Ravi Nath Verma, J.@mdashChallenge in this revision application is to the order dated 23.01.2013 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Deoghar in S.C. No. 231 of 2008 whereby and whereunder the petition filed by the petitioner under Sections 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short ''the Code'') has been rejected.
2. At the instance of the informant Rajesh Prasad Raut, the present case was instituted bearing Deoghar (Town) P.S. Case No. 214 of 2007 under Sections 341/323/307/324/34/115 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Sections 25(1-b)A/26/27 and 35 of Arms Act on the allegation that when this informant was working in his shop at about 3:30 P.M., five persons namely Manish Kumar @ Banty, Rinku Kumar, Nishant Singh (the present petitioner), Tapan Kumar Das and Anuj Kumar Verma @ Bholu were found sitting under a Banyan tree on a platform and one Ambassador Car was standing there. A neighbouring shopkeeper Sandeep Kumar Sinha was going to open his shop when one of the person Nishant Kumar sitting under the tree called him and took out his pistol and threatened Sandeep Kumar with dire consequence upon which Sandeep Kumar fled from there and again came with his brother Sudip but the accused persons assaulted them with fist and slaps and when this informant along with his brother Sudip Mistry and Kartik Raut went there for rescue, Nishikant Kumar fired from his country made pistol upon the informant with intention to kill him but the same caused injury over his right leg and Kartik Raut also sustained injury over his leg. On Hulla, when the local people started assembling there, four of the accused persons fled away in their Ambassador Car but one accused Manish @ Banty was caught on the spot. It is also alleged that the pistol of Nishikant Kumar fell down while he was fleeing away, which was collected by the informant and handed over to the police.
3. It appears from the record that after investigation, the police submitted the charge sheet in the aforesaid sections and accordingly cognizance was taken and the case was committed to the court of sessions where the petition for discharge was filed at the instance of the present petitioner along with other accused persons but the same was rejected as stated above holding sufficiency of materials and evidences on record.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner assailing the findings of the court below submitted that the court below without applying his judicial mind rejected the petition for discharge. Learned counsel further submitted that no sanction was taken under Arms Act and no ballistic report from Sergeant Major was obtained and there was absolutely no evidence in the case diary to constitute the offence under Section 307 of the I.P.C. Hence, the order impugned is fit to be set aside.
5. Refuting the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner, learned counsel representing the State submitted that there is no illegality or irregularity in the order impugned worth interference in the revisional jurisdiction and roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter is not at all permissible at the stage of framing of charge or discharge.
6. Being quite conscious of the fact that the trial would be at its very threshold and that in this application, this Court is dealing with the limited aspect of being charged or being discharged of the petitioner, I would like to examine the scope of Section 227 and 228 of the Code. The law at this point is succinctly analyzed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment i.e.
(i) "The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, to sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal."
7. On perusal of the impugned order, it is apparent that the court below was also conscious of the scope of this provision and has considered the different paragraphs of the case diary and other materials available on record and found sufficiency of materials against the petitioner to frame charge.
8. In view of the authoritative pronouncements and principles laid down in the above cases, the Court has only to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the strong suspicion and the materials produced before the Court. At this stage, the roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weighing the evidence to see the sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused during trial, is not at all required rather a prima facie case against the accused, if has been made out, that is sufficient to frame charge against the accused. I have also gone through the paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 58, 95 the injury report, of the case diary, Paragraph 14 the report of ballistic expert, Sanction Order of Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar in supplementary case diary and the materials on record and I am satisfied that there is prima facie strong suspicion against the present petitioner of assuming that the petitioner has committed the offences alleged. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not pointed out any cogent ground or any evidence from the case diary to show the false implication and that there is no sufficient material to proceed against this petitioner, hence the order impugned needs no interference.
9. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and having regard to the legal position stated above, I see no good reason to set aside the order impugned.
10. The revision application, being devoid of merit, is, hereby, dismissed.
