AR. Lakshmanan, Ag. C.J.
1. The Original Petition was filed by the petitioner herein to quash Exts. P5, P6 and P10 orders passed by the respondents 1, 2 and 3 and for a mandamus directing the respondents to release the goods covered by Ext. P4 detention certificate to the petitioner unconditionally. A further prayer by way of mandamus to direct the respondent No. 1 to take back Ext. P7 revision petition filed by the petitioner on file and to dispose of the same on merits is also sought for and in consequence thereof to direct the first respondent to condone the delay in preferring the revision petition and consider and dispose of the same on merits. The petitioner arrived at Thiruvananthapuram International Airport on 2-1-1996 from Dubai. According to him he is eligible for Transfer of Residence (T/R) facility, since he had stayed abroad for a period exceeding three years prior to his arrival on 2-10-1996. It is his case that on his arrival on 2-10-1996 the unaccompanied baggage despatched by him from Dubai arrived at Thiruvananthapuram on 9-10-1996. According to the petitioner, in Ext. P1 bill the name and address of the sender and consignee was inadvertently shown as Mrs.Shyla Begam Subaida Beevi, Kollam instead of the petitioner, Mohammed Ibrahim Abdul Hameed. On coming to know about the mistake committed by the cargo staff a fax message was sent by Lufthansa Cargo Ways to the Indian Airlines to amend and read the name of shipper and consignee as the petitioner, instead of Shyla Begum Subaida Beevi. The said communication has been marked as Ext. P2. According to the petitioner, the Clearing Agency issued necessary certificate stating that the said mistake was committed by the staff due to oversight and that the passenger is not responsible for the same, which certificate is maked as Ext. P3. Thereafter the Indian Airlines authorities issued necessary delivery order in the name of the petitioner so as to enable him to take delivery of the goods and based on the delivery order the petitioner filed baggage declaration for the clearance of his baggage and appeared before the unaccompanied Baggage Unit of Air Cargo Complex on 26-10-1996. The officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence attached to the Air Customs Office, Thiruvananthapuram obtained statements from the petitioner on 25th and 26th October 1996 alleging that the goods did not belong to him and that he had not booked any goods as claimed. According to the petitioner, the said statements were obtained from him under threat and force as he had already retracted those statements obtained by the Officers from the petitioner. Relying on the statement obtained by the D.R.I. Officers from the petitioners the Additional Commissioner of Customs held that the goods do not belong to him and that the brand new consumer goods are imported in violation of Exim Policy and the provisions of the Customs Act and accordingly confiscated the goods, imposing personal penalty of Rs.2,000/-. The personal penalty has already been paid by the petitioner on 29-10-1996.
2. Aggrieved by Ext. P5 Order the petitioner preferred an appeal u/s 128 of the Customs Act 1962 before the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) and prayed to set aside the order of the Additional Commissioner and release the goods on payment of duty. The appellate authority, under Ext. P6 dismissed the appeal holding that there is nothing on record to show that the statement obtained from the petition was by force and that the petitioner has not given any documentary evidence independent of his statement to establish his connection with the goods. It is submitted that though Ext. P6 order was received on 24-12-1996 revision petition could not be filed in time u/s 129 DD of the Customs Act since the petitioner was laid up due to the complications developed in his back bone. Finally the petitioner filed the revision petition before the first respondent on 20-8-1997 challenging Ext. P6 order passed by the second respondent. The revision petition filed under Ext.P7 was accompanied by separate petition for condoning the delay of four months and 27 days in preferring the revision petition. The delay petition has been marked as Ext. P8. It has been stated in Ext. P8 that the petitioner was laid up due to the complications developed in his back bone and he was prevented from moving as round and that he would produce the medical certificate and the treatment chart at the time of hearing the case. However under Ext. P10 the revision application was rejected as time barred. The said order passed by the Government of India, ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) dated 15-12-1997 is reproduced hereunder:--
This revision application has been filed by Shri. Mohd.Ibrahim Abdul Hameed against order-in-appeal No.333/96-Cus.dt.24-12-96 passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), Chennai.
2. The applicant in his application for condonation of delay in filing the revision application has pleaded that this delay was on account of his ill health.
3. Shri. P.V. Dinesh, Advocate appeared for personal hearing on 10-12-97 reiterated the submissions made in the revision application. The id. Advocate pleaded that they have a good case on merit. It was however, told that since the delay is beyond the statutory limit it cannot be condoned.
4. Records reveal that while the order-in-appeal was communicated to the applicant on 24-12-96, the revision application was received in the R.A. Unit only on 20-8-97 i.e., not only after the expiry of the stipulated period of three months as provided u/s 129DD(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, but also beyond the extendable period of further three months which can be invoked by the Government if sufficient cause is shown. In the instant case the delay in filing the revision application is much beyond the period of six months. Hence the delay in filing the revision application cannot be condoned.
5. In view of the above the revision application is accordingly rejected as time barred.
Aggrieved by the order passed by the Government of India, the petitioner has filed the above Original Petition along with Exts. P1 to P10 for the reliefs prayed for in the Original Petition.
3. A statement was filed on behalf of the government of India and others through the Senior Central Government Standing Counsel. According to the respondents the Government of India is not entitled to reject a revision petition filed u/s 129 DD of the Customs Act on the ground that it is time barred and that the proviso to the said Section provided for a revision petition to be filed within three months and if sufficient cause can be given the respondent has a discretion to provide for an extended period of further three months and that therefore due to the statutory provisions the Original Petition is devoid of any merits and is liable to be dismissed.
4. When the matter was listed before Mr. Justice Sivarajan it was contended that this court has got power to issue directions to the Government to consider the application for condonation of delay on merits and to condone the delay provided the petitioner is able to satisfy the Government regarding the reason for delay. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention placed on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Standard Treads v. Collector of Central Excise (1996 KLJ (Tax Cases)163) and also the judgment dated 17-7-96 in O.P. No.17509/94 by Mr. Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan.
5. The Senior Central Government Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted before the learned single Judge that the Government has no power under the Customs Act to entertain a revision filed beyond the period of six months from the date of receipt of the appellate order and therefore this court will not be justified in issuing any direction to the Government to entertain the revision and the application for condonation of delay filed beyond the period specified in Section 129DD(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. Learned standing counsel has also submitted that this court in the decision reported in 1996 KLJ (Tax Cases) 163 did not have the occasion to consider the provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 or the provisions u/s 129 DD(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. The learned Judge, after considering the rival submissions made by the respective counsel appearing on either side passed the reference order. Paragraph 4 of the said reference order is relevant for the purpose of considering the reference. The said para reads thus:--
I have perused two judgments relied on by the petitioner. Though the aforesaid two decisions support the stand taken by the petitioner since the said two decisions did not refer to or consider the effect of the provisions u/s 35 of the Central Excise Act or Section 129DD(2) of the Customs Act, I am of the view that said decisions require reconsideration by a Division Bench. I accordingly refer the matter to the Division Bench. Learned counsel submitted that urgent orders are required in the case. Office will place the papers of this case before the Honourable the Chief Justice for urgent orders.
6. When the matter was listed before the Bench comprising of the Acting Chief Justice and S.Sankarasubban, J. on 14-7-99, the Division Bench felt that the decision reported in 1996 KLJ (Tax Cases) 163 rendered by V.V.Kamat & G.Sivarajan, JJ. required reconsideration by a larger bench and for an authoritative pronouncement on the question at issue, posted this Original Petition before the Full Bench. That is how the matter is now listed before this Full Bench.
7. We heard Mr. Lal George for the Petitioner and Mr. K. Ramkumar, Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for respondents. Both the counsel reiterated the grounds raised in the petition and in the counter statement. Mr. Lal George, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Sub-Section (2) of Section 129 DD of the Customs Act enables the Central Government to allow an appeal to be presented within a further period of three months and it does not expressly prohibits the Central Government from entertaining revision petition which are filed after the further period of three months. In the absence of express provision to that effect, the Government of India is not entitled to reject a revision petition filed u/s 129DD of the Customs Act on the ground that it is time barred. He would further submit that Sub-Section (4) of Section 129 DD of the Customs Act expowers the Central Government to annual or modify any order of its own motion which is referred to Section 129(1) of the Customs Act and considering the facts and circumstances of the case on hand the Government of India ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Sub-section (4) of Section 129 DD of the Customs Act. Grounds (E) and (I) are reproduced below:--
(E) The 1st respondent went wrong in holding that it has no jurisdiction to condone the delay of more than six months occurred not in preferring the revision u/s 129DD of the Customs Act. In the absence of any express provision, prohibiting the condonation of delay for a further period of three months total (beyond six months) it has to be held that the Central Government have got power to condone the delay beyond the period of six months.
I) At any rate, considering the facts and circumstances of the case the first respondent ought to have found that this is a fit case to invoke the power conferred under Sub-section (4) of Section 129DD of the Customs Act and set aside Ext. P10 order passed by the second respondent.
Learned counsel has urged that these grounds in the Original Petition should be answered in the affirmative. In support of his contention, Mr. Lal George relied on the following decisions:--
i)
ii)
(iii) Gopalan v. Aboobacker (1995(2)KLT 205) and
(iv) Standard Treads Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise (1996 KLJ (Tax Cases)163)
The judgment reported in 1996 KLJ (Tax Cases) 163 (Supra), while referring to a similar provision, Section 35 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 for condoning the delay but not deciding on the general principles held that this court has got power to condone the delay even after the expiry of the prescribed time limit and following the said decision a learned single Judge of this court in the decision rendered in O.P. 17509/94 dated 17-7-96 also held that the appellate authority under the Customs have got power to condone the delay.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that inherent jurisdiction is there even with the Tribunals of limited jurisdiction and invoking the inherent power, the revisional authority has got jurisdiction to condone the delay.
9. Per contra Mr. Ramkumar submitted that the Tribunals are not courts and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked and that the time prescribed in a statutory provision cannot be enlarged beyond the period prescribed therein and therefore this court will not be justified in issuing any direction to entertain the revision and the application for condonation of delay filed beyond the period specified in Section 129DD(2) of the Customs Act, Mr. Ramkumar further submitted that the Government of India has no power under the Customs Act to entertain a revision filed beyond the period of six months as provided in the said Section. In regard to the submission made by the learned counsel u/s 35 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, he submitted that this court in the decision reported in 1966 KLJ (Tax Cases) 163 did not have any occasion to consider the provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 or the provisions u/s 129 DD(2) of the Customs Act and therefore the said decision rendered by a Division Bench cannot be taken as an authority on the question at issue.
10. The only question for us to consider is whether the Government of India while dealing with the provisions u/s 129 DD(2) of the Custom''s Act has power and jurisdiction to entertain a revision along with an application for condonation of delay filed beyond the period specified in Section 129DD(2) of the Act and whether the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Sub-Section (2) of Section 129DDof the Act enables the government to allow an appeal to be presented within a period of three months and it does not expressly prohibits the Central Government from entertaining a revision petition which are filed after the further period of three months has any force and merit.
11. Section 129-DD of the Customs Act deals with revision by the Central Government. Sub clause (1) and (2) of the said section read as follows:--
(1) The Central Government may, on the application of a person aggrieved by any order passed u/s 128-A, where the order is of the nature referred to in the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 129-A, annul or modify such order
Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-section, "order passed u/s 128A" includes an order passed under that section before the commencement of Section 40 of the Finance Act, 1984, against which an appeal has not been preferred before such commencement and could have been, if the said section had not come into force, preferred after such commencement to the Appellate Tribunal.
(2) An application under sub-section (1) shall be made within three months from the date of the communication to the applicant of the order against which the application is being made:
Provided that the Central Government may, if it is satisfied that the application was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the application within the aforesaid period of three months, allow it to be presented within a further period of three months.
Since we are construing the provisos 1 and 2 of the said section, sub-clauses (3) to (6) are not necessary to be reproduced here.
12. We shall now advert to the decisions cited by counsel for the petitioner. In The
11. It is plain that since 1928 when the Judicial Committee decided the case of Surty (AIR 1928 PC 103) (supra) the view which has been consistently taken by the Courts in India is that the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act would apply even though the copy mentioned in that sub-section is not required to be filed along with the memorandum of appeal. The same position should hold good in case of revision petitions ever since Limitation Act of 1963 came into force.
12. Lastly, it has been argued that the copy of the order of the Assistant Commissioner was served upon the respondent, and as such, it was not necessary for the respondent to apply for copy of the said order. In this respect we find that the copy which was served upon the respondent was lost by him. The loss of that copy necessitated the filing of an application for obtaining another copy of the order of the Assistant Commissioner.
The Supreme Court, while dismissing the SLP filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. held the High court has correctly answered the questions referred to it in favour of the dealer and against the revenue. The
13. Gopalan v. Aboobacker, 1995 (2) KLT 205 (Faizan Uddin & S.B. Majmudar, JJ) was relied on by the counsel for the proposition that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies to appeals u/s 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and hence section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals filed u/s 18 of the Act and also for the proposition that for the application of section 29(2) it is not necessary that the appellate authority functioning as court was constituted under the Civil Procedure Code. In the above judgment the Supreme Court has observed that the following conditions are necessary to attract Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and that the said requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision:
(i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application.
(ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the schedule to the Limitation Act.
If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied the consequences contemplated by S.29(2) would automatically follow. These consequences are as under:
(i) In such a case S. 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the schedule.
(ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions contained Ss.4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
14. Standard Treads v. Collector of Central Excise 1996 KLJ (Tax Cases) 163 (V.V. Kamat & G. Sivarajan, JJ.) was heavily relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned referring Judge was also a party to the above judgment. Counsel submitted that courts should adopt a liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay and invited our attention to the reasons for adopting such approach in the said judgment. Two things are clear from the above judgment. Section 129-DD of the Customs Act was not for consideration before the learned Division Bench. In the above case the appeals before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Madras have been dismissed confirming the order passed by the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) as the appeal having been filed after lapse of more than a year after the receipt of the order of the original authority, which according to the petitioner therein, is contrary to the statutory provisions of sec. 35 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, In that case the orders were passed on 14th March, 1989 and that the orders were sent to the petitioner on 15th March 1989 by registered post with acknowledgment due. However, the postman delivered two registered letters on 16th March 1989. The learned Judge in the factual situation of the above case came to the conclusion that there is no conclusive evidence of service even though the authorities considered the communication of Senior Postmaster, Kottayam, confirming that the orders were delivered to the addressee on 16th March, 1989. Accordingly the Division Bench directed respondent No.2 to refer the following questions of law:
1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the two appeals filed by the applicant before the Collector (Appeals) are barred by limitation under Sec. 35 of the Central Excise & Salt Act, 1944?
2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the presumption as to service of the two orders of the Assistant Collector on the Applicant has been rebutted?
The Division Bench has also expressed its reasons for adopting a liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay. The Division Bench stated as follows:
It has to be kept in the forefront that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. He has no interest in wasting time. It has also to be borne in mind that the great possibility of disastrous results creating a situation that a meritorious matter being thrown out at the threshold causing a heavy burden to the cause of justice has to be defeated at the very start. At the other end, it has also to be kept in mind that even if delay is condoned in an erroneous manner that the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. It must also be borne in mind that the law of limitation and the law of procedure have their important functions. The law of limitation protects the rival contestants for a telling mistake when he would be at complete loss with regard to the material making it more difficult in the process of contest after a period of time. The law of limitation has come on the statute to save the situation that as far as possible, persons should not be heard with regard to a cause after a specified time. Even the law of procedure is also understood to be a helpmate in the ultimate administration of justice and the spirit is that it is not to be considered as an obstruction in the process of justice. It is, therefore, implicit in the process of a desire to have the end of a litigation in a context that the conduct of the party has to be settled in a rational common sense and pragmatic manner. The court has to see and be vigilant that technical consideration should not be allowed to be pitted against each other, keeping in mind that substantial justice would have a preference because nobody can be understood properly in a claim of vested right of injustice, which would be the result. In this context, the last aspect is in the nature of a sentinel search light in the situation. Judiciary gets its respect in the legal order not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds. But, it has the capacity and purpose to remove injustice wherever it is in sight and this is what is understood and pointed out by the apex court as justice-oriented approach in regard to the mattes being thrown out at the threshold of the concerned proceedings.
A reading of the above observation would only reveal that the reasons given are general in nature, but not with any particular reference to Sec. 35 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 or with reference to Sec. 129-DD of the Customs Act.
15. As noticed already Justice Radhakrishnan in his judgment made a reference to the above judgment of the Division Bench and remitted the matter to the authority concerned for fresh consideration. The learned single Judge had no occasion to consider or construe Sec. 35 of the Central Excise and Salt Act or Sec. 129-DD of the Customs Act. We are therefore, of the opinion that the decisions referred in 1996 KLJ (TC) 163 cannot be taken as an authoritative pronouncement on the question at issue since neither the Division Bench nor the learned single Judge has rendered any decision construing Sec.129-DD of the Customs Act or Sec. 35 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner and referred to above by us in paragraph supra have no application to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand and are distinguishable not only on facts but also on law. The Division Bench has suggested that the court should not legalise injustice on technical grounds when it has the capacity and purpose to remove injustice wherever it is in sight. We are unable to subscribe to the views expressed by the learned Judges of the Division Bench which are generally and advisory in nature. In our view in construing the provisions of the Limitation Act equitable consideration is out of place. The fixation of period of limitation in the Limitation Act, to some extent, may result in hardship. Even then the Limitation Act is to be construed by a court of law as the language of the statute in its plain meaning imparts. While dealing with the provisions of the Limitation Act the courts should not be concerned with the policy of the Legislature or with the result, however injurious it may be, in giving effect to the language used; nor it is the function of the court, where the meaning is clear, not to give effect to it merely because it would lead to hardship. Therefore, in our opinion a Judge cannot on equitable grounds extend the time allowed by the law of limitation or postpone its operation or introduce extension not recognised by the statute of limitation. The court should not also take into extraneous consideration, such as hardship in construing the provisions of the Limitation Act, in construing a statutory provision. There is no scope for adopting a liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay.
16. In this background we shall now advert to the decisions cited by Mr.K. Ramakumar. In Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma 1973 KLT 138 (FB) (T.C. Raghavan, C.J., V.P. Gopalan Nambiar & G. Viswanatha Iyer, JJ.) this court held that the Limitation Act, 1963 applies only to courts and it prescribes periods of limitation in respect of suits, appeals and applications filed only in courts and that Sec. 18 of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is clear that the appellate authority constituted under it is not a court but only an authority persona designata and even if the power under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were to be read into special or local law by reason of the provisions of Sec. 29 of the Limitation Act that power is exercisable only by courts and not by Tribunals or other authorities such as the appellate authority in that case. The Full Bench also held that the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act is a self-contained code in the matter of prescribing the period of limitation and granting exemption therefrom.
17. Commissioner of Agricultural income tax v. Thalayar Rubber Industries Ltd. 1981 KLT 398 (FB) (Subramonian Poti, Ag.C.J., George Vadakkel & Balakrishna Menon, JJ) was a case of an application for reference filed beyond the prescribed time under the Agricultural income tax Act, 1950 (Kerala). Balakrishna Menon, J. speaking for the Bench held that Secs. 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act can be relied on for extension of time in respect of a proceeding in court and not before a Tribunal or other authority under any local or special law and that Sec. 12 of the Act on the other hand relates to the computation of the period of limitation and does not restrict its scope and applicability to proceedings in court alone, and that the provisions of Sec. 12(2) will apply for exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order, in computing the period of limitation for an appeal or application and that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to invoke Secs. 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in presenting an application under sub-section (1) of Sec. 60 of the Act indicates that the provisions of Secs. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are not attracted to proceedings under the Act and that the Act is intended to be a self-contained code in the matter of prescribing the periods of limitation for proceedings under the Act. Therefore, the Full Bench held that the Agricultural income tax Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing an application for reference under sub-section (1) of Sec. 60 of the Act.
18. Kerala Fisheries Corporation Ltd. v. P.S. John 1996 (1) KLJ 540 (FB) (K. Sreedharan Ag.C.J., P.K.Balasubramanyan & J.B. Koshy, JJ.) can be usefully referred to in the present context. P.K. Balasubramanyan, J. speaking for the Bench has observed that the Collector acting under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968 is not acting as a court and that the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be imported considering the public interest involved also and that the provisions of the Limitation Act could not be imported by anology also to proceedings for recovery.
19. We shall now consider the judgments rendered by courts in construing similar provisions in other enactments. E.S.I. Corporation v. Ramadas Reddiar, 1980 KLT 425 (Subramonian Poti, & Janaki Amma, JJ.) is a case arising under the ESI Act, 1948. Subramonian Poti, J. speaking for the Bench, has observed that the law of limitation is confined in its application to suits, appeals and applications and where a creditor does not seek to enforce a claim by resort to a suit the law of limitation has no part to play. In Sadasiva Saralai v. Government of Kerala, 1988 (2) KLT 610 (Sivaraman Nair & Fathima Beevi, JJ. the Bench held that the Forest Tribunal under the Private Forests (Vesting & Assignment) Act, 1971 cannot condone the delay in filing the application before it and that the Tribunal, with its limited jurisdiction, cannot be treated as court for the purpose of Limitation Act and that therefore the application for condonation of delay in filing the original application was not maintainable and that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the application under Sec. 8 of the Act. Kavi Rajan v. Co-operative Tribunal, 1989 (2) KLT 895 (Malimath, C.J. & Bhaskaran Nambiar, J.) is a case arising under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (Kerala). Malimath, C.J. speaking for the Bench, held that the Co-operative Tribunal is not a court and therefore, the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable and that the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969.
20. Birla Cement Works v. G.M., Western Railways & Anr. (JT 1995 (2) SC 59) is a case arising under the provisions of the Indian Railways Act, 1890. The Supreme Court held that Sec. 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act applies only to a suit or application in civil suits and Tribunal not being a civil court, Limitation (Sec. 17(1)(c) Act does not save the time barring claim under Sec. 78B of the Railways Act. Officer on Special Duty v. Shah Manilal Chandulal etc. (JT 1996 (2) SC 278) is a case of reference under Sec.18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Supreme Court held, that the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer is not a court when he acts as a statutory authority under Sec. 18(1) of the Act and that Sec.5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the period of limitation prescribed under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Sec. 18 of the Act. Vinod Gurudas v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (1992 (1) KLT 338 - SC) is a case of a claim petition filed after the repeal of the old Act and the new Act came in to force. The Supreme Court held that the question of condonation of delay must be governed by the new law and that the delay of more than six months from the date of accident cannot be condoned. The Supreme Court also in that context referred to Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act. In Prasad v. State of Kerala (1992 (2) KLT 53 a Division Bench of this court, while construing the provisions of Toddy Workers Welfare Fund Contribution Act, 1969 (Kerala), held that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to an appeal filed under Sec. 8(5) of the Act. In
21. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Mela Ram v. Dharam Chand (AIR 1958 Pun. 132-FB), in paragraph 8 of the judgment, held thus:
The only safe guide in construing the provisions of the Limitation Act, is to give strict grammatical meaning to the words used in the statute and in that process equities not be imported.
A Full Bench of the Patna High Court in
It should be borne in mind that rules of equity have no application when there are definite statutory provisions specifying the grounds on the basis of which the stoppage or suspension of running of time can arise. While the courts necessarily can checkmate or fight fraud, it should be equally borne in mind the statutes of limitation are statutes of repose.
Where the legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the court to give effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent with such expressed intent of the law-giver; more so if the statute is a taxing statute.
A learned single judge of the Madras High Court in
22. In
13. From a reading of Sec.25(2) of the Act, it is clear that every revision petition under this Act shall be preferred to this court within one month from the date on which the order was communicated to the petitioner and the proviso to Sec.25(2) of the Act empowers the High Court in its discretion to allow a further period not exceeding one month from the date of any such application. In the instant case, the time for filing the revision expired on 17-5-1996, which was during the summer vacation of this court. Therefore, under Sec. 4 of the Limitation Act, the revision petition should have been filed on the day when the court re-opened on 10-6-96 when it would be well within time. This, however, will not have the effect of extending the period of thirty days of limitation upto 17-6-1996 as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. If this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted the petitioner will have the double advantage of extended period of limitation for filing the revision on the day when the court re-opens after Summer Vacation under Sec. 4 of the Limitation Act when the period of limitation expired during the vacation of the court, and again filing a petition under the proviso to Sec.25(2) of the Act, seeking the discretionary power of the High Court to, allow a further time of one month from the date of reopening of the Court after vacation.
14. In my opinion, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard cannot at all be countenanced. This is not contemplated by the provisions of the Act. It is settled law that what is not permitted to be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. If the original period of limitation expired during the vacation on 17-5-96 and if the revision has not been filed on the day when the court re-opened on 10-6-96, the discretionary period of one month as provided for in the proviso to Sec.25(2) of the Act will start running from the date of expiration of the original period of limitation during the vacation viz. 17-5-1996. The power of this court is restricted and not unlimited as in the case of appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure, by the application of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, where the court can condone any delay for sufficient reasons. In the instant case, the last date for filing of revision was on 17-5-96 and the revision not having been filed on the date of re-opening of the court on 10-6-96, there is no discretion left to this court but to reject it on the ground that it is barred by limitation.
23. A learned single Judge of this court in Abdul Majeed v. Spl Tahsildar (1986 KLT 1336) held that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to application for reference under Sec. 20 of the Land Acquisition Act and that the Collector, while exercising the powers under Sec. 20, has no discretion to enlarge the period for filing the application since the Collector is only discharging a statutory duty and that duty depends on the filing of the application within the period. A Division Bench of our High Court in Selvi v. Nataraja Mudaliyar (1994 (1) KLT 82) held that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable only to the proceedings before courts and not before any authority other than courts and that the position may be different if the special statute authorises a body or authority constituted under that Act to apply Sec. 5 while dealing with applications for condonation of delay. The Rent Control Act does not contain such a provision and the conclusion is irresistible that the provisions of Sec. 5 cannot be made applicable to proceedings under the Rent Control Act, before the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority.
24. The consistent view taken by most of the High Courts in the country and also the apex court is that the provisions of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act is applicable only to the proceedings before the courts and not before any authority other than courts. As already noticed, the order under challenge in the Original Petition was passed by the Government of India in a revision proceedings pending before it along with a petition to condone the delay. Since the Government of India is not a court, Sec.5 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable to such proceedings and the Government of India has no jurisdiction or authority to condone the delay beyond the period of limitation statutorily fixed under the provisions of the Special Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, liable to be rejected. The judgment of the Division Bench reported in Standard Treads v. Collector of Central Excise (1996 KLJ (TC) 163) cannot, therefore, be relied on as an authoritative pronouncement on the question at issue and that the observations are obiter in nature.
25. Section 35 of Chap.VI-A of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 deals with appeals to Collector (Appeals). The said section says that any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by a Central Excise Officer lower in rank than a Collector of Central Excise may appeal to the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) within three months from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order. The proviso to Sec. 35(1) provides that the Collector (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months allow it to be presented within a further period of three months. The above section is in pari materia with Sec. 129-DD of the Customs Act which also provides for filing of revision under the said section to the Government of India within three months from the date of communication of the decision or order and a further period of three months is also provided for the aggrieved parties to present the revision by disclosing sufficient cause that the party was prevented from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months.
26. The courts, in the judgments referred to above, held that the courts have to strictly construe the provisions and has no jurisdiction to stretch the same beyond the period stipulated under the provisions of the Act. The Original Petition, therefore, fails and the order of the Government of India impugned in this Original Petition is confirmed for the reasons stated supra.
The reference is answered accordingly. No costs.
