Muttusami Ayyar, J.@mdashIt is conceded that but for the payment of Rs. 10 on account of interest made on the 22nd December 1889, the suit
would be clearly barred; but it is contended that the Subordinate Judge is in error in holding that first counter-petitioner had no authority to make
such payments. This contention, I consider, is well founded. The Subordinate Judge relies on the decision in Wajibun v. Kadir Buksh ILR 13 Cal.
292 but that decision was dissented from chinnaya v. Gurunatham ILR 5 Mad. 169; Sobhanadri Appa Rau v. Sriramulu ILR 17 Mad. 221 and
Bhasker Tatya Shet v. Vijalal Nathu ILR 17 Bom. 512 The principle laid down in these cases is that a guardian is legally competent, in the
ordinary course of management, either to acknowledge a debt due by his or her ward, or to make a part-payment, or to pay interest. This being
so, the only question that arises for decision is whether the first counter-petitioner can be treated upon the facts found as a person duly authorized
to pay interest on behalf of the second within the meaning of Section 20 of the Limitation Act. It is true that the second counter petitioner had
attained majority when the payment was made, but the Subordinate Judge finds that he allowed his mother to continue in management for
sometime after he had become a major, and that the payment was made when she was so managing her son''s affairs. The payment of interest
accruing on an existing debt being an ordinary incident of management, I think it must be taken that the authority from the son to manage his affairs
included an authority to make the payment. I may observe that Section 20 of the Limitation Act only requires that the payment should be made by
an agent duly authorized. It is therefore immaterial that no special authority was given to her. I set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge and
direct that the second defendant do pay the plaintiff the amount sued for with interest at 6 per cent, per annum from date of plaint till date of
payment and with costs.