Subhadra Devi Shivhare and Others Vs Mukhtiar Singh and Others

S.P. Srivastava, J.

Feeling aggrieved by the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal determining an amount of Rs. 2,55,000 only as compensation to the claimants-appellants on account of the death of Prem Narayan Shivhare, the husband of appellant No. 1 and the father of appellant Nos. 2 to 5, as against the owner/ driver of the offending motor vehicle exonerating the other respondents including the insurer, the respondent No. 4, they have now come up in appeal, praying for the enhancement of the amount of compensation to Rs. 4,10,000 together with interest calculated at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the said amount from the date of filing of the claim petition till realisation of the amount.

We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and have carefully perused the record.

The facts and circumstances as brought on record indicate that the claim giving rise to this appeal had been filed on 20.3.1989. Prem Narayan, deceased, had met with the accident at about 11 a.m. on 3.11.1988. The appellants had put forward a claim for an amount of Rs. 5,01,000 towards compensation together with an interest on the said amount at the rate of 12 per cent per annum for the period elapsing from the date of presentation of the claim petition till the realisation of the amount.

The order-sheet maintained by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal shows that the claimants had proceeded with their case in a most leisurely manner. They even impleaded the insurer only in the year 1995, Who was impleaded pursuant to the order of the court allowing the amendment in the claim petition vide the order dated 5.9.95. The appellants could start leading their evidence only on 14.12.1999 after repeated opportunities have been provided for the same. The disposal of the application filed by the appellants u/s 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act was delayed and the reason disclosed, as indicated in the order of the Tribunal dated 23.8.1999, was that before hearing the arguments on that application the claimants wanted to ensure as to which insurance company had actually and really insured the offending vehicle and time was required for collecting the relevant information. The aforesaid application filed u/s 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act was finally disposed of vide the order dated 4.11.1999. Even by that date the claimants had not filed their documentary evidence sought to be relied upon in support of their case. Issues were framed on that date. In spite of repeated opportunities the claimants could not lead their evidence and could examine the first witness Subhadra Devi in support of their claim on 14.12.1999. On the said date, another witness Morsin, PW 2, was also examined and the evidence was closed.

The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal after carefully considering the materials and evidence on record came to the conclusion that the deceased at the time of the accident had been posted as the Assistant Fisheries Officer in the State''s Fisheries Department who was getting in all Rs. 2,107 per month towards salary and allowances. At the time of his death he was about 46 years of age.

It may be noticed that in her deposition Subhadra Devi had stated that Dinesh Kumar, eldest son of the deceased, who was aged 33 years, was running a Photo Studio and the second and third sons were also working in that Photo Studio. Her mother-in-law who had been impleaded initially as claimant No. 6 showing her age to be 70 years had died 6 or 7 years ago before recording of her deposition. She also stated that at the time of death of the deceased a family pension of Rs. 1,200 was being paid to her which had increased to Rs. 1,700 by the date of the deposition.

The Tribunal, taking into consideration the prospects of increments likely to be earned by the deceased together with allowances, etc., during the remaining period of his service of 12 years proceeded to hold his income at an average of Rs. 3,000 per month. Out of the said amount 1/3rd was deducted towards the amount which the deceased might have been spending on himself as he was residing separately from the family at the place of his service and the amount of dependency was determined to be Rs. 2,000 per month. Taking the aforesaid amount to be the amount of monthly dependency the annual dependency was found to be Rs. 24,000. The Tribunal applied the multiplier of 10 and came to the conclusion that towards the said count the claimants were entitled to an amount of Rs. 2,40,000.

For loss of love and affection, etc., the claimants were found to be entitled to Rs. 10,000 and the wife was found entitled to an amount of Rs. 5,000 towards loss of consortium. The total amount of compensation thus was determined to be Rs. 2,55,000.

However, on the aforesaid amount of compensation instead of awarding interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition as prayed for, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that it was not obligatory on the Tribunal to grant interest from the date of presentation of the claim petition and since the close scrutiny of the order-sheet indicated that the claimants had themselves delayed the proceedings and were entitled to interest only w.e.f. 1.1.1999 and not from before. The delay in the disposal of the case from that date could not be attributed to them. The award was given on 21.12.1999.

The learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously contended that in the present case, the Tribunal has erred in applying the multiplier of 10 while determining the just amount of compensation as in the facts and circumstances of the case the multiplier of 15 ought to have been applied. It has also been urged that the appellants were entitled to interest on the amount determined payable as compensation from the date of the application but the Tribunal had erroneously awarded interest only for the period elapsing between 1.1.1999 till the date of realisation.

We have given our anxious consideration to the aforesaid submissions.

In its decision in the case of U.P. State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Trilok Chandra, 1996 ACJ 831, the Hon''ble Apex Court had observed that the calculation of compensation and the amount worked out in the Schedule referred to in Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act suffers from several defects. In fact, what had been noticed by the Supreme Court was that the Table abounds in mistakes. It was indicated further that neither the Tribunals nor the courts can go by the ready reckoner and that it can only be used as a guide. It was further pointed out that the selection of multiplier cannot in all cases be solely dependent on the age of the deceased. It was, however, further pointed out that these mistakes were limited to the actual calculations only and not in respect of other items emphasising that the multiplier could not exceed 18 years'' purchase factor. It was also indicated that it must be realised that the Tribunal/court has to determine a fair amount of compensation awardable to a victim of an accident which must be proportionate to the injury caused.

In its another decision in the case of Jyoti Kaul and Others Vs. State of M.P. and Another, , the Hon''ble Apex Court after taking into consideration its previous decisions had observed that the principle of multiplier would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case indicating further that the multiplier system is sound in computing compensation is now well settled but what multiplier should be applied would depend on various circumstances. The age of the deceased, the age of dependants, not only existing salary when he died, if any additional sum payable to the deceased depending upon the nature of job in which he was working, his chances of promotion, the life expectancy, etc., observing further it was indicated that the multiplier is bound to change to some degree.

Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case and the age factor of the deceased as well as the age of the dependants and considering the evidence brought on record in its totality, we are not inclined to disturb the choice of the multiplier applied by the respondent Tribunal. The submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants in this regard is not at all acceptable.

So far as the other submission in regard to the entitlement of the claimants to get interest in addition to the amount determined as just compensation from the date of the moving of the claim petition for the award of compensation is concerned, the provision contained in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, may be referred to which is to the following effect:

171. Award of interest where any claim is allowed.--Where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation made under this Act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf.

The question as to whether the claimants in the proceedings for the award of compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, are entitled as of right and the Tribunal is under an obligation to award the interest from the date of the claim petition was concerned was dealt with by a Division Bench of this court in its decision in Bhayla and Another Vs. Abdul Kayum and Others, .

This court in its aforesaid decision after considering the implications arising under the provisions contained in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, expressed the view that the award of simple interest contemplated therein falls in the discretion of the Tribunal and it may or may not award it. If it does, it again lies in its discretion to award it from a particular date and at a reasonable rate. It was clearly indicated that the Tribunal is not bound to award it in all events and circumstances which it was pointed out was evident from the word ''may'' occurring in the provision. This court had observed that it was a different matter that it cannot award interest from the date earlier than the date of claim application. Nor is any right vested in the claimant to claim it from a particular date and it would all depend on facts and circumstances of each case. The Tribunal has to exercise the sound judicial discretion in this matter. It was also indicated that this matter in regard to the award of interest falls in the discretion of the Tribunal which has to be exercised judicially in accordance with the recognised principles.

The awarding of interest as envisaged under the provisions contained in Section 171 of the aforesaid Act, depends not on compassionate grounds. The provision for interest being paid on the amount determined as just compensation for the period between the making of the claim and the date of the payment of the compensation in fact has a dual purpose. Firstly, it is aimed to compensate the claimant for the delayed payment of the just compensation to which he is found entitled by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The other purpose is to coerce the person or persons who have to pay the compensation so that they may not delay the payment. In a case where the claimant himself was negligent in not taking interest in the prosecution of the case and responsible for a long delay in leading the evidence in support of his case the discretion with which the Tribunal stands vested in the matter relating to the payment of interest could be exercised against the claimants. In such a situation neither the insurer company nor the owner or any person vicariously liable could be saddled with the liability to pay interest for the negligence of the claimants.

Learned counsel for the appellants has heavily relied upon certain observations occurring in the judgment rendered by a Full Bench of this court in the case of Prakramchand Vs. Chuttan and Others, and has tried to draw support from the same for the contention that the Tribunal ought to award in addition to the compensation simple interest from the date of the application and the omission to do so will indicate non-exercise or improper exercise of the jurisdiction by the Tribunal. In this connection suffice it to say that it is the ratio decidendi which is binding and not any observations made in a judgment. What constitutes the binding precedent is the ratio decidendi which has to be ascertained on an analysis of the material facts of the case, i.e., generally those facts which are found expressly or impliedly to be material on which the decision is based. It is, therefore, obvious that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but with regard to its ratio and the principles laid down therein. The decision of the Full Bench in the case of Prakramchand (supra) is an authority for the proposition which it lays down and not for what logically flows from any stray observation because a decision is an authority for what it actually decides and not what it implies or assumes.

It may further be indicated that the Apex Court had observed in its decision in the case of The State of Orissa Vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Others, , rendered by a Constitution Bench, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there, are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It was further clarified that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. It was further indicated that it is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it.

In the case of Prakramchand Vs. Chuttan and Others, , the question which had arisen for decision was as to whether in an appeal directed against the award of a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, the court had power, jurisdiction or duty to award interest at a higher rate in the absence of cross-objection in that regard by the claimant in view of the provisions contained in Section 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, in the context of Order 41, rule 33, Civil Procedure Code.

For the reasons given in the aforesaid decision, the Full Bench had overruled the decision of the learned single Judge in the case of Oriental Fire and Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. Vs. Kamala Bai and Another, and held that the law was not laid down correctly and holding further that in an appeal u/s 110-D of the Act, the High Court could act even in the absence of a cross-objection and enhance the interest to 12 per cent per annum payable from the date of the application till realisation of the amount of compensation awarded. With the aforesaid answer, the case was sent back to the learned referring Judge for the hearing and disposal of the appeal.

On a careful analysis of the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Prakramchand Vs. Chuttan and Others, and the facts on which the said decision is based, by no stretch of imagination it is possible to hold that the ratio decidendi of that case can be said to have been attracted in the present case leading to an inference that it is obligatory upon the Tribunal to award the interest from the date of the presentation of the claim petition. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants in this connection is totally misconceived and is not at all acceptable.

The word ''may'' has been sometimes understood in the imperative sense as ''shall'' but ordinarily, it indicates choice of action and not a command. In the context of the provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, there does not appear any reason to assume that the said word has been used in its extraordinary meaning. In the aforesaid connection, it may further be noticed that the Division Bench of this court in its decision in the case of Bhayla and Another Vs. Abdul Kayum and Others, , had clearly indicated that the use of the expression ''may'' as occurring in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, was a clear pointer indicating that the award of interest fell within the discretion of the Tribunal. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of Patheja Bros. Forgings & Stamping v. ICICI Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 4111 of 2000; decided on 24.7.2000 (SC), had observed that when the words of a legislation are clear, the court must give effect to them as they stand and cannot demur on the ground that the legislature must have intended otherwise.

The decision of the Division Bench of this court in the case of Bhayla and Another Vs. Abdul Kayum and Others, , is not liable to be ignored on the ground that it had overlooked the decision of the larger Bench in the case of Prakramchand Vs. Chuttan and Others, . We do not find any justifiable ground for a departure from the view expressed by the Division Bench in the case of Bhayla (supra).

The learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to demonstrate that the findings returned against the claimants by the Tribunal stand vitiated by any such legal infirmity which may require an interference therein by this court.

This appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed in limine.