@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
Ismail, C.J.@mdashThis is an appeal against the order of Mohan, J., dated 18th March, 1980 dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant herein, along with two other writ petitions. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition the appellant claimed that he is a graduate of the University of Madras, with Economics (Main) and Politics and Indian History (subsidiary subjects) and passed his degree course in 1941; in 1947 he worked as an editorial apprentice in the Hindu, and in 1948 he joined the Mail as a sub-editor, he retired from service as Chief sub-editor in December, 1976; he was closely connected with the trade union movement among working journalists from 1954; and at present he is the President of the National Union of Journalists (India); as an office bearer of trade union of working journalists he had been appearing before Industrial Tribunals and other Tribunals and Courts for nearly 25 years; as a working journalist it had become possible for him to acquire sufficient knowledge of all branches of labour legislation, and that was the reason why he wanted to do better service to the working class by acquainting himself with other branches of law and with that in mind he wanted to study the taw degree course to enable him to practise the profession of law and appear in all Courts. According to the appellant, he joined the correspondence course for B.G.L., degree conducted by the Madurai Kamaraj University in 1976-77, and passed the second B.G.L., examination in 1978. Thereafter he applied to the Director of Legal Studies, Madras, for admission to the third year B.L., degree course of the Madras Law College, for the year 1978-79. He did not receive any reply, and, when he approached the Director in person, the latter returned the application stating that he should route the application through the Madurai University, which he did immediately. Even thereafter he did not receive any reply. By that time the B.L., degree course had started in the Madras Law College and students were attending the classes, and therefore, the appellant did not pursue the matter further. Again for the next year the appellant sought admission for the third year B.L., degree course in the Madras Law College, and, according to him, he approached the Registrar, University of Madras, in person and explained the position in this regard, and also gave written representations. The Registrar, University of Madras, on 2nd December, 1978, addressed a communication to the Director of Legal Studies, with a copy to the appellant stating--
B.G.L., correspondence degree holders would not be considered for admission to the B.L., degree course of Madras University.
The appellant states that he enquired into the matter and found that there was no statutory prohibition against B.G.L., correspondence course degree-holders from seeking admission to the B.L., degree course. When he pursued the matter further, ultimately, he received a letter from the Director of Legal Studies, Madras, dated 3rd October, 1979 stating that the request of the appellant for admission to B.L., (Regular) Course could not be complied with in view of the letter of the University of Madras dated 2nd December, 1978. The letter dated 2nd December, 1978 sent by the Registrar of the University of Madras, itself stated--
I am by direction, to inform you that the authorities considered the above subject and decided that candidates who have qualified for the B.G.L., degree after pursuing the correspondence course be not considered for admission to the B.L., degree course in this University.
Obviously this letter was based on the resolution of the Syndicate of the University of Madras, dated 18th November, 1978. This resolution reads as follows--
Considered the representations from students, who have required the B.G.L., degree of the Madurai University by pursuing the correspondence course, requesting that they may be permitted to join B.L., degree course in the Madras Law College evening college; also letter dt. 28th October, 1978 from the Acting Secretary, the Bar Council of India, New Delhi, on the subject.
Resolved that in the light of the letter of the Bar Council of India, candidates who have qualified for the B.G.L., degree, after pursuing the correspondence course, be not considered for admission to the B.L. degree course in this University.
Since this resolution refers to the letter of the Bar Council of India, it is necessary to find out what the Bar Council of India wrote to the University of Madras, and why it did so. The letter of the Bar Council of India, dt. 22nd October, 1978, addressed to the Registrar of the University of Madras, reads as follows--
The candidates who have completed the B.G.L., course through correspondence course are not eligible for admission to the 3rd year law course as regular students and, if any one is granted admission and awarded degree in law, he is not entitled to be enrolled as advocate, as he has not undergone a course of instruction in law as laid down by the Bar Council of India, I am herewith sending a copy of the Rules of the Council in Part IV, Reference may be made to 1 (i) (b) and (c) of the Rules for necessary guidance.
It is therefore, necessary to refer to these Rules at this stage itself. The Rules have been framed under Ss.7 (1) (h) and (1), 24 (1) (c) (iii) and (iii-a) and 49 (1) (d) of the Advocates Act, 1991 (Central Act 25 of 1961)--hereafter referred to as the Act). R. 1 (1) states--
1 (1) Save as provided in S.24 (i) (c)(iii-a) of the Act, a degree in law obtained from any University in the territory of India after the 12th March, 1967, shall not be recognised for purposes of S.24 (1)(c) (iii) of the Act unless the following conditions are fulfilled--
(a) That at the time of joining the course of instruction in law for a degree in law, he is a graduate of a University or possesses such academic qualifications which are considered equivalent to a graduate degree of a University by the Bar Council of India;
(b) That the law degree has been obtained after undergoing a course of study in law for a minimum period of three years as provided in these Rules;
(c) That the course of study in law has been by regular attendance at the requisite number of lectures, tutorials and moot Courts in a college recognised by a University; and
(d) That the law degree has been obtained without undergoing any other course of instruction simultaneously during the period of three years of study in law.
There is a proviso to this Rule which it is on necessary to refer to for the purpose of the present case.
R.3 reads as follows--
3(1). Admission of a student to the course of Instruction in law shall ordinarily be on the basis of his merit as a student;
(2) The instruction to be imparted should ordinarily be for a minimum of 3 hours on every working day.
(3) The students should be required to put in a minimum attendance of 66 per cent of the lectures on each of the subjects as also at tutorials and moot courts;
Provided that in exceptional cases for reasons to be recorded and communicated to the Bar Council of India, the Dean of the Faculty of Law and the Principals of the Law Colleges may condone attendance short of those required by the Rule, if the student has attended 66 per cent of the lectures in the aggregate for the semester or examination as the case may be.
R.10 reads as follows--
Universities shall endeavour to establish or recognise only those colleges which have whole time day classes in law and preferably full time law schools which exclusively teach law.
2. Having regard to the fact that these Rules are statutory, and have been framed under the provisions of the Act referred to already, it is desirable to see what those provisions themselves are. S.7 of the Act lays down the functions of the Bar Council of India. It states so far as is relevant:--
7(1). The functions of the Bar Council of India shall be--...(h) to promote legal education and to lay down standards of such education in consultation with the Universities of India imparting such education; and the State Bar Councils;
(1) to recognise Universities, whose degree in law shall be a qualification for enrolment as an advocate and for that purpose to visit and inspect Universities.
S.10of the Act deals with the constitution of committees other than disciplinary committees, and Sub S.(2) (b)of that section states--
(2) The Bar Council of India shall constitute the following standing committees, namely--...(b) a legal education committee consisting of ten members, of whom five shall be persons elected by the Council from amongst its members, and five shall be persons co-opted by the Council who are not members thereof.
S.24 refers to persons who may be admitted as advocates on a State roll. That section, so far as is relevant, reads as follows--
24 (1). Subject to the provisions of this Act, and the Rules made thereunder, a person shall be qualified to be admitted as an advocate on a State roll, if he fulfils the following conditions, namely--...(c) he has obtained a degree in law...(iii) after the 12th March, 1967 save as provided in sub-Cl. (iii-a), after undergoing a three year course of study in law from any University in India, which is recognised for the purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India;
(iii-a) after undergoing a course of study in law, the duration of which is not less than two academic years commencing from the academic year 1967-1968 or any earlier academic year from any University in India which is recognised for the purposes of this Act by the Bar Council of India.
S.49 deals with the rule making power of the Bar Council of India, and in sub-S.(1)(d)it states --
4(91). The Bar Council of India may make rules for discharging its functions under this Act, and, in particular such rules may prescribe.........(d) the standards of legal education to be observed by Universities in India and the inspection of Universities for that purpose.
It is with reference to these statutory provisions that the rules extracted already have been framed.
3. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition the appellant contended that the Bar Council of India had no jurisdiction to prescribe those rules and that those rules were ultra vires the powers of the Bar Council of India and they were also unconstitutional as offending Art. 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. According to the appellant there is no distinction between the B.G.L. degree of the Madurai Kamaraj University obtained after pursuing the correspondence course and that obtained after pursuing the correspondence course and that obtained after attending classes regularly and consequently there is no justification for making a distinction between the two for the purpose of admission to the B.L. degree course of the Madras University. According to the appellant once he has obtained the B.G.L. degree of the Madurai Kamaraj University, it is totally irrelevant as to how he obtained that degree whether by pursuing the correspondence course or by attending classes, since admission to the degree course is on common criteria, the degree itself is treated as common, and the examination conducted for the award of the degree is also common.
4. The further case of the appellant was that, in any event, even assuming that the Bar Council of India had the power to make the rules and that those rules are legal, still it was the function of the University to lay down the norms for admission to the B.L. degree course, such as, what percentage of attendance should a candidate have, what subjects he should study, etc, and that the Bar Council of India could not interfere with the autonomy of a University like the University of Madras.
5. Before the learned Judge, the Bar Council of India took up the stand that the consideration of the vires or validity of the rules framed by the Bar Council of India was premature, because, those rules would come into the picture only at the time of the appellant seeking enrolment as a member of the legal profession and not at this stage. The University of Madras took up the stand that the Bar Council of India is a statutory expert body and that the University was entitled to have regard to the rules framed by it when it laid down norms for the qualification or eligibility for admission to the B.L. degree course.
6. The learned Judge accepted these contentions and dismissed the writ petition. Hence the present writ appeal.
7. The appellant appeared in person and argued his case. The appellant put forward only two contentions before us. One was that the rules referred to above, namely, the rules framed by the Bar Council of India were beyond the powers of the Bar Council of India under the statute itself, and that consequently they were ultra vires the powers of the Bar Council of India. The second contention was that, even assuming that the rules are within the competence of the Bar Council of India, they are unconstitutional as offending Arts.14 and 19 (1) of the Constitution of India. Since these were the only two arguments advanced before us, we propose to consider only these two arguments and nothing else in this judgment in this context, we may mention that the prayer in the writ petition filed by the appellant was for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the communication, dt. 3rd October, 1979 addressed to the appellant by the Director of Legal studies, and for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Director of Legal Studies to consider the admission of the appellant to the B.L. course in the Law College of the Madras University.
8. As far as the communication from the Director of Legal Studies is concerned, as we pointed out already, it is based on the communication from the University of Madras, and, therefore, as long as the validity of the communication from the University stands, the communication of the Director of Legal Studies cannot be impugned independently. As far as the communication from the University is concerned, we have already given an extract from the resolution of the Syndicate of the University showing that, on receipt of the letter from the Bar Council of India, the Syndicate took the decision referred to above. If the rules framed by the Bar Council of India are either ultra vires or unconstitutional, as contended by the appellant, naturally the resolution of the syndicate cannot stand, and, consequently, the communication of the Director of Legal Studies will have to go. On the other hand, if we come to the conclusion that the rules framed by the Bar Council of India are within the competence of the Bar Council of India and that they are also not unconstitutional, then the appellant wilt have to fail, because the communications of the Director of Legal Studies and the University of Madras were not independently impugned.
9. Regarding the first contention, that the rules framed by the Bar Council of India are out side the scope of its powers under the statute itself, we have already extracted the provisions of S. 7 (1) (h) and (i), 10 (2), 24(1) (c)(iii) and (iii. a) and 49 (1) (d) of the Act. The argument of the appellant is that S. 7 (1) merely states that the functions of the Bar Council of India shall be to promote legal education and to lay down standards of such education, and that laying down of standards for such education will not include the power to prescribe that the course undergone should be regular and not by correspondence or prescribe a minimum percentage of attendance at the classes. According to the appellant, the expression ''standards of such education'' occurring in S. 7 (1) (h) will only refer to the excellence of the standard aimed at, and it will not take in any other matter, such as, whether the course should be a regular one or may be by correspondence, or how much attendance a candidate should have put in. The appellant also contended that S. 24 (1) (a) (iii) merely referred to a three year course of study in law and that it did not refer to a three year regular course of study, attending classes in a college, and that therefore in making the rules in question the Bar Council of India went beyond its powers conferred by the relevant statutory provisions. We are unable to accept this argument. The expression ''to lay down standards of such education'' occurring in S. 7 (1)(h) is capable of taking in every ingredient which will go to constitute the end or ultimate level of education that is expected of a candidate who applies for enrolment as an advocate under the Act. As a matter of fact, the appellant relied upon the meaning of the word ''standards'' given in the Shorter Oxford English dictionary and Chamber''s Twentieth Century dictionary. We have gone through those meanings, and we are not satisfied that there is anything therein which will have the effect of narrowing down the scope of the expression ''standard'' occurring in S. 7 (1) (h), as contended by the appellant. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, relied on by the appellant gives the meaning of the word ''standard'' as follows--
A definite level of excellence, attainment, wealth or the like, or a definite degree of any quality viewed as a prescribed object of endeavour or as the measure of what is adequate for some purpose.
From this meaning we are unable to hold that the prescription that the course, namely, attending lectures in a college, or that a candidate must have put in a particular percentage of attendance before obtaining degree, can be said to fall outside the scope of the expression ''standards''. As a matter of fact, S. 7 (1) (i) refers to the qualification for enrolment as an advocate, and the meaning of the word ''qualification'' given in the same dictionary is as follows--
A necessary condition, which must be fulfilled before a certain right can be acquired, an office held, or the like.
Consequently the necessary condition contemplated will take in attendance at regular classes in a college or school and also a particular percentage of attendance. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the appellant that the expression ''standards of such education'' occurring in S. 7 (1) (h) of the Act in any way whittles down or narrows down the scope of the functions of the Bar Council of India, so as to take away from such functions the right to lay down a prescription, that the course, in the sense that the students are re-required to attend regular classes and to put in certain percentage of attendance.
10. With reference to the argument based on the language of S. 24 (1) (c) (iii), we may straightway mention that S. 24(1)opens by saying that the provisions contained therein shall be ''subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder''. Consequently, the expression ''a three year course of study in law'', occurring in S. 24 (1) (c) (iii), has to be read subject to the rules framed by the Bar Council of India, referred to above, and if so read, there is absolutely no inconsistency between the rules framed by the Bar Council of India and the statutory provisions contained in S. 24 (1) (c) (iii) of the Act.
11. For these reasons we hold that the rules framed by the Bar Council of India, to which we have drawn attention with reference to which alone arguments were advanced before us, are within the rule making powers of the Bar Council of India under the relevant statutory provisions contained in the Act.
12. The second argument of the appellant, as we pointed out already, is that the rules are unconstitutional as offending Arts. 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India. We are unable to appreciate how Art.14 comes in at all. If the University of Madras states that for the B.L. degree course in colleges, it will admit students only to regular classes, it cannot be contended that there has been a violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India in any event, Art. 14 has no application in the present context. The appellant repeatedly contended before us that the B.G.L degree of the Madurai Kamaraj University obtained through correspondence course was not in any way different from the B.G.L. degree of that University obtained after attending regular classes and that therefore the University of Madras could not make a distinction between the B.G.L. degree obtained after pursuing the correspondence course and the B.G.L. degree obtained after attending regular classes. We are clearly of the opinion that the degree obtained after pursuing the correspondence coarse cannot be equated, in all circumstances, and in all respects with a degree obtained after attending regular classes. If a particular body or organisation or association treats the two degrees as equal for certain purposes, that cannot make the two degrees equal in reality or for all purposes. As a matter of fact, the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the University of Madras in this case does dispute the case of the appellant that there is no difference between the B.G.L. degree of the Madurai Kamaraj University obtained after pursuing the correspondence course and the degree obtained after attending regular classes in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated--
However, the second respondent states on Information that it is not correct to say that the examination conducted by the Madurai Kamaraj University for the B.G.L. degree through correspondence course is the same as the examination conducted by the said University for the B.G.L. degree regular course. The second respondent learns and states that the correspondence course is under the non-semester pattern with an examination conducted once a year, while the regular course is under the semester pattern with an examination at the end of every semester. The question papers for the two courses are not common. The procedure for valuation is also not common, because internal assessment is part of the system of valuation under the semester pattern and this is absent under the non-semester pattern.
Having regard to this factual position as stated by the University of Madras, it is not possible to hold that there is no difference between the B.G.L. degree of the Madurai Kamaraj University obtained after pursuing the correspondence course and the degree obtained after attending regular classes. If so, there is absolutely no scope for the invocation of Art. 14of the Constitution at all, because, from the very nature of the case, the two degrees are not identical or equal, and therefore, it is not open to the appellant to contend that these unequal degrees must be treated as equals.
14. As far as the provisions contained in Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India is concerned, here again we are unable to agree with the condition of the appellant. That Article deals with the right of a citizen to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Art. 19 (6), among others, states--
Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restritions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevents the State from making any law relating to--
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business.
15. Thus, it will be seen that the Constitution itself provides that any law relating to the professional qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business will be valid and cannot be said to be in any way derogatory to the right of a citizen under Art. 19 (1) (g)of the Constitution of India. From what we have pointed out, it is clear that the prescription made by the Bar Council of India in the rules framed by them regarding attendance in a regular course in a college or the prescription regarding a particular percentage of attendance at such lectures in law relating to the professional qualification necessary for practising the profession of an advocate and is consequently saved by Art. 19(6) of Constitution of India. It cannot be said that the prescription requiring that a candidate should obtain a law degree after undergoing a regular course of three years, attending classes, and that he should have put in an attendance of 66 per cent of the lectures in each of the subjects has no relevancy to the standards of legal education as a qualification for admission to the profession of an Advocate, and therefore, will not fall within the scope of Art. 19(5) of the Constitution of India. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom of a particular body in laying down a particular prescription or standards, and Courts are only concerned with their competence to lay down such standards or make prescriptions, and whether those standards or prescriptions affect the legal as right of a citizen in any manner. So long the standards of prescriptions fall within the competence of the body, which the Parliament has chosen as the expert body to be entrusted with the right to lay down standards and make prescriptions, Courts ace not concerned with the wisdom thereof, but are concerned only with their competency or constitutionality. For the reasons already indicated, the Rules of the Bar Council of India not only come within the competence of the Bar Council of India, but are also constitutional and they cannot be said to violate Art. 14 or Art. 19(1) (g)of the Constitution of India. As we pointed out already, these were the only two points urged before us in support of the writ appeal, and, as we have held against the appellant on both the points, the writ fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
