K. Harilal, J.@mdashThe petitioner and the respondent are the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder respectively in EP No. 222/01 in OS No. 500/99 on the files of the I Additional Munsiff''s Court, Neyyattinkara. The said suit, for realisation of money, was decreed allowing the respondent to realise a sum of Rs. 30,000/- with interest from the petitioner. The above application was filed by the respondent herein to execute the said decree, by arrest and detention of the petitioner in the civil prison. According to him, the petitioner has refused to pay the decree-debt, though, he has sufficient ''means'' to pay the same. He has got monthly income of Rs. 5,500/- from sale of agricultural products and milk. The petitioner filed an objection raising the plea of ''no means''. The petitioner contended that he is a casual labourer and he gets only Rs. 150-160 per day as wages. His wages cannot be taken into account, in calculating his means, and the said income is the sole livelihood of his family. The respondent/decree-holder was examined as PW 1 and the petitioner/judgment-debtor was examined as DW 1. The Execution Court, after considering the oral evidence of both parties, rejected the contentions of the petitioner, and he is ordered to be detained in civil prison, for three months for his willful refusal to pay the decree amount; consequently, issued arrest warrant against the petitioner. The legality, propriety and correctness of this order are under challenge in this original petition. Sri. V. Sunil Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner advanced arguments assailing the findings of the Court below that the petitioner has sufficient means to pay the decree-debt. According to him, in the instant case, detention in civil prison cannot be ordered, unless it is found that the petitioner has sufficient means and he refused to pay the decree amount. Even if he is getting Rs. 150-160 per day as wages, the said amount is liable to be left out, in full, in calculating his means to pay the decree-debt in view of the Explanation to Section 51 read with Section 60(1)(h) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Explanation to Section 51 of the C.P.C. clearly says that in the calculation of the means of the judgment-debtor for the purpose of Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 51, there shall be left out of account of any property which, by or under any law or custom having the force of law for the time being in force is exempt from attachment in execution of the decree. The wages of labourers is completely exempted from attachment under Section 60(1)(h) of the C.P.C. If that be so, the wages of the labourers also cannot be accounted in calculating means of the judgment-debtor.
2. Though, notice had been duly served on the respondent/decree-holder, he did not enter appearance before this Court to justify the issuance of warrant, in execution of the decree. Considering the far reaching consequences that may be caused by the order to be passed, if the argument put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, this Court appointed Advocate Manoj T.N., as Amicus Curiae, to help the Court to arrive at a just and proper decision on the above legal issue raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
3. Sri. Manoj advanced arguments fervently opposing complete exemption of wages from the account in calculating the ''means'' to pay the decree amount. He drew my attention to Clauses (h) and (i) of Section 60(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and submitted that Clauses (h) and (i) cannot be construed independently and separately in the backdrop of the evolution of these Clauses to the present form as now finds in the C.P.C. According to him, on a combined reading of these two Clauses in juxtaposition, it is discernible that ''wages'' and ''salary'' appearing under Section 60(1)(h) and (i) of the C.P.C. are analogous in nature and wages of the labourers is not fully exempted irrespective of the quantum amount which they are receiving. In short, there cannot be a complete immunity of wages in view of Section 60(1)(h) of the C.P.C., in calculating the ''means'' of labourers where they are receiving wages. To buttress his arguments, Sri. Manoj, cited the decisions in
4. According to Section 51(c) of the C.P.C., among the different modes of execution of a decree, the Court may order execution of the decree by arrest and detention in prison, provided that, where the decree is for payment of money, execution by detention in prison shall not be ordered, unless the Court is satisfied of any of the requirements under Clauses (a) to (c) of the said proviso. According to Clause (b), the Court must be satisfied that the judgment-debtor has, or has had since the date of the decree, the means to pay the amount of the decree or some substantial part thereof and refuses or neglects or has refused or neglected to pay the same. Further, according to the Explanation under the said proviso, in the calculation of the means of the judgment-debtor, for the purposes of Clause (b), there shall be left out of account any property which, by or under any law or custom having the force of law for the time being in force is exempt from attachment in execution of the decree. Then the question is what are the properties which shall not be liable to attachment or sale in execution of a decree? The properties which are not liable to attachment is enumerated under Clauses (a) to (p) of the proviso to Section 60(1) of the C.P.C. According to Clause (h) of the proviso to Section 60(1), the wages of the labourers and domestic servants, whether payable in money or in kind is not liable to be attached in execution of a decree. In view of Clause (h) of Section 60(1), the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that being a labourer, even if the petitioner is getting average of Rs. 4,500/- per month as wages, the said amount is completely exempted from attachment in execution of a decree. Consequently, in the light of the Explanation to the proviso to Section 51, the said amount is completely exempted in calculating the means of the petitioner to pay the decree amount. Necessarily, it follows that the petitioner cannot be held to be a judgment-debtor having means to pay the decree-debt. If he has no means, he cannot be detained in civil prison in execution of this money decree. This is the legal basis from which the petitioner set up his case in this Original Petition.
5. The question that emerges for consideration from the above legal issue in controversy is, where the judgment-debtor is a labourer getting wages, can his wages be completely exempted from his account, in calculating his means to pay the decree amount, in view of Section 60(1)(h) of the C.P.C., for the purpose of detention in civil prison, in execution of money decree, under Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 51 of the C.P.C.?
6. Since the legal issue centers around Section 60(1)(h) and (i) of the C.P.C., it is apposite and useful to have traced the evolution of the said provision now finds in the C.P.C. Before 1943, there was no separate Clause as (h) and (i) to Section 60(1), as now finds in the C.P.C. There was only one Clause as (h) which reads as follows:
"The wages of labourers and domestic servants, whether payable in money or in kind; and salary to the extent of the first hundred rupees and one-half of the remainder of the salary."
Later, by Act 5 of 1943, the Clause (h) was divided into two such as Clauses (h) and (i). The words "salary to the extent of the first hundred rupees and one-half of the remainder of the salary" were omitted by Act 5 of 1943 and introduced another Clause (i) with that omitted portion. Subsequently, the following words "in execution of any decree other than a decree for maintenance" were inserted by Act 66 of 1956. Thereafter, the words "the first hundred rupees" were substituted with the words "first two hundred rupees" by the Act 26 of 1963. Later, by the Act 104 of 1976, the words "first two hundred rupees and one-half of the remainder" were substituted with the words "four hundred rupees and two thirds of the remainder". Lastly, by the Act 46 of 1999, with effect from 01/07/2002, "first four hundred rupees" was substituted with ''first one thousand rupees''. As on today, Clause (h) and (i) of Section 60 of the C.P.C. reads as follows:
"The wages of labourers and domestic servants, whether payable in money or in kind."
Clause (i):
"Salary to the extent of the first one thousand rupees and two thirds of the remainder in execution of any decree other than a decree for maintenance."
7. The expression "wages" has not been defined in the C.P.C. But, under Explanation II the expression "salary" has been defined to mean the total monthly emoluments excluding any allowance declared exempt from attachment under the provisions of Clause (1), derived by a person from his employment whether on duty or on leave. Explanation IV to Section 60(1) says: "For the purposes of this proviso, "wages" includes bonus, and "labourer" includes a skilled, unskilled or semiskilled labourer". Thus, though the expression "salary" has been defined to mean the total monthly emoluments, the expression "wages" has not been so defined. The use of the expression "includes" merely has the effect of enlarging the meaning of the word "wages". At any rate, it can be a remuneration for the service.
8. The High Court of Calcutta had considered the extent of exemption given to "wages" of labourers in Clause (h) of Section 60(1) of the C.P.C. in Gita Mitra v. Hemanta Kumar Mitra 1. The Calcutta High Court made a survey in other Statutes like the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, Industrial Disputes Act, Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 etc., and held as follows:
"11. It follows, therefore, that in analogous statues dealing with workman which is synonymous with a labourer, and their wages the Statute has invariably fixed a limit. That being the position, we feel that in construing the extent of exemption of the wages of a labourer under Section 60 of the Code a reference to the amount of wages becomes almost imperative as we have already indicated that it could never have been the intention of the Legislature that the wages irrespective of its amount shall be exempt when, the Legislature did not consider it necessary to exempt salary beyond the first 400 Rupees of any other class of employees. Workman as defined in the several other Statutes providing for adequate provision for their welfare and protection did not include persons drawing more than Rs. 500 a month at the most. Therefore, it seems to us that Clauses (h) and (i) read together in the light of similar statues dealing with the welfare of labourers and workmen postulate only such labourers whose wages do not exceed Rs. 400 to 500 per month."
9. In the above analysis, the Court observed that the word "labourer" must be construed having regard to the subject-matter and intention of the Act. Taking the collocation of the word "labourer" with "domestic servant" it is obvious that the reasonable application of the clause is to persons of small means receiving small wages at short intervals. It seems obvious that the object was to except from the liability to attachment of debts, the case of persons, who would be likely to be deprived of their daily means of subsistence by having their earnings attached in the hands of their employers. Taking the wider connotation of the term ''salary'', it seems that the amount paid on monthly basis and described as pay and officiating pay etc., even though earned by a person doing manual work, would be salary and not wages which has a restricted connotation.
10. Finally, the Court observed that the entire amount of wages of a labourer should not be exempt from attachment in execution of a decree for maintenance. The exemption cannot exceed the amount provided in the other clause of the section namely Clause (i), which relates to persons supposed to be better placed than labourers or domestic servants. I am also in full agreement with the interpretation given by the Calcutta High Court to the extent of exemption of wages in Clause (h) of Section 60 of the C.P.C.
11. It is significant to note that when this exemption clause was provided in the Code under Section 60, the Legislature in its wisdom considered it necessary to give some protection to labourers and domestic servants by exempting attachment of wages earned by them as the wages of those classes were too low and inadequate to meet their day-to-day living cost. Indisputably, those state of affairs of the labourers at the time when the provision was initially enacted in the Code has considerably been changed and now a manual labourer would get average 500 Rupees per day. Moreover, in our State, a manual labourer would get employment continuously, if he is ready and willing to work. I also endorse the view of the Calcutta High Court that the concept of the wages of a labourer at the time when the provision was initially enacted in the Code has considerably changed since then. It is not uncommon for a labourer now-a-days to earn much more than some other employees who are not labourers. This is a situation which was unthinkable at the time when the provision was originally made in the C.P.C.
12. It is an accepted principle that while interpreting a legal provision, the Court should not lose sight of the circumstances and conditions prevailing at the time when the provision was enacted as well as the circumstances in which the provision needs an interpretation.
13. The purposive interpretation given by the Calcutta High Court basing on evolution of law and circumstances existing at the time of legislation is justified by judicial precedents also. In Keates v. Lewis Merthyr Consolidated Collieries Co., Ltd. 1911 AC 641, Lord Atkinson said:
"In the construction of a Statute it is of course at all times and under all circumstances permissible to have regard to the state of things existing at the time the Statute was passed and to the evil which, as appears from its provisions, it was designed to remedy and I think nothing could be more unsafe or more misleading than to allow oneself to be deterred from putting upon a Statute the particular construction, which the consideration of these things would lead one to adopt, by the apprehension of the prejudicial effect it might have on rights and privileges conferred by subsequent legislation un-thought of at the time the particular Statute was passed."
The cause and necessity of a legal provision may be discovered, first of all, by considering the state of the law at the time when the Act was passed.
14. In S.E. Ry. v. The Railway Commissioners 1980 (5) QBD 217, Lush J. said:
"While we are to collect what the Legislature intended from what it has said, we must look not at one phrase or one section only but at the whole of the Act, and must read it by the light which the State of the law at the time.....throws upon it."
15. In Abrahams v. Mac Fisheries, Ltd. 1925 (2) KB 18 Fraser J. said:
"In order to ascertain the true meaning [of the Legislature] it is necessary to ascertain the circumstances with reference to which the words were used and what was the object appearing from those circumstances which the Legislature had in view".
16. In considering the meaning of a local Act or a Section in a general Act dealing with particular local matters, the state of things existing at the time of the passing of the Act, as showing the circumstances in which it was passed, can properly be considered, as was done by the Court of Queen''s Bench in R. v. Dean of Hereford 1870 LR 5 QB 196.
17. This point of view basing on the purposive interpretation is supported by the observation of this Court in Thomas v. Venugopal Chitties and Finances 1993 KHC 22 : 1993 (1) KLT 105. In this decision, this Court observed that "even under Section 60(1)(h) there cannot be a complete immunity, but it can only be to the extent mentioned in Clause (i), for otherwise it may lead to a very anomalous situation. It is well-known in these days even the wages earned by labourers per month will be much more than Rs. 400/- and the Legislature can never have intended that whatever be the income of a labourer, it shall not be attached, but if the salary of a person is just above Rs. 400/- a portion of his salary is liable to be attached. That can never be the intention of the Legislature while enacting Clauses (h) and (i) of Section 60(1) C.P.C.".
18. To sum up, there cannot be a complete immunity to the wages of the labourer, in calculating his means to pay the decree amount, where he is getting wages. If the labourer is getting more than Rs. 1,000/- per month as wages, a portion of his wages is liable to be attached in execution of the decree. If that be so, there cannot be a complete left out his wages in the calculation of the means to pay the decree-debt for the purpose of Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The exemption cannot exceed the amount provided under Section 60(1)(i) of the C.P.C. It follows that if such a labourer has means to pay the decree amount and refuses or neglects or has refused or neglected to pay the same, he can be detained in civil prison in execution of the money decree, under Clause (b) of Section 51 of the C.P.C.
19. The learned counsel for the petitioner cited the decisions in Xavier v. Canara Bank Ltd. 1969 KHC 195 : 1969 KLT 927 : 1969 KLR 961;
20. With the aforesaid analysis, I would proceed to consider the present case. During cross-examination, the petitioner himself admitted that he was a casual labourer and he would get Rs. 150/- - 160/- per day. Thus, the petitioner himself admitted that he would get more than Rs. 4,500/- per month. In the light of the above discussions, if the wages of the petitioner is more than Rs. 1,000/- per month, a portion of his salary is liable to be attached. If that be so, he shall not be deemed to be a judgment-debtor having no means to pay the decree amount. On the other hand, he can be held to be a judgment-debtor, who refuses to pay the decree amount, as rightly found by the Court below, on the basis of his own admission. Thus, the impugned order under challenge is devoid of any illegality or impropriety. Before parting with this judgment, I place on record my unreserved appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Sri. T.N. Manoj, the learned Amicus Curiae.
In the result, this Original Petition is dismissed.
