@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
Pandey, J.
This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is directed against an order dated 20th July 1961 whereby, in revision u/s 83 (1-A) of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (hereinafter called the Act), the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh set aside an appellate order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Raipur, dated 11th June 1959 and held that the Municipal Committee, Raipur was entitled to levy octroi tax on a new motor vehicle (bus) which was taken from Khairagarli in Durg district to Raipur only for the purpose of passing and registration.
At the time of entering the limits of the Raipur Municipality on 3rd February 1959, the driver of the bus delivered to the octroi authorities a declaration that the bus was being taken to the office of the Regional Transport-Authority, Raipur for passing and registration. These authorities, instead of giving to the driver a transit pass, demanded from him octroi tax and, when he failed to pay the tax, seized the bus. Thereafter, they wrote to the owner of the bus (petitioner No. 1) to say that, since the bus was to operate between Raipur and Khairagarh, it was brought for use within the limits of the Raipur Municipality and that the octroi tax demanded earlier must be paid. In answer, they were intimated that the bus would be used on the Khairagarh-Dongargarh route wholly outside the limits of the Raipur Municipality. Even after this clarification, the octroi authorities did not release the bus and insisted upon payment of the tax. Being aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Raipur and deposited in his Court the tax demanded. The appeal: was allowed and the tax deposited was directed to be refunded. Thereupon, as already indicated, the Municipal Committee, Raipur filed a revision and challenged the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The Board of Revenue set aside that order solely on the ground that the production of the bus in the office of the Regional Transport Authority, Raipur for passing and registration amounted to "use" of the vehicle within the limits of the municipality as contemplated by section 66 (1) (c) of the Act.
Having heard the counsel, we are of opinion that this petition must be allowed- In view of the concurrent finding of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Board of Revenue that the bus was not intended to be used between Raipur and Khairagarh, it is not open to the Municipal Committee to urge before us in these proceedings that that was not so. If the octroi authorities took the bus from the outpost to the Central Office to determine whether, in the circumstances, tax was leviable, we are of the view that that alone did not amount to use within the meaning of section 66 (1) (e) of the Act. Our attention was also drawn to the concession made by the petitioners'' counsel before the Board that the production of the bus for passing and registration amounted to such use. Having due regard to the fact that the petitioners were contesting their liability to pay the tax, we think that the concession, if any, was misapprehended.
The learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the word "person" occurring in section 83 (1-A) of the Act does not include a corporation like the Municipal Committee and the Raipur Municipal Committee was, therefore, not entitled to prefer a revision against the order of the appellate authority. The relevant provision reads :
(1-A). Any person aggrieved by the decision of the appellate authority may, within thirty days from the date of such decision, apply to the State Government for revision of the decision on any of the following grounds:
(a) that the decision is contrary to law or is repugnant to any principle of assessment of a tax;
(b) that the Deputy Commissioner or such other officer has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law.
The word "person" is not defined in the Act and the meaning of that word must, therefore, be gathered from section 2 (38) of the Central Provinces and Berar General Clauses Act, 1914 (1 of 1914). As there defined "person" includes any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. The petitioners'' learned counsel conceded that a company having its registered office within the limits of the Raipur Municipality would be a person within the meaning of section 83 (1-A). He however referred to the provisions of sections 84 and 85 of the Act to support his contention that the Municipal Committee had no right to challenge, by means of an application for revision, the order passed in appeal. There is, in those sections, no indication that a narrow meaning in the sense suggested ought to be ascribed to the word ''person''. We are of opinion that, in the absence of any contra-indication in the subject or context, that word occurring in section 83 (1-A) must be regarded as including the Municipal Committee concerned. We may add that, even apart from section 83 (1-A), the Board was competent to deal with the matter u/s 58 of the Act read with section 6 (1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Board of Revenue Act, 1949 (XII of 1949).
The main question for consideration in this case is whether the production of a new bus merely for the purpose of passing and registration in the office of a Regional Transport Authority situate within the limits of a municipality amounts to its USC within those limits u/s 66 (1) (e) of the Act. The word "use" is undoubtedly of very wide signification. In its most comprehensive sense, it means employment to any purpose. (Words and Phrases by Roland Burrows page 397). We however think that the true meaning of that word should be gathered not only from the subject-matter of the enactment but also from the context. The Supreme Court pointed out in
No locomotive shall be used on any highway within the county of London until an annual licence for the use of the same shall have been obtained from the council by the owner thereof.
A steam-roller, which was not employed in road-making within the county of London, passed through the county to a destination outside. It was held that the steam-roller was used within the county. It is obvious that the county imposed a tax on the owner of a steam-roller for permitting him to use its highways for taking his steam-roller. This tax, commonly known as toll traverse, is similar to the one contemplated by clause (d) of section 66 (1) and should not be confused with octroi tax leviable by a municipality. In our opinion, this case also is of no assistance for the purpose of determining the incidence of octroi tax.
Section 66 of the Act, which enumerates the taxes that may be imposed by a municipal committee provides :
(1) A committee may, from time to time, and subject to the provisions of this chapter, impose in the whole or in any part of the municipality any of the following taxes, for the purposes of this Act, namely:
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(c) a tax, payable by the owner, on all or any vehicles or animals used for riding, driving, draught or burden, or on dogs, where such vehicles, animals or dogs are kept within the limits of the municipality :
(d) atoll on vehicles and animals used as aforesaid entering the limits of the municipality, and on boats moored within those limits :
[Provided that a tool under this clause shall not be payable on any vehicle or animal on which a tax under clause (c) has been imposed :]
(e) an octroi on animals or goods brought within the limits of the municipality for sale, consumption or use within those limits;
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(o) a terminal tax on goods or animals imported into or exported from the limits of a municipality:
Provided that a terminal tax under this clause and an octroi under clause (e) shall not be in force in any municipality at the same time.
In view of the provisions of clause (e), octroi tax cannot be imposed on goods merely for the reason that they have been brought within the limits of municipality. As clause (d) shows, there is another kind of tax leviable on mere entry of vehicles and animals used for riding, driving, draught or burden. It will further be seen that the octroi tax is a substitute for the terminal tax and clause (e) expressly provides that both taxes shall not be in force in any municipality at the same time. In the case of
That by the substitution of terminal tax on goods imported into a local area the nature of the tax had not been altered from what it was when octroi was in force or when, instead of ''terminal tax octroi (without refund) was substituted is clear from the decision of the Federal Court in Punjab Flour and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Chief Officer, Corporation of City of Lahore 1947 FCR 17, which is discussed in a later part of this judgment.
In regard to the meaning of the word "import" for the purposes of terminal tax under clause (o), the Supreme Court observed :
This supports the contention raised that ''import'' is not merely the bringing into but comprises something more i. e., ''incorporating and mixing up of the goods imported with the mass of the property'' in the local area. The concept of ''import'' as implying something brought for the purpose of sale or being kept is supported by the observations of Kelly C B. in Earvy v. Corporation of Lyme Regie (1889) 4 Ex. 260 at p. 262 (P). There the claim for a tool was made under the Harbor Act and the words for construction were ''goods landed or shipped within the same cobber harbor. Construing these words Kelly C. B. said :
ordinary meaning and purport of the words is perfectly clear, namely, that tools are to be paid on goods substantially imported; that is, in fact, carried into the port for the purpose of the town and neighborhood.
These observations throw much light on the true nature of octroi tax.
As clause (e) shows, octroi tax can be levied only when goods and animals are brought within the limits of a municipality for certain specified purpose, namely for ''''sale, consumption or use within those limits". If the word "use" were given the wide meaning commended to us it would include both sale and consumption and would thereby render the words "sale" and "consumption" superfluous. In our opinion, the very fact that "use" has been employed along, with the other two words is contra-indicative of the wide meaning sought to be ascribed to it. If, as we think, the meaning of "use '' in clause (e) is not so wide, the question is what meaning should be ascribed to it. To ascertain the true meaning, we call in aid inter alia a rule of interpretation of statutes. Where the meaning of a word of wide signification is doubtful, it is legitimate to ascertain its meaning by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. Nocturne a socials. Maxwell explained this rule at page 332 in this manner:
When two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, procedure a excise. They are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, that :.s, the more general is restricted to-a sense analogous to the less general.
In
This view is reinforced by two other considerations. The first is the true nature of the tax indicated in paragraph 7. The second is the language employed in clause (e) itself. To attract that clause it is not enough that certain goods have been brought within the limits of a municipality. It is also not sufficient that the goods have been merely used within such limits. It is only when goods are brought within the limits of a municipality for use within those limits that clause (e) is attracted. The ordinary meaning and purpose of that provision is clear. The clause envisages bringing in of goods for repetitive use within the limits of a municipality so that it can be said that the goods have been substantially brought for use within those limits. In this view, when a vehicle merely passes through the limits of a municipality or is casually brought within those limits, it cannot be taxed under clause (e). Similarly, when a vehicle is so brought not for use within those limits but for making it fit for the use such as registration or passing or repairs, it cannot be taxed under that clause.
The relevant Rules of the Raipur Municipality also lend support to the view we have taken. Rules 9 (c) and 10 (a) read as follows :
9 (e). On the arrival of dutiable articles at an out-post, the Moharir on duty shall call upon the person in-charge :
(i) to declare whether they are intended :
(a) for consumption or use within the Municipality, or
(b) for immediate export, or
(c) for temporary detention within the Municipality and eventual export, and
(ii) to give their description and where duty is leviable ad valorem export, their value. 10 (a). If the articles are stated to be intended for consumption or use within the Municipality the Moharrir shall, on being satisfied as to the correctness of the description and value as given, assess the duty and demand its payment and, on such payment being made, grant a pass for the articles in the prescribed form. He shall be bound to supply the payer with such change, not exceeding one rupee, as he may require to enable him to pay the duty.
It is obvious that if any goods taken within the limits of Raipur Municipality are not intended for consumption or use within those limits, they cannot be taxed.
In this case, the new bus was not brought within the limits of Raipur Municipality for use within those limits in the sense indicated by us. It was taken there for passing and registration. That being so, no octroi tax could be levied upon its entry into the municipal limits. In conclusion, we may point out that the Board itself took the same view in a subsequent case. Municipal Committee, Raipur v. M.P. Transport Company Ltd. 1962 MPLJ 722.
The petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Board dated 20 July 1961 is quashed. The Municipal Committee, Raipur (respondent No. 2) shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the petitioners to whom the security amount shall also be refunded. Hearing fee Rs. 100.
