@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
Prabha Sridevan, J.@mdashThe respondent filed the suit for declaration and injunction and paid the Court fee u/s 25(b) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") by calculating the market value at thirty times the survey assessment. The respondent claimed title to the suit property under a settlement deed dated 05.07.1985. In this settlement deed, the value of the suit property was given as Rs. 43,000/-.
2. The Trial Court dealt with the issue with regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction as a preliminary issue and came to the conclusion that the court-fee paid was correct and that the Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. Aggrieved by this, the defendants filed the present revision.
3. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that it is not necessary for the Court to look anywhere-else except the averments in the plaint itself, wherein the respondent based his right on a settlement deed in which the market value is given. Therefore, the case of the petitioners is that there was deliberate under-valuation of the suit, which the respondent is not entitled to do and reliance was placed on a decision reported in D. Pattammal vs. K. Kalyanasundaram 1988 TNLJ 260, wherein a learned Judge of this Court while dealing with the correctness of the Court fee paid in a suit u/s 30 of the Act, held that the market value should be determined in the absence of evidence as the actual market value for which it would be possible for a property to be to be sold in the open market, regardless of any consideration, such as litigation relating to it.
4. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand would submit that it has been clearly held by the Supreme Court in Sri Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt. Vimla 1962 M.L.J. 36 that it is not the concern of the defendant to obstruct the progress of the suit by approaching the High Court to revise the order relating to the court-fees. The decision reported in Kamaleshwar Kishore Singh v. Singh Paras Nath Singh 2001(4) CTC (SC) 764 was also relied on to show that for the purpose of determination of the court-fee payable on the plaint, the Court should begin with presumption that the averments in the plaint are correct and unless there is arbitrary valuation of the suit property to evade payment of Court fee, the Court shall accept the Court fee paid based on the plaint as framed. The decision reported in Raman v. Rahmathunnisa 1999 M.L.J. 381 was also relied on to show that in identical circumstances, this Court had held that the assessment of the market value must be done only in accordance with Section 7 of the Act and with regard to the suits, the market value is revenue assessment multiplied by thirty and the open market value has no relevance.
5. The determination of the market value is laid down in Section 7 of the Act. Section 7(2) reads thus:-
"7. Determination of market value.
1) ... ... ...
2) The market value of land in suits falling u/s 25(a), 25(b), 29, 30, 37(1), 37(3), 38, 45 or 48 shall be deemed to be -
a) where the land is ryotwari land - thirty times the survey assessment on the land."
This Section deals with various categories of suits and the manner in which the market value should be assessed. Section 10 of the Act deals with the statement of particulars of the subject matter and it also provides that suit fee payable depends on the market value of the subject matter of the suit. Section 12(2) of the Act gives the defendant the right to plead that the subject matter of the suit has not been properly valued and all questions arising on such pleas shall be heard and decided before evidence is recorded.
6. In this case, there is no dispute regarding the fact that the suit property is an agricultural land and the plaintiff has rightly assessed the market value in accordance with Section 7 of the Act which is extracted above. In the decision reported in Raman v. Rahmuthunnisa 1999 M.L.J. 381 cited supra, this Court has held as under:-
...."There is no scope for assessing open market value in a suit u/s 25(b). From the Court-Fee Act, I find that the provision where open market value has relevance is only for a suit under Sec. 40 of the Act, which deals with setting aside a decree or instrument."
Even in the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners reported in D. Pattammal v. K. Kalyanasundaram 1988 T.N.L.J. 260, the learned Judge had stated thus:-
"Particularly when Section 7 of the Court-Fees Act provides for the market value being computed on a particular basis with reference to suits for different kinds of lands and is silent with reference to a suit for a building and the land appurtenant thereto"....
Therefore, even in the above decision, the learned Judge had held that the correct market value should be taken into account only in a suit where the suit property is building or land or appurtenant thereto. Section 7 of the Act provides the market value with reference to the suits for different kinds of land. That decision came out only because in the particular case Section 7 is silent about the market value. Further, in Sri Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt. Vimla cited supra, the Supreme Court has disapproved of the defendant seeking to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court with regard to adequacy of Court fees. Especially when the Trial Court had exercised its jurisdiction properly, there was no occasion for the High Court to interfere with it u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The following extract is also relied upon:-
...."The anxiety of the Legislature to collect Court-fee due from the litigant is manifest from the detailed provisions made in Chapter III of the Act, but those provisions do not arm the defendant with a weapon of technicality to obstruct the progress of the suit by approaching the High Court in revision against an order determining the Court-fee payable. In our view, the High Court grievously erred in entertaining revision applications, on questions of Court-fee at the instance of the defendant, when no question of jurisdiction was involved."
7. For the above reasons, I do not see any ground to interfere with the order of the Trial Court. This Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 10600 of 2001 is also dismissed. No costs.
