@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
1. In this case the petitioner, Dr. Chandra Kala Jha, has obtained a rule from the High Court asking the respondents to show cause why the award of the Labour Court of Chota Nagpur Division, dated the 31st December, 1958, in Reference Case No. 1 of 1958, should not be quashed by grant of a writ in the nature of certioriart under Article 226 of the Constitution.
2. Cause has been shown on behalf of respondent No. 1, the Sone Valley Portland Cement Company Limited, Japla, to whom notice of the rule was ordered to be given.
3. The case of the petitioner is that she was discharged by respondent No. 1 on the 31st July, 1957, for reasons stated in the discharge notice, with a month''s pay in lieu of notice. The petitioner alleges in paragraphs 4 and 5 of her application that her case was taken up by the Japla Labour Union, and Sri Sarju Prasad Ambasth, who was then Office Secretary of the Japla Labour Union, made a demand to respondent No. 1 to reinstate her in service. The request was turned down by respondent No. 1, ana thereafter the Japla Labour Union made a representation to the Labour Commissioner, Government of Bihar, Patna.
Upon that representaiton there was a conciliation proceeding; but as the Conciliation Officer failed to bring about a settlement, the Government of Bihar made a reference of the dispute to the Labour Court of Chota Nagpur Division. While the reference was pending before the Labour Court there was a compromise entered into between respondent No. 1 and the Japla Labour Union representeo through its new Secretary Sri Mahabir Prasad Singh. The compromise petition is dated the 31st October, 1958, and by virtue of that compromise respondent No. 1 agreed that it would pay a sum of Rs. 1050/- besides Provident fund accumulation as per Provident Fund Rules, to the petitioner Or. Chandra Kala Jha. The Labour Court accepted the compromise petition and held that the reference should be dis-posed of in terms of the compromise between the parties and that there was no question of reinstatement of Dr. Chandra Kala Jha.
4. The submission of learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner is that the award of the Labour Court dated the 31st December, 1958, is ultra vires and illegal because the only person who was competent to represent the petitioner before the Labour Court was Sri Sarju Prasad Ambasth, who was the Secretary of the Japla Labour Union at the time the dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 arose. The submission made on behalf of the petitoner is that the provisions of Section 36(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act apply to this case, and since the petitioner is not a member of any trade union she was entitled to be represented before the Labour Court by any workman of her own choice. Section 36(1)(c) of the industrial Disputes Act reads as follows :
"36. (1) A workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by --
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(c) where the worker is not a member of any trade union, by an officer of any trade union connected with or by any other workman employed in, the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed".
It was, therefore, contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Labour Court was erroneous in law in acting in accordance with the compromise entered into between respondent No. 1 and Sri Mahabir Prasad Singh, the newly elected Secretary of the Japla Labour Union, and giving an award in terms of that compromise. We are unable to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner as correct. It is not clear from the documents filed in this case whether the petitioner is a member of any trade union connected with the industry. We shall, however, proceed on the assumption that she is not a member of any trade union. But even so we are satisfied that in the present case she is not entitled as a matter of law to be represented by any workman of her choice.
It is manifest from paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the writ application that the case of the petitioner with regard to her discharge was taken up by the Japla Labour Union in its representative capacity and not by Sri Sarjug Prasad Ambasth in his personal capacity. That is the reason why the dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 became an industrial dispute. In this situation it is manifest that the petitioner cannot be in her own right a party to the industrial dispute which has been preferred to the Labour Court. The legal position is that when an individual work man is a party to an industrial dispute he is a party not independently of the Union which has espoused his cause, and the main parties to the industrial dispute before tne Labour Court are therefore the employer and the Union which has taken up the cause of the individual workman. In these circumstances the ordinary rule is that the individual workman should be represented before the Labour Court through the officer of the trade union which has taken up his cause.
That is the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in a recent case in
The scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act is that the machinery provided therein should not be set in motion to cover disputes between an employer and a single employee, but the machinery should be set in motion only to settle such disputes which involve the workmen as a class, and a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of adjudication under the Act, if the same had not been taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. The necessary corollary to this is that the individual workman is at no stage a party to the industrial dispute independently of the union; and the union which has by its action converted the individual dispute into an industrial dispute can, therefore, claim to have a say in the conduct of the proceedings before the Tribunal.
As we have already said, in the present case the grievance of the petitioner was taken up by the Japla Labour Union whose Secretary was Sri Sarju Prasad Ambasth at the time the dispute arose. It appears that there was a general election of the Japla Labour Union on the 9th July, 1958, and the finding of the Labour Court is that after the general election Sri Sarju Prasad Ambasth was not an officer of the Union and was, therefore, not competent to represent the Union before the Labour Court after the date of the general election. The further finding of the Labour Court is that after the general election Sri Mahabir Prasad Singh was the General Secretary of the Union, and was, therefore, competent to represent the Union in the Labour Court during the hearing of this particular reference.
In these circumstances we are satisfied that the Labour Court did not commit any error of law in refusing the petitioner to be represented by Sri Sarju Prasad Ambasth, who had ceased to be an officer of the Japla Labour Union at the time of hearing the reference, and in accepting the compromise entered into between respondent No. 1 and Sri Mahabir Prasad Singh, the newly elected Secretary of the Japla Labour Union, and giving an award in terms of the compromise.
5. It was also arguad by learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner that Sri Mahabir Prasad Singh had no authortiy on behalf of the Japla Labour Union to enter into the compromise. It was also said that the compromise entered into between respondent No. 1 and Sri Mahabir Prasad Singh was mala fide. These questions were not argued before the Labour Court. It is obvious that these questions are essentially questions of fact and the High Court cannot entertain questions of fact for the first time at the hearing of a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution, In our opinion there is no substance in the arguments put forward on behalf of the petitioner.
6. For these reasons we hold that there is no merit in this writ application which is accordingly dismissed.
7. There will be no order as to costs.
