@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
1. The appellant-company approached the State ofHaryana for acquisition of land for establishing asheet glass factory. The State Government, on beingsatisfied, took a decision to initiate proceedings inrespect of the land in question. Preliminarynotification u/s 4 of the Land AcquisitionAct was issued on 2.7.1973. Thereafter declaration wasmade u/s 6 on 4.9.1973. The Collector passedthe award on 20.6.1974 in respect of the said land,awarding compensation to the land owners i.e.respondent Nos. 1-5 herein, a sum of Rs. 3,93,688.12.The amount of compensation was also paid to therespondents on 16.10.1974 and the possession of theland was also taken on the same date. The respondentsmade an application for reference u/s 18 ofthe Act. The Additional District Judge, Rohtakenhanced the compensation amount by a sum of Rs.59,349. The respondent 1-5 not being satisfied withthe enhanced amount of compensation, approached theHigh court by filing an appeal. The High Court byjudgment dated 2.6.1988 enhanced the compensation by anamount of Rs. 8.10 lakhs.
2. The respondents filed Civil Writ Petition No.14735/1991 in the High Court on 25.9.1991 praying forquashing the notification issued under Sections 4 and6 of the Land Acquisition Act and for other reliefs.The said writ petition was allowed by the High Court on5.3.1992. Hence, this appeal by the company for whosebenefit the land was acquired.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant contended thatthe High Court was not right in entertaining the writpetition condoning the delay and laches on the part ofrespondents in approaching the High court almost aftera period of 17 years, that too when the acquisitionproceedings had attained finality and possession alsohad been taken as early as on 16.10.1994 on which datethe land rested with the State free from allencumbrances. The High Court committed an error inquashing the acquisition proceedings and directingrestoration of the land to the respondents, even thoughthe land was not utilized for the purpose for which itwas acquired. The learned counsel cited a fewdecisions in support of his submissions.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents 1-5 madesubmissions in support of justification of the impugnedjudgment. He contended that having regard to the factsand circumstances of the case, particularly, when theappellant railed to utilize the land acquired for thepurpose for which it was acquired and when it wasmaking unjust enrichment out of the land acquired, theHigh Court was just and right in passing the impugnedjudgment.
5. It may be stated that the State has also filedappeals challenging the impugned judgment in CivilAppeal Nos. 7024 & 7025-7030 of 1993. The learnedcounsel for the State submitted that the State hasalready initiated proceedings for resumption of theland acquired. He stated that this submission was madebefore the High Court also but, unfortunately, the samewas not considered.
6. It is not in dispute that the writ petition wasfiled almost after 17 years from the date of passingthe award and after taking possession of land. Thereis no explanation for inordinate delay and lachesexcept the statement made in para 8 of the writpetition to the effect, that although the possession ofthe land was taken 17 years back in 1973, thecompensation was not paid fully and the acquisition wasmala fide and illegal and that the acquisition was madeonly to peg down the prices. It is also not in disputethat respondents 1-5 accepted/received the amount ofcompensation as early as on 16.10.1974 on the basis ofthe award passed; they sought reference under Section18 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation andfurther they pursued the matter in the High Courtseeking further enhancement of the compensation till1988. Three years thereafter they filed writ petitionchallenging the acquisition proceedings. In our view,in the absence of any explanation for inordinate delayand laches on the part of the respondent 1-5 inapproaching the High Court, the writ petition ought tohave been dismissed on this short ground. it appearsthat the High Court was impressed by two circumstances- (1) that even after 17 long years the respondentswere not paid enhanced compensation and (2) if theacquisition proceedings are not quashed and if nodirection is given to revest the land in respondents1-5, there would be unjust enrichment by the appellant-company. According to the High Court, this was extraordinarysituation, which warranted exercise of itswrit jurisdiction to quash the acquisition proceedings.
7. This Court in
"This Court has repeatedly held that writpetition challenging the notifications issuedunder Sections 4 and 6 of the Act is liableto be dismissed on the ground of delay andlaches if challenge is not made within areasonable time. This court has said thatthe petitioner cannot sit on the fence andallow the State to complete the acquisitionproceedings on the basis that notificationunder Section 4 and the declaration underSection 6 were valid and then to attack thenotifications on the grounds which wereavailable to him at the time when these werepublished as otherwise it would be putting apremium on dilatory tactics."
8. In
9. Looking to the facts of the present case andconduct of the respondents 1-5, the High Court wasnot at all justified in ignoring the delay and lachesand granting relief to them. As already noticed, therespondents 1-5 approached the High Court by filingwrit petition almost after a period of 17 years afterfinalization of the acquisition proceedings. Theyaccepted the compensation amount as or the award andsought for enhancement of the compensation amountwithout challenging the notification issued underSections 4 and 6. Having sought for enhancement ofcompensation only, they filed writ petition eventhree years after the appeals were disposed of by theHigh Court in the matter of enhancement ofcompensation. There is no explanation whatsoever forthe inordinate delay in filing the writ petitions.Merely because full enhanced compensation amount wasnot paid to the respondents, that itself was not aground to condone the delay and laches in filing thewrit petition. In our view, the High Court was alsonot right in ordering restoration of land to therespondents on the ground that the land acquired wasnot used for which it had been acquired. It is well-settled position in law that after passing the awardand taking possession u/s 16 of the Act,the acquired land vests with the Government free fromall encumbrances. Even if the land is not used forthe purpose for which it is acquired, the land ownerdoes not get any right to ask for retesting the landin him and to ask for restitution of the possession.This Court as early as in 1976 in
"At this stage Shri Deshpande complainedthat actually the municipal committee hadsold away the excess land marking them outinto separate plots for a housing colony.Apart from the fact that a housing colony isa public necessity, once the originalacquisition is valid and title has vested inthe municipality, how it uses the excess landis no concern of the original owner andcannot be the basis for invalidating theacquisition. There is no principle of law bywhich a valid compulsory acquisition standsvoided because long after the requiringauthority diverts it to a public purposeother than the one stated in the Section 6(3)declaration."
10. In
11. Yet again in
12. If the land was not used for the purpose for whichit was acquired, it was open to the State Governmentto take action but that did not confer any right onthe respondents to ask for restitution of the land.As already noticed, the State Government in thisregard has already initiated proceedings forresumption of the land. In our view, there arises noquestion of any unjust enrichment to the appellantcompany.
13. We have to deal with one more contention of thelearned counsel for the respondent 1-5 that adifferent procedure has to be followed foracquisition of land by the State for the purpose of aprivate company. There is no dispute on that point.We fail to understand how this contention advancesthe case of the respondents when they did notchallenge the acquisition proceedings, even on thatground if it was available within reasonable time.It was too late for them to challenge the acquisitionproceedings on that ground as well.
14. For all that is stated above, the impugnedjudgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. Itis set aside. The writ petition filed by therespondents 1-5 is dismissed. For the same reasonthe judgments dated 4.9.1992 in C.W.P. Nos. 8181-8186of 1992 are also liable to be and are hereby setaside, having regard to the fact that the judgmentsin these cases have been rendered merely by followingthe decision dated 5.3.1992 in C.W.P. No. 14735 of1991.
15. The appeals are allowed accordingly. There shallbe no order as to costs.
