1. This Contempt Case is filed by the respondents in W.P. No.41273 of 2015 alleging wilful disobedience of the order passed by this Court in the said Writ Petition on 18.02.2016.
2. Facts, to the limited extent necessary, are that W.P. No.41273 of 2015 was filed by the respondent-contemnor to declare the action of the Commercial Tax Officer, Vijayawada-II, in issuing a provisional attachment notice dated 08.12.2015, to respondents 3 to 6 and the 8th respondent-Banks and two others (respondents 7 and 9) in the Writ Petition and to withhold the amounts due from them to him pending finalisation of the assessment proceedings, as illegal and without jurisdiction.
3. In its order in W.P. No.41273 of 2015 dated 18.02.2016, this Court observed that, in terms of Section 27(2)(a) of the A.P. VAT Act, power is conferred on the competent authority, even during the pendency of assessment proceedings, to attach provisionally any property belonging to the dealer; while it could not be said with certainty that the amount still lying with respondents 7 and 9 would not fall within the ambit of Section 27(2)(a) of the Act, it did appear that, on a cheque being issued by them in the petitioners favour, it may fall within the ambit of the word property as used in Section 27(2)(a) of the Act. This Court thereafter noted that the respondent- contemnor had filed an affidavit of undertaking dated 17.02.2016 stating that the amounts due from the 9th respondent (Sri Chaitanya Group of Institutions), by way of an account payee cheque, would be deposited with the 5th respondent i.e. M/s.Axis Bank Limited, Vijayawada-II; and he undertook not to withdraw the said amount that would be paid by way of account payee cheque, and it would be deposited in the 5th respondent-Bank, till a final assessment order was passed by the Commercial Tax Officer, Vijayawada-II. This Court also noted the apprehension expressed by Sri S. Suri Babu, Learned Special Standing Counsel for Commercial Taxes, that acceptance of such an undertaking may well result in the respondent-contemnor withdrawing the entire amount from the bank on the date on which an assessment order was passed leaving the department high and dry, and preventing them from recovering the tax, if any, due from the respondent-contemnor. This Court then recorded the submission of Sri M.V.J.K. Kumar, Learned Counsel for the petitioner (respondent-contemnor herein), that the petitioner was present in Court and he had been instructed, by the petitioner, to state that, for a period of one week after the assessment order was communicated to him, Axis Bank Limited could be directed not to release the money to him; and, in the interregnum, it would be open to either party to take necessary action in accordance with law.
4. In the light of the aforesaid undertaking given by the respondent-contemnor, the Writ Petition was disposed of permitting the 9th respondent to pay the amounts, if any due from them, to him only by way of an account payee cheque under communication to the Commercial Tax Officer; the respondent-contemnor (the petitioner in the Writ Petition) was directed to deposit the account payee cheque, in terms of the affidavit of undertaking furnished by them to this Court, with the 5th respondent-Bank; and the 5th respondent-Bank was directed to retain the said amount, and not pay it either to the petitioner or to the Commercial Tax Department till expiry of a period of one week from the date on which the assessment order was communicated to the petitioner. This Court left it open both to the petitioner and to the Commercial Tax Officer to inform the 5th respondent-Bank that an assessment order has been passed. The Commercial Tax Officer was directed to pass an assessment order before 30.04.2016, and communicate the assessment order immediately after it was passed to the respondent-contemnor, and inform the 5th respondent-Bank accordingly.
5. In the affidavit filed in support of the Contempt Case, it is asserted by the Commercial Tax Officer, Vijayawada-II, that a detailed assessment order, passed in Form VAT 305 dated 27.04.2016, was sent to the respondent-contemnor by registered post with acknowledgement due on 28.04.2016; the same was returned with an endorsement no such addressee in the given door number. Hence, returned; the assessment order was sent by e-mail to the official mail I.D. of the respondent-contemnor as well as to the authorised representative of the firm; a physical copy of the said order was also sent by registered post with acknowledgement due, on 28.04.2016, to the authorised representative of the respondent-contemnors firm; the same was duly acknowledged by the office of the authorised representative on 29.04.2016; the final assessment order, in Form VAT 305 dated 27.04.2016, had been served on the 5th respondent by letter dated 29.04.2016 requesting the bank to pay the above arrears out of the amount held by the Bank on the account of the respondent- contemnor; however the Branch Manager of the said Bank, by letter dated 03.05.2016, had informed that no amount was lying to the credit of the respondent-contemnor; M/s. Sri Chaitanya Group of Institutions had, by their letter dated 15.03.2016, informed the 2nd respondent herein that it had released payment of Rs.42,08,818/- by way of cheque bearing No.419948 for Rs.17,61,899/- dated 11.03.2016, and cheque bearing No.419963 for Rs.24,46,919/- dated 11.03.2016, drawn on Axis Bank Limited, S.R.Nagar Branch, Hyderabad; both the cheques were encashed on 17.03.2016; M/s. Sri Chaitanya Group of Institutions had also informed that the above cheques were encashed by the partnership firm through Sapthagiri Grameena Bank; when a letter was addressed to the Managing Director of the Sapthagiri Grameena Bank to furnish details of the account, from where the dealer had encashed the cheques, it came to light that the respondent-contemnor had opened an account with Nuziveedu Branch of Sapthagiri Grameena Bank on 28.12.2015, and had encashed the cheques issued by M/s.Sri Chaitanya Group of Institutions; the respondent-contemnor had encashed the cheques much before the assessment order was passed; and such withdrawal was in gross violation of the undertaking given by the respondent- contemnor to this Court on oath, based on which this Court had passed final orders on 18.02.2016. It is specifically asserted, in the affidavit filed in support of the Contempt Case, that the action of the respondent-contemnor was not only contrary to the order passed by this Court in W.P. No.41273 of 2015 dated 18.02.2016 but also amounted to perjury as the respondent-contemnor had acted in gross violation of the undertaking given by him to this Court on 01.02.2016.
6. In his counter-affidavit dated 13.06.2017, the respondent- contemnor expresses great respect for this Court and claims not to have committed deliberate and intentional contempt of the order. While tendering his unconditional apology, he requests this Court to discharge him from the contempt. After extracting the order passed by this Court on 18.02.2016, the respondent-contemnor states that, on 16.03.2016, two cheques were received from the 9th respondent at 11.00 A.M; while returning home with the said cheques, he was confronted by the farmers of Nellore District, who were aware that a cheque was due to him from the 9th respondent i.e M/s. Sri Chaitanya Group of Institutions; he had to pay an amount of Rs.43.00 Lakhs to these group of farmers on account of purchase of paddy from them in the month of December, 2015; all these farmers forcibly took him to the Sapthagiri Grameena Bank on 16.03.2016; they made him deposit the cheques, and held him captive in the house till the next day; they took him to the Sapthagiri Grameena Bank on 17.03.2016, and had forcibly encashed the whole amount threatening to hurt him, and they had taken away the whole money; he had no chance even to seek any help; while he intended to comply with the Court order, he could not do so in these circumstances, for which he was tendering his unconditional apology; and as all the farmers had threatened and coerced him to deposit and encash the said cheques, he had no alternative, but to do so. The respondent- contemnor named the farmers as (1) Vemireddy Malyadri Reddy (2) Papana Mallikarjuna Reddy (3) Aadireddy Narayana Reddy (4) Kuncha Subba Reddy (5) Polepalli Balasankara Reddy (6) Aadireddy Krishna Reddy (7) Bikkam Venkateswarlu and (8) Parisuboyena Papaiah etc. of Buchireddypalem, Panchedu, Chennur and Nellore etc. He further states that he has great respect for this Court, and he had no intention whatsoever to commit deliberate or intentional contempt of Court; and that he was honestly tendering his unconditional apology.
7. Before examining whether or not the respondent-contemnor had wilfully and deliberately violated the solemn undertaking furnished by him to this Court, and had thereby committed civil contempt, it is useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines civil contempt to mean wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. A wilful breach of an undertaking given to the court would also amount to Civil Contempt. Section 12 relates to punishment for contempt of court and under sub-section (1) thereof, save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to Rs.2,000/-, or with both. Under the proviso thereto, the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court. Under the explanation thereto, an apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bonafide. Section 12(3) stipulates that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 12, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the Court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary, shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit. Section 13(a) stipulates that, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no Court shall impose a sentence under the Act for a contempt of court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere, with the due course of justice.
8. The answer to the question, whether the act tantamounts to wilful disobedience and a lame excuse is offered in order to subvert compliance of the court order or a solemn undertaking given to the Court, will depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. (Dinesh Kumar Gupta v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., ). In terms of the undertaking given by him to this Court, the respondent-contemnor was required to deposit the two cheques received by him from M/s.Sri Chaitanya Group of Institutions, both dated 11.03.2016 for a total sum of Rs.42,08,818/- with Axis Bank Ltd till a final assessment order was passed by the Commercial Tax Officer, Vijayawada-II, and for one week thereafter. The assessment order was passed on 27.04.2016. Long prior thereto the two cheques were deposited by the respondent-contemnor in Sapthagairi Grameena Bank instead of Axis Bank Limited, M.P.Das Street, Combay Road, Vijayawada Branch, (i.e the fifth respondent-bank), and the entire amount was encashed on 17.03.2016. This itself is proof of the fact that the undertaking given to this Court has been violated by the respondent-contemnor.
9. Effective administration of justice would require some penalty to be imposed for disobedience of orders of the Court if disobedience is more than casual, accidental or unintentional. (Heatons Transport Ltd. v. Transport and General Workers Union ; Court on its own motion v. N.S. Kanwar ). In exercise of its contempt jurisdiction, the Court is primarily concerned with an enquiry whether the contemnor is guilty of intentional and wilful violation of the orders of the Court. (Maninderjit Singh Bitta v. Union of India ). The wilful element is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act. (Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh ). Wilful means an act or omission which is done voluntarily and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say, with the purpose of either disobeying or disregarding the law. (Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai ; Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha ). Wilful would exclude casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. Whether or not disobedience is willful depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Even negligence and carelessness can amount to disobedience. (Kapildeo Prasad Sah v. State of Bihar ).
10. If a party who is fully in the know of the order of the Court, or is conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the undertaking furnished by him to the Court, ignores it or acts in violation thereof, it must be held that disobedience is wilful. It may not be possible to prove the actual intention behind the act or omission. A Court can approach the question only objectively, and it may presume the intention from the act done as every man is presumed to intend the probable consequence of his act. (N.S. Kanwar3). To establish contempt of court, it is sufficient to prove that the conduct was willful and that the contemnor knew of all the facts which made it a breach of the order. It is not necessary to prove that he appreciated that it did breach the order. (St. Helens Ltd. v. Transport & General Workers Union ; Adam Phones Ltd v. Goldschmidt ).
11. While the jurisdiction exercised in cases of contempt is quasi- criminal in nature and the court must be satisfied, on the material before it, that contempt of court was in fact committed, such satisfaction may be derived from the circumstances of the case. (Ram Autar Shukla v. Arvind Shukla ; Bank of India v. Vijay Transport ). For the purposes of judging ''civil contempt'', intention or mens rea is not relevant. The question is only whether the breach was on account of wilful disobedience i.e, whether it was not casual or accidental and unintentional. (V.C. Govindaswami Mudali v. B.Subba Reddy ). Every person, be it a party to a lis before the court and even otherwise, must obey orders of the Court, in its true letter and spirit, with due respect for the institution. (Maninderjit Singh Bitta4).
12. In considering the question whether violation of the undertaking was wilful or deliberate, it is necessary to examine the justification put forth by the respondent-contemnor in the counter- affidavit filed by him. His claim is of having been confronted by certain farmers when he was returning home with the cheques, to have been forced to deposit the cheques in the Nuzvid Branch of Sapthagiri Grameena Bank on 16.03.2016, to have been held captive in his own house that night, to have been taken to the said bank the next day, to have been forced to encash the cheques on 17.03.2016 on the threat of being subjected to hurt, and they had then taken away the entire amount withdrawn by him from the bank.
13. W.P. No.41273 of 2015 was filed before this Court on 17.12.2015, and it is only thereafter was the account opened by the respondent-contemnor, with the Nuzvid Branch of the Sapthagairi Grameena Bank, on 28.12.2015. The respondent-contemnor suppressed the fact, that he had opened a new bank account with the Nuzvid Branch of Sapthagiri Grameena Bank on 28.12.2015, in his affidavit of undertaking dated 17.02.2016. If his claim of threat and coercion were indeed true, he ought to have filed a complaint before the concerned Police Station immediately after 17.03.2016, and informed both the Commercial Tax Officer-II (assessing authority) and this Court of the circumstances resulting in his inability to comply with the undertaking furnished to this Court earlier on 17.02.2016.
14. The Contempt Case was filed on 29.09.2016, notice was ordered on 21.10.2016, and it is nearly eight months thereafter that the respondent-contemnor has filed his counter-affidavit dated 13.06.2017 taking this plea. The story concocted by the respondent- contemnor, for having violated the undertaking furnished to this Court, defies credulity. The respondent-contemnor has sought to hoodwink this Court to somehow wriggle out of his obligation to abide by the solemn undertaking furnished by him to this Court on 17.02.2016. This fig-leaf of a defence, for not abiding by the undertaking given to this Court, does not merit acceptance. We are satisfied, therefore, that violation by the respondent-contemnor, of the solemn undertaking furnished by him to this Court, is wilful and deliberate.
15. The next question which necessitates examination is whether the apology tendered by the respondent-contemnor merits acceptance. It is no doubt true that the respondent-contemnor has sought pardon, and has tendered his unconditional apology. Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, and the Explanation thereto, enables the Court to remit the punishment awarded for committing contempt of court on an apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court. While an apology should not be rejected if the accused makes it bona fide a conduct which abuses, and makes a mockery of, the judicial process of the Court must be dealt with an iron hand. (Bal Kishan Giri v. State of U.P., ). An apology can neither be a defence nor a justification for an act which tantamounts to contempt of court. An apology can be accepted in cases where the conduct, for which the apology is given, is such that it can be ignored without compromising the dignity of the court, or it is intended to be evidence of real contrition. It should be sincere. Apology cannot be accepted in case it is hollow, there is no remorse, no regret, no repentance, or if it is only a device to escape the rigour of the law. Such an apology is merely a paper apology. (Bal Kishan Giri14).
16. An apology tendered is not to be accepted as a matter of course, and the court is competent to reject the apology and impose the punishment recording reasons therefor. (Bal Kishan Giri14). If the apology is found to be without real contrition and remorse, and to have been tendered merely as a weapon of defence, the court may refuse to accept it. If the apology is offered at the time when the contemnor finds that the court is going to impose punishment, it ceases to be an apology and becomes an act of a cringing coward. (Bal Kishan Giri14; Debabrata Bandhopadhyaya v. State of W.B. ; Mulk Raj v. State of Punjab , Hailakandi Bar Assn. v. State of Assam , C. Elumalai v. A.G.L. Irudayaraj and Ranveer Yadav v. State of Bihar ).
17. A mere statement of apology by the contemnor before the court would hardly amount to his purging himself of contempt. The Court must be satisfied of the genuineness of the apology. If the court is so satisfied, and on this basis accepts the apology as genuine, it should pass an order holding that the contemnor has purged himself of contempt. (Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali ). After the Contempt Case was finally heard, and orders were reserved on 07.07.2017, the respondent-contemnor filed his affidavit dated 19.07.2017 enclosing thereto an affidavit/ undertaking dated 18.07.2017. In his affidavit dated 19.07.2017, the respondent-contemnor states that he does not have Rs.42,08,818/- to deposit in view of the facts stated in the counter-affidavit; his brother-in-law Sri Tumaguntla Indraneel has agreed to give surety for a tune of Rs.42,08,818/- within a period of three weeks; and this Court may be pleased to grant three weeks time to him to file a registered surety for a sum of Rs.42,08,818/-. In the affidavit/undertaking dated 18.07.2017, the respondent-contemnor states that in order to save his life, on the threat of being killed by some people, he had committed a small mistake; he did not make any mistake intentionally, and for this purpose he was prepared to offer collateral security of his sister and brother-in-law, who were solvent and well to do people, as he had no capacity to pay Rs.40 lakhs or more approximately. He requests that the collateral security as third party surety be accepted, and he be relieved from this problem.
18. While one of the factors which this Court would consider, in examining the nature and extent of punishment to be imposed for willful and deliberate violation of the undertaking submitted to this Court, is whether the contemnor has purged himself of contempt, the affidavit dated 19.07.2017, filed nearly two weeks after orders were reserved in the Contempt Case, is only for grant of three weeks time, not for payment of the amount due to the petitioner in the Contempt Case of Rs.42,08,818/-, but to furnish a registered surety. The affidavit does not also indicate the nature and extent of surety intended to be provided or the period within which the amount due, in excess of Rs.42.00 Lakhs, would be discharged. The said affidavit can, by no stretch of imagination, be construed as the respondent- contemnor having purged himself of contempt.
19. An apology is not intended to operate as a universal panacea. (M.Y. Shareef v. Judges of Nagpur High Court ; Pravin C. Shah20; T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) v. Ashok Khot ). It is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilty of the offence, but is intended to be evidence of real contrition, the consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrongdoers power. (Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction ). Only then is it of any avail in a court of justice. Unless that is done, not only is the tendered apology robbed of all grace but it also ceases to be a full and frank admission of a wrong done, which it is intended to be. (Hiren Bose, Re ; Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai6). The apology tendered by the contemnor, to be accepted by the Court, should be a product of remorse. (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India ). Public interest demands that when a person has interfered with the judicial process, the judicial decision should not be pre-empted or circumvented merely by a conditional or an unconditional apology. While it is open to the Court, in an appropriate case, to accept an unconditional apology based on the factual position, dropping the proceeding of contumacious acts deliberately done, after accepting the apology offered, would be a premium for the flagrant abuse of the judicial process. (Ram Autar Shukla11).
20. In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P. , the Supreme Court observed:- We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the slapsay sorryand forget school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying sorry does not make the person taking the slap smart less upon the said hypocritical word being uttered. Apology shall not be paper apology and expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen. For it is one thing to say sorryit is another to feel sorry
(emphasis supplied)
.
21. The apology tendered by the respondent-contemnor is neither a product of remorse nor is there any evidence of real contrition on his part. It is but a crude and crafty attempt to avoid being committed for contempt. Accepting such an apology, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, would result in the respondent-contemnor going scot free after committing gross contempt of Court.
22. The next question which arises for consideration is the nature and extent of penalty to be imposed on the respondent-contemnor on his being found guilty of contempt. There is an element of public policy in punishing civil contempt, since the administration of justice would be undermined if the order of a Court of law, or a solemn undertaking given to it, is disregarded with impunity. (Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai6 Attorney General v. Times Newspaper Ltd ). The power to punish for contempt is intended to maintain an effective legal system, and is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of justice. (Kapildeo Prasad Sah8 Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai6). There are certain well recognized principles which govern the exercise of power and jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The power to commit for contempt will not be used for the vindication of a Judge as a person, but only with a view to protect the interests of the public for whose benefit, and for the protection of whose rights and liberties, the Courts exist and function. (Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad v. V. Ramana Rao ).
23. It is not only the power but the duty of the Court to uphold and maintain the dignity of Courts and the majesty of law which may call for the extreme step of punishing the person for contempt of court. For proper administration of justice, and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by it, the Court would not hesitate in wielding the potent weapon of contempt. (Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai6). The summary jurisdiction, exercised by Superior Courts, in punishing contempt of their authority exists in order to prevent interference with the course of justice; to maintain the authority of law as is administered in the Court; and thereby protect the public interest in ensuring the purity of administration of justice (Hira Lal Dixit v. State of U.P. ).
24. While awarding sentence on a contemnor, the Court does so to uphold the majesty of the law and to ensure that the unflinching faith of people in Courts remains intact. If the guilty are let off, and their sentence remitted on grounds of mercy, people would lose faith in the administration of justice. The Court is duty-bound to award proper punishment to uphold the rule of law, however high the person may be. (J. Vasudevan v. T.R. Dhananjaya ). There cannot be any laxity, as otherwise law courts would render their orders to utter mockery. Tolerance of law courts there is, but not without limits and only upto a point and not beyond. (Anil Ratan Sarkar5). The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free and those who seek its protection lose hope. (Jennison v. Baker ).
25. Section 13(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act postulates no punishment for contemptuous conduct in certain cases and, unless the Court is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that the act complained of substantially interferes with the due course of justice, the question of imposing punishment would not arise. It is evident from Section 12(3), read with 13(a), of the Contempt of Courts Act that the Legislature intended that a sentence of fine should be imposed in normal circumstances, (Smt. Pushpaben v. Narandas v. Badiani ), and a sentence of imprisonment should be restricted to cases where the contumacious act is of such magnitude that a mere sentence of fine would not suffice. The jurisdiction in contempt is seldom exercised by Courts except when they find that, in addition to failure to comply with their orders, obstruction has been caused to their primary function of administering justice as authorities charged with that function. (Dulal Chandra Bhar v. Sukumar Banerjee ).
26. The act of contempt should have substantially interfered with the due course of justice which has been equated with due administration of justice. The Contempt of Courts Act places an obligation on the Court to assess the situation itself as regards the factum of any interference with the due course of justice or of obstructing the administration of justice. (Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia ). Anyone who deflects the course of judicial proceedings, or sullies the pure stream of the judicial process, must be held to have interfered with the due course of justice, and to have obstructed administration of justice. Such persons must be punished not only for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith of people in the system of administration of justice. (Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma ; Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana ).
27. While Courts are not hypersensitive, and ordinarily impose a sentence of fine as punishment for contempt, the respondent- contemnor has interfered with the administration of justice, and has made a mockery of the order of this Court passed on the faith of the undertaking furnished by him. The respondent-contemnor, by his contumacious act, has wilfully and deliberately flouted the solemn undertaking given by him to this Court. Such open defiance is contempt of such a nature as to have substantially interfered with the due course of justice for which imposition of a sentence of fine alone would not meet the ends of justice. Such flagrant violation of the undertaking submitted to this Court must be dealt with sternly. In our considered opinion, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, imposition of fine on respondent-contemnor, in lieu of imprisonment, will not meet the ends of justice. (Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai6). Where public interest demands, the Court will not shrink from exercising its power to impose punishment even by way of imprisonment, in cases where a mere fine may not be adequate, to let people know that they cannot, with impunity, hinder or obstruct or attempt to hinder or obstruct the due course of administration of justice. (Hira Lal Dixit29). Unscrupulous and devious methods, adopted to circumvent and defeat orders of courts, or of the undertaking given to this Court, must be curbed. (Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Hannabasappa ).
28. The brazen act of violation of, and his utter disregard for, the undertaking submitted to this Court is an affront to the majesty of law. A sentence of fine alone would not suffice and, considering the gravity of his offence, we consider it appropriate to impose on him the stringent punishment of sentence of imprisonment with fine. The respondent-contemnor has, by his brazen acts of obstruction of administration of justice and making a mockery of the undertaking given by him to this Court, invited upon himself the maximum punishment prescribed under the Contempt of Courts Act. He shall, therefore, be detained in civil prison for a period of six months, and shall in addition pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- within four weeks from today.
29. As required under Rule 32(1) of the Contempt of Court Rules, 1980, the respondent-contemnor shall be entitled to subsistence allowance, in accordance with his status, during the period of his detention in civil prison. The subsistence allowance for the respondent-contemnor is fixed at Rs.500/- per day. The State Government shall bear the cost of the subsistence allowance payable to the respondent-contemnor. The Contempt Case is, accordingly, disposed of.
The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also
stand disposed of.
