S. Awasthy, J.@mdashThis appeal arises out of the judgment of acquital u/s 5(1)(d), read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1955, and also u/s 161 of the Indian Penal Code, by the Fourth Additional Sessions Judge (Special Judge), Jabalpur in Special Criminal Case No. 1 of 1982, decided on 17-4-1982.
2. The respondent Vishnu Prasad Babele was prosecuted on the allegation that, on 15-3-1980, while working as Reader to the Executive Magistrate, accepted Rs. 50/- as bribe from Shri P.K. Tiwari (P.W. 1), Advocate, and Shri M.A. Khan (P.W. 2), Advocate, for releasing one Ganesh Prasad son of Shambhoo Prasad, who was apprehended u/s 107/116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on bail. The aforesaid Advocates were appearing for Ganesh Prasad and had applied for grant of bail on 13-5-1980. The said Ganesh Prasad was not released on 13-5-1980, but was sent to the jail. It is alleged that on 14-5-1980, two other accused persons were released, but not Ganesh Prasad, because the bribe was not given as demanded. The Advocates requested the Presiding Magistrate Shri U.D. Chaube (P.W. 6) to pass in order for release of Ganesh Prasad, but the Presiding Magistrate asked them to go and contact the Reader. Being disgusted with the attitude of the Magistrate and his Reader, the said Advocates made an application (Ex. P. 1) to the Vigilence Department for taking the Reader to task. Shri Hanumant Singh (P.W. 13) arranged a trap. Rs. 50/- were treated with phenolphthalein powder and Panchnama (Ex. P. 2) was prepared in the presence of P.W. 5 Shri Mahadeo Prasad Khare and other Officers. The money was handed over to the Advocates and a trap was laid on 15-5-1980.
3. At about 3-00 p.m. on 15-5-1980, P.W. 1 Shri P.K. Tiwari and P.W. 2 Shri M. A. Khan along with P.W. 3 Shri S.K. Shukla, Advocate, went into the court-room No. 12 of Collectorate at Jabalpur and after some conversation with the accused-respondent, passed on the bribe money to him. The accused-respondent kept the money in his pocket. After receiving the signal, P.W. 5 Shri M. P. Khare and P.W. 13 Shri Hanumant Singh and others, reached the spot. The hands of the accused were washed with lotion of sodium carbonate powder and the same turned into pink colour. His pocket of the pant was also washed-which also turned into pink colour. Thereafter, a panchanama was prepared, which is Ex. P. 7. Seizure of the pant etc. was made vide Exs. P-4 and P-5. The concerning file was also seized vide Ex. P-6 Ex. P-7 is the Panchanama of the proceedings. Sanction to prosecute the respondent was obtained vide Ex. P-9 which is proved by P.W. 7 B.D. Jugade. The allegation of the prosecution is that the property in question had been changed, except the notes, which were seized from the possession of the respondent. The application for grant of bail dated 13-5-1980, filed by the learned Advocates, is also missing from the record.
4. The learned Special Judge held that the demand of bribe and acceptance thereof, has not been proved. He further held that no independent witnesses were examined. The Executive Magistrate P.W. 6 Shri U.D. Chaube did not support the prosecution case. He was not declared hostile. The story of the prosecution is unbelievable. There had been material variations in the statements of the witnesses examined by the prosecution. Thus, the trial Court was of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond all reasonable doubt.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the State argued that the findings recorded by the learned Special Judge are perverse. There is no variation in the prosecution story. The file of the Magistrate had been tampared with and there had been material interpolations. The Magistrate Shri U.D. Chaube (P.W. 6) was out and out to help the accused respondent. Though he had not been declared hostile, but no reliance should have been placed on his version. No enmity between the accused-respondent and the two Advocates examined as P.W. 1 (Shri P.K. Tiwari) and P.W. 2 (Shri M. A. Khan) has been proved. The demand of bribe has been proved. The amount of bribe was accepted and the money was recovered from the possession of the accused-respondent. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the State that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt. Reliance was placed on the decisions of --
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v) The judgment of this Court, i.e., State of M.P. v. Dr. J.L. Jain (Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 1985, decided on 27-3-1989).
6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent relied on the statement of P. W. 6 Shri U.D. Chaubey. He made a reference to para 6 of this witness''s statement. He also referred to the statements of P.W. 1 Shri P.K. Tiwari, with special emphasis to paras 2, 23 and 25; P.W. 2 Shri M.A. Khan Paras 11,15, 21 and 22, P.W. 3, Shri S.K. Shuklaparas 10 and 12; and P.W. 13 Shri Hanumant Singh paras 20 and 27. His submission was that the respondent, who was merely a clerk, had no right to grant bail, as the bail orders are always passed by the Court and not by a clerk or Reader of the Court. The story that the Magistrate had delegated his power to his clerk, cannot be believed. The Magistrate was examined as P.W. 6 (Shri U.D. Chaube), but he did not support the prosecution story. He has not been declared hostile. The question was not put to him with regard to the delegation of power to his clerk by him. If this story of the prosecution is not believed, the entire case falls to the ground. In the end, it is submitted that the story put up by the prosecution, was rightly not believed by the learned Special Judge. In the alternative, it is submitted that if two views are possible and the trial Court acquitted the accused by accepting one of the two views, the appellate Court should not interfere, in an appeal against acquittal, with the view taken by the learned Special Judge. He referred to paras 8, 13, 14, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26 and 31 of the judgment. He also relied on the following cases --
(i) Dwarkaprasad v. State (1987 MPLJ 527);
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)M.P. Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1974 SC 773 : 1974 Cri LJ 509;
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii) Moti Ram Jai Singh Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (1985 (II) Crimes 18);
(ix)
(x) Antar Singh v. State of M. P., AIR 1979 SCI 188: 1979 Cri LJ 715;
(xi)
(xii)
7. Before I proceed to deal with the evidence and findings recorded in the case, I feel it my duty to state the law on the subject as decided by the Supreme Court. In the case of
"There could be no doubt that the evidence of the complaint should be corroborated in material particulars. After introduction of Section 165A of the I.P.C. making the person who offers bribe guilty of abetment of bribery the complainant cannot be placed on any better footing than that of an accomplice and corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime has to be insisted upon."
In the case of
"......the complainant is in the nature of an accomplice."
"........Before any court could act on his testimony, corroboration in material particulars is necessary............"
In the case of
"They must seriously endeavour to secure really independent and respectable witnesses so that the evidence in regard to raid inspires confidence in the mind of the court and the court is not left in any doubt as to whether or not any money was paid to the public servant by way of bribe........."
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.".......The evidence in regard to the search of the appellant and the seizure of five marked currency notes from him is, in the context of the other facts and circumstances of the case, not such as to inspire confidence and cannot be implicitly accepted."
In the case of
".......There ought to be some other evidence before his word can be accepted with so much other evidence to contradict him. In trap cases at least some panches over-hear the conversation or see something to which they can depose....."
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".......We are satisfied that there is considerable room for doubt in this case and that the statement of Kishori Lal which alone is the foundation of the charge against the appellant cannot be accepted without corroboration."
In the case of Salim Khan (supra), it was held --
".........very clever people who are young and agile are often victimised by pick-pockets and only when their valuables have been lost the fact is noticed by them. The process here is the reverse one. Instead of the pocket being picked, currency notes have been inserted into it....."
In the case of
".........The result is that not only the story of demand of bribe by the appellant from the complainant is not proved but even the story of payment of the money by the complainant is not established beyond reasonable doubt. That being so, the rule of presumption engrafted in Section 4(1) cannot be made use of for convicting the appellant."
"....On mere recovery of certain money from the person of an accused without the proof of its payment by or on behalf of some person to whom official favour was to be shown the presumption cannot arise."
In the case of
"......There is thus no independent reliable corroboration of the statements of Niranjan Lal and Anand Behari Lal as regards the first offer. Lastly, in this background it was proper to took for unimpeachable evidence as to the passing of the currency note from Niranjan Lal to the appellant. We have already indicated certain important circumstances which cast doubt on that story".
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"Having regard to all these circumstances, we think it is a fit case whether the courts below should have required independent and trustworthy corroboration of the evidence of Niranjan Lal and Satish Chandra who had laid the trap........."
8. In the case of Raghbir Singh (supra), it was held that the officer laying the trap must seriously endavour to secure really independent and respectable witnesses so that the evidence in regard to raid inspires confidence. Please also see :
9. In the case of Darshan Lal (supra), it has been held that though the trap witness is an interested witness in the sense that he is interested to see that the trap laid by him succeeded. He could at least be equated with a partisan witness and it would not be advisable to rely upon his evidence without corroboration. The interested and partisan witnesses are concerned in the success of the trap. Their evidence must be tested in the same way as that of any interested witness and in proper case, the court may look for independent corroboration for convicting the accused person. Please also see :
10. Is the story of demand of bribe and its payment is not established, the rule of presumption engrafted in Section 4(1) cannot be made use for convicting the appellant.
".......Undoubtedly there are circumstances in this case which are highly suspicious against the appellant, but the High Court having disbelieved an essential part of the prosecution case on which the other part was dependent, we do not consider it safe to sustain the conviction of the appellant."
11. In the case of M. P. Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1974 SC 773 : 1974 Cri LJ 509 the Supreme Court had held as under (at page 774 SC; AIR 1974) :--
"7. the accused can establish his case by preponderance of probabilities, that is to say, he need not prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt."
In
"11. No explanation has been given by the appellant why he received the money and kept the same into his pocket. Indeed, no suggestion was given to any witness that no money was received by the appellant."
In Dwarkaprasad v. State, 1987 MPLJ 527 it has been observed --
"7-A. The principles of law regarding the appreciation of evidence in bribery or trap cases; generally speaking, are as follows --
(a) that the burden of proving the prosecution case, generally lies on the prosecution even in case of trap or bribery, this burden in not shifted by Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act; (b) that Section 4 has not limited application only for raising of presumption regarding the motive of the taking of money provided it is proved that the money was obtained or accepted by the accused; (c) that even in raising the presumption u/s 4, the Act of acceptance or obtaining must be wilful, voluntary and with conscious mind; (d) that even where such a presumption is drawn, the accused can rebut it by showing there is a plausible" explanation and the basis of preponderance of probability of other theory; (e) the accused is not required to rebut this presumption by leading evidence beyond reasonable doubt. But all that is required to show is to establish preponderance of probability in his favour; (f) that the witnesses of trap are not to be discharged as accomplices but in a given case the court can insist on independent corroboration for believing their testimony."
12. The Supreme Court, in the case of
"11.......in an appeal against acquittal, the powers of the High Court in dealing with the case are as extensive as of the trial Court, but before reversing the acquittal, the High Court should bear in mind that the initial presumption of the innocence of the accused is in no way weakened, if not reinforced, by his acquittal of the trial, and further, the opinion of the trial Court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of the witnesses, as to the value of their evidence should not be lightly discarded. Where discarded. Where two views of the evidence are reasonably possible, and the trial court has opted for one favouring acquittal, the High Court should not disturb the same merely on the ground that if it were in the position of the trial court, it would have taken the alternative view and convicted the accused accordingly.--"
In the case of
"15. It is well settled that if two views of the evidence are reasonably possible, one favouring acquittal and the other conviction, the High Court should not reverse the order of acquittal."
13.
"11. -- While there is no doubt that the jurisdiction of an appellate court is coextensive with that of the trial court, in the case of an appeal against a judgment of acquittal it cannot totally brush aside the appreciation of the evidence by the trial court. The reasons for reversing a judgment of acquittal should be cogent and if two views are reasonably possible, the appellate court should be slow in interfering with the judgment of the trial court even if it is possible for it to take a different view after a process of laborious reasoning......"
14. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the learned trial Court was right in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove that a demand for bribe was made by the accused-respondent? Shri P. K. Tiwari (P.W. 1), for the incident dated 13-5-1980, has stated as under :--
In para 3, he states --
15. P.W. 2 Shri M.A. Khan, Advocate, has discribed the incident dated 13-5-1980 as under :--
16. Shri U.D. Chaube (P.W.6), Executive Magistrate, has stated as under :--
17. Thus, the difference in the versions of the three prosecution witnesses of the incident dated 13-5-1980 is apparent -- as they do not reconcil with each other.
18. Regarding the incident dated 14-5-1980, the versions of the prosecution witnesses are as under :--
P.W. 1 Shri P. K. Tiwari --
P. W. 2 Shri M.A. Khan --
P.W. 6 Shri U.D. Choubey --
The difference in the version of the three prosecution witnesses can be noticed.
19. Regarding the incident dated 15-5-1980, the versions of the prosecution witnesses are reproduced hereunder --
P. W. 1 Shri P. K. Tiwari --
P. W. 2 Shri M.A. Khan
P. W. 3 Shri Shivkant Shukla --
P. W. 6 Shri U.D. Choubey --
20. The learned Special Judge, in paras 12 to 18 of his judgment, has discussed the testimony of all the above witnesses and has come to the conclusion that the allegation of demand of bribe has not been proved. He relied on the statement of Shri U. D. Choubey, Executive Magistrate, for holding that the order for release of Genesh Prasad was already passed on 13-5-1989. Hence, there was no question of demanding the bribe of Rs. 50/- on 13th or 14th of May, 1980 as alleged by the prosecution. In para 20 of his judgment, the learned lower Court has again relied on the statement of Shri U. D. Choubey, Executive Magistrate, who had stated that he did not ask the accused to write the order-sheet on 14-5-1980. Hence, there was no occasion for him to demand the bribe on that day. The learned Judge, regarding the incident dated 15-5-1980, has discussed in his judgment (paras 21 to 25) the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3, viz., Shri P. K. Tiwari, Shri M. A. Khan and Shri Shivkant shukla and has disbelieved them. He has pointed out other circumstances also for holding the prosecution story doubtful. In my view, there is no error in the judgment of the trial Court, for holding the respondent-accused not guilt of the offences with which he was charged. The view taken by the trial Court is probable and reasonable.
21. I, therefore, find no substance in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed.