Md. Humayu Akhtar and Another Vs Rameshwar Chaudhary

Patna High Court 25 Aug 2009 Civil Revision No. 722 of 2008 (2009) 08 PAT CK 0107
Bench: Single Bench
Result Published
Acts Referenced

Judgement Snapshot

Case Number

Civil Revision No. 722 of 2008

Hon'ble Bench

Ravi Ranjan, J

Advocates

Sudhir Kumar, for the Appellant; Ajit Lal, Rajesh Prasad and Shanti Kumar, for the Respondent

Final Decision

Dismissed

Acts Referred
  • Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 - Section 14(8)
  • Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14, 21

Judgement Text

Translate:

Dr. Ravi Ranjan, J.@mdashThe petitioners, aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 29th of March, 2008, passed in Eviction Suit No. 4/05 by the Munsif, Biharsharif, Nalanda, granting a decree of eviction in favour of the plaintiff-opposite party, have preferred this Civil Revision u/s 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter to be referred to as "Act"). Plaintiff-opposite party filed the eviction suit concerned for evicting defendants-petitioners on the ground of bona fide personal necessity and also for damages at the rate of Rs. 30/- per day from 1.8.2005 up to the date of conferring possession of the suit property upon the plaintiff. The suit property, as described in Schedule-I of the plaint, is a shop, which is 6 ft. wide and 17 ft. of length.

2. Plaintiff''s case, in short, is that the suit property is his ancestral property, upon which the joint family of the plaintiff is coming into possession since long. The joint family resides on the first floor of the house concerned, whereas on the ground floor there is a small market, in which there are six shops, three facing west and other three facing east. Further case of the plaintiff is that his brother, namely, Mahendra Chaudhary, deals in vegetable business at Jharia and according to the family arrangement, he receives the rent of three shops facing west (out of the aforesaid six shops), whereas the plaintiff-opposite party receives the rent of eastern three shops for the maintenance of his family. Plaintiff himself works in a local fabric/cloth shop on monthly emolument. However, it is stated that from that meagre salary of private service now it has become difficult to maintain his family, and, thus, he requires the suit property for doing his own cloth business. II has further been disclosed in the plaint that the plaintiff alongwith his brother has let out the shop by inducting the defendants-petitioners as tenants in the year 1994 and rent was fixed at Rs. 800/- per month. A deed of lease/agreement dated 22.7.1994 was also executed in this regard. It was agreed upon that the defendants-petitioners would deposit Rs. 70,000/- as advance and they will deposit only Rs. 400/-per month out of rental fixed as aforesaid and the rest Rs. 400/- would be adjusted from the advance so deposited. The arrangement was till July 2005, which was the date of termination of the tenancy. Further case of the plaintiff is that Rs. 52,800/- out of Rs. 70,000/-, taken as advance, has been adjusted and Rs. 17,200/- has remained with the plaintiff, which he is ready to return to the defendants as the period of tenancy had already expired by July 2005. Since the plaintiff himself was in bona fide personal need of the suit property for his own business, he requested the defendants to vacate the shop concerned. However, on refusal by the defendants, the eviction suit was filed. It has further been stated in the plaint that since the disputed shop is only 6 ft. wide, the partial eviction of the tenant concerned would not serve anybody''s purpose.

3. The defendants-petitioners had filed written statement. The landlord-tenant relationship between the parties is not in dispute. However, the defendants in their written statement have refuted certain allegations made in the plaint and disputed the alleged arrangement between the plaintiff and his brother with regard to receiving rent of the shop, as claimed in the plaint. It is further stated that the plaintiff is not unemployed, rather he is in service and he does not have sufficient capital to start his own business. The defendants have accepted the deed/agreement regarding tenancy. However, it has been stated by them that at the time of negotiation for tenancy, it was agreed that the tenancy would be for eleven years and after expiry of the aforesaid period, if good relationship prevails and remains between the landlord and the tenant, then a fresh deed of tenancy would be executed. It is claimed by the tenants that since they are Muslims and do not know Hindi, therefore, now it had transpired to them only after filing of the suit that according to the terms of aforesaid lease/tenancy, after expiry of the tenancy period, the first party/ landlord was not bound to initiate a fresh tenancy. The personal necessity of the plaintiff for doing his own business has also been disputed by the defendants. However, the defendants have also admitted that no useful purpose would be served by partial eviction of the tenants, as the width of the shop is merely 6 ft. Further case of the defendants is that since August 2005 they are not in illegal possession of the suit property, therefore, there is no question of any damages to be awarded to the plaintiff. It has been further claimed that earlier also the plaintiff had filed the eviction suit on the ground of bona fide personal necessity with respect to the other shops, which was decreed and possession of which had been given to the plaintiff on 20.5.2005 in an execution case. Thus, the plaintiff could well have started his business in the aforesaid shop, vacant possession of which had been restored to him by the court concerned. However, the plaintiff had again let it out at enhanced rate of tenancy. Therefore, according to the defendants-petitioners the plaintiff-opposite party did not have any bona fide personal necessity of the suit premises, rather this case had been filed as a device to evict the tenants and let out the shop concerned at enhanced rate of rental. It has also been contended by the defendants that in eleven years of tenancy now their business has been established in that shop and if they are compelled to shift the business to another place, then it would prove to be detrimental for them.

4. The trial court on aforesaid pleadings of the parties framed issues. Five witnesses had been examined on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party. Apart from the above, certain documentary evidences had been brought on record by him, such as, the deed of Kirayanama dated 22.7.1994 (Ext.-1) and some Kisan Vikas Patras for total purchase amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- (Exts. 2 series) to show that the plaintiff has sufficient capital for starting a business. Apart from that, money order receipt had also been brought on record as Ext.-4 to show that one of the tenants, Himayu Akhtar, had put his signature in Hindi, which, according to the plaintiff, falsified his claim that he did not know how to write and read Hindi. The defendants had examined seven witnesses and had also brought on record certain documents, such as, money order receipts, postal receipt, order dated 20.5.2005 in Execution Case No. 10/-4 as well as compromise petition.

5. The trial court, on appreciation of the documentary as well as oral evidence led on behalf of the parties, has come to the conclusion that according to the agreement concerned, it was not binding upon the first party/landlord to let out the property again to the second party/defendants. It has also been found by the trial court that the disputed shop is required by the plaintiff for his bona fide personal necessity as he wants to start his own business of cloth since his earning from the private service is insufficient to maintain his family. It has further found that since there is no term and condition in the agreement for tenancy for award of any compensation and damages, the plaintiff is not entitled for the same. The trial court has also held that need of the plaintiff cannot be satisfied by partial eviction of the tenant from the suit property, as the shop concerned is merely 6 ft. wide. Thus, defendants were ordered by the trial court to restore the vacant possession of the suit property to the plaintiff within 90 days, as the premises concerned is bona fide required by the plaintiff for his own personal use. The plaintiff was also ordered to return back to the defendants the amount of advance received by him, which still remains with him after adjusting the rent as per agreement.

6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the opposite party.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the plaintiff-opposite party in past also filed suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide personal necessity with regard to another shop, which was decreed in his favour and ultimately, the vacant possession was given to the plaintiff in execution case concerned. However, that premises was again let out and not used for aforesaid personal necessity by the plaintiff. It had been further submitted that there was a clause for reviving the tenancy after expiry of the previous period and the defendants were ready for the same. Learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his submission has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Amarjit Singh Vs. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, . It had been submitted that in the aforesaid case, the Apex Court had held that while deciding the matter of eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide personal necessity of the landlord, it was to be seen that whether the landlord was in possession of any other reasonable suitable accommodation If that was so, then the landlord, after his need arose, could well have taken possession of other reasonable accommodation, that having not been done, he was disentitled to evict the tenant on the ground of bona fide need. Thus, it was contended that since in the year 2005 the plaintiff had got vacant possession of another shop, that could well have been utilized by him for his personal need. By not doing so, it was apparent that there was no bona fide personal need.

8. Learned counsel for the opposite party strongly refuted the aforesaid submissions raised on behalf of the petitioners. It had been submitted that the decision of the Apex Court in Amarjit Singh (supra) is not applicable in the present case, as that case arose out of Delhi Rent Control Act (59 of 1958), wherein there existed provision u/s 14(1)(e) itself providing that from the premises let out for residential purposes, the tenant could be evicted on the ground of bona fide personal requirement only if the landlord had no other reasonable suitable residential accommodation. It had further been contended by learned counsel for the opposite party that from the pleadings as well as the evidence it has come that the earlier suit with regard to another shop was jointly filed by the plaintiff and his brother in the year 2003. However, there was family arrangement in the family, according to which the brother of the plaintiff was receiving the rent of the eastern three shops whereas the plaintiff was receiving the rent of the western shops of the building concerned. The aforesaid eviction suit was with regard to one of the shops on the eastern side of the building, which had come in the share of the brother of the plaintiff, therefore, the plaintiff could not utilize that shop for his own purpose.

9. I find force in the submissions raised on behalf of the opposite party. The plaintiff in his evidence has clearly stated that after the separation as per the family arrangement, the shops situated in the eastern side of the building in question fell into the share of his brother, whereas the western side shops came in his share. The earlier suit was filed by both the brothers in the year 2003, however, the present suit has been filed by the plaintiff himself alone, which also supports his claim that in 2003 this property fell into the share of the plaintiff. Further, the decision in the case of Amarjit Singh (supra) is in regard to Delhi Rent Control Act (59 of 1958), wherein the Apex Court has held that the provision u/s 14(1)(e) does not violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It would be apt to refer to relevant passage of the decision in Amarjit Singh (supra), wherein Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act has been quoted, as under:-

"9. x x x x

Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 provides that the Controller may on an application made to him in the prescribed manner make an order for recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the various grounds mentioned in different sub-clauses of Section 14(1) and sub-section (e) is to the following effect:

(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation."

10. It is, thus, clear that the aforesaid provision of the Delhi Rent Control Act is only with regard to building for residential purposes and secondly it is manifest from the provision itself that to establish the required bona fide need of personal use the landlord has to satisfy that he or she has no other reasonable suitable residential accommodation. The case in hand arises out of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act"). Section 2(b) of the Act defines the meaning of the "building" as follows:-

"2(b) "Building" means any building, or hut or a part of the building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes, and includes-

(i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appurtenant to such building or hut or part of such building or hut; and

(ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut;"

11. The relevant provision for eviction is contained in Section 11(1)(c) of the Act, which is quoted as below:-

"11 (1 )(c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord:

Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall henceforth constitute the building within the meaning of clause (b) of Section 2 and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed u/s 5;

Explanation-I.-In this clause the word "landlord" shall not include an agent referred to in clause (f) of Section 2.

Explanation-II.--Where there are two or more premises let out by the landlord, it will be for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him and the tenant or tenants shall not be allowed to question such preference."

12. It is, thus, clear from the above provisions under the Act that the same is with regard to both building for residential and non-residential purposes and there is no such statutory requirement herein, which is a requirement u/s 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act which would be applicable in case of residential building only as discussed above. The only requirement is that the court should satisfy itself as to whether the reasonable requirement can be satisfied by evicting the tenant from the part of the suit property concerned. Contrary to the provisions contained in Delhi Rent Control Act, the Explanation-ll to Section 11(c) of the Act clearly stipulates that where there are two or more premises let out by the landlord, it will be for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him, and the tenant cannot question that.

13. That apart the petitioners could not demonstrate even before this Court that finding of the trial court to the effect that the plaintiff is in bona fide need of all suit premises, is erroneous. As a result, this civil revision fails and is dismissed, accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs.

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