@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
1. The appellant is the original complainant who had lodged a complaint with the Bar Council of Rajasthan, Jodhpur against the respondents who
were then practising as advocates in the courts in Rajasthan. The complainant happened to be a tenant of a showroom. His landlords had filed the
suit against him for arrears of rent and possession on 21-12-1974. S/Shri K.L. Saxena and Satyandra Saxena represented the plaintiffs in that suit.
Later on, the two respondents appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. A standard rent suit was filed by the landlord represented by the two
respondents against the complainant bearing No. 36 of 1978 and that suit was later decreed and the standard rent was fixed at Rs 300 per month.
Thereafter, it is alleged that the respondents got the showroom transferred in the name of the respondent R.C. Kasliwal''s sons, Sarvshri
Harshwardhan and Himanshu and Smt Ritu Kasliwal. The allegation was that the vendees were non-earning members of the family of the two
respondents and were, therefore, benamidars. The two respondents continued to represent them in the suit even after the transaction. The two
respondents have admitted the fact of the institution of the two suits and their being engaged as advocates for the original plaintiffs and also the fact
that the property in question was purchased by the aforesaid three family members but they contended that the consideration was paid by the
vendees out of their own funds.
2. After examining the facts of the case and the behavior of the two respondents as representing the original plaintiffs in the two suits, the State
Disciplinary Committee came to the conclusion that it was a benami transaction as no evidence was led on record to show that the vendees had
paid the consideration out of their own funds. The Disciplinary Committee, therefore came to the conclusion that there was an infringement of Rules
9 and 22 of the Bar Council of India Rules. The Committee, therefore, recorded a finding of guilt, professional misconduct and directed that the
respondents be reprimanded for their action. The State Bar Council, therefore, visited the respondents with the punishment of reprimand and cost
of Rs. 300.
3. Against the said finding recorded by the State Bar Council, the two respondents filed an appeal before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
Council of India which after hearing the parties, came to the conclusion that the character of the transaction being benami was not established, that
there was misconduct committed by the present respondents and that the State Bar Council was in error in visiting the respondents with the
punishment of reprimand and cost. The Bar Council of India, therefore, set aside the order of the State Bar Council dated 8-9-1991 and
exonerated the two respondents. That is why the original complainant has moved this Court.
4. Having carefully examined the evidence on record and the conduct of the two respondents herein and having heard the learned counsel for both
the sides, we are satisfied that the conduct of the respondents was not unblemished and that they had played a part in securing the property in the
name of benamidars while they were representing one of the parties to the suit. The Bar Council of India was, therefore, wrong in thinking that the
conduct of the respondents was unblemished. The technical objections raised on the interpretation of Rules 9 and 22 of the Bar Council Rules, in
our opinion, should not weigh because what is important is to ascertain if the respondents were guilty of misconduct and if yes, to ensure that they
are visited with some penalty. The State Bar Council visited the two respondents with a mild penalty of reprimand and payment of cost quantified
at Rs 300. We do not think that the Bar Council of India was justified in interfering with the order made by the State Bar Council because one
thing is clear from the evidence that the two respondents had taken an active interest in getting the property transferred to the names of their
relatives and practically evidence was laid to show that the consideration had come out of their funds. In a situation like this, we think that the Bar
Council of India ought not to have interfered with the action taken by the State Bar Council. We, therefore, set aside the order of the Bar Council
of India by allowing this appeal and direct the respondents to suffer the sentence imposed upon them by the State Bar Council,
5. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Bar Council of India impugned herein. We, however, make no order as to costs.