@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
1. These are plaintiff''s revisions. In the three suits the plaintiff has filed in the Court of the Principal Civil Judge, Mangalore, Dakshina Kannada, that Court and the first Appellate Court (the District Judge, Mangalore) have concurrently held that since the subject matter of the suits (O.S. Nos. 76, 77 and 78 of 1982) relates to the determination of rights and interests in immovable property (within the meaning of Section 16(d) of the C.P.C.), the Court leacked jurisdiction to entertain the said suits.
2. Facts in great detail need not be adverted to for the reason that both the Courts below have, with sufficient clarity, brought out the same.
3. The contesting defendants in the three suits, it is said, had entered into three separate agreements with the 3rd defendant (2nd respondent herein) on 30-12-1980 agreeing to sell the trees and permitting him to cut and remove the same from the lands bearing Sy. Nos. 10/1, 10/2 and 10/7 of Madbba Village in Sringeri Taluk, Chikmagalur District. The trees had to be cut and removed out of the lands by 31-12-1983. The 3rd defendant, it is said, has since assigned his rights under the agreements in favour of the plaintiff (plaintiff-firm).
4. The plaintiff''s case is that defendants 1 and 2, in collusion with the 3rd defendant, had subsequently entered into an agreement re: these very items with a third party and were taking steps to cut and remove the trees standing thereon depriving him of his rights under the three agreements. The common relief claimed in the three suits is to declare that the defendants had no manner of right to sell or alienate the standing timber; for a permanent injunction restraining them from selling or alienating the trees to any third party and from removing the same; and also restraining the defendants from preventing the plaintiff from entering into the said property or cutting and transporting the said timber.
5. The question is whether the timber and fuel-wood trees standing in the lands in question, the subject matter of the suits, are immovable property within the meaning of Section 16(d) C.P.C.?
6. Section 16(d) reads thus:
"SUITS TO BE INSTITUTED WHERE SUBJECT MATTER SITUATE: Subject to the pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any law, suits......
a) ...................................................
b) ...................................................
c) ...................................................
d) for the determination of any other right to or interest in immovable property e) ...................................................
f)..................................................
shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate."
The term ''immovable property'' is not defined in the Code nor is ''movable property''. Sub-Section (13) of Section 2 of the Code merely says ''movable property'' includes growing crops. The code is a Central Act and was brought into force in the year 1908. The General Clauses Act, 1897 (the Act) provides that the definitions in Section 3 of that Act also apply to all Central Acts made after 3rd January, 1868 and to all regulations made on or after the 14th January, 1887 (sec. 4). Section 3 of the Act itself provides that ''unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context in the concerned Central Act or Regulation the words and terms defined there in should be assigned the same meaning in those Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of the Act.''
As observed in Davangere Cotton Mills Ltd., Davangere. v. Dy. Commissioner, Chitradurga and another the effect of S. 3 is to incorporate it as it were as an interpretation section in all Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act. As further observed therein "whenever the Central Act or Regulation made after March 11, 1897, is enacted, the General Clauses Act becomes statutorily a part thereof and by its own force it applies to the interpretation of every such enactment."
To the same effect are the observations of the Supreme Court in Chief Inspector of Mines & Another v. Karm Chand Thapar etc. The Court observed thus:
"The purpose of the General Clauses Act is to place in one single statute deferent provisions as regards interpretation of words and legal principles which would otherwise have to be specified separately in many different acts and regulations. What ever the General Clauses Act says, whether as regards the meanings of words or as regards legal principles, has to be read into every statute to which it applies."
(Head note ''e'')
7. The definition of the term ''immovable property'' in the Act is an inclusive one and sub-section (26) of Section 3 reads thus:
"''immovable property'' shall include land, benefit to arise out of land and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to any thing attached to the earth."
This exhaustive and comprehensive definition of ''Immovable property'' would include within it all the trees in the land including standing timber. The exception provided for in C.P.C., is only in the case of growing crops. Sub-Section (13) of Section 2 of the Code includes ''growing crops'' as movable property. If the definitions provided in the Act are to be read into the Code, as we ought to so read, all types of trees, including the standing timber, would be immovable property. Trees are undoubtedly benefits arising out of the land things attached to the earth.
8. The next question is: Is it in law permissible to qualify the definition of ''immovable property'' found in the Act before adopting it to the Code with the definitions, if any, given to those words in other enactments?
9. Arguments, at length, were advanced at the Bar drawing my attention to the definition of the terms ''movable propery'' and ''immovable property'' found in other enactments, and, in particular, the Transfer of property Act. But it may not be correct, at this stage, to draw any inspiration from other enactments like the transfer of Property Act. My attention was drawm by both the sides to the observations of Bose, J., in Smt. Shantabai. v. State of Bombay & others. However, the question that arose for consideration in that case was as to whether the suit document was a lease or licence. That was an unregistered document and the plaintiff, relying on that document, asserted her right to enter upon certain lands comprised in a Zamindari forest and to cut and remove Bamboos, fuel-wood and teak-wood. When the agreement was in currency the Zamindari rights were abolished with the result all proprietary rights came to be vested in the State from the appointed day. The plaintiff had been stopped by the authorities from cutting the trees. The nature of that document, including the question as to whether the plaintiff can be said to have acquired any share or interest in the proprietary right of the estate or any share or interest of that estate an immovable property under that agreement came up for consideration in view of that vesting order. It is in that context Bose, J., proceeded to examine the definition given the term ''immovable property'' in the General Clauses Act, Transfer of Property Act, and the Registration Act and proceeded further to examine as to what was meant by the term ''standing timber'' used while defining the term ''immovable property'' in the Transfer of Property Act.
10. But, at the moment, we are not examining the plaintiff''s claim, emanating as it does on an alleged agreement and there by considering the nature of that transaction. We are now concerned with certain procedural aspects touching the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suits. While examining this aspect we have to keep in mind the nature of the relief sought for and this we have to do in the light of the provisions of the Code itself. If, in this matter, the Code is silent, the related law i.e., the Act having a bearing on that question can alone be looked into. In the instant case, as already stated, the term ''immovable property'' has to be assigned to it the meaning given to that term in the Act.
11. A full bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Umed Ram v. Daulat Ram also lends support to the conclusion I have reached that in deciding questions pertaining to the jurisdiction and other related Procedural matters of Civil Courts governed by the CPC the terms defined in the Code, and, if not defined, the definitions given to such terms in the General Clauses Act that have to be taken into consideration and not the definitions of such terms available in other laws. Under the Mufassal Small Cause Court Act (XI of 1865) it was not competent for the Court of Small Causes to attach immovable properties while executing a small cause decree. In Umed Ram, the decree-holder, sought attachment of some standing trees. That was objected to on the ground that the ''standing trees'' were not movable properties. However, it was argued for the other side that under the Indian Registration Act, 1877, and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, standing timber was a movable property and, therefore, there was no bar to attach the standing trees. The trial court felt some doubt in the matter and referred this question to the High Court under Sec. 617 of the then Civil Procedure Code. The Division Bench, before whom that reference came up for consideration, referred that question to a Full Bench. The following observations of the Full Bench may be noted:
"The question referred is whether standing timber is movable property within the meaning of S. 19, Act XI of 1865, against which a Court of Small Causes can direct execution ofits decree. The Mufassal Small Cause Court, Court Act (XI of 1865) contains no definition of the words ''movable'' and ''immovable'' property, and these words have been differently defined in different Acts. In the Registration Act and the Transfer of Property Act, standing timber, growing crops and grass are included in ''movable'' property. In the General Clauses Act (I of 1868), however, ''immovable'' property includes land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth; and ''movable'' property means property of every description except ''immovable'' property; and under these definitions standing timber will be ''immovable'' property. The interpretation clause of the General Clauses Act is made applicable to that Act and all Acts made by the Governor-General in Council after that Act shall come into operation, unless there be repugnant in the subject or context. It, therefore, does not apply to the Mufassal Small Cause Court Act; but we are of opinion that the definitions of ''immovable'' and ''movable'' property which it contains may appropriately be applied to the Small Cause Court Act, as being in accord with the spirit of that Act, and the scope of the powers intended to be exercised under it by a Judge of Small Cause Court. We are of opinion therefore that standing timber must be classed as immovable property, and this view appears to be in accord with the current of rulings on subject."
12. Thus, it is clear from what is stated above that the three suits in the instant case deal with the determination of rights and interests in immovable property (within the meaning of Sec. 16(d) of the Code). Since the properties involved in these suits are not situated within the local limits of the Civil Judge, Mangalore, that Court, in the circumstances, lacks jurisdiction to entertain the said suits.
13. The findings of the courts below that the court of the Civil Judge, Mangalore, has no jurisdiction to deal with the subject-matter of the suits is upheld for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, the petitions are hereby dismissed. No costs.
