@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
B.D. Rathi, J.@mdashThis revision petition u/s 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1974 preferred by the petitioners-accused is directed against an order dated 2/11/2012 passed in Criminal Case No. 868/12 by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambah, district Morena framing charges against the accused/petitioners for commission of offence punishable u/s 498A of I.P.C.
2. The brief facts, just for the decision of this revision petition are that on 24/6/12 FIR was lodged by the complainant/respondent No. 2-Smt. Seema Sehar against the petitioners/accused. The allegations contained in the FIR for the sake of convenience are recapitulated in four parts as under:-
"(i) I (complainant) is serving as a teacher in the Govt. Primary School, Chhoti Malpur, Block Pabda, district Alirajpur. I am a permanent resident of Porsa. My marriage was solemnized on 27/11/2010 with Rahul Sehar, resident of Guna. My father borne expenditure of Rs. 10,00,000/- for the said marriage. I resided in the matrimonial house for three months. During this period, my father-in-law Hariram Sehar, mother-in-law Rajni Sehar and husband Rahul Sehar raised demand of Rs. 4,00,000/- in cash and four wheelers and asked me to bring the dowry from my parents if wants to live with them (in-laws).
(ii) On 28/1/2012 I came to my parental home at Porsa. I told to my mother and father about raising demand of dowry by the in-laws and then my father gave Rs. 20,000/- once to my husband.
(iii) Thereafter, I came back to my matrimonial home (Guna). At matrimonial home, my husband, mother-in-law and father-in-law used to talk that their son (husband) has now become permanent employee and therefore various alliances for his marriage are coming, hence, I was told to bring more amount from my parents. Then at the period of short intervals, I was beaten by my husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law.
(iv) After that I was sent to my parental house at Porsa. On 14/4/2011 my father-in-law Hariram Sehar came to my parental home at Porsa. In the presence of my mother, my father-in-law told that if amount of Rs. 4,00,000/- would be given in dowry then they (in-laws) would allow to live her daughter (complainant). Then after abusing I was also beaten by my father-in-law. Despite efforts by my mother, he was not convinced and went back. Thereafter I started living either in my parents house or Alirajpur. In Family Disputes Centre at Ambah a case is pending. My all ornaments and the articles of dowry which were presented at the time of marriage have been retained by in-laws. So the report is being lodged for taking appropriate action."
3. On the basis of the aforesaid report/complaint, Crime No. 149/12 was registered against the petitioner for the offence u/s 498A/34 of I.P.C.
4. It is submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that after completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed by the police in the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambah, district Morena where charges for commission of offence u/s 498A of I.P.C. have been framed against all the petitioners by the court in Criminal Case No. 868/12 under the order impugned.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners has raised submissions in two-folds. It is contended by the counsel that on bare perusal of the allegations made in the FIR it is crystal clear that in first phase of the incident, the entire offence has been committed at Guna by all the petitioners and therefore, the court of Morena has no jurisdiction to try with the case. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on the decisions in the cases of
6. The second argument is that if we take up the second phase of the incident, then as per the prosecution''s own case the complainant was subjected to mal-treatment and harassment by the father-in-law, namely, Hariram Sehar (petitioner No. 1) at Porosa and therefore against her mother-in-law/petitioner No. 2-Smt. Rajani and husband/respondent No. 3-Dr. Rahul Sehar no case is made out and in that event the entire proceedings are liable to be quashed against them. That apart, it is contended that even if all the allegations as mentioned in the FIR are taken to be true, no case is made out against the present petitioners. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in the case of
7. During the course of arguments learned counsel for the petitioners also drew attention of this court on the complaints dated 6/6/2012 and 8/6/2012 made by the respondent No. 2-Smt. Seema Sehar to SDO (P), Ambah district Morena and Project Officer, Posra to contend that on perusal of these complaints it is clear that the allegations levied in the FIR assailed herein in regard to the second phase of offence committed on 14/4/2011 have not been asserted by the complainant in these very two complaints and it reflects that this FIR has been lodged falsely against the petitioners/accused.
8. Per contra, the submissions put forth by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 2/complainant is that after taking into consideration the entire facts as mentioned in the FIR it seems that some part of offence has been committed at Guna and some at Porsa, therefore, in this view of the matter, as per clause (b) & (c) of Section 178 of the Criminal Procedure Code, both the courts have the territorial jurisdiction to hear the case. In support of their contentions, reliance is placed on the decision in the case of
9. Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, following two questions appear to be germane for the adjudication of the controversy involved in this matter.
(i) Whether JMFC Ambah court has the jurisdiction to try the case ? ?
(ii) Whether, prima facie case is made out to frame charge u/s 498A of I.P.C. against the petitioners ?
Question No. (I)
10. This question is being dealt with on the premise that the facts mentioned in the FIR are disclosing the commission of offence firstly at Guna (matrimonial house of the complainant) and secondly at Porsa (parental house of the complainant). The first phase of offence has been disclosed in third part of the FIR which clearly indicates that offence was committed at Guna by all the petitioners whereas fourth part of the FIR reveals that offence has been committed only by petitioner No. 1-Hariram at Porsa-Ambah, district Morena. A combined reading of parts "3" and "4" of the FIR postulates that petitioner No. 1-Hariram, father-in-law of the complainant was present at the time of committing offence at both the places Guna and Porsa. Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Section 178(b), both the courts established at Guna and Porsa have the jurisdiction to try the case only against petitioner No. 1. But so far as petitioners No. 2 and 3, namely, Smt. Rajani and Dr. Rahul are concerned, the allegations have been mentioned against them by the complainant in part 3 of the FIR that they have committed the offence at Guna, therefore for these two petitioners the jurisdiction to try their case is vested to the court of Guna and the same cannot be tried by the court of JMFC, Ambah, district Morena. In this view of the matter, the provisions of section 223 of Cr.P.C. are not attracted because the alleged offence has not been committed by the petitioners in the course of same transaction at both the places at Guna and Porsa. Consequently, joint trial of all the petitioners cannot be permitted. It is made clear that aforesaid finding would prevail and apply to the case only when it is established that the offence has been committed by the accused. Hence, in order to find out whether any prima facie case is made out against the accused/petitioners, the question No. 2 would be relevant for consideration.
Question No. (II)
11. On dwelling upon to consider this question, all allegations made in the FIR are divided and reproduced above in four parts. In parts (I) & (II), the allegations were not made with regard to cruelty committed upon the complainant/respondent No. 2 by the petitioners/accused-persons. Simultaneously in third part of the FIR, neither specific allegations against the petitioners nor any single instance have been given with mentioning the date, time and place of the incident on which according to complainant/respondent No. 2 was made subject to cruelsome behaviour by the petitioners. Only omnibus allegations were made.
12. However, the allegation only against petitioner No. 1-Hariram appears in fourth part but this fact cannot be left aside that the FIR in this case has been lodged by the complainant on 24/6/2012 and prior to that she forwarded on 6/6/2012 a written complaint to SDO(P), Ambah, District Morena, which has been filed on record by the complainant/respondent No. 2 herself alongwith list of documents on 20/8/14. On perusal of the complaint dated 6/6/2012, it is clear that in this the complainant nowhere has alleged about cruelsome behaviour against petitioner No. 1-Hariram as mentioned in fourth part of the FIR. Similarly, instance dated 14/4/2011 was also not mentioned in the written complaint dated 8/6/2012 addressed to the Project Officer, Porsa. Besides that, the allegations made in fourth part of the FIR are quite unnatural and un-believable to think for a common man that at the parental house of complainant, her father-in-law (petitioner No. 1), who is quite old having age of 68 years alone would go to commit the alleged offence.
13. Apart that on perusal of the complaints dated 6/6/12 and 8/6/12, it is clear that the complainant is residing separately from in-laws since 28/1/2011 till date. This fact was specifically mentioned in para 5 of both the complaints referred to above. Therefore, it is clear that the fact mentioned in the present FIR that she went to her parental house on 28/1/12 is totally wrong and it is also wrong that she again left the house of her parents and went to her in-law''s house in the year 2012 where she was assaulted by all the petitioners as mentioned in third part of the FIR.
14. At this stage, to properly understand the meaning of the provisions of section 498A of I.P.C. and section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 same are needed to be discussed with their explanations:
Section 498A reads as follows:
"498-A: Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty-Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation-For the purpose of this section ''cruelty'' means-
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or physical of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
15. The Dowry has been defined in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 which reads as follows:
"Definition of ''Dowry''-In this Act, ''dowry'' means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly-
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before [or any time after the marriage] [in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include] dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.
16. Explanation (b) of section 498A says that cruelty would mean the harassment of the woman with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. The word "agreement" referred to in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act has to be inferred on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this case in either parts of the FIR, nowhere it was mentioned that there was a settlement of dowry at the time of marriage of complainant with respondent No. 2.
17. It may be seen that in parts (I) and (II) as also in part (IV) of the FIR, the allegations were made that certain amount of Rs. 4,00,000/- was demanded by the petitioners from the complainant and in part (II) it was mentioned that amount of Rs. 20,000/- was given by the father of the complainant to the petitioners but in the absence of previous agreement or contract in regard to dowry at the time of marriage, only raising demand of certain amount does not constitute any offence under the Act and therefore no punishment can be awarded under the law.
18. Apart that this FIR in respect of commission of offence on 14/4/2011 as alleged in part (IV) of the FIR has been lodged belatedly on 24/6/2012 without giving any explanation of delay though the complainant was residing separately from in-laws since 28/1/2011 as mentioned in the complaints dated 6/6/12 and 8/6/12. Further the complainant fails to point out that which of the words were uttered by the petitioner No. 1 causing mental agony to her. Therefore examining the FIR on the touchstone of this kind of her assertion of living with the parents since 28/1/2011 would lead to draw an inference that the allegations made against the petitioners in third and fourth parts of the FIR are absolutely vague and false, causing thereby suspicion on the entire prosecution case. Therefore, in absence of allegations of active involvement of the petitioners with regard to cruelty in the matter of demand of dowry, no case is made out against them.
19. In the same situation, the Hon. Apex Court in the case of
"The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a Herculean task in a majority of these complaints. The tendency of implicating the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of the criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases.
The allegations of harassment by the husband''s close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant wife resided would have an entirely different complexion. Such allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection."
20. Prior to above, in the case of
"9 In order to lodge a proper compliant, mere mention of the sections and the language of those sections is not be all and end of the matter. What is required to be brought to the notice of the court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in committing of that offence."
21. This court also in the case of Ravikant (supra) after following the principles laid down in the case of Preeti Gupta (supra) held that where FIR does not disclose specific allegation or constitute a prima facie offence against the accused, the Court should not be slow and quash the proceedings in order to prevent abuse of the process of law.
22. In this case also from perusal of the FIR, it is clear that only omnibus allegations have been made by the complainant against the petitioners. No specific date, time and place was mentioned in the FIR. Consequent to the said position, it is difficult to hold that any cruelty was meted out to the respondent No. 2 by the accused/petitioners. Same is sufficiently proved from the evidence on record. Therefore, this court is court of the view that the trial court has committed an illegality in framing charge against the petitioners for commission of offence u/s 498A of I.P.C. Accordingly, by allowing this petition, the order in question is hereby quashed.
23. Since the order impugned has been quashed by this court because no case of committing offence by any of the petitioners at any place is made out as discussed above, there is no need to consider the other question raised on the point of territorial jurisdiction of the court.
24. Resultantly, the revision stands allowed. The order dated 2/11/2012 passed in Criminal Case No. 868/12 by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambah, district Morena framing charge against the accused/petitioners for commission of offence punishable u/s 498A of I.P.C. is hereby quashed. The petitioners are discharged of the offence u/s 498A of I.P.C.
25. A copy of this order be sent to the trial court for necessary compliance.
