J.B. Pardiwala, J.@mdashBy way of this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the Appellant - original Petitioner seeks to challenge the
legality, validity and propriety of the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 28th August 2008 whereby the learned Single
Judge rejected the writ petition confirming the order dated 30th April 1996 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.
TEN BA. 888 of 1982 as well as order dated 25th June 1998 passed by the Tribunal in review application filed by the Appellant - original
Petitioner.
2. The facts relevant for the purpose of deciding the present appeal can be summarised as under:
3. The agricultural land bearing Survey No. 1207/1 situated at Anand was owned by one Shri Naranbhai Patel. It is the case of the Appellant -
original Petitioner that NA permission was granted with respect to the said land on 22nd November 1964 by Collector, Kheda. Thereupon,
Naranbhai Patel sold the land in question to Shri Dayabhai Patel i.e., predecessors-in-title of the present Appellant. Respondent No. 3 claimed
tenancy rights on the said land in question and instituted Tenancy Case before the Mamlatdar & ALT by filing application on 8th February 1966.
The Mamlatdar & ALT dismissed the application on 31st December 1977. Thereafter, tenancy appeal was filed before the Deputy Collector
challenging the order of the Mamlatdar, which was dismissed by the Deputy Collector vide order dated 30th November 1981. Further revision
application being TEN.BA.888 of 1982 was allowed by the Tribunal by the judgment dated 20th September 1985. The Appellant herein
challenged the said decision of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal before this High Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 5831 of 1985. In this
petition, the learned Single Judge by an order dated 22nd July 1993 remanded the proceedings after quashing the order of the Tribunal for fresh
consideration. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal upon remand by its judgment and order dated 30th April 1996 once again allowed the revision
application of the tenant. The contention of the Appellant herein that the land having been converted into non-agricultural use Tenancy Act would
not apply, was rejected. It appears that the predecessors-in-title of the Appellant was Respondent No. 2 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal
when the order dated 30th April 1996 was being passed.
4. The record further reveals that the Appellant herein filed a review application against the order of the Tribunal, which also came to be dismissed
by the order dated 25th June 1998.
5. The record reveals that the first order was passed by the Tribunal on 30th April 1996 and thereafter the second order was passed by the
Tribunal upon review application on 25th June 1998.
6. The record further reveals that thereafter the Mamlatdar initiated the proceedings for fixing the purchase price of the land in question. The
Appellant kept on contesting and opposing such proceedings at different stages, but never thought fit to challenge the orders passed by the Gujarat
Revenue Tribunal in the year 1996 and 1998.
7. After a period of almost 12 years the petition came to be preferred being Special Civil Application No. 10753 of 2008 challenging two orders
of the year 1996 and 1998.
8. The learned Single Judge thought fit to reject the petition substantially on two grounds viz. gross unexplained delay of about 12 years in
challenging the orders passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and to a certain extent, some series of misstatements. It would be appropriate to
quote paragraphs 5 and 6 of the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, which read as under:
5. It is unfortunate that such series of mis-statements are made in the petition. It cannot be ignored as mere isolated lapse. Some isolated slip or
omission can always be overlooked, but such series of gross mis-statements directly conflicting with the material on record cannot be ignored. I am
not going into the question whether the Petitioner himself or the draftsman of the petition was responsible for such mis-statements, leaving it to the
good sense of draftsman to ensure that such instances do not recur.
6. On such gross mis-statements itself perhaps it would have been possible to dismiss the petition. However, right to approach the Court being
fundamental right, I desist from choosing such an option. However, even otherwise, I find that the petition cannot be entertained. The Petitioner has
challenged an order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal way back in the year 1996 without proper explanation of delay. Such gross and
inordinate delay of more than 10 years is not properly explained. The Petitioner only pressed in service confusion on his part pursuing proceedings
for fixation of sale price and his non-availability in India as grounds to explain the delay. None of these grounds could explain the delay of more
than 10 years. The Petitioner is an educated person with sufficient means and can and has engaged legal advisers from time to time to assist him. In
the meantime rights have been created in favour of tenant and such delay, therefore, cannot be lightly viewed.
9. We have heard learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant and learned Counsel appearing for Respondents Nos. 3/2, 3/5 and 3/6.
10. The only contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is to the effect that the learned Single Judge ought not to have rejected
the petition on the ground of delay as the Appellant was prosecuting with due diligence another proceedings against the Respondents before the
Mamlatdar. He submitted relaying upon Section 14 of the Limitation Act that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, the time during
which the party has been prosecuting with due diligence another proceeding shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter
and issue and is prosecuted in good faith.
11. We are afraid, we cannot accept this contention. The whole contention is misconceived. Firstly, Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be
made applicable in the present case. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tilokchand and Motichand and Others Vs. H.B. Munshi and
Another, in India we have the Limitation Act which prescribes different periods of limitation for suits, petitions or applications. There are also
residuary Articles which prescribe limitation in those cases where no express period is provided. If it were a matter of suit or application, either an
appropriate Article or the residuary Article would have applied. But a writ petition under Article 226 or a petition under Article 227 is not a suit
and is also not a petition or an application to which the Limitation Act applies. It is evident from the record that after the order of the Tribunal
passed in 1996, the Mamlatdar & ALT proceeded further in the matter and initiated the proceedings for fixing the price to be paid by the tenant
under the provisions of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. At no point of time, for a period of almost 12 years, the Appellant herein
thought fit to challenge the main orders passed way back in the year 1996 and 1998. The learned Single Judge having refused to interfere with the
orders passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in the year 1996 and 1998 on the ground of gross delay and misstatements, then, in our opinion,
no error, much less error of law can be said to have been committed by the learned Single Judge in rejecting the writ petition warranting any
interference at our hand in this appeal. The position of law is well settled. The relief under Article 226/227 is discretionary and the Petitioner who
approaches this Court for such relief must come with clean hands and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and suppresses the material facts,
his application is liable to be dismissed.
12. In Prestige Lights Ltd. Vs. State Bank of India, it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High
Court is not just a court of law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court''s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution is duty bound to place all the facts before the court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts
have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in refusing to entertain petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. This
Court referred to the judgment of Scrutton, L.J. in R v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners (1917) 1 K.B. 486, and observed:
In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking
such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, then the
Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous
litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct
facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become
impossible.
13 In K.D. Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others, , the court held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the Petitioner
approaching the Writ Court must come with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything
and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the Petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his
petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. The same rule was reiterated in G. Jayashree and Others Vs.
Bhagwandas S. Patel and Others,
14. In Yunus (Baboobhai) Yunus (Baboobhai) A Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary and Others, the Supreme Court
held as under:
10. ''6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the ''Constitution''). In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of
time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the
discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad Vs. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Of course, the discretion has to be exercised
judicially and reasonably.
''7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurde etc. (1874) 5 PC 221 at
page 239 was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts AIR 1967 SC 1450 and Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation Vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and Others, Sir Barnes had stated:
Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either
because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect
he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy
were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief,
which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of
that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay
and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course
or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.
''8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation with Article 32 of the
Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in
Rabindranath Bose and Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, that no relief can be given to the Petitioner who without any reasonable
explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does
not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed
after inordinate delay.
''9. It was stated in State of M.P. and Others Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Others, that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily
assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is
premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to
cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its trail new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may
have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is
invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High
Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.''
15 In a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Tamilnadu Housing Board, Chennai v. M. Meiyappan reported in AIR 2010
SCW 7130 the Supreme Court in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 20 and 21 has observed as under:
15. In Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, this Court had held that it is well-settled that the relief under Article 226 is
discretionary, and one ground for refusing relief under Article 226 is that the Petitioner has filed the petition after delay for which there is no
satisfactory explanation. It was noted that:
4. Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench, in Smt Narayani Devi Khaitan v. The State of Biharobserved:
It is well-settled that under Article 226, the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary. There can be no doubt that if a
citizen moves the High Court under Article 226 and contends that his fundamental rights have been contravened by any executive action, the High
Court would naturally like to give relief to him; but even in such a case, if the Petitioner has been guilty of laches, and there are other relevant
circumstances which indicate that it would be inappropriate for the High Court to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of the
Petitioner, ends of justice may require that the High Court should refuse to issue a writ. There can be little doubt that if it is shown that a party
moving the High Court under Article 226 for a writ is, in substance, claiming a relief which under the law of limitation was barred at the time when
the writ petition was filed, the High Court would refuse to grant any relief in its writ jurisdiction. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when
the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches.
That is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court and like all matters left to the discretion of the Court, in this matter too
discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably.
16. In Rabindranath Bose and Ors. v. The Union of India and Ors., a Constitution Bench of this Court, dealing with the same issue in relation to
Article 32 of the Constitution, had observed that:
We are of the view that no relief should be given to Petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation, approach this Court under Article 32 of
the Constitution after inordinate delay. The highest Court in this land has been given original jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the
Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself
a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should discard all
principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.
17. Though the afore-extracted observations in Rabindranath Bose (supra) relate to Article 32 of the Constitution, a fortiori, they would apply to
writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution as well. (See:
Yunus (Baboobhai) A. Hamid Padvekar (supra)).
18. Similarly, in Tridip Kumar Dingal and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (to which one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a party), this Court had
observed as under:
56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary
jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is
delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the
grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the Petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the Petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity.
Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying
object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where
the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime"" (See also: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu.)
20. We may, however, note that in Dayal Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., a three Judge bench of this Court, while dealing with a case
of land acquisition, had observed that:
Primarily a question of delay and laches is a matter which is required to be considered by the writ court. Once the writ court has exercised its
jurisdiction despite delay and laches on the part of the Respondents, it is not for us at this stage to set aside the order of the High Court on that
ground alone particularly when we find that the impugned judgment is legally sustainable.
21. We feel that the view echoed in Dayal Singh (supra) is not in consonance with the decision of the Constitution Bench in Rabindranath Bose
(supra), which was not noticed in the said judgment. It is also pertinent to note that subsequently in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed and
Ors.12, another three Judge Bench of this Court, had observed as follows:
Furthermore, the writ petition should not have been entertained keeping in view the fact that it was filed about three years after making of the
allotment and execution of the deed of sale. The High Court should have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches on the part
of the first Respondent. The Division Bench of the High Court also does not appear to have considered the plea taken by the Appellant herein to
the effect that the first Respondent had been set up by certain interested persons.
16. In the present case, as already stated, the Appellant has failed to furnish any explanation as to why it took 12 years to challenge the orders
passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal when, admittedly, the Appellant was aware of the orders which were passed by the Gujarat Revenue
Tribunal. In our view, the learned Single Judge has rightly not entertained the petition and dismissed the same on the ground of gross delay and
misstatements. We do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, the appeal is ordered to be
dismissed with no order as to costs.