B. Prakash Rao, J.@mdashHeard Sri A. Rangacharyulu, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and the learned Government Pleader for Revenue (General) appearing on behalf of the respondents.
2. Since common questions are involved in all these writ petitions, the same are being taken up together for disposal.
3. The main point which arises for an adjudication in all these cases is as to whether the provision for condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings under the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 ?
4. The few facts which are necessary for disposal of these cases are that the petitioners herein filed applications u/s 11(a) of the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short ''the Act'') seeking for grant of patta which was initially negatived. Against which, they filed appeals before the first respondent herein with applications u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing thereof. The main ground urged on behalf of the petitioners was that having regard to the fact that possession is in their favour, they are entitled for grant of patta. It was urged that as they are illiterates and living in a remote village, they were not aware of the notifications, apart from several other reasons given in support to seek condonation of delay. However, the appellate authority namely the first respondent in all these cases, rejected the said applications on the ground that they have no power or jurisdiction to condone the delay inasmuch as the Government in G.O.Ms.No. 400 Revenue, dated 24.4.1993 had taken away such power which was previously conferred on them in G.O. Ms. No. 551, dated 19.5.1986.
5. Sri A. Rangacharyulu, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that having regard to the special rule made on 17.10.1950 u/s 67(2)(c) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 applying the provisions of the Limitation Act for the purpose of proceedings under the Act, it cannot be said that the Limitation Act has no application. The said rule specifically contemplates that Sections 4, 5, 12(1) and (2), 17(1) and 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to all the proceedings under the said Act, Further, it is pointed out that having regard to the change as brought u/s 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and there is no special exclusion of applicability, it cannot be said that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be made applicable.
6. The learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that having regard to the nature of the provisions and especially there being no specific provision in this regard seeking for condonation of delay, the petitioner cannot press into service the provisions of the Limitation Act.
7. Considering the submissions made on both the sides and on perusal of the material, coming back to the foreground of the question involved, it is seen that there is no dispute to the fact that the petitioners made their respective applications on various dates for grant of pattas which were rejected and as against which the appeals were filed before the first respondent with a long delay along with condonation of delay application giving various reasons. However, the sufficiency or otherwise of the reasons have not been gone into by the Settlement Authority, but rejecting the applications only the ground of that no such power exists.
8. As submitted above, the principal question ultimately boils down to whether the rule issued u/s 67(2)(C) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, dated 17.10.1950 has to be given effect to or not ?
9. The undisputed statutory coverage on the issue now confronted is that in exercise of powers conferred u/s 67(e) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, a specific rule has been made to the effect that the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 12(1) and (2), 17(1) and 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to all the proceedings under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, (26 of 1948) or the rules made thereunder before the Tribunal, Special Tribunals, authorities and Officers having jurisdiction under the later Act. However, subsequently in pursuance of Rules made in G.O.Ms.No. 50, Revenue (J1) dated 16.1.1974 called as A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Grant of Ryotwari Patta Rules, 1973, made in exercise of powers conferred under Clause D of Sub-section (2) of Section 67 read with Section 11 of the A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948. Rule 4 thereunder contemplates the prescribed period of limitation under its proviso that the Settlement Officer may, for good and sufficient reason shown by the applicant, entertain any application filed before him after the period of 30 days as aforesaid. Later on as per G.O. Ms. No. 911, Revenue (J) Department, dated 15.6.1983 issued by the Government of A.P. by way of an amendment. The aforesaid proviso added to Sub-rule (4) of Rule 2 of the said Rules was omitted. However, again as per G.O. Ms. No. 551, Revenue (J) Department, dated 19.5.1986, a further amendment was made to the said rules in G.O. Ms, No. 50, Revenue (J1), dated 16.1.1974 whereby in place of Sub-rule (4) of Rule 2, a proviso was added to the effect that the Settlement Officer may condone the delay if such delay is caused due to the pendency of a dispute in a Court or for good and sufficient reasons shown by the applicant for the delay caused and thereafter entertain an application filed before him after the said period of thirty days. Curiously, once again as per G.O. Ms. No. 400, Revenue (J A) Department, dated 24.4.1993 in exercise of the very same rule making power, the said second proviso to Sub-rule (4) of Rule 2, which was added, was omitted. Thus, by inclusion and exclusion, there have been varying stands statutorily by the Government in regard to the power to condone the delay in filing the application before the Settlement Officer. Be that as it may, however, the fact remains that the earliest notification issued as aforesaid in the supplement Part-I of the Fort St. George Gazette, dated 17.11.1950, in exercise of powers under Sub-section (2) of Section 67 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 ( Act XXVI of 1948) whereby the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 12(1) and (2), 17(1) and 18 of the Limitation Act were made applicable before the Tribunals, Special Tribunals, Authorities and Officers having jurisdiction under the said Act are still in force and are not in any way tinkled with by any exercise of statutory power. In fact, having regard to such provision being made as long back as on 17.11.1950, the subsequent amendment as sought to be ushered in and taken out is virtually futile exercise. There is no dispute raised on behalf of the respondents herein to show that the said rule made under notification dated 17.11.1950 is in any way has undergone any statutory oblivion. In view of the same, necessarily it follows that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act apart from the other provisions made therein would have ample application to all the proceedings before all the authorities as constituted under the said Act.
10. Even otherwise, it is very relevant to note the subsequent provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 which contemplates that unless and until the provisions of the Limitation Act are excluded by any special or local law, the same cannot be excluded in its application. Admittedly, there is no provision under the provisions of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion of Ryotwari) Act 1948 excluding the application of the provisions of Section 5 or other provisions as stated above to the proceedings under the Act before any authority at any stage. In view of the same, necessarily it also follows that in the absence of any such exclusion, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act can as well be pressed into service though of course subject to the satisfaction and sufficient reasons shown in support of any entitlement for such indulgence. Though, various authorities have cited across the bar in regard to the interpretation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, however, it is not necessary to delve into the same in view of the findings given earlier.
11. In view of the aforesaid reasons and on hearing the Counsel appearing on either side, it has to be held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to all the proceedings, which arise under the aforesaid Act, and the same has to be considered on merits.
12. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed setting aside the impugned orders. The first respondent shall dispose of the applications filed by the petitioners in the appeals afresh on merits in accordance with law after giving notice and opportunity to both the sides. No costs.
