Thomas, J.@mdashAppellant was elected to the Managing Committee of a Co-operative Society (Thiruvalla East Co-operative Bank Ltd., hereinafter referred to as ''the Society'') in the election held on 4-1-93. But she could not continue as member of the Managing Committee for long as she has now been declared disqualified to be a member of the committee by the learned single Judge who allowed the Original petition filed by the first respondent. This appeal is in challenge of the said judgment. First respondent made a complaint to the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (second respondent) on 25-5-93 pleading for a declaration that appellant has been disqualified to be a member of the committee on the ground that she is the lessee of the society is respect of a building belonging to the society. According to the appellant the building was leased out to one Dr. K.V. Mammen in 1972 and after his death it was in the possession of one Dr. R.P. Thomas (husband of the appellant.)
2. The Joint Registrar rejected the complaint as per Ext. P6 order holding that there was no contract between appellant and the society. First respondent had in fact filed the Original Petition even before the order Ext. P6 was passed and prayed for a declaration that appellant has been disqualified to be a member of the committee. The Joint registrar was directed by this Court to dispose of Ext. P1 representation and Ext. P6 order was passed pursuant to that direction. Subsequently the Original petition was amended by seeking the relief to quash Ext. P6.
3. Learned single Judge considered the finding of the Joint Registrar that the building was in possession of the appellant and her husband and that rent of the building was paid from the account of the appellant herself. However, the Joint Registrar found that the appellant or her husband had not entered into any contract with the society since no lease deed was executed or any resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the Society. Learned single judge pointed out that for attracting the disqualification under Rule 44(1)(d) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 (for short the Rules) oven an implied contract is sufficient and hence Ext. P6 was quashed. Learned single Judge then proceeded further and declared that the election of the third respondent to the Board of Directors was illegal and further declared that appellant was ''disqualified to be a member of the Board of Directors'' of the society.
4. Shri. T.P. Keju Nambiar, senior counsel who argued for the appellant, advanced mainly two contentions. First is that the Original Petition should not have been entertained as the petitioner could have resorted to the statutory remedy provided in Sec. 87 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (for short the Act''). Learned senior counsel pointed out that, as a matter of fact appellant who was aggrieved by certain adverse findings made in Ext. P6 (that appellant was in possession of the building) has filed an application for revision before the Government and the said revision is pending. Second contention is that an election cannot be set aside except by the procedure specified in Sec. 69 of the Act.
5. The latter contention is well founded since an embargo is incorporated in Sec. 69(3) of the Act in the following words:
No dispute arising in connection with the election of the Board of Management or an officer of the society shall be entertained by the Registrar unless it is referred to him within one month from the date of the election.
It is admitted by both sides that no such references was made within one month from 4-1-93, the date of election. Hence the result of the election cannot now be disturbed.
6. Regarding the former contention, we would observe that it is the discretion of the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution to desist from interfering with a matter in respect of which there is an alternative remedy is available. As the single Judge has decided to proceed with the matter there is no illegality in it.
7. The surviving question is, could the appellant have been declared disqualified to be a member of the committee? Learned single-Judge pointed out that the view of the Joint Registrar that there was no contract between the appellant and the society is not enough to save the appellant from the consequences envisaged in Rule-14 of the Rules. So we would now consider the legality of the remaining question mentioned above.
8. Sec. 28 of the Act empowers the general body of a society to constitute its committee for management. Sub-section (2) disqualifies a person for being a member of the committee if he has membership in the committee of another society in certain conditions. Rule 44(i) enumerates certain other grounds for disqualification. (Such Rules were formulated by the Government as Sec. 109 (xiv) of the Act which empowers the Government to make rules prescribing the qualifications or disqualifications for membership of the committee of a society). What is pertinent in this case among such grounds is the one mentioned in clause (d) of Rule 44(i). Material portion of it reads thus."
...is interested directly or indirectly in any contract made with the society or in any sale or purchase made by the society if the contract, or transaction is subsisting.
To entail the consequence of this clause the member concerned need not be a tenant under the society. It is enough if he has any interest in a contract made with the society. There again such interest need not be direct, even indirect interest in the contract would catch the consequences. Sub rule (2) says that "a member of the committee shall cease to hold his office as such if he becomes disqualified under sub-rule (1)" So the disqualification should normally result in cessation of his membership.
9. It is in the above background that we have to examine the scope of sub-rule (3) of Rule 44. It reads thus:
If any person is or becomes disqualified to be a member of the committee, the Registrar may on his own motion or on a representation made to him by any member of the society or by its Financing Bank by an order in writing declare that he shall cease to be a member of the committee of the society concerned from the date of such disqualification. Before passing an order, the Registrar shall give such person an opportunity to state his objections, if any, against the proposed action and if the person wishes to be heard he shall be given an opportunity to be heard.
Once it is found that a person is disqualified to be a member of a committee, then it is for the Registrar to declare that he shall cease to be a member of the committee. The word "may" used in the sub-rule cannot be interpreted as merely conferring a discretion on the Registrar to make the declaration. The word "may" in the context in which it is used is suggestive of a compelling duty cast on the Registrar to make the declaration that the disqualified person shall cease to be a member of the committee of a society concerned from the date of such disqualification.
10. No doubt, the word "may" in a statutory provision normally denotes that it is optional for the person concerned to do the particular act. But this normal rule of interpretation is subject to exceptions. In a certain context the word "May" would suggest that it is incumbent on the person to do the act enjoined on him. Maxwell on "Interpretation of Statues" has pointed out (at page 234, 12th Edition) that "in ordinary usage "may" is permissible and "Must" is imperative and the word "may" in a statute will not generally be held to be mandatory. In some cases, however, it has been held that expressions such as "may" - to say the least-a compulsory force". Maxwell then quoted the decision in R.V. Roberts [(1901) 2 K.B. 177] in which Sec. 13 of the Weights and Measures Act, 1889 was considered as it provided that as Inspector "may" take, in respect of the verification and stamping of weights, measures etc., the fees specified. It was held that the word "may" was used to indicate that it is obligatory on the part of the Inspector to take action. Again quoting Shaw V. Reckitt [(1893) 1 Q.B. 779] the learned author observed that the word "may" in the context conferred powers or jurisdiction to be exercised perforce. Lord Parker, C.J. in "In re Shuter" (1960 (1) Q.B. 142) considered the impact, of the word "may" in Sec. 7 of the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1891. Contextually it was regarded as a mandate put on the authority to act in a given situation. The Supreme Court in State (Delhi Administration) V. I.K. Nangia [(1980)1. S.C.C. 2581, referred to the aforesaid observations of the learned author (Maxwell and stated that in certain contexts the word "may" would mean "must". Their Lordships were considering the scope of Sec. 17(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and the employment of the word "may" was construed as a compelling obligation. In
11. Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind we are inclined to hold that the context in which the word "may" is used in sub-rule (3) would suggest that it was not merely a discretion or option conferred on the Registrar to act either on his own motion or on a representation made to him by any member of the society. The option is only to decide whether his action should be on his own motion or on the basis of any representation. Otherwise he has no option in the matter. We are in agreement with the contention of the Learned Counsel Shri T.P. Kelu Nambiar that after stating the legal position, the Joint Registrar should have been directed to exercise the powers envisaged in Rule 44(3) of the Rules. What we are differing from learned single Judge here is only that the statutory authority was not directed to exercise the jurisdiction after laying down the legal provision because it is first for him to act on the factual conclusion in accordance with law. This is more so because the appellant for all practical purposes has continued as a member of the committee till the date of the impugned judgment, and long before such date the appellant has ceased to be an occupant of the building of the society. Appellant has a case that even long before Ext. P6 order, possession of the building was surrendered to the society. If that be so, the Joint Registrar has to be directed to consider the nature of the order to be passed in the light of the legal position set out above.
In the result, we set aside that part of the Judgment of the learned single Judge declaring the election of the appellant as illegal. We agree with the finding of the learned single Judge that Ext. P6 should be quashed, but we direct the second respondent Joint Registrar to take a decision on Ext. P1 afresh in the light of the legal position stated above. Such decision shall be taken within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment after affording a reasonable opportunity to the appellant and first and third respondents.
Appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
