqishbund was also one of the candidates, seeking to be

selected to the Indian Forest Service.'' Earlier, the other officials who were aggrieved by the promotion of Naqishbund as Acting Chief

Conservator of Forest moved the Supreme Court. They were (1) G H Basu, (2) M.I.Baig and (3) A.N.Kaul. Similarly, the appeals filed by two

other persons, claiming that they were seniors were pending before the Government at the relevant point of time. The said Naqishbund did not sit

in the selection board at the time, when his name was considered for selection, but admittedly, he did sit in the board and participated in its

deliberations, when the names of Basu. Baig and Kaul (i.e) his rivals were considered for selection. Even though the recommendations of the

Board was not final the Apex Court ruled thus:

Para 15: It is unfortunate that Naqishbund was appointed as one of the members of the selection board. It is true that ordinarily, the Chief

Conservator of Forests in a State should be considered as the most appropriate person to be in the selection board. He must be expected to know

his officers thoroughly, their weaknesses as well as their strength. His opinion as regards their suitability for selection to the All India Service is

entitled to great weight But then under the circumstances it was improper to have included Naqishbund as a member of the selection board. He

was one of the persons to be considered for selection. It is against all cannons of justice to make a man judge in his own cause. It is true that he did

not participate in the deliberations of the committee, when his name was considered. But, then the very fact that he was a member of the selection

board must have had its own impact on the decision of the selection board. Further, admittedly he participated in the deliberations of the selection

board when the claims of the rivals particularly that of Basu was considered. He was also party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates

in order'' of preference. At every stage of his participation in the deliberations of the selection board there was a conflict between his interest and

duty. Under those circumstances it is difficult to believe that he could have been impartial. The real question is not whether he was biased. It is

difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore, what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was

likely to have been biased. We agree with the learned Attorney General that a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There must be a reasonable

likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct. It

was in the interest of Naqishbund to keep out his rivals in order to secure his position from further challenge. Naturally, he was also interested in

safeguarding his position while preparing the list of selected candidates.

Para 21 It was next urged by the learned Attorney General that after all the selection board was only a recommendatory body. Its

recommendations had first to be considered by the Home Ministry and thereafter by the UPSC. The final recommendations were made by the

UPSC. Hence, grievance of the petitioners have no real basis. According to him while considering the validity of administrative actions taken, all

that we have to see is whether the ultimate decision is just or not. We are unable to agree with the learned Attorney General that the

recommendations made by the selection board were of little consequence. Looking at the composition of the board and the nature of the duties

entrusted to it we have no doubt that its recommendations should have carried considerable weight with the UPSC. If the decision of the selection

board is held to have been vitiated, it is clear to our mind that the final recommendations made by the Commission must also be held to have been

vitiated. The recommendations made by the Union Public Service Commission cannot be disassociated from the selections made by the selection

board, which is the foundation for the recommendations of the Union Public Service Commission. In this connection, reference may be usefully

made to the decision in 1967 2 QB 864 ..."" (Italic supplied)

17. We find considerable force in the submission made in this regard and we are of the firm view that Dr.Tamilannal should not have been

nominated as a member of the committee, not only on the ground that his participation would create bias but also on the ground that the fairness in

action on the part of the Government must be evident.

18. The other member, who has been nominated is by name Sri R.Elankumaran. He is supposed to represent the Tamil scholars. The Government

should have, when decided to include Sri.R.Elankumaran, a Tamil scholar, in all fairness included other members as well like scholars in Telugu,

Kannada and Malayalam (the regional languages of adjoining States) because according to the Government, the medium of instruction has to be in

the mother tongue, who would have assisted the committee to give worthy recommendations.

19. It is contended that even though the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Justice S.Mohan (retired Judge of the Supreme Court) is respected by

one and all, inasmuch as he has expressed his view in a Judgment, as a Judge of the Supreme Court, though not a ruling on this subject, the

Government should not have requested him to be the Chairman of the committee.

20. Attention of this Court was drawn to G.O.Ms. No. 1720 (School Education C2 Department), dated 25.7.1977 in and by which the

Government took over the control of all the Matriculation Schools and constituted a Board of Matriculation Schools to advise the Director of

School Education (Matriculation Schools). According to the said G.O., the Board shall advise the Director of School Education in charge of all

Matriculation Schools, on all matters referred to it and on all matters pertaining to Matriculation Schools. It further says that the Board shall be

consulted on the courses of study, text books and examinations for Matriculation Schools. The G.O. is further to the effect that the Board shall

constitute a separate committee to get expert advice on such matters like framing of the courses of study and preparation of syllabus etc., The said

G.O. is very much in force. The said G.O. has not been rescinded. We do not find any rhyme or reason in the State Government ignoring the

Board of Matriculation Schools and in not nominating even one of the members from the said Board, while constituting the committee. Apart from

that the Government should have nominated some members, representing the minorities as well. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we

would have appreciated, if child Pschylogists and Neurologists were also nominated. We hold that the appointment of members to the committee

was not in accordance with the acceptable standards and norms, as there were no representatives from the Board of Matriculation Schools/

minorities etc., who are really concerned/affected. The decisions of the Government in this regard and orders passed are arbitrary and irrational.

21. Functioning of the committee and its recommendations: The committee was constituted by the Government on 3.5.1999. The Government

requested the committee to submit its report by 31.5.1999. Even from the report, it is seen that the committee started its work by 15.5.1999. The

report further says that it took into consideration the representations from various quarters and also ascertained the views of the general public on

three days. The report was submitted to the Government somewhere in June, 1999. The impugned G.O.Ms. No. 324 (School Education C2

Department), came to be issued on 19.11.1999. It was pointed out that when the Government thought that a committee should be appointed to go

into and study the matter in detail and even the committee in atleast two places mentioned in its report that the issue referred is a complicated one,

none the less, it completed the exercise within a very short span of time i.e. about three weeks.

22. A reading of the report of the committee would only show that it has only expressed its view in the matter and there is absolutely nothing to

show that it considered the views expressed by others. Not even a single note of opposition or disapproval or dissent is referred to therein. In this

context, we have to necessarily point out that one well known and noted Tamil scholar by name Sri K.A.P. Viswanathan, in his statement has

categorically stated that the child must learn in his/her mother tongue between 21/2 years and 4l/2 years and thereafter he/she can learn in any other

language. Similarly the second member of the committee viz., Dr. V.C. Kuzhandhiswami in his statement issued in the year 1992, when he was the

Vice Chancellor of Indira Gandhi Open University, New Delhi has stated as under:

There should be a realistic approach when dealing with ticklish problem. Tamil should no doubt be made as a compulsory subject of study from

LKG class. English medium may be permitted, if that is the choice of the parents..

(Vide page Nos.78 and 81 of Annexure E filed by the State)

23. The committee should have called for statistics from each and every school in the State and examined the same in detail to find out if the

students are directed to study the subject in Tamil/mother-tongue whether it will affect them in any manner which should mean a time consuming

process and which is absolutely necessary. We can confidently say that nowhere in the report the committee has discussed/considered the

consequences of implementing the policy, the possible difficulties that may arise and the solutions for that etc.,

24. There are certain annexures to the report. One annexure is to the effect that one Joint Director (Education Department) Tamil Nadu met eleven

high officials of the Education Department of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad on a single day i.e. on 27.5.1999, discussed the matter with them and

obtained information from them with regard to the administration and functioning of all the Schools. Similarly, the Joint Director claims to have

visited Bangalore city on 18.5.1999 and met seven senior officials of the Education Department of the Government of Karnataka on the very same

day and discussed the matter with them and also collected facts and figures. We do not understand why the Joint Director should have acted in

such a hasty manner. If a Joint Director of the Education Department had met eleven senior officials of the Education Department on a single day,

we are unable to understand as to how for and to what extent he could have discussed the matter with them. From the files produced we do not

find any details of the discussion or the report submitted by the said officer.

25. The next aspect to be noted is that when the change of policy, which had been there for over a period of half a century, it should have in all

fairness called upon the Board of Matriculation Schools, the Managements'' Association and the Parents'' Association by sending individual

communications to them to appear before the committee on a particular day to express their views. This is because of three reasons:

(1) The Government gave recognition to the Schools without any condition and at every stage since 1950 it has been clearly understood that

English shall be the medium and in fact it has been so;

(2) Parents opted these schools instead of Anglo Indian or C B. S. E., Schoolls;

(3) While constituting the committee the Government ignored G.O.Ms. No.1720 (School Education C2 Department), dated 25.7.1977 in which

the Government clearly laid down that the Matriculation Board shall advise the Director of School Education which consists of representatives

from the Management/Head of the School/public.

At the risk of repetition, it may be stated that the abovesaid G.O. is still in force. Not having done so and completing the enquiry in a short span of

time on a very major/complicated/ticklish issue, in a hasty manner and without considering relevant materials/factors, it cannot be said that the

committee acted in conformity with the acceptable standards and norms and in compliance with the principles of natural justice. One has to

remember that education policy cannot be changed every now and then. It should be precise and complete. It must be a long term policy.

26. Relevant material''s not considered by committee:

Point No.I A typed set has been filed in Writ Petition No.53 of 2000. It contains the details in respect of fifty Schools in Coimbatore District. In

respect of each School statistics has been given as to how many students are studying between Standards I and V and also indicating their mother-

tongue. Let us now take the statistics given with regard to three Schools for discussion and almost the same is the position in other Schools as well;

SRI SAKASWATHI VTOHYALA NURSERY AND PRIMARY SCHOOL, KARAMADAI

S.No. Mother tongue of the pupils Boys Girls Total

1 Tamil 33+17 19+26 95

2 Hindi _ ... -

3. Telugu 15+4 6+6 31

4. Malayalam 3+5 3+3 14

5. Kannada 32+9 32+14 87

6. Rajasthaoi 1+1 2

7. Urdu 4+5 5+2 16

SB1 SOWDESWARI VIDHYALA MATRIC HIGHER SECONDARY SCHOOL HOSKAMPUDUK BOARD,

CO1MBATOSE

(for standards 1 to 5 totally)

S.No. Mother tongue of the pupils Boys Girls Total

1. Tamil 125 93 218

2. Hindi 11 10 21

3. Telugu 96 91 187

4. Malayalam 10 8 18

5. Kannada 45 31 76

6. Gujarathi 2 1 3

7. Sourastra 3 2 5

8. Marathi 2 2 4

9. Urdu 1 1 2

10. Oria 1 ... 1

11. Kongai ..- 1 1

Total 296 240 536

CMS. MATRICULATION HIGHER SECONDARY SCHOOL GANA-PATHY, COIMBATORE

S.No. Mother Tongue of the pupils Boys Girls Total

1. Tamil 379 306 685

2. Hindi 7 7 14

3. Telugu 31 21 52

4. Malayalam 131 112 243

5. Kannada 15 8 23

6. Urdu 2 1 3

7. Maratbi _ 2 2

8. English - 1 1

Total 565 458 1023

(The above statistics given by the petitioner are not disputed by the State)

27. If the impugned G.O. is implemented, then the Schools will have to open various Sections in each standard with different (languages)/medium

of instructions. A school may be able to do it or may not. Then what will be the consequences? There are number of students with Kannada,

Telugu, Malayalam as their mother-tongue, apart from few students with atleast five different mother tongues. More or less atleast fifty per cent

may be the same pattern of students who will join in the School in the years to come. Whether the Schools are available in those places to teach

the students in their respective mother tongue? Whether the Government has endeavoured to discharge its obligations expected under Article

350A of the Constitution of India? The committee has not considered this very important aspect of the matter. Suppose all the Schools in a

particular town conduct classes only in Tamil medium, what is the position of students whose mother-tongue is not Tamil? Can they be

compelled/allowed to study in Tamil medium? If the answer is ''yes'' then is it not that one has to study in his/her mother tongue to preserve culture

(this is the view of the committee as mentioned in the report)? Is it that the State is not concerned with the welfare of others (i.e). other than

Tamilians? Certainly it is not so, because the State has clearly stated in the counter affidavit (in paragraph 20 in W.P.No.604 of 2000) that

the Government has a fundamental duty to ensure that the children of this State are taught in proper medium of language, so that they become

good citizens in due course of time

Whether the parents have to go in search of a Telugu medium School/Kannada medium School as the case may be wherever it is? Then is it by this

a person''s right under Article 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution of India is infringed? Suppose the father of a child is an employee of the

Government or a private concern or a professional, what is to happen? Nowhere in the entire report, the committee took note of the fact that

children with mother-tongue other than Tamil are in this State in considerable numbers and examined as to their future or fate. Similarly suppose

parents have three children studying in a School in the mother tongue medium, say Tamil, and they entertain an idea to move to some northern

State, to improve their prospects/business, whether the fact that these children will have to be admitted in the English medium, if they move to a

different State will dissuade even to a very small/limited extent to take such a decision and whether that in a way restricts parents enjoyment of the

rights conferred under Article 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution of India. We are confident that the committee has not considered these

important aspects of the matter and has only expressed its views.

28. Learned Advocate General submitted that it is common knowledge that whenever a new policy is introduced or there is a change in policy,

there is bound to be some difficulties and the same can be solved. But inasmuch as these are all serious problems, the State cannot be heard to say

that it will face the situation as and when they come and take remedial measures, particularly when the committee and the State Government have

not even applied their mind or taken pains to find out the problems that may arise. Learned Advocate General produced some statistics to show

the number of schools opened by the Government in discharge of its obligations under Article 350A of the Constitution of India. It is not the

question of opening some schools in the entire State. Even on the date of hearing the State could not place materials before us to demonstrate that

there are sufficient number of schools with different mediums in all places and that the G.O. can be implemented without any difficulty. The

committee/Government should have conducted a detailed study of each School/area etc., before taking any decision.

29. In The State of Maharashtra and Another Vs. Lok Shikshan Sansatha and Others, the Apex Court ruled:

So long there is no violation of any fundamental rights and if the principles of natural justice ate not offended, it was not for the High Court to lay

down a policy that should be adopted by the educational authorities in the matter of granting permission for starting Schools. The question of policy

is essentially for the State and such a policy will depend upon an overall assessment and summary of the requirements of residents of a particular

locality and other categories of persons for whom it is essential to provide facilities for education. If the overall assessment is arrived at after a

proper classification on a reasonable basis, it is not the Courts to interfere with the policy leading upto such assessment.."" (Italic supplied).

As already pointed out such an assessment was not done for proper classification on a reasonable basis.

30. Point No.II Learned senior counsel for petitioners, in W.P.No.604 of 2000 while elaborating his arguments explained the point taken by him

by way of giving the following illustration.

Suppose a man, whose mother-tongue is Urdu and his wife''s mother tongue is Telugu and both of them not knowing the mother tongue of each

other, but speak only English at home, can it be taken that the mother tongue of their child is Telugu.

Learned senior counsel would give yet another illustration.

Suppose the parents have a desire to move to some other State (for whatever may be the reason) or to go abroad, is it that their children should

be compelled to study the subjects in Tamil/mother-tongue. Similarly, the parents may desire to send their children to other States or even abroad

for studies, can it_be said that to compel those children to study in Tamil/mother tongue will be in their interests? In fact it is said that in a well

known institution in Rajasthan, which admits students, after conducting Entrance Examination in English and which conducts Engineering and other

courses, at least one hundred students get admission every year from the State of Tamil Nadu. We are afraid, as rightly pointed out by the learned

counsel, no one had bestowed their attention (committee or the State) to consider all these important and relevant aspects before taking a decision.

31. Mr.Shanthi Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu contended that the mother tongue of a child is to be

understood for the present issue/purpose as the language which a child is most familiar with. He further submitted that it need not be the mother''s

tongue or father''s tongue. Learned counsel also mentioned that in families, where both mother and father go for work mostly the children are left in

the pre-nursery schools. It is common knowledge that in such schools children who come from different sections of communities, speak different

languages and in the school they are taught only in English and the children speak only in English. The counsel himself gave one illustration namely

suppose a tamilian (man) marries a Telugu or Kannada or Hindi speaking woman and after a child is bom, obtains divorce and goes back to her

State leaving the child with the husband, it cannot be said that Telugu or Kannada or Hindi respectively has to be the child''s mother-tongue. This

Court put a pointed question to the learned senior counsel appearing for the State that in that event is it not that only the parents will be the best

persons to say which language a child is most familiar with? The learned senior counsel gave the reply that generally it is so. But, however, Mr.

Shanthi Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing for the State would add that there are some parents, who in their anxiety, compel their children

to study in English medium, on a wrong notion that the children who study the subjects in English medium alone will have a bright future, even

though those children are not most familiar with that language and are not able to cope up. Again learned senior counsel added by saying that in

cases, where the parents so compel their children, the school authorities can find it out in no time. This prompted this Court to put another

question, viz., when children are brought to the schools for admission in 1st Standard, many of them out of fear and shyness do not open their

mouth and that being so, how can the school authorities find out Learned senior counsel contended by stating that it could be found out in due

course, but however, he did not elaborate. Obviously, the State has not examined the matter in depth. Even if that is true, the State has to find out

the proper and reasonable remedial measures. The above discussion would show that there has been a clear departure in the stand of the

Government. The committee as well as the Government considered the entire issue on the basis that the tongue of the mother is the mother tongue

of the child. The impugned G.O. was also passed only on that basis. The impugned G.O. has lost its basis and if that is so, what remains in the

impugned G.O.?

32. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP.No.33 of 2000 submitted that it is an admitted fact that before a child is admitted in

a nursery school, many parents send their children to pre-nursery school i.e. when the child complete 2 or 21/2 years and after completing three

years, they are admitted in LKG and on the completion of fourth year, they are taken in UKG. Really during this period of 2.1/2 years, the children

study the subjects only in English language and teachers and other children around them also speak only in English, In such cases, such children can

only said to be most familiar with English and not the tongue of the mother. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the position is same

where people live in multi-storeyed apartments and where people with different religion and mother tongue reside. These children will be most

familiar with English or at least equally familiar with English. We find considerable force in the said submissions. The above materials and very

relevant aspects have not been considered by the committee or the State.

33. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP.No.604 of 2000 submitted that students of Muslim religion need not have the same

mother-tongue, viz., Urudu. There are Tamil Muslims, Telugu Muslims, Kannada Muslims, Kerala Muslims and Marathi Muslims etc., and their

mother tongue is only the respective language indicated. In fact, most of those students do not know Urudu language. If the impugned G.O., is to

be implemented, then, these Schools will have to open a number of Sections in each Standard to teach the subjects in the respective languages.

This very important aspect of the matter has not been taken note of either by the committee or by the Government.

34. At this juncture, learned senior counsel drew our attention to a portion in the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.604 of 2000, wherein in

paragraph 18 it is stated as under :

It is respectfully submitted that since the G.O. has been issued only on a minor issue of medium of instruction at the primary level only and since it

does not involve or interfere with the rights of minorities, no separate order was considered to be necessary in respect of the educational

institutions run by the minorities.

and submitted that the committee and the Government failed to consider the seriousness of the matter/issue involved and they ought to have deeply

examined the matter.

The learned senior counsel is right in his submissions.

The committee as well as the Government failed to take note of the various important material factors as indicated above before

recommending/taking the decision.

35. Point No.III Career opportunities: Population projection for the year 2000 based on 1991 census mentions the population of the State at

roughly about 6,17,74,000. The annual report of the Director of Employment and Training 1998 gives the details with regard to the registered

number of job seekers in Tamil Nadu as under:

Graduates 4, 96, 548

Post Graduates 74, 433

Diploma Holders 1,09,665

6,80,646

Non-Graduates 20,98,144

27, 78, 790

Obviously as on date we have to add a few more lakhs. It is common knowledge that one third of the people in our country are below the poverty

line. Every one would like to see that his children study well and get themselves fixed up well somewhere, so that they can lead a life at least with

minimum necessities viz., food and shelter. It may not be possible for every one to get a job in commensurate with their knowledge and capacity

within the State. They may have to go out of the State or even out of the country to get a suitable job. The students who study in English medium

will have an added advantage than the students who study in Tamil medium. Let us take a simple illustration. Suppose there are two students, after

completing XII Standard coming from lower/ middle class, one studied in English medium and another studied in other medium viz., Tamil or

Telugu and when both of them go for an interview for the post of attender in private concems/banks/three star (and above) hotels etc., certainly the

student who studied in English medium would do well because of the advantage of spoken English. That being so, the career prospects of the

students also must be considered. There are parents who like to send their children to study in good institutions/take up jobs in good firms in other

States and even abroad and by compelling them to study in mother tongue their prospects will be doomed. The job seekers when go to other

States and in abroad will have to face stiff competition. In fact, there is a very old proverb in Tamil which says,

which means ""even go across the sea to earn wealth

The committee did not consider the aspect as to whether compelling the students to study in Tamil/mother tongue would affect the career

prospects of the children.

36. Committee took note of irrelevant materials/factors:- Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners pointed out that the committee has

taken into consideration irrelevant materials/factors while giving its recommendations. Firstly, attention of this Court has been drawn to paragraph

3.2 of the report, wherein it is stated that the students who study in English medium Schools, whose parents are well educated and well placed in

Society perform appreciably but the students coming from the poor/middle class are not able to shine well, because of their family background and

as their parents are not well educated. Then again in paragraph 3.10 of the report, it is stated that because of various factors, such as discipline,

standard of education, good results, excellent infrastructure conducive atmosphere to learn, teachers hardwork etc., most of the parents would like

to admit their children only in those schools, but since such facilities/advantages are not available in the Government/Government aided Schools

parents are rather hesitant to admit the students in those Schools and if those schools are improved certainly, the parents will be inclined to admit

their children in those schools as well. Again, in the very same paragraph, it is stated that even though those who are interested in Tamil language

and who want to educate their children only in Tamil medium, admit their children only in English medium because they have no other go. It is

pointed out that the above three reasonings and others in paragraphs 3.9 to 3.12 of the report even assuming to be true, the question would be

what is the solution? Is that the remedy is to ask every one to study in Tamil/mother tongue? Apart from the fact that these are not relevant

considerations, certainly they do not even, assuming them to be correct, lead us to a logical conclusion that the solution is that the students should

read only in Tamil/mother tongue.

37. Culture:- According to the committee because students whose mother tongue is Tamil, but study in English medium, they forget the Tamil

culture and when they go abroad for taking up employment, after completing their studies in India, they could see that in foreign countries people

live with good culture and whereas these people live without culture. The foreigners also do not respect our people and those who go abroad can

realise it.

The committee further is of the opinion if one studies Tamil deeply and also the Tamil Literature then this situation will not arise. This is one of the

reasons why medium of instruction should be Tamil, according to the committee. The committee has also expressed that the culture is exhibited in

one''s conduct, dress, behaviour and his knowledge in literature which he has learnt in Tamil.

We do not know on what basis the committee has formed this opinion.

The word culture is defined as:

OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY

Improvement or refinement of mind, manners etc., by education and training;

WEBSTERS III NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

: The act of developing by education discipline social experience;

: The training or refining of the moral and intellectual faculties;

: Admittedly in dress and food habits, we have completely changed ourselves;

The remaining are conduct, behaviour and education''

Is it by studying in English medium one will lose his culture?

Is it only by reading in mother tongue (tongue of the mother) one will retain/cherish his culture?

Is it that education /intellectual faculties is /are only with reference to the education one gets in his mother tongue?

Is it that refinement of mind and manners can be only by learning in mother tongue?

True one has to preserve and cherish the culture by his learnings, but it need not necessarily be in his mother tongue alone.

The basic culture that every Indian has to preserve and cherish is:

honesty, integrity, moral values, dedication in work, sacrifice for the sake of the nation, sense of tolerance and cleanliness in public life.

The committee has erred in assuming something without any basis and which is not there and on that criteria made the recommendations. Even

assuming what the committee says is true, the remedy is not to issue the impugned G.O.

Hence after giving our anxious consideration, we are of the firm view that the committee erred in not considering the relevant materials and

considering irrelevant materials.

B

38. Whether G.O.Ms. No. 324 (School Education C2 Department), dated 19.11.1999 is liable to be quashed? and if so for what reasons?

English "" has been the medium of instruction in all the Matriculation Schools right from 1950. In the year 1976 i.e. on 19.7.1976, a meeting of the

Management of Matriculation Schools with the Government and the Madras University was convened by the Vice Chancellor of the University of

Madras. It was decided that the Director of School Education of Government of Tamil Nadu will take over the control of the Matriculation

Schools from the University. Necessary G.O. was issued in this regard. Government also issued G.O.MS.NO. 1720 (Education Department) in

1977, setting up a Board of Matriculation Schools. The Board consists of representatives of Managements of Matriculation Schools,

Headmasters, Teachers and special interests and the department officials. As per the said Government Order, the Board has to advise the Director

of School Education, in charge of Matriculation Schools from time to time on all matters referred to it and on such matters relating to Matriculation

Schools and that the Board shall be consulted on the courses of study, syllabus, text books and examinations for the Matriculation Schools. The

G.O. is further to the effect that the Board shall constitute separate committees for any specific purpose or to get any expert advice on such

matters like, framing of courses of study and preparation of syllabi. At that time, there were only thirty Matriculation Schools. In. 1992, there were

one thousand Schools and as on to-day, there are two thousand Matriculation Schools. The said G.O.Ms. No.1720 (Education Department),

dated 25.7.1977 is still in force. Admittedly, as already pointed out in the committee the representatives of the Managements/Heads of

Institutions/Teachers/ public interest/minorities were not included. When the Government thought that the Board of School Education should take

the advice of the Board of Matriculation Schools even to decide about the courses of study, syllabus, text books etc., the Government could have

in all fairness before passing the impugned order asked the Board of Matriculation Schools, the managements'' association/parents association to

put forth their views/objections for the purpose of considering. This is necessary as could be noticed from the ruling of the Apex Court which ruled:

a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was done so arbitrarily or by an ulterior criteria"". Kumari

Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, .

This fairness expected is lacking and this gives a very strong impression that it was done arbitrarily. At the risk of repetition, it may be stated that

under the impugned order Government changed the policy nearly after half a century.

39. Earlier, we have come to the conclusion that the committee was not properly constituted and the committee took into consideration irrelevant

factors/materials and at the same time failed to consider the relevant materials. We have also held that the committee acted in haste. Now, it is

categorically admitted in the counter affidavit that the Government passed the impugned G.O., only on the basis of the recommendations. That

apart we also sent for and perused the original file. Though two communications received from the Director of School Education are available they

are only in the nature of parawar remarks and there are absolutely nothing to show that the Director of School Education took note of the relevant

factors/materials which we have pointed out earlier. On a careful examination of the entire matter, we are of the clear view that Government also

failed to consider the relevant materials/factors and took into consideration irrelevant materials/factors. In view of this, G.O. has to be quashed as

irrational.

40. According to the G.O., Tamil/mother tongue shall be the medium of instruction in Matriculation Schools and that from 2000-2001 onwards the

medium of instruction should be changed to Tamil or mother tongue in the 1st standard and this should be extended to higher standards within a

period of three years in a phased manner.

41. The learned Advocate General submitted that the Government is going to issue an amendment increasing the period as four years to switch

over instead of three years as mentioned in the G.O.

42. Suppose a child studys in the 1st standard in English medium now (1999-2000), by 2003-2004, he will be in the Vth standard. That is to say

in the normal course, he will be in

1999-2000 1st standard

2000-2001 2nd standard

2001-2002 3rd standard

2002-2003 4th standard

2003-2004 5th standard.

Now as per the G.O. the period granted to the Schools is four years to switch over to Tamil/mother tongue medium (i.e.) 2000-2001, 2001-

2002, 2002-2003, 2003-2004. So, when the child goes to fifth standard he /she will have to read in mother tongue. Or in other words he/she will

study Standard I to IV in English medium, then V standard in mother tongue and again VI standard in English medium. The conditions stipulated in

the G.O. are unworkable and unreasonable by any standards.

43. Learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu submitted that ''mother-tongue'' should be understood as the language which a

child is most familiar with. Learned senior counsel further submitted that generally the parents are the best persons to decide about the same, as

they will only be fully in the know of things. However, it was submitted that the School authorities can find it out if the father or the mother of a

child makes a false statement in that regard. Learned senior counsel also admitted the fact that when the children are taken to the School for

admission in 1st Standard, many of them do not even speak out. If that is so, the question would be as to how the school authorities are going to

decide and when and whether can they be invested with such powers? There are absolutely no guidelines whatsoever in this regard. The impugned

Government Order suffers from vagueness and non-application of mind. In fact, the committee, the impugned G.O. and the counter affidavit

proceeded only on the basis that the mother tongue is the tongue of the mother. There has been a clear departure in the stand of the Government of

Tamil Nadu, as otherwise the G.O. or the counter affidavit would have given certain guidelines to decide/find out the mother-tongue of a child and

hence it has no consistent case. When the Government has understood the concept of mother-tongue in a way different from the one now put

forward before Court by it, the G.O. can only be characterised as arbitrary and suffers, from non-application of mind.

44.There are 41 Anglo Indian Schools (HSS) and (HS) and 194 C.B.S.E.Schools (HSS) & (HS). Totally, in all there are about 2, 16, 852

students are studying. There is no dispute that the medium of instruction therein is only English.

45. The statement made by the petitioners (W.P.No.604 of 2000) in their affidavit is that the mother-tongue of most of the students studying there

is not English. This has not been denied by the State. That should mean that nearly two lakhs students are studying in English medium, even though

their mother-tongue is not English. When two lakhs students are permitted to study with medium of instruction in English the impugned G.O.

directing that all the students in Matriculation Schools must study their subjects in Tamil, /mother-tongue is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution

of India. On this ground also, the impugned G.O. is liable to be struck, down as arbitrary and thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of

India.

46. In view of the G.O., there will be very heavy rush for admission in Anglo Indian and C.B.S.E., Schools. Invariably only rich and influential

candidates alone will succeed in getting admission and the candidates hailing from middle and lower class will only be the disappointees.

47. For all the abovesaid reasons the G.O. is liable to be struck down on the ground that it is arbitrary and irrational and thus violative of Article 14

of the Constitution of India.

48. Even by 1950, there were some Matriculation Schools and the medium of instruction has been only in English. By 1976, the number of

Matriculation Schools rose to 31 then it was 200 or so in 1987, 1000 in 1992 and as on date 2000. Till 1957, those Matriculation Schools were

under the control of the University of Madras. In 1977, School Education and a Board for Matriculation Schools was also constituted to advise

the Director . In this regard, the Government passed G.O.Ms.No.1720 (Education Department), dated 25.7.1977. Even thereafter, those schools

continue to be fee based, using English as medium of instruction. A Code known as Code of Regulations for Matriculation Schools in the State of

Tamil Nadu came into force on 27.9.1980. Clause 7 of the Code reads:

The Matriculation Schools will continue to be fee based and use English as medium of instruction . They will continue to be free as hitherto to

innovate with regard to their curriculum except for the last one year when they prepare students for the public examination.

Clause 10 of the said Code is to the effect that"" the competent authority to grant permission to open a private Matriculation School will be the

Director and the application will be made in the proforma prescribed in Annexure II in the said Code.

In the said application in column 12 the applicant has to mention the medium of instruction. The competent authority has been granting recognition

since; 1957 for the schools. Neither in the 1980 Regulation (in fact even since 1950) nor in the Order granting recognition all these years, there has

been anything to show that the Government reserved any right to change the medium. In other words, the order granting recognition to all these

Schools has been without any condition whatsoever all these fifty years.

49. In these circumstances, it is contended by the various Managements who are before us that they legitimately expected that the medium of

instruct ion, as requested by them in their applications, and which has also been granted and which is also in confirmity with clause 7 of the Code

will not be changed/altered/interfered with. They would also contend that only on that basis they have made vast improvements at the cost of huge

expenditure and if the impugned G.O. is to be implemented, it should only mean their closing down the school or some classes and also retrenching

Teachers, which will result in irreparable loss and untold hardships. Their further grievance is that the State Government without even affording

them an opportunity has passed the impugned G.O. and consequently, the said G.O. is liable to be quashed.

50. Per contra, learned Advocate General appearing for the State would contend that it is not as if the State Government made some

representations and that the managements believed those representations and then acted upon those representations and started the Schools. That

being so, there is no substance in the claim made by the managements.

51. In this context let us refer to some of the rulings of the Apex Court. In Food Corporation of India Vs. M/s. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries,

in paragraph 8, the Supreme Court observed thus:

The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to

consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate

expectation forms part of the principles of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant

factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision making process.."" (Italic supplied.)

In Union of India and others Vs. Hindustan Development Corpn. and others, , the Apex Court ruled.

it is stated that legitimate expectation is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by Courts of revenue and administrative action and its,

creation takes its place beside such principles as the rules of natural justice, unreasonableness, the fiduciary duty of local authorities and in future,

perhaps the principle of proportionality .

Again in paragraph 33. it is observed thus:

A case of legitimate expectation would arise when a body by representation or by past practice aroused expectation which it would be within its

power to fulfil. In a given case where there are certain facts and circumstances give rise to a legitimate expectation, it would primarily be a question

of fact."" (Italic supplied)

In Madras City Wine Merchants'' Association and Another Vs. State of T.N. and Another, , the Apex Court after considering the earlier rulings

summed up as under:

From the above, it is clear that legitimate expectation may arise (a) if there is express promise given by a public authority or (b) because of the

acceptance of a regular practice, a claimant can reasonably expect it to continue and (c) such expectation must be reasonable. However, if there is

a change in policy or in public interest the position is altered by a Rule or Legislation, no question of legitimate expectation would arise."" (Italic

supplied)

The next ruling that can be usefully referred to is one reported in Punjab Communications Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others, , wherein in

paragraph 27, it is observed thus:

The basic principles in this branch relating to legitimate expectation were enunciated by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v.

Minister far the Civil Service, 1985 AC 374. It was observed in that case that for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of the

administrative authority must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (1) he had in the past been permitted by

the decision maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue, to do until there has been communicated to him

some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or...

Again in paragraph 37, the Apex Court observed that

According to the principle of legitimate expectation, if the authority propose to defeat a person''s legitimate expectation, it should afford him an

opportunity to make a representation in the matter.

In that case, the Supreme Court after referring to Madras City Wine Merchants'' Association and Another Vs. State of T.N. and Another, ,

pointed out that as there was change in the policy by legislation the principle of non-arbitrariness was not invocable.

52. It may be pointed out that in the cases with which we are concerned there was only a Government Order and the change in the policy is not by

any legislation.

In the case in Punjab Communications Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others, , after considering various rulings, the Supreme Court observed thus:

The result is that a change in policy can defeat a substantive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on Wednesbury reasonableness. We have

noticed that in Hindustan Development Corporation ease, also it was laid down that the decision maker has the choice in the balancing of the pros

and cons relevant to the change in policy. It is, therefore, clear that the choice of the policy is for the decision maker and not for the Court. The

legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the Court to find out if the change in policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate

expectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made. (Italic supplied).

53. Coming to the present case, as already pointed out the Matriculation Schools have been teaching in English medium for over fifty years. They

have been permitted to continue ever since the date of recognition of all the Schools and that recognition has been granted without any condition.

54. The Managements can be said to be reasonable in claiming that they expected this to continue. It is not necessary that there should have been a

representation by the Government and that the Schools were opened by the management only believing those representations. It is not disputed

that these managements have spent considerable amount in improving their respective schools.

55. In the circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the managements are perfectly justified in claiming that on the principles of

legitimate expectation the impugned order is liable to be quashed which order, we have already found to be irrational, arbitrary and unreasonable.

56. Learned Senior Counsel for petitioners contended that the present G.O. impugned in these writ petitions has been passed by the State

Government by virtue of the powers conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. According to them nothing short of a law in this

regard will be valid and legally enforceable in view of the fact that India is a signatory to the Declaration of Human Rights. In this context, they also

pointed out that the committee itself has in more than two places categorically advised the Government to enact a law. Taking us through

paragraph 1 in the impugned G.O. it was submitted that the statement contained therein that the Court has upheld the validity of the Executive

Orders on the Policy of the Government on the medium of instruction is not correct, as writ appeals have been pending against the judgment of the

learned single Judge since July, 1999 while the G.O. came to be passed in November, 1999.

57. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State contended that the State Government has power to pass the impugned G.O. under Article

162 of the Constitution of India and that in fact on the date of the Impugned G.O. there was no policy of the Central Government that medium of

instruction should be only in English.

58.The universal Declaration of Human rights-convention on the rights of the child was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on

20th November, 1989. The Government of India accepted this convention on 11th December, 1992, which is to the effect that the State

Authorities recognise that every child has an inherent right to life and shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and growth of the

child.

59. Article 26(1) is to the effect that every one has the right to education.

Article 26(2) is to the effect that education shall be directed to the full development of human personality and for strengthening of respect for

human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Article 26(3) lays down that the parents have the right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

60. The Apex Court in People''s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, while considering the scope of Article

21 etc. of the Constitution of India as to whether telephone/tapping is a serious invasion of an individual''s privacy had occasion to consider the fact

of India''s signing to the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights 1966 and its implications. It is necessary to quote certain paragraphs from

the said Judgment:

21. International law today is not confined to regulating the relations'' between the States. Scope continues to extend. Today matters of social

concern, such as health, education and economics apart from human rights fell within the ambit of International Regulations. International law is

more than ever aimed at individuals.

22. It is almost an accepted proposition of law that the rules of customary international law which are not contrary to the municipal law shall be

deemed to be incorporated in the domestic law.

23.Article 51 of the Constitution directs that the State shall endeavour to inter alia, foster, respect for international law and treaty obligations in the

dealings of organised peoples with one another. Relying upon the said Aiticle Sikri, C.J., in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru Vs.

State of Kerala, observed as under (SCC p.333 at para 151)

..it seems to me that, in view of Article 51 of the directive principles, this Court must interpret language of the Constitution, if not intractable, which

is after all a municipal law, in the light of the United Nations Charter and the solemn declaration subscribed to by India.

24. In Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur Vs. Shivakant Shukla, Khanna, J. in his minority opinion observed as under (SCC p 754 para 542).

Equally well established is the rule of construction that if there be a conflict between the municipal law on one side and the international law or the

provisions of any treaty obligations on the other, the Courts would give effect to municipal law. If, however, two constructions of the municipal law

are permissible, the Courts should lean in favour of adopting such construction as would make the provisions of the municipal law to be in harmony

with the international law or treaty obligations. Every statute, according to this rule is interpreted, so tar as its language permits, so\ as not to be

inconsistent with the comity of nations, or the established rules of inter national law, and the Court will avoid a construction which would give rise

to such inconsistency unless compelled to adopt by plain and unambiguous language.

25. In Jolly George Varghese and Another Vs. The Bank of Cochin, Krishna Iyer, J posed the following question:

From the perspective of international law the question posed is whether it is right to enforce a contractual liability by imprisoning a debtor in the

teeth of Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Article reads:

No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.

The learned Judge interpreted Section 51 of the CPC consistently with Article 11 of the International Covenant.

26. Article 17 of the International Covenant quoted above does not go contrary to any part of our municipal law. Article 21 of the Constitution

has, therefore, been interpreted in confirmity with the international law.

Again in Vishka and others v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1997 (7) Supreme 323, the Apex Court while considering the fundamental rights of

Gender equality and the protection required for the women from sexual harassment referred to International Convention and Norms. Suffice to

quote paragraph 12 of the said judgment which reads as under;

12. The meaning and content of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution of India are of sufficient amplitude to encompass all the

facets of gender equality including prevention of sexual harassment or abuse. Independence of judiciary forms a part of our constitutional scheme.

The international conventions and norms are to be read into them in the absence of enacted domestic law occupying the field when there is no

inconsistency between them. It is now an accepted rule or judicial construction that regard must be had to international conventions and norms for

constructing domestic law when there is no inconsistency between them and there is a void in the domestic law. The High Court of Australia in

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teah., 128 ALR 353 has recognised the concept of legitimate expectation of its observance in the

absence of a contrary legislative provision, even in the absence of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution of Australia..

61. The proposition of law laid down in the above rulings is that the rights of Customary International . Law which are not contrary to the

Municipal Law shall be deemed to be incorporated in the domestic law. In this case there is only a government order which directs all schools to

teach the subjects in the Tamil/mother-tongue. As there is no domestic law we have to read the accepted international conventions and norms into

domestic law. That should mean that parents have the right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. Then the impugned

G.O. will be contra and has to be held as not valid in law and enforceable. Accordingly we do so.

62. The next important question is whether the right to education will include the right to choose the medium of instruction and whether the parents

can exercise such a right on behalf of the child.

63. The Preamble of the Constitution reads as under:

''We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign, Socialist Secular Democratic Republic and to secure to all

its citizens: Justice, Social, Economic and Political; Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality of status and of opportunity

and to promote among them all; Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation.''

Article 19 deals with ''Right to Freedom''. It reads thus:

19 (1) All citizens shall have the right-

(a) to freedom of speech and expression;

(b) ----

(c)-----

(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and

(g) to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business.

Article 19 (2) to (6) impose certain conditions:

The next Article that has to be referred to is Article 21 which reads as under:

No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.

Now let us go to Article 39 of the Constitution of India which is also very relevant for our discussion and which reads as under:

The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing-

(a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood:

(b)........ . .

(c)..... .....

(d).........

(e)..........

(f) that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and

youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment..

Article 41 is to the following effect:

The State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education

and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want.

To quote Article 45 which reads thus''

The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education

for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years.

The next Article that has to be referred to is Article 51, which reads as follows:

The State shall endeavour to-

(a) promote international peace and security;

(b)...

(c) foster respect far international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another;

Article 343 of the Constitution deals with the Official language of the Union. Sub-clause (2) of Article 343 is to the effect that for a period of fifteen

years from the commencement of this Constitution, English language shall continue to be used for all the official purpose of the Union for which it

was being used immediately before such commencement.

64. At this juncture reference may also be made to Section 3 of the Official Language Act, 1963, which is to the effect that notwithstanding the

expiration of the period of fifteen years from the commencement of the Constitution, the English language may, as from the appointed day,

continued to be used, in addition to Hindi- for all official purposes of the Union for which it was being used immediately before that day; and for

the transaction of business in Parliament:

Article 348 of the Constitution of India deals with language to be used in the Supreme Court and in the High Courts and the authoritative texts of

all bills to be introduced or passed, as the case may be before the Parliament or Legislature of a State, shall be in English language.

Article 350A is to the effect that it shall be the endeavour of every State and of every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities

for instruction in the mother-tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups;

65. The first aspect to be considered is how the provisions of the constitution should be interpreted. In this regard let us straight-away refer to a

few rulings of the Apex Court:

In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. and Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI), , the Apex Court ruled that the right to freedom of speech and expression

carries with it the right to publish and circulate one''s ideas, opinions and views with complete freedom and by resorting to any available means of

publication, subject to such restrictions as could be legitimately imposed under clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution and though our

Constitution does not expressly provide for the freedom of press, this freedom is included in the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed

under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. In the said judgment, in paragraph 29, the Apex Court observed thus;

It must be borne in mind that the Constitution must be interpreted in a broad way and not in a narrow and pedantic sense. Certain rights have

been enshrined in our Constitution as fundamental and, therefore, while considering the nature and content of those rights the Court must not be too

astute to interpret the language of the Constitution is so literal a sense as to whittle them down. On the other hand the Court must interpret the

Constitution in a manner which would enable the citizen to enjoy the rights guaranteed by its in the fullest measure subject, ofcourse, to permissible

restrictions.(Italic supplied).

The next ruling is one reported in Life Insurance Corporation of India and Union of India and another Vs. Prof. Manubhai D. Shah and Cinemart

Foundation, . Here again, the Apex Court was considering the scope of the Constitutional policy of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed

under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. It may not be necessary to advert to the facts of the said case in detail. Paragraphs 6 and 7 in

the said judgment reads thus:

(6) A constitutional provision is never static, it is ever evolving and ever changing and, therefore, does not admit of a narrow, pedantic or

syllogistic approach. If such an approach had been adopted by the American Courts, the"" First Amendment (1791)."" Congress shall make no law

abridging the freedom of speech or of the press-would have been restricted in its application to the situation then obtaining and would not have

catered to the changed situation arising on account of the transformation of the print media. It was the broad approach adopted by the Court which

enabled them to chart out the contours of ever expanding notions of press freedom. In Dennis v. United States, 1950 (341) U.S. 494, Justice

Frankfurtur observed,

...The language of the First Amendment is to be read not as barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols of historic experience illuminated

by the presuppositions of those who employed them.

Adopting this approach in Joseph Burstyn, Inc v. Wilson, 1951 (343) US 495 the Court rejected its earlier determination to the contrary in Mutual

Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 1914 (236) US 230 and concluded that expression through motion pictures is included within

the protection of the First Amendment. The Court thus expanded the reach of the First Amendment by placing a liberal construction on the

language of that provision. It will thus be seen that the American Supreme Court has always placed a broad interpretation on the constitutional

provisions for the obvious reason that the constitution has to serve the needs of an ever changing society.

7. The same trend is discernible from the decisions of the Indian Courts also. It must be appreciated that the Indian Constitution has separately

enshrined the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution, since they represent the basic values which the People of India cherished when they

gave unto themselves the constitution for free India. That was with a view to ensuring that their honour, dignity and self-respect will be protected in

free India. They had learnt a bitter lesson from the behaviour of those in authority during the colonial rule. They were, therefore, not prepared to

leave anything to chance. They, therefore, considered it of importance to protect specific basic human rights by incorporating a Bill of Rights in the

Constitution in the form of Fundamental Rights. These fundamental rights were intended to serve generation after generation. They had to be stated

in broad terms leaving scope for expansion by Courts. Such an intention must be ascribed to the Constitution makers since they had themselves

made provisions in the constitution to bring about a socio-economic transformation. That being so, it is reasonable to infer that the Constitution-

makers employed a abroad phraseology while drafting the fundamental rights so that they may be able to cater to the needs of a changing society.

It, therefore, does not need any elaborate argument to uphold the contention that constitutional provisions in general and fundamental rights in

particular must be broadly construed unless the context otherwise requires. It seems well settled from the decisions referred to at the Bar that

constitutional provisions must receive a broad interpretation and the scope and ambit of such provisions in particular the fundamental rights, should

not be cut down by too astute or too restricted an approach. See Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. and Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI), ."" (Italic

supplied)

66. In Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India and others Vs. Cricket Association of Bengal and others, , the Apex

Court was considering the issue viz., as to whether an organizer or producer of an event has a right to get the event telecast through an agency of

his choice and whether the Government is entitled to impose any conditions thereon except charging technical fees, service charges etc., In the said

Judgment, the Supreme Court was considering the scope of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court of India in paragraph

20 of the said Judgment affixed its seal of approval of the earlier view of the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India and Union of India

and another Vs. Prof. Manubhai D. Shah and Cinemart Foundation, . From the above rulings it is amply clear that the Constitutional Provisions

must receive a broad interpretation unless the context otherwise requires and that Court must interpret in a manner which would enable all the

citizens to enjoy the rights guaranteed by it in the fullest measure, subject of course to permissible restrictions.

67. The next aspect to be considered as to how the fundamental rights and the directive principles of State policy to be read and understood:

In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956 a Full Bench of the Apex Court consisting of seven Judges while affirming the primacy of

fundamental rights made the following observations:

....Nevertheless, in determining the scope and ambit of the fundamental rights relief on by or on behalf of any person or body the Court may not

entirely ignore these directive principles, of State policy laid down in Part IV of the Constitution but should adopt the principle of harmonious

construction and should attempt to give effect to both as much as possible....

In His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala, more than one learned Judge adverted to this aspect. In the words of

Hegde and Mukherjee, JJ

the fundamental Rights and Directive Principles constitute the conscience'' of the Constitution... To ignore Part IV is to ignore the sustenance

provided for in the Constitution, the hopes held out to the nation and the very ideals on which our Constitution is built. There is no anti-thesis

between the Fundamental Rules and the Directive Principles.. One supplements the other.

Shelat and Graver, JJ. in their Judgment observed

Both parts III and IV... .have to be balanced and harmonised.. then alone the dignity of the individual can be achieved. They (Fundamental Rights

and Directive Principles) were meant to supplement each other..

In Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others etc. etc., the Apex Court, after considering all the earlier rulings

observed as under:

It is thus well established by the decisions of this Court that the provisions Parts III and IV are supplementary and complementary to each other

and that the fundamental rights are but a means to achieve the goal indicated in Part IV.

It is further held by the Supreme Court that the fundamental rights must be construed in the light of the Directive Principles.

68. Keeping the above decisions of the Apex Court in mind let us now proceed to consider the point in issue:

The earliest ruling is one repotted in Shri Krishna Rangnath Mudholkar Vs. Gujarat University and Others, a Full Bench of Gujarat High Court

consisting of J.M.Shelat, P.N.Bhagwati and M.R.Mody, JJ (as Their Lordships then were) while dealing with the Gujarat University Act, 1949

held:

In our view the Act gives no power to the University to impose Gujarati or Hindi as the sole medium of instruction and examination or even as one

of the media of instruction and examination on affiliated colleges or to prohibit the use of English as a medium of instruction and examination in

affiliated colleges. The substitution of the new proviso in Section 4(27) and the addition of Section 38-A in the Act by Act IV of 1961 make no

difference and do not add any such power to the powers of the University under the Act. Consequently, Statutes 207, 208 and 209 as they stood

originally or as amended are ultra vires the powers of the University and the Senate and are, therefore null and void.

69. By virtue of the provisions of Sections 208 to 209 of that Act it was sought to impose only Gujarati and/or Hindi as media of instruction for

examinations held by the University. The Full Bench held:

In the result, we hold that:

(i) Statutes 207 and 209 in so far as they seek to lay down and impose Gujarati and/or Hindi in Devanagiri script as the media of instruction and

examination on institutions other than its own institutions are unauthorised and beyond the powers of the University and Senate and are therefore

null and void as neither Section 4''(27) nor any other provision of the Act empowers the University to law down Gujarati or Hindi as the medium of

instruction and examination for such institutions or to forbid the use of English as a medium of instruction and examination for and in such

institutions.

(ii) Assuming that Section 4 (27) and/or any other provisions of the Act do contain such power, that power at best is only to lay down Gujarati or

Hindi as one of the media of instruction and examination and not as the only medium of instruction and examination to the exclusion of other

languages and does not extend to forbid the use of English or any other language as a medium of instruction and examination and Statutes 207 to

209 are therefore null and void.

The observation of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court on the rights of the parents may be noticed in this connection. The Full Bench ruled:

It cannot be denied though the American decisions may not be a guide to the interpretation of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, that the

petitioner is entitled as a parent to direct and education of his son in the manner he considers best suited and to guide thereby his future prospects.

The State has no concern and we hope no right to direct him to do so in a particular manner. That can onty happen in countries which do not boast

of democratic Constitutions. Though such a right may not arise from a Statute or a contract, he is entitled and has the liberty in law to educate his

son in the manner he thinks best."" (Italic supplied)

70. At that relevant point of time the right to education was not declared as a fundamental right.

In Kharak Singh Vs. The State of U.P. and Others, the complaint of the petitioner was about the surveillance that he was subjected to by the State

by virtue of powers under Regulation 236 of U.P.Police Regulations. In the said decision, the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the scope

of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which as has been referred to earlier, deals with protection of life and personal liberty. The relevant

paragraph to be noted is:

We shall now proceed with the examination of the width, scope and content of the expression ""personal liberty in Article 21. Having regard to the

terms of Art 19 (1) (d), we must take it that that expression is used as not to include the right to move about or rather of locomotion. The right to

move about being excluded in its narrowest interpretation would be that it comprehends nothing more than freedom from physical restraint or

freedom from confinement within the bounds of a prison; or in other words, freedom from arrest and detention, from false imprisonment or

wrongful confinement. We feel unable to hold that the terms was intended to bear only this narrow interpretation but on the other hand consider

that ''personal liberty'' is used in the Article as a compendious term to include within itself all the varieties of rights which go to make up the

''personal liberties'' of man other than those dealt with in the several clauses of Article 19(1). In other words, white Article 19(1) deals with

particular species or attributes of that freedom, ""personal liberty'' in Article 21 takes in and comprises the residue"" (Italic supplied)

In The Ahmedabad St. Xavier''s College Society and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, , the Bench consisting of nine Honourable Judges

of the Supreme Court while considering the scope of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India and certain provisions of Gujarat University

Act 50 of 1949 as amended by Act 6 of 1973 referred to the role and rights of a parent and endorsed the view expressed by the Supreme Court

of the United States. In paragraphs 141 and 142 of the said Judgment, the Apex Court ruled thus:

The fundamental right postulate of personal liberty excludes any power of the State to standardize and socialise its children by forcing them to

attend public schools only. A child is not a mere creature of the State. Those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right coupled with the

high duty to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names, 1924 (268) US 510. 535. The

parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a democratic system. It is the touchstone of difference between democratic education and

monolithic system of cultural totalitarianism"" (Italic supplied)

It may be noticed that in Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 138, while considering the scope of Articles 21 and 19(1)(d) of the

Constitution of India and while examining the validity of M.P.Police Regulations framed under Police Act, 1861, the Supreme Court observed thus:

Para 24: Any right to privacy must encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home the family, marriage, otherhood, procreation and

child rearing. This catalogue approach to the question is obviously not as instructive as it does not give analytical picture of the distinctive

characteristics of the right of privacy. Perhaps, the only suggestion that can be offered as unifying principle underlying the concept has been the

assertion that a claimed right must be a fundamental right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty..

It can be seen that ''education'' was not included while mentioning the various rights that flow from Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

71. For the first time in Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746 the Apex Court while considering a habeus corpus Petition

in which the order issued u/s 3 of the COFEPOSA was questioned by the petitioner, who was a British national, while considering the scope of

Article 21 of the Constitution of India ruled:

The right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such adequate

nutrition; clothing and shelter over the head and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and

mixing and commingling with fellow human beings"" (Italic supplied)

72. The Apex Court recognised the educational facilities as one of the rights flowing from Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India (UOI) and

Others, . In that case the Apex Court was considering the complaint of violation of human rights of some persons who were forced to serve as

bonded labourers. While affirming the proposition that Article 21 of the Constitution of India must be construed in the light of the Directive

Principles of State Policy, the Apex Court observed thus:

The right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy and particularly

clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include protection of the health and strength of workers

men and women, and of the tender age of children against abuse, opportunities and facilities of children to develop in a healthy manner and in

conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. These are the minimum

requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity..."" (Italic supplied)

The next ruling that can be referred to is reported in General Secretary, Linguistic Minorities Protection Committee and Another etc. Vs. State of

Karnataka and Another, (consisting of M.Rama Jois. H.G. Balakrishna and S.Raiendra Babu, JJ (as Their Lordships then were) The Court was

concerned with the Government Order, dated 20.7.1982 prescribing Kannada as the sole first language of the Secondary School level from the

academic year 1987-88, leaving the choice to the students in respect of only two other languages in which Kannada is also one of them. The said

order also directed the study of Kannada as compulsory from the first year of the primary school in non-kannada Schools and to children whose

mother-tongue is not Kannada. The Full Bench in paragraph 22 of the said judgment also referred to the resolution adopted by the Provincial

Education Ministers (Conference of 1949 and approved by the Central Advisory Board of Education and Government of India. The resolution

reads thus:

The medium of instruction and examination at the Junior Basic Stage must be the mother-tongue of the child and where the mother-tongue is

different from the Regional or State language, arrangements must be made for instruction in the mother-tongue by appointing at least one teacher,

provided there are not less than 40 pupils speaking the language in the whole school or ten such pupils in a class. The mother-tongue will be the

language declared by the parent or guardian to be the mother-tongue.

After considering various decisions and recommendations the Full Bench observed thus:

As we can see from the decisions and recommendations extracted above that at least on three aspects there has been agreement They are:

1. Primary education must be in mother-tongue, if that happens to be the choice of the parents.

2. .....

3. ............

In a decision reported in State of Karnataka v. Noble Saint Education Society, 1993 (2) K.LJ.19, a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court

while considering the right to establish primary and High Schools with medium of instruction as the choice of management/parents, following the

ruling of the Full Bench observed thus:

The choice of medium of instruction is primary for the parents to decide and we have referred to the majority view in the decision of the Full

Bench referred to already. In a city like Bangalore, it is not possible to limit any particular locality as that of the particular institution. In other

words, it cannot be held that a particular institution would be catering to the residents of a particular locality. It is a well-known fact that Bangalore

is a cosmopolitan and multi-lingual city. Having regard to the multiplicity of the languages spoken to and the need to have a link language, it cannot

be said that the desire of the parents to impart education to their children in a well-known international language like English can be by-passed,

forgetting the realities of life."" (Italic supplied.)

It may be noted that there was no dissenting/minority Judgment by any judge in the Full Bench and the observation made therein may be incorrect.

It was in Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others etc. etc., the Apex Court held that the right to education is a

fundamental right flowing from Article 21 read with Articles 41, 45 and 46 of the Constitution of India.

Para 144.lt is argued by........

The effect of holding that right to education is implicit in the right to life is that the State cannot deprive the citizen of his right to education except in

accordance with the procedure prescribed by law."" Para 145:

In the above state of law.........

The right to education which is implicit in the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 must be construed in the light of the directive

principles in Part IV of the Constitution...

.. .A true democracy is one where education is universal, where people understand what is good for them and the nation and know how to govern

themselves. The three Articles 45, 46 and 41 are designed to achieve the said goal among others. It is in the light of these articles that the content

and parameters of the right to education have to be determined. Right to education understood in the context of Articles 45 and 41 means; (a)

every child/citizen of this country has a right to free education until he completes the age of fourteen years, and (b) after a child/citizen completes 14

years, his right to education is circumscribed by the limits of the economic capacity of the State and its development. We may deal with both these

limbs separately.

In a subsequent ruling reported in R. Rajagopal alias R.R. Gopal and Another Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, , the Apex Court was

considering the scope of Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution of India while considering a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the

Constitution of India by a publisher of a magazine, who was directed by the State not to publish the autobiography alleged to have been written by

an accused which set out the close nexus between him (accused) and some high Government Officials and in that context the Apex Court

observed thus:

We may now summarise the broad principles flowing from the above discussion:

(1) The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a ""right to be let alone.

A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child bearing and education among other

matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent-whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or

critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in action for damages. Position may,

however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy.

It may be noted the Apex Court has held that a citizen has a right to safeguard education which flows from Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

One other ruling of the Apex Court, which may have some relevance to the point in issue is reported in Secretary, Ministry of Information and

Broadcasting, Govt. of India and others Vs. Cricket Association of Bengal and others, . In that case, the Supreme Court was considering the issue

as to whether an organizer or producer of an event has got a right to get the event telecasted through an agency of his choice, national or foreign.

Articles 19(1)(e) and 19(2) of the Constitution of India etc., were considered by the Apex Court in the said ruling.

In paragraph 43 of the said ruling the Supreme Court observed that

We may now summarise the law on the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) as restricted by Article 19(2). The freedom of

speech and expression includes right to acquire information and to disseminate it. Freedom of speech and expression is necessary for self-

expression which is an important means of free conscience and self-fulfilment.

Again in paragraph 75 it is observed

However a right to freedom of speech and expression also includes the right to educate to inform and to entertain and also the right to be

educated, informed and entertained.

The next ruling that may be usefully referred to is People''s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, , wherein the

Apex Court considered various Articles viz.. Articles 14. 19(1)(a). 19(2), 21, 32 and 51 etc., of the Constitution of India. The question that was

considered in that ruling was invasion of telephone/tapping and surveillance of individual''s privacy. After referring to the ruling in R. Rajagopal alias

R.R. Gopal and Another Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, , the Supreme Court observed thus:

In R. Rajagopal alias R.R. Gopal and Another Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, . Jeevan Reddy, J. speaking for the Court observed that in

recent times right to privacy has acquired constitutional status. The learned Judge referred to Kharak Singh case Gobind case and considered a

large number of American and English cases and finally came to the conclusion that the right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty

guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is ft ""right to be let alone''. A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his

family, marriage, procreation, mother hood, child bearing and education among other matters.

We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that right to privacy is a part of the right to ""life"" and ""personal liberty"" enshrined under Article 21 of the

Constitution. Once the facts in a given case constitute a right to privacy. Article 21 is attracted. The said right cannot be curtailed ''except

according to procedure established by law"". (Italic supplied).

73. From the above discussions we sum up as under:

I Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles constitute the conscience of the Constitution. One supplements the other. His Holiness Kesavananda

Bharati Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala, -

II Fundamental right can be curtailed only according to the procedure established by law; People''s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) Vs. Union of

India (UOI) and Another,

III Right to education is a fundamental right. Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others etc. etc.,

IV Under Article 21 of the Constitution, a citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood,

child bearing and education among other matters. People''s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another,

V. Children must be given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner to improve the conditions of freedom and dignity-Article 39(f)

of Constitution of India;

VI State shall foster respect for International Law and Treaty obligations (Article 51(c)) of the Constitution of India.

VII Clause 26 (3) Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Convention on the right of the child has been adopted by India also, which is to the

effect that the parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

VIII Fundamental Right is never static. It is ever evolving and ever changing and therefore it does not admit or a narrow pedantic or syllogistic

approach. Constitution makers employed a broad phraseology to cater to the needs of the changing society. Fundamental rights must be broadly

construed and must receive a broad interpretation. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Union of India and another Vs. Prof. Manubhai D.

Shah and Cinemart Foundation,

IX Court must interpret the constitution in a manner which would enable the citizens to enjoy the rights guaranteed by . it in the fullest measure.

Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. and Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI),

X A true democracy is one where education is universal, where people understand what is good for them. Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others Vs.

State of Andhra Pradesh and others etc. etc., .

XI Parent has the right coupled with the high duty to recognise and prepare the child for additional obligations. The parental right in the matter of

education is very pivotal point of a democratic system. The Ahmedabad St. Xavier''s College Society and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and

Another,

XII Parents have the liberty in law to educate his son/daughter in the manner he thinks best, even though such a right may not arise from a statute

or a contract. Shri Krishna''s case, 1962 Guj. 88

XIII Primary education must be in the mother-tongue if that happens to be the choice of the parents. General Secretary, Linguistic Minorities

Protection Committee and Another etc. Vs. State of Karnataka and Another,

74. The parents on behalf of the children can call upon the State to provide free education upto 14 years. Such education has to be given to shape

the children to face the challenges and cater to the needs of a changing society. Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, a citizen has a right to

safeguard education. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Convention on the Rights of the Child) as accepted by Government

of India even in 1992 parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children, which the Apex Court

described even in 1974 as a pivotal right of the parents in a democratic country. The beneficiary of such a fundamental right should be allowed to

enjoy it in the fullest measure. Article 350A of the Constitution of India is not restricting such a right in any manner, as it imposes only an obligation

on the State and nothing more.

75. Now the parents are not demanding the State to provide education. They desire and only want to be left alone to decide. It is not as if, they

want their children to learn something, which is prohibited under law. All that they want is to educate their children all the subjects of their choice.

Certainly, it cannot be said that the nation''s image and dignity will be affected, as the language English has already been accepted by this nation as

an ''associate language. No one can claim to know better than the parents about the child, to decide, as to what the child requires in the sphere of

education and such a decision they take keeping their duty in mind to shape the career and destiny of their child. With the nation touching a

population of 100 crores and the State of Tamil Nadu with more than 6 crores, may not be able to do much in view of the limitations and

constraints on them. First, the State has to endeavour to provide food and shelter to every one and education comes only thereafter. It can safely

be said that the only logical conclusion that flows from the various decisions referred to supra and the discussions made above, is that the right to

education is a fundamental right, which also includes the right to choose the medium of instruction and it can be exercised by the parents on behalf

of their children.

Charles Darwin said

the future will always be for those most fit to survive. It is not the strongest of the species that survive; nor the most intelligent, but the one most

responsive to change

We hold that the impugned G.O. which infringes the above right conferred under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has to be quashed and

accordingly it stands quashed on this ground as well.

76. The next question is as to whether such a fundamental right is subject to any limitation or restriction.

At the risk of repetition, we deem it necessary to repeat certain facts. The committee as well as the Government while passing the G.O. proceeded

on the basis that the mother tongue of the child is the tongue of the mother. Even the counter affidavit proceeded only on that basis. For the first

time, at the time of arguments, the learned senior counsel Mr.Shanthi Bhushan, appearing for the State submitted that the mother tongue should be

understood to only mean the language with which a child is most familiar with. Learned counsel further elaborated by saying that it need not be the

tongue of the mother or the tongue of the father. He would also state that generally the parents will be the proper persons to say as to what is the

language with which a child is most familiar with. The reason for the Government to issue the impugned G.O. is that the learning process for a child

will be easier in mother tongue and that the child will be able to grasp well. But some parents compel their children to study in English medium even

though those children are not most familiar with that language and are not able to cope up, with the result such a learning gives too much strain on

them and practically stands in the way of their healthy development which cannot be permitted in view of the constitutional provisions.

The stand of the parents is that they have a pivotal/prior right to decide what kind of education their children require and this they have to decide

keeping in mind various factors. The greatest anxiety of the parents is that when in today''s world the Darwin''s theory of ''Survival of the fittest'' is

found to be more and more true, they have to prepare the children in such a way to meet the future challenges so that they will lead their life with

dignity in future. Some children may have to undergo some strain which is only in the nature of a passing cloud and certainly that will not affect their

development in any way.

For a problem or an issue of this nature, it may not be possible to give a foolproof method/formula which would give complete and satisfactory

solution for each and every case. The people in general in their life have to face multifarious problems and difficulties and it would not be possible

to give an exhaustive list of that.

Keeping in mind the ruling of the Apex Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, which held that;

The right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India...... it must include protection of the health and strength of

workers, men and women, and of the lender age of the children against abuse, opportunities and facilities of the childrens to develop in a healthy

manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, ""just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief (Italic supplied)

and after giving our anxious considerations, we lay down the following norms in the light of our findings already arrived at.

(a) It is only for the parents to decide and say as to whether their child is ""(a) most familiar with a language (here) English., or

(b) Equally familiar both with the tongue of the mother and English;

or

(c) Less familiar with English when compared to the tongue of the mother.

II. (a) If a child is most familiar with a language and when even that may not be the tongue of the mother, the parents will have the absolute and

exclusive right to choose that language in which the child should study the subjects:

(b) If the child is equally familiar with two languages namely the tongue of the mother (say for instance Tamil) and English, the parents will have the

absolute and exclusive right to choose the medium in which the child should study the subjects.

(c) If the parents are in a transferable job (even any one of them is sufficient) or if the parents desire to move to some other State/abroad for

whatever may be the reasons, or if the parents desire to send their children to some other State/abroad to be educated, in the years to come, then

notwithstanding the fact that the children may be less familiar with English when compared to the tongue of the mother, the parents will have the

absolute and exclusive right to choose the medium in which their children to take up their studies.

77. The learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that some parents are compelling their children to study the subjects in English language

even though those children find it difficult to follow and grasp, whereas they are able to do well when they study in the mother tongue. We do not

find any statement to this effect in the counter affidavit. No materials are available in the files produced before us in this regard. The

recommendations filed by the committee also do not refer anything in this regard. All that is stated in the report is that some children who were

studying in the English medium, left the school to join Tamil medium, as they found it difficult to study in English medium. Even this statement of the

committee has not been substantiated with any material.

78. ARTICLE 30(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. It is contended on behalf of some of the petitioners, who are minority institutions

that the impugned G.O. has made a serious inroad into their rights and the same is violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. Under the

guise of introducing Tamil/mother tongue as medium of instruction, the Government of Tamil Nadu is actually taking away the rights of the

minorities to administer the institutions of their choice. The term''administer will include the right of minority institutions to lay down their own

syallabi and choose a subject which they want and award degrees and diplomas and when such a right has been given, choosing the medium of

instruction is a part of this right. It is also submitted that the Courts have repeatedly held that the rights conferred under Article 30(1) is an absolute

right and the same is not subject to any reasonable restrictions. Referring to The Ahmedabad St. Xavier''s College Society and Another Vs. State

of Gujarat and Another, , it is contended that the minority institutions'' right to establish and administer subject to the Regulations which can be

made, as pointed out by the Apex Court will automatically lead to the conclusion that they have the right to teach the subjects in the medium of

their choice.

79. Learned Additional Advocate General would contend that the rights conferred under Articles 29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India

would be available to the minority institutions only so long as they do not admit non-minorities and not giving secular education; or in other words,

once they admit non-minorities and impart secular education they come out of the special pool and they have to be treated on par with others.

According to learned Additional Advocate General imparting education at the Primary stage in their mother-tongue would be natural and\ that

would be the healthy educational process. As a regulatory measure, the Government can issue the impugned G.O. and that will help very much to

attain excellence in the educational standards.

Article 29(1) of the Constitution is to the effect that any section of the citizens in India having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall

have the right to conserve the same.

Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India is to the effect that all minorities whether based on religion or language shall have the right to establish and

administer educational institutions of their choice.

Article 29 of the Constitution of India is a general protection given to all Sections of the citizens to serve their language, script or culture.

Article 30 of the Constitution of India is a special right given to the minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice.

The two Articles create two separate rights and that it is possible that the rights might meet in a given case. In fact, in paragraph 122 in The

Ahmedabad St. Xavier''s College Society and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, , the Apex Court has pointed out the distinctions

between the said two Articles.

The first question is whether an institution of a religious minority can teach only that religion and whether a linguistic minority teach only that

language.

In In re Kerala Education Bill, AIR 1958 SC 956 Special Reference No.l of 1958, the Apex Court observed thus:

The real import of Article 29(1) and Article 30(1) seems to be that they clearly contemplate a minority institution with a sprinkling of outsiders

admitted into it. By admitting a non-member into it the minority institution does not shed its character and cease to be a minority institution. Indeed

the object of conservation of the distinct language, script and culture of a minority may be better served by propagating the same amongst non-

members of the particular minority community. In our opinion, it is not possible to read this condition into Article 30(1) of the Constitution"". (Italic

supplied)

In Sidhraibhai v. The State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 SC 540, the Supreme Court observed thus:

Regulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be

directed to making the institution, while retaining its character as a minority institution effective as an educational institution. Such Regulation must

satisfy a dual test-the test of reasonableness, and the test that is regulative of the educational character of the institution and is conducive to making

the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. (Italic supplied)

This being the law laid down by the Apex Court, we do not accept the contentions of learned Additional Advocate . General.

80. The next issue for consideration would be whether the minority institutions imparting secular education, lose their rights and privileges and come

under the general pool? The answer to this question we find in the ruling of the Supreme Court in In re Kerala Education Bill''s case, AIR 1958 SC

956 wherein in paragraph 23, the Apex Court observed thus:

The first point to note is that the Article gives certain rights not only to religious minorities but also to linguistic minorities.

In the next place, the rights conferred on such of minorities is to establish educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities

based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish

educational institutions for teaching their language only. What the Article says and means is that the religious and the linguistic minorities should have

other right to establish educational institutions of their choice. There is no limitation placed on the subjects to be taught in such educational

institutions. As such minorities will ordinarily desire that their children should be brought up properly and efficiently and be eligible for higher

university education and go out in the world fully equipped with such intellectual attainments as it will make them fit for entering the public services,

educational institutions of their choice will necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education also. In other words, the Article leaves

it to their choice to establish such educational institutions as well to serve both purposes, namely the purpose of conserving their religion, language

or culture, and also the purpose of giving a thorough, good general education to their children. The next thing to be noted is that the Article, in

terms, gives all minorities, whether based on religion or language, two rights, viz., (i) the right to establish and (ii) the right to administer educational

institutions of their choice. The key to the understanding of the true meaning and implication of the Article under consideration is the words of their

own choice. It is said that the dominant word is choice and the content of that Article is as wide as the choice of the particular minority community

may make it. The ambit of the rights conferred by Article 30(1) was, therefore, to be determined on a consideration of the matter from the points

of view of the educational institutions themselves"". (Italic supplied)

In The Ahmedabad St. Xavier''s College Society and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, , the Apex Court endorsing the earlier view of

the Apex Court in In re Kerala Education Bill''s case, AIR 1958 SC 956, observed thus:

Any Section of citizens which includes the majority as well as the minority shall have under Article 29 the right to conserve their distinct language,

script or culture. That is why the minorities are given specific rights in respect of educational institutions under Article 30. Article 30(1) gives the

right to linguistic minorities as well where no question of religion arises. It is therefore ''not at all possible to exclude secular education from Article

30"" (Italic supplied)

Again in paragraph 12, it was held

The real reason embodied...

General secular education will open doors of perception and act as the natural light of mind for our countrymen to live in the whole...

In paragraph 123, it was observed ""Ramaswami, C.J. said in Dipendra Nath Sarkar Vs. State of Bihar and Others, that the crucial phrase in

Article 30(1) is''""of their choice"", that the ambit of the freedom of choice conferred by the Article is therefore as wide as the choice of the particular

community may make it and that it is open to a religious minority to establish educational institutions for the purpose of conserving its religion,

language or culture, and also for the purpose of giving a thorough good secular education to their children as the Article applies to both these

classes of institutions."" (Italic supplied)

In view of the above legal position laid down by the Apex Court, the contention of learned Additional Advocate General that once the minority

institutions impart secular education they lose their rights and privileges, does not deserve acceptance.

81. Then arises the remaining questions for consideration viz., what are the Regulations that can be imposed on minority institutions? whether they

can choose their own medium of instruction? and finally what are their rights for getting recognition/affiliation? All these three aspects can be dealt

with together and the rulings can be referred chronologically:

In In re Kerala Education Bill''s case, AIR 1958 SC 956, in paragraph 31, the Apex Court observed thus:

We have already observed that Article 30(1) gives two rights to the minorities (1) to establish and (2) to administer, educational institutions of

their choice. The right to administer cannot obviously include the right to mal-administer. The minority cannot surely ask for aid or recognition for

an educational institution run by them in unhealthy surroundings, without any competent teachers possessing any semblance of qualification and

which does not maintain even a fair standard of teaching or which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of the scholars. It stands to reason,

then, that the constitutional right to administer an educational institution of their choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to

insist that in order to grant aid the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided."" (Italic

supplied)

In the very same Judgment in paragraph 32 the Apex Court observed thus:

Without recognition therefore, the educational institutions established or to be established by the minority communities cannot fulfil the real objects

of their choice and the rights under Article 30(1) cannot be effectively exercised. The right to establish educational institutions of their choice must,

therefore mean the right to establish real institutions, which will effectively serve the needs of their community and the scholars who resort to their

educational institutions. There is no doubt, no such thing as fundamental right to recognition by the State but to deny recognition to the educational

institutions except upon terms tantamount to the surrender of their constitutional rights of administration of the educational institutions of their choice

is in truth and in effect to deprive than of their rights under Article 30(1). We repeat that the legislative power is subject to the fundamental rights

and the legislature cannot indirectly take away or abridge the fundamental rights which it could do directly and yet that will be the result if the said

Bill containing any offending clause becomes law."" (Italic supplied)

In D.A.V. College, Bhatinda, etc. Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, , the Apex Court observed thus:

The right of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice would include the right to take a choice of the medium

of instruction also which would be the result of reading Articles 30(1) and 29(1) of the Constitution of India."" (Italic supplied)

In The Ahmedabad St. Xavier''s College Society and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, , the Apex Court observed thus:

Para 15: Affiliation to a University really consists of two parts. One part relates to syllabi, curricula, courses of instruction, the qualifications of

teachers, library, laboratories, conditions regarding health and hygiene of students. This part relates to establishment of educational institutions. The

second part consists of terms and conditions regarding management of institutions. It relates to administration of educational institutions.

Part 16:With regard to affiliation a minority institution must follow, the statutorymeasures regulating educational standards and efficiency, the

prescribed courses of study, courses of instruction and the principles regarding the qualification of teachers, educational qualifications for entry of

students into educational institutions etcetera.

........

Para 18..... Affiliation mainly pertains to the academic and educational character of the institution. Therefore, measures which will regulate the

courses of study, the qualifications and appointment of teachers, the conditions of employment of teachers, the health and hygiene of students,

facilities for libraries and laboratories are all comprised in, matters germane to affiliation of minority institutions. These regulatory measures for

affiliation are for uniformity, efficiency and excellence in educational courses and do not violate any fundamental right of the minority institutions

under Article 30.

The Apex Court in paragraph 56 observed thus:

The right under Article 30 cannot be exercised in vacuo. Nor would it be right to refer to affiliation or recognition as privileges granted by the

State. In a democratic system of Government with Italic on education and enlightenment of its citizens, there must be elements which give

protection to them. The meaningful exercise of the right under Article 30(1) would and must necessarily involve recognition of the secular education

imparted by the minority institutions without which the right will be a mere husk. This Court has sofar consistently struck down all attempts to make

affiliation or recognition on terms tantamount to surrender of its rights under Article 30(1). as abridging or taking away those rights. Again as

without affiliation mere can be no meaningful exercise of the right under Article 30(1), the affiliation to be given should be consistent with that right,

nor can it indirectly try to achieve what it cannot directly do. (Italic supplied).

Again in paragraph 57, it was ruled thus-

The only purpose that the fundamental right under Article 30(1) would serve would in that case be that minorities may establish their institutions,

lay down their own syllabi, provide instructions in the subjects of their choice, conduct examinations and award degrees or diplomas. Such

institutions have the right to seek recognition to their degrees and diplomas and ask for aid when aid is given to other educational institutions giving

a like education on the basis of the excellence achieved by them. The State is bound to give recognition to their qualifications and to the institutions

and they cannot be discriminated except on the around of want of excellence in their educational standards so far as recognition of degrees or

educational qualifications is concerned and want of efficient management so far as aid is concerned."" (Italic supplied)

In paragraph 74, the Apex Court observed as under:

The management must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees can mould the institution as they think fit and in accordance with

their ideas of how the interest of the community in general and the institution in particular will be best served. The words ""of their choice"" qualify the

educational institutions and show that the educational institutions established and administered by the minorities need not be of some particular

class; the minorities have the right and freedom to establish and administer such educational institutions as they choose."" (Italic supplied)

In paragraph 94 of the said Judgment, the Apex Court further ruled thus:

No institution can claim affiliation or recognition until it conforms to a certain standard. The fact that the institution is of the prescribed standard

indeed inheres in the very concept of affiliation or recognition. It is, therefore, permissible for the authority concerned to prescribe regulations which

must be complied with before an institution can seek and retain affiliation and recognition. Question then arises whether there is any limitation on the

prescription of regulations for minority educational institutions. So far as this aspect is concerned, the authority prescribing the regulations must bear

in mind that the Constitution has guaranteed a fundamental right to the minorities for establishing and administering their educational institutions.

Regulations made by the authority concerned should not impinge upon that right."" (Italic supplied)

Again in paragraph 98, it was observed as follows:

Article 30(1) was intended to have a real significance and it is not permissible to construe it in such a manner as would rob it of that significance.

82. The above rulings of the Apex Court have laid down the following;

The right conferred under Article 30(1) is an absolute one. It is the right to establish and administer institutions. Recognition / affiliation must be

granted once the Institutions maintain the standards;

It is for the minority to choose the medium of instruction since the right to administer v would also include the right to choose the courses to be

conducted by the institution as well as the medium in which the courses are to be taught.

Regulations can be imposed on the institutions, only to the extent as indicated in In re Kerala Education Bill''s case, AIR 1958 SC 956 and in The

Ahmedabad St. Xavier''s College Society and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, .

83. Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that it is the duty of the State to see all these institutions attain excellence in educational

standards and that the impugned G.O. is one such endeavour; which is only in the nature of a regulation.

84. The G.O. was passed on the basis that mother-tongue is the tongue of the mother. Sri. Shanthi Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the State submitted that ''mother-tongue'' should be understood for the purpose of these cases, as the language which the child is most

familiar with and not the tongue of the mother. We have held that it is for the parents to decide as to in which language the child has to study the

subjects. Really in these circumstances, there is nothing to be considered in the point raised by the learned Advocate General as referred to by us

in the previous paragraphs.

85. The condition imposed in the impugned G.O. cannot be considered as a regulation but only a restriction on the rights conferred under Article

30(1) of the Constitution of India. Consequently the impugned G.O. is liable to be quashed and accordingly it is quashed.

86. The committee in its recommendations relied on a ruling of the Apex Court reported in English Medium Students Parents Association Vs. State

of Karnataka and others, . Even though the said ruling would not apply and help the State to substantiate its case, as put forward before the Court,

for the purpose of completeness let as consider that ruling as well.

87. What were the grievances of the petitioners in W.P.No.536 of 1991 filed before the Apex Court? Whether the orders passed on 19.6.1989

and 22.6.1989 by the State of Karnataka directed the Institutions to switch over to mother tongue (medium of instruction) from English?

88. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend that the above said decision was on an entirely different issue/point and

that being so any view expressed in that ruling can not stand in the way as that cannot be said to be a law laid down by the Apex Court.

The State of Karnataka made an order, on 20th July, 1982 prescribing that Kanada should be the sole first language at the Secondary School level

from the academic year 1987-88, leaving choice to the students in respect of only two other language out of the list of the languages in which

Kannada is also one of them. It is absolutely necessary to extract the relevant portion of the order which reads thus:

Keeping in view the above, Government are pleased to direct as follows:-

1. At the Secondary School level, the language pattern to be adopted shall be as follows (from the academic year 1987-88).

A. First language:-

Kannada shall be the sole first language (to carry 125 marks)

B. Two other languages from the following:-

Urudu, Tamil, Telugu, Marathi, English, Hindi, Sanskrit, Arabic, Persoan, Malayalam and Kannada, (to carry 100 marks each).

Note:- 15 grace marks shall be given for a period of ten year (s) in the first language examination, to students, whose mother tongue is not

Kannada and (b) in Hindi examination to students who study Hindi and whose mother tongue is not Hindi.

2. Students coming from outside the state and joining VII or IX Standard in the State of Karnataka and who did not study Kannada earlier nay be

permitted to take English or Hindi as first language;

3. The teaching of Kannada from 1st standard in non-Kannada Schools will commence from the academic year 1982 itself and the language

pattern for High Schools prescribed in para (1) above will come into force from the academic year 1987-88

A batch of writ petitions were filed before the Karnataka High Court, questioning the validity of the said order. Three questions were referred to

the Full Bench for decision which can be extracted as under:

1. Whether the Government Order, dated July 20,1982 or any part of it is void being violative of the fandamental rights guaranteed to the

petitioners under articles 29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution?

2. Whether the Government Order dated July 20, 1982 or any part of it is violative of the pledge of equality guaranteed under article 14 of the

Constitution? and

3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Circular dated Aug. 11, 1982 issued by the Director of Public Instruction of the

State Government is violative of articles 14, 29(1), and 30(1) of the Constitution?

The Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court, after elaborately considering the matter answered the three questions as under:

Our answers to the three questions referred for the opinion of the Full Bench, are as under:

(1) The Government Order, dated 20th July, 1982 in so far as it relates to the making of study of Kannada as a compulsory subject to children

belonging to linguistic minority groups from the first year of the Primary School and compelling the primary schools established by linguistic

minorities to introduce it as a compulsory subject from the first year of the primary school and also in so far it compels the students joining high

schools to take Kannada as the sole first language and compelling the high schools established by linguistic minorities to introduce Kannada as the

sole first language in the secondary schools, is violative of Articles 29(1), and 30(1)of the Constitution.

(2) The Government Order, dated 20.7.1982 in so far it relates to the making of study of Kannada as a compulsory subject to children belonging

to linguistic minority groups from the first year of the primary school and compelling the primary schools established by linguistic minorities to

introduce it as a compulsory subject from the first year of the primary school and also in so far it compels the students joining high schools to take

Kannada as the sole first language and compelling the high schools established by linguistic minorities to introduce Kannada as the sole first

language in the secondary schools is violative of the pledge of equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.

(3) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Circular dated 11.8.1982 issued by the Director of Public Instructions of the State

Government is violative of Articles 14, 19(l) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India.

After the Full Bench of Karnataka High Court expressed the above opinion, writ petitions were placed before the Division Bench. The Division

Bench allowed the writ petitions holding that the impugned Government Order as also the Circular issued by the Director of Public Instructions

pursuant to the aforesaid G.O. are void as offending. Articles 14, 29(1), and 30(1) of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench however, gave

liberty to the Government to introduce Kannada as one of the two languages from that primary school class from which study of another language

in addition to mother-tongue is made obligatory as part of the general pattern of primary education; and to make study of Kannada compulsory as

one of three languages for study in secondary schools.

As against this judgment, the State of Karnataka moved the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court granted special leave and the cases were

numbered as C.A.Nos.2856 and 2857 of 1989.

Pending decision before the Supreme Court, the Government of Karnataka announced the Language Policy to be implemented in the Primary and

Secondary Schools in G.O.No.87 /PRU- SE - BHA-88, dated.19th June, 1989. It is necessary to the relevant portion of the said G.O.

In the circumstances explained in the preamble of this Government Order, Government are pleased to order that the following language policy

shall be implemented in the primary and secondary schools pending final decision of the Supreme Court.

(i) From 1st standard to the IV standard, mother-tongue will be the medium of instruction, where it is expected that normally only one, language

from Appendix I will be the compulsory subject of study.

From III standard onwards Kannada will be an optional subject for non-Kannada speaking students. This will (not) (?) be taught on a purely

voluntary basis and it will not be at the cost of any other instruction imparted in the school or any other school activity in which all school children

participate. There will be no examination at the end of the year in Kannada language.

(ii) From the V standard onwards, where, in the normal course second language is introduced, the child has to study second language selected

from Appendix I which will be other than the first language, subject to the condition that the child who has not taken Kannada as the first language

will have to take Kannada as the second language.

From V standard onwards provision will be made for the study of the third language which will be other than language studied by the student as

first and second languages. This has to be chosen from the list given in Appendix II.

Attendance in the third language class will be compulsory, writing of the examination in the third language will also be compulsory, but from Vth to

VII standard it will not be obligatory to pass the third language examination. No extra credit will be given in rank, division, class etc., on account of

the marks obtained in the third language examination from Vth to VII standard.

(iii) At the secondary stage, i.e. from VIIIth to Xth standards three languages will be compulsory. First language carrying 125 marks, second

language carrying 100 marks and the third language carrying 100 marks. It will be obligatory to pass the examinations conducted in all these three

languages, and one of them shall be Kannada.

(iv) The standard expected in second and third language at the end of Xth standard will be what would have been achieved at the end of 6 years of

study, if the language subject had been chosen as first language.

(v) As contemplated in Government Order No.ED 113 SOH 79 dated July 20, 1982, grace marks shall be given in Kannada language

examination for non-Kannada speaking students: and in Hindi for students whose mother-tongue is not Hindi. Award of grace marks will be upto a

maximum extent of 15 marks to enable the student to pass that language examination:

(vi) Exemption from studying Kannada as a compulsory language can be given to the students whose parents have come to the State on temporary

transfer.

Appendix I

1. Kannada

2. Tamil,

3. Telugu,

4. Malayalam,

5. Marathi,

6. Hindi,

7. Urudu,

8. English.

Appendix II

1. Kannada,

2. Tamil,

3. Telugu,

4. Malayalam,

5. Marathi,

6. Hindi,

7. Urudu,

8. English,

9. Sanskrit,

10. Arabic,

11. Persian.

Subsequently, the State of Karnataka issued a Corrigendum on 22.6.1989 to the G.O. already issued viz., the one dated 19.6.1989 which reads

thus:

For para (i) of Order portion of the above said Government Order dated June 19, 1989 i.e. from the words ''From 1st standard., subject to

study'' the following para shall be substituted:

From 1st standard to IV standard, where it is expected that normally mother tongue will be the medium of instruction, only one language from

Appendix I will be compulsory subject of study.

Aggrieved by this, the English medium students/parents association filed Writ Petition No.536 of 1991 under Article 32 of Constitution of India

before the Supreme Court.

The above said civil appeals and the writ petition were disposed of by a common judgment on 8th December 1993 and the same is reported in

English Medium Students Parents Association case, cited supra. The Apex Court held that it cannot be contended that a student studying in a

school from Karnataka need not know the regional language and that it should be the endeavour of every state to promote the regional language of

the State. The Court further held that the Government of Karnataka has done commendably well in passing the G.O. and therefore to contend that

the imposition of study of Kannada throws an undue burden on the students is untenable. The court also expressed that children should begin their

schooling through the medium of their mother tongue. The question is as to whether such expression by the Apex Court is only its opinion or a

ruling laid down.

89. First of all the question is as to what exactly the nature of the order passed by the State of Karnataka on 19.6.1989 and as amended by the

order, dated 22.6.1989. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the reading of the various orders, i.e. 19.6.1989,

22.6.1989 and 29.4.1994 would show that in June, 1989 the State did not direct the Institutions to switch over to mother tongue (medium of

instruction) and what was expressed in the orders passed in June, 1989 were only in the nature of a pious wish. The reading of the said two

orders, dated 19.6.1989 and 22.6.1989 which we have already extracted earlier and the subsequent G.O. ED. 28 PGC/94, dated 29.4.1994

would show that the orders (i.e) in G.O.No.87/ PRU-SE-BHA-88 (dated 19.6.1989 and 22.6.1989), the State of Karnataka only expressed its

desire to introduce mother tongue as the medium of instruction in Standards I to IV. In fact, it may also be made clear that the English medium

Schools were not directed to switch over and teach the students the subjects in the mother tongue by those orders (i.e.) dated 19.6.1989 and

22.6.1989. It was on 22.4.1994, the State Government passed an order directing the English Medium Schools started after 19.6.1989 to switch

over to mother tongue. Again by a subsequent order, dated 29.4.1994 the State Government cancelled the order, dated 22.4.1994 and directed

all the Schools irrespective of the fact when they were started to switch over to mother tongue medium from English medium. The learned senior

counsel appearing for the State did not advance any arguments on this aspect. Consequently, we have to take it that the senior counsel is not

disputing this position.

90. Secondly we directed the Registry to get a copy of the writ petition filed in WP No.536 of 1991 (in that case before the Apex Court). The

Registry placed before us a copy of the same received by it from the Supreme Court. We perused the same very carefully and we are completely

satisfied that the writ petitioner did not raise any around/point touching the medium of instruction. Rightly so since as already mentioned by the

impugned G.O. no institution was directed to introduce the medium of instruction in mother tongue and nobody was directed to study the subjects

in the mother tongue. This is further clear from the fact that if a person was aggrieved even by asking him to study Kannada language, he would

have been more aggrieved, if he was asked to study in Kannada Medium and certainly that would have been the very first and main ground in the

writ Petition.

91. Thirdly we extract the relevant paras in the Supreme Court judgment which, refer to

(a) contention in the writ petition

(b) argument of the petitioner

(c) argument of the Advocate General and

(d) the findings rendered on the agitated issues.

10. The validity of the GO is questioned in the writ petition on the ground that it is violative of Articles 29, and 30 of the Constitution of India.

Further, it is violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as equal opportunity is not provided, in that, students belonging to minority

communities ace discriminated against The infringement of right guaranteed under Article 350-A of the Constitution of India is apparent on the face

of the impugned order as it prevents linguistic minority group to avail the opportunity of choice of languages.

11. Insofar as Kannada is made a compulsory language in spite of the clear direction in the judgment of the Pull Bench of the Karnataka High

Court it is bad. The impugned enter throws an undue burden on the students since the children are obliged to study three languages from the

primary school stage itself. Accordingly, a writ of mandamus is prayed for directing not to enforce the order in question.

12. In support of the grounds urged in the writ petition learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that Articles 29, and 30 must be read

along with Article 39(f) of the Constitution of India, because as on today that directive principle has assumed significance. If, therefore, the children

are to be given proper opportunities in relation to education no language should be imposed. It is the choice of the parents to select the language

for the child. Under the impugned order from Vth standard onwards Kannada is made compulsory. That cannot be done vis-a-vis linguistic

minorities. In support of this reliance is placed on D.A.V. College, Bhatinda, etc. Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, . Again when Punjabi was

made the sole medium of instruction this court struck down such a provision as seen from D.A.V. College, Bhatinda, etc. Vs. The State of Punjab

and Others, . If as laid down in The Ahmedabad St. Xavier''s College Society and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, the linguistic

minorities have a fundamental right to conserve their language or culture. That cannot be interfered with and there cannot be an element of force

obliging the student to study another language. By forcing them to study Kannada there is a violation of Article 14. Insofar as there is no equal

opportunity an arbitrary act is liable to be struck down as held in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, .

13. The learned Advocate-General of Karnataka submits that the impugned government order is consistent with the judgment of the Full Bench.

The State of Karnataka has accepted the judgment and has passed the impugned order. The G.O. is only a regulatory measure to bring about

academic discipline. Having regard to the fact that the minority institutions exist in the State of Karnataka it is obligatory on the part of these

institutions to impart knowledge of Kannada. This is the regional language of the State. The G.O. removes the compulsory element during the

primary stage as is required to be provided under Article 350-A of the Constitution. The arguments of the petitioner proceed on a wrong basis as

though minorities are deprived of their right to preserve its language or culture. That is not so. There is no violation of either Article 29 or Article 30

nor even of Article 14 of the Constitution."" (Italic supplied)

After referring to the order passed in the writ petition by the Karnataka High Court, the Supreme Court proceeded to observe:

15. "" The above ruling is based on the fact that Kannada was made compulsory even in the primary stage. That was the gravamen of the charge by

the minority institutions (the writ petitioners). This was the reason why the Full Bench expressed its opinion on the three questions quoted above, in

those terms."" (Italic supplied)

After referring to the corrigendum dated 22.6.89 which we have already extracted Article 350A of the Constitution of India, the view of the father

of our nation and the advantages in studying the subjects in mother tongue the Apex Court held as under:

The child who has not taken Kannada as a first language is required to take it as a second language. At the secondary stage the three language

formula is introduced. However, in cases of non-Kannada speaking students grace marks upto 15 are awarded. Certainly, it cannot be contended

that a student studying in a School from Karnataka need not know the regional language. It should be the endeavour of every State to promote the

regional language of that State. In fact, the Government of Karnataka has done commendably well in passing this G.O. Therefore, to contend that

the imposition of study of Kannada throws an undue burden on the students is untenable"". (Italic supplied)

92. The above extracted portion of the judgment of the Apex Court would show beyond any doubt that the grievance of the petitioner in the writ

petition was only about the studying of Kannada language. Arguments by the petitioners were only about the imposition of language. The learned

Advocate General''s reply was also only on that. We have also extracted the findings of the Apex Court . we have to mention that the learned

senior counsel who appeared for the State Government only took us through the judgment of the Apex Court and no arguments were advanced on

any of the above aspects discussed by us in the previous paragraphs.

93. Before concluding, let us now refer to a few decisions of the Apex Court on the question as to when there can be a judicial review in policy

matters.

In The State of Maharashtra and Another Vs. Lok Shikshan Sansatha and Others, , the Apex Court ruled thus:

So long as there is no violation of any fundamental rights and if the principles are not offended, it was not for the High Court to lay down the

policy that should be adopted by the educational institutions in the matter of granting permission for starting Schools. The question of policy is

essential for the State and such a policy wilt depend upon the overall assessment and summary of the requirements of residents of a particular

locality and other categories of persons for whom it is essential to provide facilities for education. If the overall assessment is arrived at, after a

proper classification on a reasonable basis, it is not for the Courts to interfere with the policy leading up to such assessment."" (Italic supplied)

In the decision reported in Narendra Kumar Maheshwari Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , the Apex Court had occasion to consider certain

provisions of Capital Issues (Control) Act 29 of 1947) and the powers and functions and the role of Controller of Capital Issues, particularly with

reference to an order, dated 9th September, 1988. In paragraph 64, the Apex Court observed thus:

Shri Ganesh submitted that the CCI is duty bound to act in accordance with the guideline which lay down the principles regulating the sanction of

capital issues. This is especially so because the guidelines had been published. It was submitted that the investing public is, therefore, entitled to

proceed on the basis that the CCI would act in conformity with the guidelines and would enforce them while sanctioning a particular Capital issue.

It was submitted that it is not permissible to deviate from the guidelines. In this connection, reliance was placed by him as well as by Shri Haksar,

appearing for the petitioner in T.C.No.161 of 1988, upon the observations of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport

Authority of India and Others, , where this Court observed that it must be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the

public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licence or granting other forms of largers, the Government

could not act arbitrarily at its sweet will and like a private individual, deal with any persons it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with the

standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. We accept the position that the power of discretion of the Government in the matter

of grant of largers including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences, etc., must be confirmed and structured by rational, relevant and non-

discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departed from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the

Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it could be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary but was based

on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, irrelevant, unreasonable or discriminatory. Mr. Haksar drew our attention to the

observations of this Court in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, , where this Court

reiterated that claim of change of policy would not be sufficient to exonerate the Government from the liability; the Government would have to

show what precisely was the changed policy and also its reason and justification so that the Court could Judge for itself which way the public

interest lay and what the equity of the case demanded. It was contended by Shri Haksar that there were departures from the guidelines and there

was no indication as to why such departures had been made."" (Italic supplied)

The next ruling that can be usefully referred is one repotted in Vencil Pushpraj Vs. State of Rajasthan, . In paragraph 29, the Apex Court observed

thus:

It can no longer be doubted at this point of time that Article 14 of the Constitution of India applies also to mamas of Governmental policy and if

the policy or any action of the Government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional (See

Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, and Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy, Represented by its Partner Shri

Kasturi Lal, Jammu and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Another, . In Col. A.S. Sangwan Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, ,

while the direction to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled by the statue or rule was held to be wide, it was

emphasised as imperative and implicit in Article 14 of the Constitution that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give, the

impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirements of every State action

qualifying for its validity on this touch -stone, irrespective of the field of activity of the State, has long been settled. Later decisions of this Court

have reinforced the foundation of this tenet and it would be sufficient to refer only to two recent decisions of this Court for this purpose.

In Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India, , the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the various decisions. It is absolutely necessary that the

following passages from the said Judgment have to be extracted:

Paragraph 90

Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application of judicial review is made, (but the

decision making process itself."" (Italic supplied)

Paragraph 94:

Therefore, it is not the Court to determine whether a particular policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. It is only

concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairfy will vary from case to case. Shortly put,

the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to connot by judicial review can be classified under:

(i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it.

(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.

(iii) Procedural impropriety:

Paragraph 95

The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As & matter of fact, in R.V. Secretary

of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind, 1991 (1) AC 696, Lord Diplock refers specially to one development namely, the possible

recognition of the principles of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the Court should, consider whether something has

gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention,"" (Italic supplied)

Paragraph 97

To quote again Michael Supperstone and James Goudie: in their work ''Judicial Review (1992 Edition) it is observed at pages 119 to 121 as

under:

The assertion of a claim to examine the reasonableness been done by a public authority

In 1947, the Court of Appeal confirmed a similar approach for the review of executive discretion generally in Associated Provincial Pictures

Houses Ltd., v. Wednesbury Corporation, 1948 (I) KB 223: 1947 (2) All ER 680. This case was concerned with a complaint by the owners of a

cinema in Wednesbury that it was unreasonable of the local authority to licence performances on Sunday only subject to a condition that no

children under the age of 15 years shall be admitted to any entertainment whether accompanied by an adult or not. In an extempore Judgment

Lord Greene M.R. drew attention to the fact that the word ''unreasonable'' had often been used in a sense which comprehended different grounds

of review. (At page 229) where it was said that the dismissal of a Teacher for having red hair (cited by Warrington LJ in Short v. Poole Corpn.

1926 (1) Ch 66.91 as an example of a ""frivolous and foolish reason)'' was, in another sense, taking into consideration extraneous matters, and

might be so unreasonable that it could almost be described being done in bad faith; See also R v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council Ex

Chetnik Development Ltd, (1988) Act 858 at page 873, Chapter 4. p. 73 (supra). He summarised the principles as follows:

The Court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing whether or not they have taken into account matters which

they ought not to have taken into account, or conversely, they refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matter which they

ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that, although the local

authority had kept within the four comers of the matters which they ought to consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so

unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have come to it. In such a case again, I think the Court can interfere. The power of the Court to

interfere in each case is not as an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned and

concerned only to see whether the local authority has contravened the law by acting in excess of the power which Parliament has confined in

them."" (Italic supplied)

This summary by Lord Greene has been applied in countless subsequent cases.

The modern statement of the principle is found in a passage in the speech of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the

Civil Service, 1985 (1) AC 374:

By irrationality"" I mean what can now be succinctly referred to as Wednesbury unreasonableness"" (Associated Provincial Picture Houses v.

Wednesbury Corporation, 1948 (I) KB 223, it applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards

that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at

Paragraph 98:

At this stage the Supreme Court Practice 1993 Volume I, pages 849-850 may be quoted:

4. Wednesbury Principle- A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial

review proceedings, where the Court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting

reasonably could have reached it. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation, 1948 (1) KB 223: 1947 (2) All ER

680 per Lord Greene MR.)

Paragraph 99

Two other facts of irrationality may be mentioned:

(1) It is open to the Court to review the decision maker''s evaluation of the facts. The Court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could

not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision

the way, cannot be upheld. Thus in Emma Hotels Ltd., v. Secretary of the State of Environment, 1980 (41) P & CR 225, the Secretary of the

State referred to a number of factors which led him to the conclusion that a non-resident''s bar in a hotel was operated in such a way that the bar

was not an incident of the hotel use for planning purposes, but constituted a separate use. The Divisional Court analysed the factors which led the

Secretary of the State to that conclusion and, having done so, set it aside. Donaldson, LJ said that he could not see on what basis the Secretary of

State had reached his conclusions.

(2) A decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial and unequal in its operation as between different classes. On this basis, in R v.

Barnet London Borough Council, ex P.Johnson, 1989 (88) LGR 73, the condition imposed by a local authority prohibiting participation by these

affiliated with political parties at events to be held in the authority''s parks was struck down."" (Italic supplied)

94. Mr. Chandru, learned senior counsel appearing for the impleading respondents viz., respondent submitted that he would tike to advance his

arguments on two - points viz., (1) the petitioners are not the aggrieved persons and as such no relief can be granted to them; and (2) the extent of

the rights of the minorities under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India.

As far as the first point is concerned, it may be pointed out that even the State of Tamil Nadu has not raised any such objection. That apart, we are

satisfied that the petitioners/who are the managements'' as well as the parents'' are certainly aggrieved persons and the writ petitions are

maintainable.

So far as the second contention is concerned, as we have heard elaborately the arguments advanced by Mr.Shanthi Bhushan, learned senior

counsel and Mr. Rajagopalan, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu, we told Mr.Chandru, learned

senior counsel that written arguments can be filed by him, citing the authorities. But till today, the said counsel has not chosen to file any written

arguments.

95. G.O.MS. No. 6 (School Education C2 Department) dated 13.1.1999

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant in W.A. No. 1095 of 1999 would contend that G.O.Ms. No. 324 (School Education C2

Department), dated 19.11.1999 would not apply in so far as the nursery and primary Schools are concerned. In support of his contention, he

would point out the following reasons:

G.O. Ms. No. 324 (School Education C2 Department), dated 19.11.1999 does not refer to primary and nursery schools.

Earlier during the course of hearing of Writ Petition No. 5313 of 1999 etc., before a learned single Judge, learned senior counsel appearing for the

State contended that a separate Government Order would be issued with reference to all the Matriculation Schools:

G.O.Ms. No. 324 (School Education C2 Department), dated 19.11.1999 does not say that G.O.Ms.No. 6 (School Education C2 Department),

dated 13.1.1999 has been cancelled.

96. Per contra, learned Additional Advocate General contended that clause 2 of the impugned G.O. clearly says that the G.O. is applicable to all

Schools and that the impugned G.O. also mentions G.O. 6 (School Education C2 Department), dated 13.1.1999. According to learned Additional

Advocate General automatically G.O.Ms. No.6 (School Education C2 Department), dated 13.1.1999 has ceased to be in force. Whatever it is

whether G.O.MS. No. 6 (School Education C2 Department), dated 13.1.1999 is still in force or not, inasmuch as we have quashed G.O.Ms.No.

324 (School Education C2 Department), dated 19.11.1999, it will enure to the benefit of all nursery and primary schools for many reasons though

not ail and even assuming that G.O.Ms.No.6 (School Education C2 Department), dated 13.1.1999 is still in force.

97. In the result, we hereby quash the impugned Government Order, viz., G.O.Ms.No. 324 (School Education C2 Department), dated

19.11.1999 for each of the following reasons;

1. The impugned G.O. is irrational as while passing the said G.O. the Government failed to take into consideration the relevant factors and took

into consideration irrelevant factors. Apart from this, the G.O. is vague;

2. The impugned G.O. is arbitrary and thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in that, the State while allowing the students, whose

mother tongue is not English to study the subjects in Standards I to V in English medium in Anglo Indian and C.B.S.E., Schools, has called upon

the students in the Matriculation Schools to study the subjects only in their mother tongue (ie) tongue of the mother:

3. Petitioners/Managements were not given an opportunity of hearing before passing the G.O. This, the Government should have done on the

principle of legitimate expectation.

4. The impugned G.O. was passed by virtue of the powers conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. According to Article 26(3) of

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Convention on the tights of the students), the parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education

that shall be given to their children and that has the force of law by virtue of the Government of India''s accepting the said Convention on 11th

December, 1992. An order passed under Article 162 of the Constitution of India can not have the force of law. In the absence of any local law

contrary to the said Article viz.. Article 26(3) of the said Convention, it alone prevails.

5. The right to education is a fundamental right, which includes the right to choose the medium of instruction as well and it can be exercised by the

parents on behalf of their children. The impugned G.O. infringes such fundamental right.

6. The impugned G.O. infringes the rights of the minorities conferred under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India as the conditions imposed in

the said G.O. amount to restrictions of their choice of selecting the medium of instructions.

The common judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court dated 7.6.1999 made in W.P.Nos.5313, 5748, 6066, 6590 and 7191 of 1999 is

hereby set aside.

All the writ petitions and the writ appeals are allowed.

However, there will be no order as to costs.

All the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.