@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
1. This appeal is barred by limitation.
2. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties and taking into consideration the averments made in the limitation petition, we are satisfied that sufficient ground has been made out to condone the delay. Accordingly, the delay in filing this appeal is condoned.
3. This appeal is directed against the order dated 2.2.2001 passed by the learned single Judge, whereby he has allowed the writ application filed by the writ Petitioners Respondents and set aside the order dated 22.6.1999 passed by the Deputy Director, Consolidation, Purnea in favour of the Appellants, who were Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in the writ application, in exercise of power u/s 35 of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act (hereinafter referred to as the ''Act'').
4. In view of the nature of order which we propose to pass, it is not necessary to go into the factual matters in detail.
5. During consolidation proceeding chak was prepared in the name of the writ Petitioners Respondents. The Appellants did not challenge the said order before the appellate authority but filed revision u/s 35 of the Act, which was allowed in their favour by the Deputy Director, Consolidation by order dated 22.6.1999.
6. Learned single Judge allowed the writ application primarily on the ground that the revision application u/s 35 of the Act was not maintainable in view of the fact that the said order was not challenged by the Appellants before the appellate authority.
7. The question as to whether revision application can be directly filed u/s 35 of the Act without taking recourse to the remedy of appeal or not was considered by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of
8. In view of the aforesaid judgment of this Court, the view taken by the learned single Judge that the revision application was not maintainable is not correct and accordingly, the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge is set aside.
9. The revisional order has been passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in exercise of power u/s 35 of the Act. The Director of Consolidation has been defined u/s 2(4) of the Act which means an officer appointed as such by the State Government to exercise the powers and perform the duties of Director of Consolidation under this Act which includes an Additional Director of Consolidation and a Joint Director of Consolidation. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has been defined in Section 2(4a) of the Act who is different from the Director of Consolidation as per the definition.
10. However, without going into the larger question as to whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation could be vested with the power of the Director of Consolidation in view of the provisions contained u/s 34 of the Act, in the facts of this case, we are of the view that the matter should be heard by the Director, Consolidation. We have also gone through the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation and we find that he has not given any definite finding. On this ground also, the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is vitiated in law.
11. Accordingly, the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application, is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Director of Consolidation, who will hear the parties and take final deciston in the matter in accordance with law.
12. In the result, this appeal is allowed.
