M.F. Saldanha, J.@mdashWe need to prefix this judgment with the observation that instances of object disregard of judicial orders at all levels seems to have become the order of the day as far as the State and Public authorities are concerned giving rise to a virtual multiplication of unnecessary post decisional litigation which has almost reached epidemic proportions. The problem is not acute. It is not chronic, it is virtually malignant. The question that is legitimately being posed in this situation is as to whether the law has any teeth left and the present situation appears to have stemmed from the impression of the authorities. That the law has not only lost its teeth but also its gums. It is in these circumstances that it has become necessary for us to deal at some length with this issue because this High Court alone as of now is unnecessarily over burdened with almost three thousand contempt proceedings which is a virtual national record !
2. An impression is unfortunately current that in those of the cases where a judicial order does not specify a prescribed timeframe for implementation, that the authority can postpone it indefinitely and still canvass the plea that no breach has been committed because no deadline had been set. Secondly, an erroneous impression prevails that unless the beneficiary of the order formally procures a certified copy thereof and serves it on the authority, that there is no obligation existent to carry out the directive. The favourite explanation put forward, apart from the last one, particularly by State Departments, is that an appeal was intended and, therefore, the non-implementation is justified during the interim period. It has also become almost a ritual with public authorities, long after the institution of contempt proceedings to report compliance with an air of confidence as though they have done something praiseworthy, coupled with the parallel explanation that the already over burdened Courts will most willingly drop the proceedings. Lastly however, the authorities are supremely confident of the fact that howsoever gross the misconduct, whatever be the harassment and torture and loss to which the citizen has been subjected and the utter wastage of precious judicial time, that every thing can be wiped out with one stroke of an apology. We deem it necessary to rectify this state of affairs and to make it known both clearly and firmly that the attitude which this Court will adopt in contempt proceedings will be a virtually nonsense procedure and that the dignity of the rule of law and its efficacy will be enforced at all costs.
3. It would be useful at this stage, to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Advocate General,
"But, on the other hand, it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the expression "Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with."
In this context, it would be useful to recall the words of Frankfurter, J. in this regard wherein he has observed :-
"It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage."
Also, Judge Curtis-Raleigh in Jennison v. Baker (1972) 1 All ER 997
"The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope."
Chinnappa Reddy, J. In
"The question whether a person should be punished for contempt has to be approached not from the point of view of the judge whose honour and dignity require to be vindicated but from the point of view of the public whose right and interest in the due administration of justice has to be protected. The strains and mortification of litigation cannot be allowed to lead litigants to tarnish, terrorise and destroy the system of administration of justice by vilification of judges. It is not open to the Court to invariably accept the easy and ready solution of accepting the apology and imposing a fine. A contumacious disregard of all decencies, such as, that exhibited by the contemnor in this case, can only tend to a serious disturbance of the system of administration of justice, unless duly repaired at once by inflicting an appropriate punishment on the contemnor which must be to send him to jail to atone for his misconduct."
4. It is in this background that we approach the facts of the present case. The complainant before us is the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 41405/93. It is his case that he had purchased two granite blocks and that the same were being transported on 7-11-93 under transport permits which were valid for seven days from 31-10-93 to 6-11-93. The lorry is alleged to have got stuck in the mud causing a delay of four hours and when the same reached the checkpost, the respondent No. 2 seized the same on the contention that the permits had expired and that the complainant had to pay Rs. 41,500/- and Rs. 35,800/- respectively as penalty. We are deliberately setting out the facts of this case as they are rather illustrative of the conduct of the Government Officers concerned. Their action was challenged through a writ petition whereby inter alia the question of the seven days validity of the permits was called into question. The learned single Judge issued emergent notices dt. 7-12-93 and finally, after hearing the parties passed an interim order on 7-2-94 to release the blocks on payment of Rs. 2412/- and furnishing a bank guarantee for Rs. 20,000/- subject to the final decision of this writ petition. The respondents had contested the matter and were represented by the Govt. Pleader which is a matter of some significance.
5. According to the averments made in the contempt petition, the complainant approached the first respondent on 18-2-94 along with a certified copy of the order and requested him to give a proforma, if any, of the bank guarantee to be furnished. The first respondent is alleged to have told the complainant to put his request in writing and he is alleged to have told him that the blocks would not be released and that the order in question would be challenged in appeal. The complainant''s counsel addressed a letter dated 18-2-94 once again requesting for the proforma of the bank guarantee and stated therein that a D.D. for Rs. 2412/- would also be produced before him. The letter was tendered along with a zerox copy of the Court order. The attitude of the first respondent is illustrated in the acknowledgment given by him to this letter wherein he states that he has "received one cover, the contents not known." The communication was ignored whereupon a second letter dt. 24-2-94 was addressed by registered post to the first respondent enclosing a D.D. for Rs. 2412/- and the bank guarantee for Rs. 20,000/- in favour of the State Government along with the renewed request to release the blocks seized on 7-11-93. The certified copy of the High Court order was also enclosed. Both the respondents were served under registered post acknowledgment due and they were informed that the complainant would approach them on 1-3-94 for obtaining the release order. The complainant has also alleged that on 2-12-94 when he tried to meet the first respondent, that he was rudely told not to come there but to go to Court if he so desired. On 1-3-94, the complainant went to the Madiwala Checkpost but the second respondent was not there. The complainant telephoned to the first respondent and requested him to release the blocks but he was very curtly told that the first respondent proposed to challenge the order in the High Court and that consequently, he would not release the blocks in question. It is in this background, that the complainant filed a contempt petition on 2-3-94 and after examination thereof, notice was issued to the respondents.
6. As late as on 17-6-94, the learned Govt. Counsel filed a copy of an order dated 13-6-94 passed by the first respondent creptically stating that the granite blocks seized on 7-11-93 are released herewith. In his counter, respondent No. 1 has sought to justify his conduct by stating that the interim order dt. 7-2-94 was received by him on 15-2-94 and that on 17-2-94 he addressed a letter to the office of the Advocate General to file an application for vacating the stay. He had also written to the law department to this effect and followed up the same on through a reminder letter dated 6-4-94. In the meanwhile, time was sought in the contempt proceedings on the ground that the requisite application was being made to the trial Court "for vacating the stay." This plea, in our considered view is not only specious and hallow, but indicates how utterly worthless it is and how in fact, it is a weak attempt to cover up for almost unpardonable conduct because there was no question of any stay involved in this case. The officer thereafter contended that in the meanwhile he was transferred to Chikmagalur and that he had instructed his successor to attend to the above case and that consequently, his successor released the blocks in question by an order dt. 13-6-94. Initially, it was assumed that the moment compliance was reported, that this Court was obliged to drop the contempt proceedings regardless of the harassment caused to the citizen, the fact that the interim order had been disregarded for as long as four months and more importantly, that this Court had been burdened with one more unnecessary litigation which had been dragged through half-a-dozen dates of hearing. What is also of consequence is the fact that had there been even a modicum of bona fide involved, that the compliance would have been reported not at the earliest point of time even after institution of the contempt proceedings but virtually as a measure of last resort. These are some of the tests which a Court would apply for purposes of assessing whether or not contempt has been purged and more importantly as to whether an apology should be accepted and lastly, for assessing the quantum of punishment that the case deserves.
7. In the reply filed by respondent No. 1, it has been contended that efforts were made for purposes of taking out further proceedings in the matter and that there was considerable delay in the law department. The deponent therefore seeks to take shelter under the umbrella of bureaucratic slackness which is sought to be projected as an absolute defence in the face of contempt. Since this plea is habitually advanced, we need to lay down very clearly as to what the approach of the Court in such situations is.
8. We do not under any circumstances, where a State or its officers or public authority is represented in the first instance accept the plea that unless the petitioner makes a formal demand for implementation of the order or produces a certified copy thereof, that the authority is absolved from carrying out the Court directive. Under all judicial systems, where the respondents are represented it is the function of the learned counsel and his office which in this case is the office of the Govt. Pleader, High Court, to immediately convey through the quickest means available the substance of the Court''s order regardless of whether the officer concerned was present in Court or not. No excuse can be advanced that a certified copy was necessary when orders are pronounced in open Court and where, if the office of the Govt. Pleader so desires, an ordinary copy can be made available immediately. It shall therefore no longer be a defence in contempt proceedings that there was non-communication or late communication and it would therefore be advisable for the Chief Secretary, the law Secretary and the Heads of other public sector organisations to take cognizance of the fact that they shall ensure that the machinery set up by them for handling of their litigation promptly informs them of the Courts orders. Where the orders are time bound, the order will have to be implemented within the prescribed time unless extension of time has been obtained or the order has been stayed. The lame excuse that further proceedings such as an application for stay or review or appeal was intended or that it was merely filed and left in the office of some Court will not avail a contemnor who has transgressed the time limit.
9. Courts passing final or interim orders do some times specify the time frame within which the order is to be carried out. Where the Court indicates that it was conscientiously directed expedition or forthwith execution, that direction shall be implemented in letter and spirit. Conversely, where no such time limit is prescribed, it shall be obligatory on the part of the authority to implement the order with the least possible delay within a reasonable period of time. Since these two expressions particularly in bureaucratic circles are misunderstood to confer a licence to disobey the order for anything up to several months or a year, we need to lay down that a period of one month would be reasonable outer limit in all such cases.
10. It is now well settled law, that in case where a party against whom an order is passed is genuinely aggrieved and desires to adopt further proceedings that appropriate time for this purpose must be sought from the Court which has passed the order or from the appeal Court. This presupposes the fact that such an application for stay of the order or for time to file an appeal or to consider its position must be made and orders obtained thereon from the Court that has passed the order. Further more, in cases where an appeal is filed, it will be necessary to obtain appropriate and interim orders within the prescribed period of time. In sum and substance, therefore, what emerges is that in the absence of the order being stayed or extension of time being obtained either for considering one''s position or implementing the order, it shall be no defence, to state that some correspondence was going on at some official levels, that files were moving from office to office and that on this ground, the Court orders were put into cold storage. There shall have to be a full stop once and for all if such a state of affairs which cannot be legally defended. Such pleas shall also have to be disregarded hereinafter. It would in these circumstances be advisable if these guidelines are taken special note of by the heads of departments of the State Govt. and the public sector organisations in particular, and that they be made aware that the current attitude of complacency and the impression that any lame excuses of the aforesaid type would serve as defence in contempt proceedings, will have to be firmly understood as being no longer available and the authorities are advised to take serious note of this aspect.
11. In this regard, we need to set at rest the general impression that is prevalent namely that in cases where appeals or further proceedings are intended, the orders can be disregarded. There is no guarantee that the appellate Court would entertain the appeal in the first instance nor is there any assurance that the order in question would be stayed. Under these circumstances, the plea that an appeal was contemplated or for that matter has been filed and is lying in the office shall not avail a contemnor unless a contemnor has followed the proper course of adopting the proceedings within the prescribed time and obtaining an appropriate directions from the appeal Court.
12. In this context, we need to also observe in the strongest terms that the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court is analogous to a criminal proceeding where the consequences to the contemnor can be extremely grave. This is not because Courts are vindictive or harsh but because it is essential to up hold the rule of law and to enforce it. Under the scheme of our Constitution, it is the Courts and the higher judiciary that are the final arbitrators in the matter of disputes and their verdict howsoever unpalatable has to be accepted. The State today is the largest litigant and the attitude of some of its officers which betrays a degree of cussedness, defiance and high handedness is responsible for multiplying that litigation. An appeal remedy is prescribed in law and is required to be resorted to in those of the cases where there is a genuine grievance such as where another view may be reasonably possible or where an important point of law requires to be set at rest. We find that in the majority of "run of the mill" cases where there is virtually nothing that an appeal Court would do, such as in a situation presented by the present case where a mere interim order was passed and where no damage was done to the State''s interest, officers indiscriminately take up the plea that appeals were intended. A Court hearing a contempt proceeding is certainly entitled to look at the nature of the order and arrive at its own judgment as to whether an order was such as genuinely warranted an appeal or whether the officer concerned was trying to hit back at the petitioner for having approached the Court by delaying reliefs through the subterfuge of resorting to an appeal. We consider it appropriate that when the aforesaid guidelines are made known by the heads of departments to the subordinate officers and it is pointed out to them that contempt is an act of misconduct and where an officer lands himself in contempt not only shall he be personally responsible for his own conduct but that the punishment awarded including fines shall have to be his own personal responsibility.
13. Coming specifically to the fact of the present case, the learned Advocate General who appeared on behalf of the contemnor stated that at the initial point of time, the respondent No. 1 genuinely felt that the interim order should either be reviewed or that it should be appealed against and that he should be excused for using the expression stay in relation to any such further proceedings. He also submitted that having regard to the workload that various departments are faced with, that a certain amount of time lag is understandable both taking into account the fact that an order has to be considered by the officer concerned, that he has to thereafter write to the requisite departments and that those department in turn are required to examine the case in relation to the records. In sum and substance, the action was sought to be defended even though the respondent No. 1 has also tendered an apology. On the other hand, the complainant''s learned counsel has vehemently contended that this Court must read between the lines from which it would be abundantly evident that the first respondent was acting with characteristic bureaucratic high handedness coupled with the customary arrogance that a citizen is required to face from officials. He also contended that the plea of taking out further proceedings is a totally sham excuse because the interim order fully safeguarded the department''s interest but his client was faced with the familiar situation of having to cope with the retaliatory vengeance that is customarily directed against any person who has the courage to approach a Court of and insist upon his rights and more so, if the misconduct of the officers is exposed in the process. He also pointed out, that the legal position in relation to an apology is well defined and perfectly crystallised to the extent that an apology must be tendered at the earliest point of time and that it should be bona fide, sincere and genuine. Learned counsel submitted that the present apology bears none of the aforesaid characteristics.
14. We do no need to take note of the fact that the apology has come virtually at the fag end of the proceedings. If a Court order has been overlooked or if it has not been implemented for genuine or valid reasons, the contemnor must point out to the Court at the earliest point of time that there were valid and cogent grounds for the breach that has occurred. If there is a genuine sense of remorse, the apology tendered must be at the initial stage and not as a second string to the defence namely that an attempt is made of defend the misconduct and if the effort fails, the apology is used as a measure of the last resort. In such cases, the Court will refuse to accept the apology because it is abundantly clear that it is neither bona fide nor genuine. It is equally necessary, that compliance is a condition precedent meaning there by that it is a matter of priority that the order must be obeyed first and then an apology tendered for the breach that has occurred.
15. What is being completely overlooked in all these contempt proceedings is the fact that the offence of contempt is complete immediately when the breach has occurred and this being the position, by merely reporting complaince, the offence cannot be undone. Where a contemnor drags on the proceedings before the Court even after a contempt petition has been filed, and complies with the order much later, the contempt is aggravated. We need in passing, to refer to the plea that is often adopted namely that the order that has been breached has subsequently been vacated or that the main proceeding has subsequently been disposed of. This is absolutely no defence because the requirement of law is that the order has to be obeyed, respected and implemented while it is in force. The subsequent modification of the order can never therefore be pleaded as either a justification or a defence in contempt proceedings.
16. The learned Advocate General, did very fairly concede that he would be the last person to defend an officer who has defied or disobeyed a Court order, also adding that he would never come to the assistance of an officer who has no regard for the rule of law. He however submitted that even if this Court were to take a very strict view of the situation hereinafter, that it may be done after a due warning and to this extent advanced a strong plea that the apology be accepted in the present case. It is only under these circumstances, and that too with some degree of reluctance that we accept the apology tendered by respondent No. 1. Regardless of that fact however, having regard to the stage at which the apology was tendered and the fact that this proceeding went through several dates of hearing even though the contempt notice is discharged, we award costs quantified at rupees one thousand payable by respondent No. 1 personally.
17. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka, forthwith, with a direction that he shall bring the guidelines contained in, and the observations and the recommendations made in this order to the notice of the authorities concerned with a view to avoiding future inaction on their part in complying with the directions of the Courts.
18. Order accordingly.
