J.B. Pardiwala, J.@mdashBy way of this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the Appellant - original Petitioner seeks to challenge the legality, validity and propriety of the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 28th August 2008 whereby the learned Single Judge rejected the writ petition confirming the order dated 30th April 1996 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN BA. 888 of 1982 as well as order dated 25th June 1998 passed by the Tribunal in review application filed by the Appellant - original Petitioner.
2. The facts relevant for the purpose of deciding the present appeal can be summarised as under:
3. The agricultural land bearing Survey No. 1207/1 situated at Anand was owned by one Shri Naranbhai Patel. It is the case of the Appellant - original Petitioner that NA permission was granted with respect to the said land on 22nd November 1964 by Collector, Kheda. Thereupon, Naranbhai Patel sold the land in question to Shri Dayabhai Patel i.e., predecessors-in-title of the present Appellant. Respondent No. 3 claimed tenancy rights on the said land in question and instituted Tenancy Case before the Mamlatdar & ALT by filing application on 8th February 1966. The Mamlatdar & ALT dismissed the application on 31st December 1977. Thereafter, tenancy appeal was filed before the Deputy Collector challenging the order of the Mamlatdar, which was dismissed by the Deputy Collector vide order dated 30th November 1981. Further revision application being TEN.BA.888 of 1982 was allowed by the Tribunal by the judgment dated 20th September 1985. The Appellant herein challenged the said decision of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal before this High Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 5831 of 1985. In this petition, the learned Single Judge by an order dated 22nd July 1993 remanded the proceedings after quashing the order of the Tribunal for fresh consideration. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal upon remand by its judgment and order dated 30th April 1996 once again allowed the revision application of the tenant. The contention of the Appellant herein that the land having been converted into non-agricultural use Tenancy Act would not apply, was rejected. It appears that the predecessors-in-title of the Appellant was Respondent No. 2 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal when the order dated 30th April 1996 was being passed.
4. The record further reveals that the Appellant herein filed a review application against the order of the Tribunal, which also came to be dismissed by the order dated 25th June 1998.
5. The record reveals that the first order was passed by the Tribunal on 30th April 1996 and thereafter the second order was passed by the Tribunal upon review application on 25th June 1998.
6. The record further reveals that thereafter the Mamlatdar initiated the proceedings for fixing the purchase price of the land in question. The Appellant kept on contesting and opposing such proceedings at different stages, but never thought fit to challenge the orders passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in the year 1996 and 1998.
7. After a period of almost 12 years the petition came to be preferred being Special Civil Application No. 10753 of 2008 challenging two orders of the year 1996 and 1998.
8. The learned Single Judge thought fit to reject the petition substantially on two grounds viz. gross unexplained delay of about 12 years in challenging the orders passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and to a certain extent, some series of misstatements. It would be appropriate to quote paragraphs 5 and 6 of the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, which read as under:
5. It is unfortunate that such series of mis-statements are made in the petition. It cannot be ignored as mere isolated lapse. Some isolated slip or omission can always be overlooked, but such series of gross mis-statements directly conflicting with the material on record cannot be ignored. I am not going into the question whether the Petitioner himself or the draftsman of the petition was responsible for such mis-statements, leaving it to the good sense of draftsman to ensure that such instances do not recur.
6. On such gross mis-statements itself perhaps it would have been possible to dismiss the petition. However, right to approach the Court being fundamental right, I desist from choosing such an option. However, even otherwise, I find that the petition cannot be entertained. The Petitioner has challenged an order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal way back in the year 1996 without proper explanation of delay. Such gross and inordinate delay of more than 10 years is not properly explained. The Petitioner only pressed in service confusion on his part pursuing proceedings for fixation of sale price and his non-availability in India as grounds to explain the delay. None of these grounds could explain the delay of more than 10 years. The Petitioner is an educated person with sufficient means and can and has engaged legal advisers from time to time to assist him. In the meantime rights have been created in favour of tenant and such delay, therefore, cannot be lightly viewed.
9. We have heard learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant and learned Counsel appearing for Respondents Nos. 3/2, 3/5 and 3/6.
10. The only contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is to the effect that the learned Single Judge ought not to have rejected the petition on the ground of delay as the Appellant was prosecuting with due diligence another proceedings against the Respondents before the Mamlatdar. He submitted relaying upon Section 14 of the Limitation Act that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, the time during which the party has been prosecuting with due diligence another proceeding shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter and issue and is prosecuted in good faith.
11. We are afraid, we cannot accept this contention. The whole contention is misconceived. Firstly, Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be made applicable in the present case. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of
12. In
In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, then the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.
13 In
14. In Yunus (Baboobhai)
10. ''6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the ''Constitution''). In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in
''7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurde etc. (1874) 5 PC 221 at page 239 was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts AIR 1967 SC 1450 and
Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.
''8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in
''9. It was stated in
15 In a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Tamilnadu Housing Board, Chennai v. M. Meiyappan reported in AIR 2010 SCW 7130 the Supreme Court in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 20 and 21 has observed as under:
15. In Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, this Court had held that it is well-settled that the relief under Article 226 is discretionary, and one ground for refusing relief under Article 226 is that the Petitioner has filed the petition after delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation. It was noted that:
4. Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench, in Smt Narayani Devi Khaitan v. The State of Biharobserved:
It is well-settled that under Article 226, the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary. There can be no doubt that if a citizen moves the High Court under Article 226 and contends that his fundamental rights have been contravened by any executive action, the High Court would naturally like to give relief to him; but even in such a case, if the Petitioner has been guilty of laches, and there are other relevant circumstances which indicate that it would be inappropriate for the High Court to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of the Petitioner, ends of justice may require that the High Court should refuse to issue a writ. There can be little doubt that if it is shown that a party moving the High Court under Article 226 for a writ is, in substance, claiming a relief which under the law of limitation was barred at the time when the writ petition was filed, the High Court would refuse to grant any relief in its writ jurisdiction. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. That is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court and like all matters left to the discretion of the Court, in this matter too discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably.
16. In Rabindranath Bose and Ors. v. The Union of India and Ors., a Constitution Bench of this Court, dealing with the same issue in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution, had observed that:
We are of the view that no relief should be given to Petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation, approach this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate delay. The highest Court in this land has been given original jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.
17. Though the afore-extracted observations in Rabindranath Bose (supra) relate to Article 32 of the Constitution, a fortiori, they would apply to writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution as well. (See:
Yunus (Baboobhai) A. Hamid Padvekar (supra)).
18. Similarly, in Tridip Kumar Dingal and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (to which one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a party), this Court had observed as under:
56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the Petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the Petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime" (See also: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu.)
20. We may, however, note that in Dayal Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., a three Judge bench of this Court, while dealing with a case of land acquisition, had observed that:
Primarily a question of delay and laches is a matter which is required to be considered by the writ court. Once the writ court has exercised its jurisdiction despite delay and laches on the part of the Respondents, it is not for us at this stage to set aside the order of the High Court on that ground alone particularly when we find that the impugned judgment is legally sustainable.
21. We feel that the view echoed in Dayal Singh (supra) is not in consonance with the decision of the Constitution Bench in Rabindranath Bose (supra), which was not noticed in the said judgment. It is also pertinent to note that subsequently in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed and Ors.12, another three Judge Bench of this Court, had observed as follows:
Furthermore, the writ petition should not have been entertained keeping in view the fact that it was filed about three years after making of the allotment and execution of the deed of sale. The High Court should have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the first Respondent. The Division Bench of the High Court also does not appear to have considered the plea taken by the Appellant herein to the effect that the first Respondent had been set up by certain interested persons.
16. In the present case, as already stated, the Appellant has failed to furnish any explanation as to why it took 12 years to challenge the orders passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal when, admittedly, the Appellant was aware of the orders which were passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. In our view, the learned Single Judge has rightly not entertained the petition and dismissed the same on the ground of gross delay and misstatements. We do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, the appeal is ordered to be dismissed with no order as to costs.
