R.S. Garg, J.@mdashHeard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Appellant-M/s. Pepsico India Holding Ltd., being aggrieved by the order dated 18.12.98 passed in Special Civil Application No. 10818 of
1998 by the learned Single Judge, whereunder the order dated 23.11.1998 passed by the authority under the Payment of Wages Act has been
confirmed, is before this Court under Clause-15 of the Letters Patent. It would be necessary to note that present is the second round of litigation at
the instance of the present appellant. The facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal are that the respondent made an application before the
authority constituted under the Payment of Wages Act (referred to as ""authority"" for the sake of brevity) for certain reliefs against the present
appellant. The appellant raised certain issues including that there was no relation of employer and employee and in view of the salary of more than
Rs. 1600/- being paid to the respondent, the authority would have no jurisdiction in the matter. On an earlier occasion, the contentions were
negatived, therefore, the appellant came to this Court in Special Civil Application No. 3930 of 1997, the application was finally disposed of on
10.7.97. The question raised before the Court was that the authority would have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter and therefore, the
application before the authority was not maintainable. The question of jurisdiction of the authority was also raised, to which, this Court observed
that the petitioner (the appellant) will be at liberty to raise the objection as a preliminary objection before the learned Payment of Wages Authority
and the authority will decide the same in accordance with law, though it will be for the learned authority to take its own decision as to whether the
objections should be decided as a preliminary objection or along with other issues in the matter.
3. After the orders were passed by this Court, application exh. 22 was again placed before the authority.
4. The authority, this time, by its order dated 23.11.98, rejected the application and directed to proceed further with the matter.
5. The appellant again being aggrieved by the order dated 23.11.98 is before this Court.
6. Submissions of Mr. Nanavaty are two-fold, firstly, that the order passed by the authority is a non-speaking order, therefore, it deserves to be
quashed and the matter deserves to be remitted to the authority for reconsideration in accordance with law, and secondly that, as the employee
was getting more than Rs. 1600/- per month as salary, the authority would have no jurisdiction under the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act.
7. On being asked as to how the appeal against an order passed by the learned Single Judge would be maintainable, it was submitted that the
petitioner-appellant had clearly mentioned in the memo of the writ application that it was a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
therefore, any order passed in the said proceeding would be amenable to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
8. It was further submitted that a writ of prohibition was sought against the Tribunal, therefore also, an appeal under Clause-15 of the Letters
Patent would be maintainable.
9. In our considered opinion, simply by giving a cover of Article 226 to any matter, the same would not become a subject matter for its
examination under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. True it is, that a writ of prohibition can be issued by the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, but in the present matter, we cannot close our eyes to the order dated 10.7.97 passed between the same parties on an
earlier occasion in Special Civil Application No. 3930 of 1997. If on the earlier occasion, the petitioner had come to this Court, then, he could
have requested the High Court to look into the merits of the matter and decide the matter finally. On the earlier occasion, when this Court refused
to interfere in the matter and issued the directions that the question can be raised by the present appellant before the very same Tribunal, then, the
Tribunal alone has to decide the issue in accordance with law and at a particular stage as it deems fit. The writ of prohibition under the
circumstances cannot be issued.
10. Even otherwise, it would clearly appear that the appellant-petitioner is challenging the correctness, validity and propriety of the order dated
23.11.98 passed by the authority and this fact would be clear from paragraph-2 of the title of the writ application. The said authority has been duly
constituted under a Statute and it exercises its quasi-judicial functions. Realising that position when on the earlier occasion, the High Court directed
that question of jurisdiction can be raised before the authority and it would be competent for the authority to decide the issue as a preliminary issue
or not, then, under the set of circumstances, we must observe that the order challenged before this Court in Special Civil Application No. 10818 of
1998 is an order, which is passed by the authority exercising quasi-judicial functions. It is trite law that if the learned Single Judge interferes or
refuses to interfere in a matter under Article 227 of Constitution of India, then, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause-15 of the Letters Patent would
not be maintainable. At this stage, we hold that the appeal is not maintainable.
11. As we were taken to the merits of the matter, we would like to make our comments on the merits also. Submission was that the order is a non-
speaking order, reference to certain judgments of the Supreme Court was also made.
12. Present is not a case where rights of the parties are decided at an interlocutory or final stage where a Tribunal or a Court is required to pass an
order after giving reasons. In the present matter, by rejecting an application filed by the present appellant, the Court has simply deferred the
decision on the issues, which were to be decided as a preliminary issue in accordance with the prayer of the present appellant. The present is not a
case where the Tribunal has refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law or has exercised jurisdiction which is not vested in it. The Tribunal
has simply rejected the application, rejection simply means that the issues raised by the present appellant would be decided and disposed of finally
along with other issues.
13. So far as the question of salary of Rs. 1600/- is concerned, we are even not required to interfere in the matter, firstly because, the Tribunal has
yet not decided anything nor the learned Single Judge proposed to interfere in the matter.
14. Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances and in view of the discussion aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the
appeal is not maintainable and we are not required to interfere in the matter, because, no serious rather any prejudice is caused or occasioned to
the present appellant. The issue is still open and would be disposed of by the authority at an appropriate stage in accordance with law. The appeal
is dismissed with costs quantified to Rs. 5,000/(Rupees Five Thousand). Rule is discharged.
15. Learned authority is hereby directed to dispose of the matter finally within a period of four months from the date of appearance of the parties.
16. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, the Civil Application No. 12357 of 1998 is rejected.